

THE
DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

OF THE
MARQUESS WELLESLEY / K. G.

 DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN

INDIA.

EDITED BY
MR. MONTGOMERY MARTIN.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCCXXXVI.

luable a part of the British Empire, as our possession in India.*

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect and esteem,
My Lord, your Lordship's,
Most faithful and humble servant
CLIVE.

No. CXIV.

Tippoo Sultaun to the Earl of Mornington.

18th Dec. 1798.

(Received at Fort St. George, 25th Dec. 1798.)

I have been made happy by the receipt of your Lordship's two friendly letters, the contents of which I clearly comprehend, (vide those written 4th and 8th November.)* The particulars which your Lordship has communicated to me, relative to the victory obtained by the English fleet over that of the French near the shores of Egypt, nine of their ships having been captured and two burnt, on one of which of the latter was their Admiral, have given me more pleasure than can possibly be conveyed by writing. Indeed I possess the firmest hope that the leaders of the English and the Company Bahauder, who ever adhere to the paths of sincerity, friendship, and good faith, and are the well wishers of mankind, will at all times be successful and victorious; and that the French, who are of a crooked disposition, faithless, and the enemies of mankind, may be ever depressed and ruined. Your Lordship has written to me with the pen of friendship, "that in no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue ever cultivated with such success as they are at present by the French nation. Would to God that no impression had been produced on my mind by that dangerous people; but that your Lordship's situation enables you to know that they have reached my presence, and have endeavoured to pervert the wisdom of my councils, and to instigate

* It may be necessary to remark, that at this period the Governor General had never had any personal acquaintance with Lord Clive.

* See pages 321 and 326.

DEDICATION.

TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

SIRE,

The deep solicitude which your Majesty has, on all occasions, evinced for the welfare of that important portion of the empire denominated British India,—the countenance and favour bestowed from the throne on those who may have contributed either to acquire or to retain a dominion which, with justice, may be considered the brightest gem in the English diadem,—and the personal regard with which it has pleased your Majesty to honour the nobleman whose administration the following despatches and correspondence fully illustrate, will, I hope, acquit me of any charge of vanity for soliciting the distinguished honour of dedicating the accompanying work to a Sovereign whose comprehensive mind has been long directed to the weal of our transmarine possessions, and which, at an earlier period of life, and in an hostile age, he had so nobly endeavoured to preserve and to extend.

It must at all times, Sire, be grateful for the Monarch of a free people to contemplate the arduous and heroic efforts of his subjects in a distant country, under an enervating clime, and amidst an adverse race, struggling to maintain, in all its puissance, the proud pre-eminence of their native land; and

Sire, it must be equally grateful for those subjects to know and to feel that, whether their efforts be crowned with success or otherwise, they are certain to receive a protection, encouragement and reward, proportioned to their deserts, which neither faction nor envy can withhold, and the conferring of which forms one of the purest sources of enjoyment of a patriot King.

But, Sire, high and great as are the sentiments of loyalty and patriotism which prompted and sustained the efforts of the British Nation, for the acquisition and maintenance of dominion in the East, there are yet higher and holier feelings connected with this important subject. No lust of power, no ambitious thirst, no mercenary thoughts, have led to the conquests which these pages record;—an unseen, yet ever present, Providence has given to a small island in the western Atlantic supremacy over millions of our fellow creatures in another hemisphere; myriads of brave and intelligent men have been rescued from the ignominious bondage of ages; the clang of arms has changed into the busy hum of industry; the arts of peace have followed in the track of our footsteps; science and literature are every where expanding; and the barbarous rites of fanaticism and superstition are yielding to the mild and humanizing influence of Christianity.

Sire, it was the hope of accomplishing these truly great objects that guided the Councils of Anglo-Indian policy, and nerved our gallant countrymen to deeds of unwonted heroism; and that Omnipotence which presides over man in his collective, as well as individual capacity, gave fortitude and wisdom to our statesmen, and strength and humanity to our soldiery.

To place on irrefutable record the noble deeds of Britons, while many are yet living who can attest their accuracy, is the

main object of the present work, so that when the impartial historian shall ponder in amazement on the Anglo-Indian territories, he may be enabled to judge with correctness, and to declare with truth, the motives for our acquisition of these territories, and the means by which they were acquired.

Let me also, Sire, be permitted to express a wish that the bright example which these pages hold forth may not be without its effect on the rising generation; that the remembrance of the past may operate as a stimulus to future exertions for the honour and glory of the British crown, for upholding in its integrity this vast and unparalleled maritime empire, and for diffusing the incalculable advantages of order and of peace, of freedom and of happiness, throughout the most distant regions of the earth.

With an ardent hope that our constitutional monarchy, which has been productive of so many and such beneficial results, may long continue in its purity and strength; and with a sincere prayer, that He who governeth the hearts of kings, and sways the destinies of nations, may vouchsafe to your Majesty a full enjoyment of all the blessings derivable from a conscientious exercise of the exalted power, which your Majesty so mercifully wields,—I have the distinguished honour and gratification to subscribe myself,

Sire,

Your Majesty's dutiful subject,

ROBERT MONTGOMERY MARTIN.

INTRODUCTION.

THE publication of the official despatches and correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, during his administration in India, originated in the suggestion contained in a letter from Mr. Montgomery Martin to his Lordship, of which the following is an extract :—

London, 8th Sept. 1835.

“ In preparing the second Edition of my ‘ *History of the British Colonies,*’ (Vol. 1, Asia,) I have been more strongly than ever impressed with the importance of your Lordship’s eventful career, as Governor-General of British India, while regretting that the public are so much in error as to the events of that momentous period. Several friends of India have expressed their regret that your Lordship’s despatches have never been made public ; I am, therefore, desirous of ascertaining whether your Lordship would aid me with copies of your despatches and official correspondence, which, combined with those obtainable from the East India House, Board of Controul, &c., would, I think, form an important portion of the history of the British empire.”

Lord Wellesley’s assent to this proposal is contained in a letter to Mr. Martin, of which the following is an extract :—

“ Fulham, 13th Sept. 1835.

“ It is perfectly true, that the public has received erroneous impressions of the system of policy, which I pursued in India.

“ I have neither had leisure nor inclination to rectify those

errors ; although I certainly must agree with you, that it is highly proper to clear such important transactions from misunderstanding. I shall be happy to furnish you with any materials within my reach for this laudable purpose."

The collection of official and other documents in Lord Wellesley's possession relative to India, was ascertained to be very great, and of the highest importance, since it supplies information which could not be obtained, with equal advantage, from any other source.

In order to preserve the spirit of the correspondence, it was deemed preferable to give the documents chronologically rather than according to the events to which they refer ; for by this means the reader is better enabled to judge of the motives which prompted various actions ; and the nature of the policy pursued is rendered more apparent than by the perusal of letters written after the completion of the transactions to which they advert, and necessarily receiving some colouring from the success or failure of the undertaking.

The work commences with the Governor-General's correspondence from the Cape of Good Hope*, while on his voyage to India, and the first volume terminates with the fall of Seringapatam ; thus embracing the origin and conclusion of the war in Mysore.†

* Lord Mornington was appointed Governor-General of India on the 4th, and sworn in on the 6th, October, 1797 ; sailed from England on the 7th November following ; arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798 ; at Fort St. George on the 26th April, 1798 ; sailed from thence on the 9th May, and arrived at Fort William on the 17th May, 1798.

† The Editor has much pleasure in acknowledging the attentions and kind assistance with which he has been favoured by the Earl of Powis, Lord Viscount Melville, the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Secretary of the East India Company, N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., Lieutenant-Colonel Meyrick Shaw, Sir Robert Campbell, Bart., Sir Charles Forbes, Bart., the Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, M. P., T. Cockburn, Esq., and by several other distinguished individuals, whose names will be more particularly acknowledged in the subsequent volumes.

As the following documents are connected with almost every part of this volume,* they are here inserted.

Proclamation at the Isle of France.

Liberté.

Egalité. Liberty.

Equality.

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE,

Une & indivisible.

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

One and indivisible.

PROCLAMATION.

Anne Joseph Hyppolite Malartic, General en Chef, Gouverneur-general des Isles de France & de la Reunion, & Commandant-general des Etablissements Français, à l'Est du Cap de Bonne Esperance.

CITOYENS,

Connaissant depuis plusieurs années votre zèle & votre attachement pour les intérêts & la gloire de notre République, nous sommes très empressés & nous nous faisons un devoir de vous donner connaissance de toutes les propositions que nous fait Tippoo Sultaun, par deux ambassadeurs qu'il nous a dépêchés.

Ce prince a écrit des lettres particulières à l'Assemblée Coloniale à tous les Généraux qui sont employés dans ce gouvernement, & nous a adressé un paquet pour le Directoire Executif.

1°. Il demande à faire une alliance offensive et défensive avec les Français, en proposant d'en-

PROCLAMATION.

Anne Joseph Hyppolite Malartic, Commander in Chief and Governor-General of the Isles of France and Reunion, and of all the French establishments to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

CITIZENS,

Having for several years known your zeal and your attachment to the interests, and to the glory of our Republic, we are very anxious, and we feel it a duty to make you acquainted with all the propositions which have been made to us by Tippoo Sultaun, through two ambassadors whom he has despatched to us.

This prince has written particular letters to the Colonial Assembly; to all the generals employed under this government; and has addressed to us a packet for the Executive Directory.

1. He desires to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and proposes

* See Governor-General's Minute of the 12th August, 1798.

tretenir à ses frais, tant que la guerre durera dans l'Inde, les troupes qu'on pourra lui envoyer.

2°. Il promet de fournir toutes les choses nécessaires pour faire cette guerre, excepté le Vin & l'Eau de Vie, dont il se trouve absolument dénué.

3°. Il assure que tous les préparatifs sont faits pour recevoir les secours qu'on lui donnera, & qu'à l'arrivée des troupes, les Chefs & Officiers trouveront toutes les choses nécessaires pour faire une guerre à laquelle les Européens sont peu accoutumés.

4°. Enfin il n'attend plus que le moment où les Français viendront à son secours, *pour déclarer la guerre au Anglais, desirant avec ardeur pouvoir les chasser de l'Inde.*

Comme il nous est impossible de diminuer le nombre des soldats des 107e. & 108e. regimens, & de la garde soldée du Port de la Fraternité, à cause des secours que nous avons envoyés à nos alliés les Hollandais; nous invitons tous les citoyens de bonne volonté, à se faire inscrire dans leurs municipalités respectives, pour aller servir sous les drapeaux de Tippoo.

Ce prince desire aussi avoir des citoyens de couleur, libres,

to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops which may be sent to him.

2. He promises to furnish every necessary for carrying on the war, wine and brandy excepted, with which he is wholly unprovided.

3. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him, and that on the arrival of the troops, the commanders and officers will find every thing necessary for making a war, to which Europeans are but little accustomed.

4. In a word he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, *to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India.*

As it is impossible for us to reduce the number of soldiers of the 107th and 108th regiments, and of the regular guard of Port Fraternité, on account of the succours which we have furnished to our allies the Dutch; we invite the citizens, who may be disposed to enter as volunteers, to enrol themselves in their respective municipalities, and to serve under the banners of Tippoo.

This prince desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of

& nous invitons tous ceux qui voudront aller servir sous ses drapeaux, a se faire aussi inscrire.

Nous pouvons assurer tous les citoyens qui se feront inscrire, que Tippoo leur fera des traitements avantageux qui seront fixés avec ses ambassadeurs qui s'engageront en outre, au nom de leur souverain, a ce que les Français qui auront pris parti dans ses armées, ne puissent jamais y être retenus quand ils voudront rentrer dans leur patrie.

Fait au Port Nord-Ouest, le 10 Pluviose, l'an six de la République Française, une & indivisible.

(Signé) MALARTIC.

colour, we therefore invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag, to enrol themselves.

We can assure all the citizens who shall enrol themselves, that Tippoo will allow them an advantageous rate of pay, the terms of which will be fixed with his ambassadors, who will further engage in the name of their sovereign, that all Frenchmen who shall enter into his armies, shall never be detained after they shall have expressed a wish to return to their own country.

Done at Port North West, the 30th January, 1798.

(Signed) MALARTIC.

Tippoo Sultaun to Sir John Shore.

Received at Fort William, 26th April, 1798.*

“I have been favoured with your letter, notifying your intention of returning to Europe, and the nomination of Lord Mornington, who is of rank to the office of Governor-General, in whom the same disposition would be manifested with yourself to cultivate and improve the friendship and good under-

* N. B.—On the 26th of April, 1798, (the day on which this letter was received at Calcutta) Tippoo Sultaun's Ambassadors landed at Mangalore, accompanied by the French force, levied under the above proclamation :—The Earl of Mornington landed at Fort St. George from England, on the same day—the 26th April, 1798.

standing subsisting between the two states, and an inviolable adherence to the engagements by which they are connected. It is very well; you must impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between us, and constantly favour me with letters communicating your health and welfare."

[In another letter from Tippoo Sultaun received also at Fort William on the 26th of April, 1798, and relating solely to Wynaad, Tippoo thus concludes.]

"Believing my friendly heart disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord established between the two states, I hope you will always gratify me by letters notifying your welfare."

ERRATA.

Page 6, l. 19, for *enemy*, read *to my*

31, l. 10, for *I conceive*, read *I consider*.

32, l. 13, for *can be imagined*, read *it would afford*.

37, l. 8, 9, and 10, for *Omdal*, read *Omdat*; *Zulfattier*, *Zulfiker*; *Tung*, *Jung*, and *Surdan*, *Surdar*

39, l. 15, after "Memorandum Fort St. George," read "by the Governor-General."

41, after "Minute by Governor-General on Tanjore," read "Fort William."

43, l. 11 from bottom, for *Residence*, read *Presidency*.

53, l. 9 from bottom, for *murhered*, read *murdered*.

59, l. 6, for *Kauntamunghe* and *Coloorbayre*, read *Kauntamungie* and *Coloorbayee*.

61, *note*, for *Sept. 1798*, read *18th Oct. 1798*.

76, l. 11 from bottom, for *Gugulhelta*, read *Gungulhelly*.

80, l. 6, for *impudence*, read *imprudence*

139, l. 6, for "Poishwa," read "Nizam."

172, l. 23, for *or*, read *and act of war*.

176, l. 11 from bottom, for *practicul*, read *practicable*.

178, *note*, for *see Appendix*, read *see page, 214*.

187, l. 12 and 23 from bottom, for *Mahdu Row*, read *Madhu Row*.

208, at the end, "I am, &c." to be expunged.

214, in the address of the Letter from Fort St. George, for *K. B.* read *K. P.*

266, 12 lines from bottom, for *Nussun*, read *Nussur*.

272, 6 lines from bottom, for *Yah*, read *Jah*.

333, l. 16 from bottom, for *Stewart*, read *Stewart*.

343, l. 8 from bottom, for when you *will* recollect, "when you recollect."

383, l. 6, a full stop at "understood."

391, l. 17, for *Governor-General*, read *Governor in Council*.

404, l. 19 from bottom, for *Delphi*, read *Delhi*.

484, l. 3 from bottom, for *surety*, read *secrecy*.

487, l. 2, before *endanger*, read *not*.

511, l. 14 from bottom, for *Jaghurs*, read *Jaghues*.

546 last line, for *sensation*, read *sensations*.

547, end of 1, 2 and 3 sections of paragraph 34, read *pagodas*; also in paragraph 45, p. 550

554, l. 21 and 23, for *sterling*, read *ster*.

567, l. 23, for *this*, read *his*.

569, l. 2 from bottom, (in note), for *his*, read *its*.

592, next page, for 693, read 593.

599, l. 23, for CCIV, read CCXIV.

621, l. 14, omit *own* before *acquaintance*.

658, l. 21, for *Nundydroog*, read *Nundydroog*.

ERRATA, APPENDIX.

Page 667, l. 4, for *Mutta Talou*, read *Muter Talou*.

l. 16, for *Kerkarah*, read *Mikarah*.

2^d sheet, for page 667, read 677, and so on.

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DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

&c. &c. &c.

INDIA.

No. I.

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Control, &c.

MY DEAR SIR,

Cape of Good Hope, 23 Feb. 1798.

(Among the subjects which you recommended to my early consideration upon my arrival in India, you particularly urged the necessity of my attending with the utmost degree of vigilance to the system, now pursued almost universally by the native princes, of retaining in their service numbers of European or American officers, under whom the native troops are trained and disciplined in imitation of the corps of sepoys in the British service.) By accident I found at this place, on account of his health, Major Kirkpatrick lately Resident at the Court of Hyderabad, and formerly at that of Scindiah, and I have endeavoured during the period of my detention here to collect from him whatever information he could furnish respecting the European or American officers and the corps commanded by them in the service of the Nizam. For this purpose after several conversations on the subject, I requested Major Kirkpatrick to return detailed answers in writing to several questions which I drew with the intention of bringing under your observation not only the actual strength but the original object of this part of the Nizam's military establishment, its rapid increase, the consequences to be expected from its continuance or further growth, as well as the means which either had been or might be suggested for averting any danger which those consequences might threaten to our interests in India. I transmit

with this Letter a copy of my questions and of Major Kirkpatrick's answers,* and although I am aware that the substance of both must be familiar to you, yet imagining that it may hitherto have come under your notice only incidentally in detached despatches and advices from India, I think it may be useful to lay before you in a more regular and connected form a view of this most material and (in my judgment) formidable branch of the system to which you have directed my attention. (In this Letter, I shall endeavour to recapitulate the most important facts stated by Major Kirkpatrick, adding such observations as have occurred to me upon them, in the hope of receiving from you at an early period, your instructions upon such points as the materials before you can enable you to determine.)

It appears that the Nizam had recently at different periods retained in his service, exclusive of our detachment, three distinct corps of sepoys under the command of European or American officers: one commanded by a Frenchman of the name of Raymond, another by an American of the name of Boyd, and a third by an Irishman of the name of Finglass, for some time a Quarter-Master in the 19th Regiment of Dragoons.

The corps of Boyd and Finglass were taken into the service of the Nizam during the residence of Azim ul Omra at Poonah, at the suggestion of our Resident at that Court, acting under the sanction of the Government of Bengal. This measure was taken by our Resident and by that Government principally with a view of forming a counterpoise to the corps of Raymond. Boyd's corps consisted of about 1800 men, it is no longer in the service of the Nizam, and has probably passed into that of the Mahrattas. Finglass's corps still remains at Hyderabad, but consists of only one battalion of about 800 men. Both these corps appeared to be well affected to our interests, as may be judged by their willingness to assist our detachment in repelling an expected attack from the corps of Raymond. The corps of Raymond had been in the service of the Nizam before the last war with Tippoo Sultaun, and in 1792 its strength was not more than 1500 men at the highest estimation, at the battle of

* See Appendix A.

Khurdlah in 1795 its strength amounted to no less than 11,000 men, it now consists of 10,000 men, and the order has actually been given for augmenting it to the number of 14,000 men. Attached to this corps is a train of artillery of about 30 field pieces, and a troop of 80 native dragoons. The discipline of the corps does not appear to be by any means good, and accordingly it has never yet rendered any distinguished service in the field.

The pay of the corps is now secured by the assignment of a large district of country, part of which borders the Carnatic; at this particular station is a fortified post, and constant communication is maintained between it and the port of Narpilly, as well as with Ongole and other parts of the territories of the Company and of the Nabob of Arcot. The corps is recruited in the proportion of one-third of its total numbers, from our territories and from those of the Nabob of Arcot, and partly from deserters abandoning our service. The chief officers are Frenchmen of the most virulent and notorious principles of jacobinism; and the whole corps constitutes an armed French party of great zeal, diligence and activity. (The efforts of this party are continually directed to the object of magnifying the power, resources, and success of France in the eyes of the Court of Hyderabad, and of depreciating the character, force and credit of Great Britain by every possible means.)

The detachment of this corps stationed on our frontier has been very assiduous with great success in seducing from their duty our sepoys quartered in the neighbourhood—a considerable desertion lately took place in one of our native regiments on its march from Masulipatam to the southward, and many of the deserters on that occasion are to be found in Raymond's corps. No positive proof has yet appeared of a direct correspondence between the leaders of this corps and the French Government, but it seems to be unquestionably certain that they communicate with Tippoo Sultaun and with the French corps in his service. Whatever may be the discipline or military skill of this corps, it now forms by far the most considerable part of the Nizam's military establishment. In this corps consists the main strength of the army of our ally; and it possesses the influence which usually belongs to an army in the councils of the native princes of India. This influence

seems to have alarmed Azim ul Omra the first minister of the Nizam; neither the origin nor the subsequent augmentations of this corps appear to have been at all connected with any hostile disposition in the Court of Hyderabad towards the British interests. The institution of the corps proceeded from an admiration of the successful policy of Mahdajee Scindiah and the subsequent augmentation was directed principally if not solely against the Mahrattas. There is reason to believe that the orders lately given for a further increase of the corps to the number of 14,000 men arose from a desire in the mind of Azim ul Omra of drawing us into a more intimate connection with the Nizam, by exciting our jealousy of the growing influence of the French party at Hyderabad.

Such is the state of the leading facts communicated by Major Kirkpatrick. (The result in my mind is a decided opinion,) that the continuance, and still more the further growth of the corps of Raymond ought to be prevented by every means within our power, consistent with the respect due to the Court of Hyderabad, and with the general principles of moderation and justice, which ought to form the rule of our conduct in India. The dangers to be apprehended from the existence of this corps are not to be estimated by a consideration of its actual state of discipline, or even of its actual numbers, or degree of present influence over the councils of the Nizam. (I consider it as the basis of a French party in India, on which, according to the opportunities of fortune and the variation of events, the activity of the enemy may found a strength of the most formidable kind either in peace or war.) If we are to look to the settlement of peace; can it be possible to provide a more ready channel for the intrigues of France, than would be offered by the existence of a body of 10,000 men, united by military discipline, and stationed in the dominions of one of our principal allies, and on the borders of our own? If the war is to continue in Europe without extending to the continent of India in the first instance, the danger of French intrigue acting with such an instrument as I have described, would be greatly aggravated. But if the war should extend to the continent of India, and if we should be under the necessity of calling forth the strength of our allies to assist us in any contest with Tippoo, what assistance could we expect from the Nizam, the

main body of whose army would be officered by Frenchmen, or by the agents of France, and the correspondents of Tippoo himself.* In such a situation it would be difficult to determine whether our danger would be greater from an entire desertion of our cause by the Court of Hyderabad, or from our acceptance of the only species of support which its military force could offer us in the field. But I confess I carry my opinion upon this subject still farther. I have no doubt that the natural effect of the unchecked and rapid growth of such a party at the court of one of our principal allies must be in a very short period to detach that Court entirely from our interests, and finally to fix it in those of our enemies, to subject its councils to their control, and its military establishments to their direction. However despicable the corps of Raymond may now be in point of discipline or effect in the field, would it be wise to leave such a large body of men in readiness to receive whatever improvements the ability, assiduity and zeal of French officers, sent from Europe for that express purpose, might introduce into the constitution of a corps, so prepared by correspondent principles and objects to meet the most sanguine expectations of their new leaders. Under these circumstances, the corps, which perhaps now has little more efficiency than that of a political party, might soon become in the hands of our enemy as efficient a military force, as it is now in that view wholly useless either to the Nizam or to us.

I desire to add one more consideration; must not the continuance of such a corps in the service of our ally tend to raise the hopes of Tippoo, and in the same proportion to disparage us in the eyes of all the native princes of India? That it has tended to encourage Tippoo, I have no doubt, and his correspondence with the leaders of the corps will sufficiently shew in what light he views them. Perhaps I have dwelt too long on this part of the subject, where the proof of the weak policy of suffering such an evil, as I have described, to increase without check or disturbance seems to require no labour of argument.

A more interesting and difficult consideration will be to

* The correspondence of M. Raymond with Tippoo was subsequently proved by means of a letter found in the palace of Seringapatam among the other papers, after the death of Tippoo.

devise for remedying this evil some means which shall not expose our interest to as great a danger as that which we wish to avoid. In the paper transmitted with this letter four distinct measures are proposed for consideration with a view to the desirable object of subverting the French party at the Court of the Nizam. The first is to introduce British subjects, or others (being the subjects of friendly powers) into the military service of the Nizam for the purpose of forming a balance against Raymond's corps. This measure has already been partially attempted by the introduction of the corps of Boyd and Finglass at Hyderabad, but it has failed of success in the case of Boyd, who upon some quarrel with the Court has left the service of the Nizam. I do not think this measure likely to be effectual to any good purpose, and it might even aggravate the evil which it is proposed to remove. A party so consolidated and united as that of Raymond's, which has been strengthening itself for a period of several years at Hyderabad, and has established the means of recruiting and augmenting its members will not be counteracted by the irregular and desultory opposition of such adventurers as might be induced by our encouragement to seek employment in the service of the Nizam; persons of this description (and we cannot expect that any other will engage in such an undertaking) would want the system and concert necessary to give vigor to their operations.

It is also difficult to suppose that the Nizam would at once retain in his service such a number of these persons, as could in any degree enter into competition with the numerous corps of Raymond and his adherents. But even if these objections did not exist against the introduction of a crowd of European adventurers at Hyderabad, there would remain a difficulty which appears to me insuperable. The impossibility of finding a sufficient number of such adventurers on whose principles any reliance could be placed; in such circumstances, our attempt to subvert the French party at Hyderabad might only serve to furnish it with additional recruits of other nations; and I much fear that many British subjects might be found in India whose spirit of adventure would rather direct them to seek a new order of things, than to contribute to the maintenance of our power.) Lord Hobart has declared his objection to this measure, but as well as I recollect his letter, his

principal ground is the danger of improving the military discipline of the armies of the Native Princes by furnishing them with European officers: unfortunately this objection now comes too late; the system which Lord Hobart very justly dreads, has been suffered gradually to gain such a strength, that there is scarcely a native court in India without its establishment of European officers.

The second measure proposed in the annexed paper, is nothing more, than that we should endeavour by representation and demand to induce the Nizam to disband Raymond's corps; I recommend Major Kirkpatrick's observations on this head, to your particular attention. Certainly no representation from one friendly state to another could ever be more solidly founded than ours might be to the Nizam in the case before us. But besides that Major Kirkpatrick expects no benefit from representation and demand unconnected with the offer of some advantage to the Nizam; I doubt whether our manifesting in the first instance the extent of our anxiety for the dismissal of Raymond's corps, might not embarrass us in the progress of the most effectual measures for that desirable end; at present the Court of Hyderabad seems willing to purchase a closer connection with us by great sacrifices, and if that connection should not appear objectionable on other grounds, it may probably take place on much more advantageous terms to us, if we grant it as a matter of favour to the solicitation of the Nizam, than if we commence the negotiation by demanding the dismissal of any part of the Nizam's military establishment. This observation will be better understood, when I come to take notice of the fourth measure proposed by Major Kirkpatrick. Before I leave this article I must however remark that I should not be satisfied by obtaining the modification hinted by Major Kirkpatrick, namely, that the French officers or other Europeans in Raymond's corps should be dismissed, and their places filled by British subjects nominated by us. This modification would leave the corps precisely in its present form with the exception of the European officers only: although the European officers are certainly the most objectionable part of the establishment, it may be doubted whether the habits and dispositions of the native officers and sepoys formed under their French leaders would be at once broken

by a mere change in the command, while every other circumstance of the corps remained the same; seeing then no prospect of success from official representation or demand alone, and thinking it imprudent to anticipate the expected application of the Court of Hyderabad for a more intimate connection with us by urging to them at this period any proposition the concession of which they might deem a favour, I proceed to examine Major Kirkpatrick's third suggestion. This he states to be of a nature justifiable only by the case of an actual rupture with the Nizam, or of open violence on the part of Raymond against us; the measure is no other than to induce Raymond's officers by pecuniary compensation to abandon the corps, on this measure it is unnecessary to say anything, because the cases alone to which it is meant to apply, neither have existed nor are now likely to happen, I own that I should never think it worth while, even in the cases supposed of a rupture with the Nizam, or of an attack from Raymond, to repel the aggression by corrupting the officers of the hostile enemy; I trust that in either case, we should soon find a more certain as well as a more honourable mode of effectually destroying this French party and its adherents.

The fourth proposition contained in Major Kirkpatrick's paper, is that to which I wish to call your most particular attention.

The desire of the Court of Hyderabad to obtain from us an increase of our detachment now serving the Nizam, and also an extension of the power of employing the force furnished by us, has appeared on several occasions, and you will find allusions to this disposition in the last secret despatches from Bengal. There seems to be no objection to the first part of this proposition provided our consent to it shall secure to us equivalent concessions on the part of the Nizam. In another Letter which I shall forward to you on the general subject of the political state of India in the present moment, you will find my reasons for entertaining an opinion that it would be a wise policy for us to check by timely aid the rapid declension of the Nizam's weight among the powers of Hindostan; this could be done in no manner so effectual or unobjectionable as by furnishing him with a large increase of our force now in his pay; the pay of the

augmented force to be secured in the manner best calculated to prevent future discussion and embarrassment. In granting this force to the Nizam, we ought not only to stipulate for the disbanding of Raymond's corps, but we ought to take care that the officers should be immediately sent out of India. There are perhaps other points which on this occasion might be obtained from the Court of Hyderabad. The great difficulty which would obstruct such an arrangement would be, that the Nizam would probably be unwilling to part with Raymond's corps, which he has the power of employing against any enemy, unless he could obtain powers equally extensive with respect to the employment of any force furnished by us. You are aware that the British detachment now in the pay of the Nizam is not only restricted from acting against the Mahrattas in any possible case, but also from acting against certain Polygars tributary both to the Mahrattas and to the Nizam, and even from passing, without a formal permission, certain parts of the Mahratta Territory which are intermixed with the dominions of the Nizam. The object of the Court of Hyderabad would of course be to obtain our guarantee of its possession generally, against the Mahrattas, accompanied with the assistance of a large force, to be employed with the same extensive powers as now apply to the corps of Raymond. For this object I have little doubt that the Nizam would sacrifice the whole French party at his court, and even the peiscush now paid by us on account of the northern circars. But such an alteration of our connection with the Nizam would naturally raise the jealousy of the Mahratta powers, and might involve us in discussions of a very disagreeable nature if not in a war with them. The result therefore of this view of the subject would lead us to enquire, whether some arrangement might not be framed, founded on a modification of the views of the Court of Hyderabad, and comprehending certain favourite objects of the Mahratta States, which while it secured for us the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, should tend to restore to the Nizam his due weight among the Indian powers, without exciting the animosity of the Mahrattas against the British Government.

It appears to me that the only effectual mode of eradicating the French party at Hyderabad would be to furnish to the

Nizam such a force as should be a just equivalent to Raymond's corps; considering the superior discipline of our sepoys, I believe that 3,000 men under British command, not only would be, but would be deemed by the Court of Hyderabad, a force fully equal to that of Raymond in its present state.

The instruction by which our detachment is prevented from acting as the troops of the Mahrattas and of the Nizam now act against the Polygars who pay joint tribute to the two powers might probably be removed by a full previous explanation with the Mahrattas; as that restriction does not appear to be founded on any solid principle, nor could the removal of it open the way to any real inconvenience or danger to the interests of the Mahratta State.

The power of mutually passing their intermixed boundaries is now constantly exercised by the troops both of the Mahrattas and of the Nizam; and there is no reason to suppose that a formal permission would have been refused to our detachment for the same purpose, had it ever been demanded. But the Nizam never would allow any application to be made for a permission to do that, which he held to be his right, and which was constantly done without question both by his own army and by that of Poonah. It is very improbable that we should find great difficulty in engaging the Mahrattas to place our detachment in this respect on a footing with the other branches of the Nizam's military force, and with their own; nor can I foresee any tenable ground of argument on which this point could be maintained against us.

The settlement of these two points only, would, I understand, be considered as a great acquisition by the Nizam, and would go a great way towards inducing him to substitute a British force in the room of Raymond's corps.

The third point is of much more importance and of much greater delicacy and danger, I speak of the desire of the Court of Hyderabad to obtain our guarantee of their possessions against the Mahrattas as well as against Tippoo, together with a right of employing defensively the troops furnished by us against the former as well as against the latter of these powers. This point perhaps might be reconciled with the interests of the Mahrattas, if it were thought prudent to

enter into similar engagements with them, or in other ~~words~~ ^{ways}, to guarantee their possessions against any attack from the Nizam. The effect of such an engagement with both powers would be to place us in the situation of arbitrators between them; and perhaps their mutual apprehensions of our interposition in the case of any aggression on either side might tend to restrain the resentment and ambition of both. In this view such a system of treaty with the Mahrattas and with the Nizam, so far from being liable to the objection of an undue interference in the disputes of the native powers of India, or of that description of officiousness and intriguing spirit which tends to foment divisions, and to occasion war, might be deemed the best security for the maintenance of the peace of India, as well as the strongest pledge of our disposition to preserve it from disturbance. It would also tend to preserve unimpaired the strength and resources of the two powers, on whose cooperation we must depend for assistance against any future attempt on the part of Tippoo: it cannot be a wise policy to suffer the Nizam and the Mahrattas to weaken themselves by repeated contests, while Tippoo remains at rest; and any measure deserves attention, the tendency of which is to restore to the Mahrattas and to the Nizam their relative consideration and power as they stood at the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam. You will find by the last secret despatches from India,* that some opening has been given for our arbitration in settling the disputes between the several Mahratta chiefs, and that the Government of Bengal has agreed to undertake the mediation proposed, under the condition of a previous formal agreement signed by all the parties, binding themselves to accept our award as final and conclusive upon their respective claims. If any such proceeding should take place, it will give a natural opening to such further engagements as may appear advisable.

The same despatches will inform you of the anxiety of the Mahrattas to obtain our agreement to a general defensive treaty against Zemaun Shah. The Government of Bengal have postponed the consideration of this proposition to a

* The opening of these Despatches is explained in Letters, Nos. II. and III.

period of time, which I confess I should think the most unfavourable for the examination of this difficult question, and still more unseasonable for the negociation of a treaty with such a power as the Mahratta states; this period of time is no other, than the moment when Zemaun Shah shall again approach the frontiers of Hindostan. Without giving any decisive opinion on the wisdom of entering into the treaty proposed, I shall certainly think it my duty upon my arrival in India to proceed without the delay of one moment to the examination and decision of the proposal made by the Mahrattas: if it should appear expedient to engage with them in a defensive system against the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, there is no doubt that such a measure would tend greatly to reconcile to them any propositions, which we might wish to offer with respect to the arrangements at the Court of Hyderabad.

The inclination of my opinion at present rather leads me to think, that a general defensive alliance between all the existing powers of Hindostan (Tippoo perhaps alone excepted) against the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, would not only be the best security against the success of such an invasion, if attempted, but might have the effect of deterring that Prince from an undertaking which must end in his own disappointment and ruin, if our Government in India, and our allies do not neglect to make seasonable preparations of defence. If a treaty can be formed at an early period so as to unite the Mahratta powers with us in a cordial and systematic plan of vigorous opposition to the supposed projects of Zemaun Shah, without binding us to advance farther from our own frontiers, than the real exigency of the case may appear to demand upon his approach, I should think such a treaty a solid acquisition of strength in the present critical situation of India, you will observe from this detail, that I consider the fourth measure suggested by Major Kirkpatrick to be the only one, from which it is reasonable to hope that the effectual destruction of the French army at Hyderabad can be accomplished, but that I view that measure as connected with considerations of the most serious nature, and involving consequences of the utmost delicacy and importance. I have laid before you the whole train of my thoughts on this subject, as I shall think it my duty to do on every question affecting those interests,

which I know to be not only highly valuable in your estimation, but the most particular and anxious objects of your unremitting solicitude and care. I will conclude this long letter by stating the precise questions on which I wish to receive your instructions, and by submitting to you the plan of measures which I propose to pursue with relation to this subject, in the interval which must elapse, before I can receive your opinion.

In the first place I wish to be informed whether you think a closer connection than at present subsists between us and the Nizam advisable for our interests on general grounds, provided such a change of our engagements with the Nizam can be rendered acceptable to the Mahrattas.

Secondly, whether you would approve of our entering into treaties with both the Mahrattas and the Nizam guaranteeing the dominions of each power respectively against the aggression of the other.

Thirdly, whether you would approve of our taking measures for acting in concert with Azim ul Omra in support of the succession of Secunder Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam? whether we should endeavour to obtain the cooperation of the Mahrattas in securing this succession? and what should be our conduct, if the Mahrattas should differ from us in the choice of the successor to the Nizam?

Fourthly, whether you would approve of a general defensive treaty against any invasion from Zemaun Shah, and what limitations would you propose to the powers which the other allies might require of employing our troops beyond our own frontiers?

You will observe that the determination of all these questions is necessary, in my view of the subject, in order to enable me to carry into effect the only measure which I can rely upon as a sufficient check to the growth of the French interest at the Court of Hyderabad and as a permanent barrier against any future revival of that interest in the same quarter.

But I am aware that I cannot receive your opinions for a long time. In that interval circumstances may compel me to decide some of these important questions upon my own judgment; my wish however is to reserve them all for yours, and with this view, I propose to pursue a system of measures, which, while it shall leave all the most delicate parts of the

situation of affairs in India open to your decision, shall tend to check in some degree the progress of the French party at Hyderabad, and to furnish me with such materials as shall enable me to form a competent opinion of the effects to be expected from any decision of the points reserved for your judgment.

I propose to direct the Resident at Hyderabad to suffer no augmentation of Raymond's corps to take place, if it can be prevented by the strongest and most pointed representations. This step may probably check the increase of the corps, although from this step alone I cannot hope for its final annihilation.

I mean also to direct that any proposals from the Nizam's ministers for an increase of our detachment shall be favourably received; and I shall increase the detachment accordingly on the first practicable occasion; but I shall stipulate that for every man we grant, there shall be a proportional reduction made in Raymond's corps. This proportion shall be calculated upon the relative estimation of our sepoys (in the opinion of the ministers of the Nizam themselves) when compared with Raymond's corps; and I believe that on this ground, I shall not find it difficult to contend that a reduction of 3,000 men should be made for every 1,000 men granted by us. In reducing the army of Raymond, I shall endeavour in the first instance to disband the most obnoxious and dangerous officers with their corps. I have reason to believe that I may be able to effect this species of partial reduction of Raymond's corps, without entering upon any of the difficult points involved in the general questions stated in the letter. In the meanwhile however I shall direct the Resident, at Poonah and with Scindiah, to ascertain as speedily as possible the views and dispositions of those powers with respect to the same points and especially with respect to any alteration of our connection with the Nizam, to his eventual successor, and to the proposed defensive engagements against Zemaun Shah.

In submitting the whole of this extensive subject to your consideration I have been obliged to leave many parts of it open to doubt, for want of the information which may be expected from the residents with Scindiah, and at Poonah; I believe however that it will not be difficult for you to answer the questions which I have proposed, framing your answers

in such a manner as may admit of any variation of opinion, which the information from those Courts may require.

The state of the military establishment of the Mahratta powers did not properly come under Major Kirkpatrick's view, and I propose to transmit to the residents at Poonah and with Scindiah a copy of my questions to Major Kirkpatrick with such alterations as the several cases may require, in order to obtain for you a full statement of the corps disciplined by Europeans or Americans in the service of the Mahrattas. I am at present able to give you no fuller information on this part of the subject, than that Scindiah employs about 20,000 sepoys disciplined by Europeans or Americans. The commander is named *Perron*, a Frenchman; most of the officers are British subjects. The discipline of this corps is said to be superior to that of Raymond's, but the disposition of its officers to be much more favorable to the British than to the French interests. This was De Boigne's corps, whose history you probably know: De Boigne was lately in London, if he should not have left it, he can give you the fullest information of the state of Scindiah's army. There was a small corps of about 2,000 men commanded by European officers in the service of the Peishwah, and another of about the same number in that of Tuckagee Holkar; they are both inconsiderable, if they still exist, and the dissensions which have broken out between Holkar's two sons since the death of their father, have left that branch of the Mahratta power in a situation from which little danger is to be apprehended. There is a fourth corps commanded by a Frenchman of the name of D'Agincourt in the service of Azim ul Dowlah at Hyderabad. This corps is paid by the state. It consists of 1,500 men. The commander is a determined jacobin.

The Rajah of Berar is said to have a corps in his service commanded by British officers, it is said to consist of above 2,000 men.

I am, my dear Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. II.

To the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Cape of Good Hope, Feb. 25th, 1798.

In my letter dated the 19th instant, addressed to the Honourable the Court of Directors,* I have stated the circumstances which induced me to open the secret packet addressed to your Honourable Committee, on board the ship Houghton.

In addition to the circumstances stated to the Honourable Court of Directors, I think it necessary to submit to you that I had learnt, by vague reports, the outline of the important events which have happened in Oude, the apprehensions entertained of the return of Zemaun Shah towards the frontiers of that province, the several movements of Tippoo Sultaun, and the sudden suspension of the expedition embarked for the attack of Manilla.

It appeared to me on every ground to be an indispensable article of my duty to obtain, as speedily as possible, the most authentic account of events so deeply affecting the interests committed to my charge, and of which any false impression might render me less equal to the execution of my public trust.

But whatever may have been my view of my duty, or my conception of the propriety and necessity of the step which I took in opening the several despatches and packets, I shall not be satisfied with my conduct until it shall have received the sanction of your approbation, as well as that of the Honourable the Court of Directors. To both, in your joint and several capacities, it will always be my desire to pay every mark of deference and respect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* The Letter here adverted to does not require insertion, the observations being similar to those contained in the present Letter.

No. III.

To the Right Honourable Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Cape of Good Hope, Feb. 28th, 1798.

During my detention at this place the ships, of which I enclose a list, arrived with despatches from Bengal. My anxious desire to learn the actual state of affairs in India from the most authentic sources induced me to open the public and secret packets, the contents of which I have examined with great attention and care. I flatter myself that this step, proceeding from a wish to enable myself to do justice to their service, will meet with the approbation of the Court of Directors, and that they will be satisfied with the reasons which I have offered in my letter to them on this subject.

The contents of these despatches have led me to a very serious review of the opinions which I had formed under your direction with regard to the relative situations of the several native powers of India, and the system to be pursued with respect to their interests by the government committed to my charge.

The leading principle of your instructions to me as applicable to our external policy in India, was, that I should endeavour, as nearly as possible, to preserve the balance of power between the native princes upon the same footing on which it was placed by the Treaty of Seringapatam.

It would be a waste of your time to state, at any length, the precise nature of the relative conditions of those states whose interests were affected, and whose power was ascertained by the operation of that treaty. It will be sufficient to remark, that one part of the policy of the treaty was, by strengthening the Mahrattas and the Nizam to the extent and in the manner provided by the articles of the treaty, to establish an efficient check upon the future ambition or resentment of Tippoo, and to secure to us an efficient support against him whenever we might have an occasion to call for it.

The plain question, to which my attention has been directed by the inspection of the late despatches, is this:—Are the Mahrattas and the Nizam now in the same condition in

which the Treaty of Seringapatam left them; and can we now look to both, or to either of those powers, for that degree of support against Tippoo which it was the intention of that treaty to provide? I am afraid that a very short examination of the present position of the Mahrattas and of the Nizam will furnish ample proof that neither of those powers remain in the same state in which they stood in 1793, either with relation to each other or to the general balance of power in India; and above all, that their means of assisting us against Tippoo are considerably diminished.

Since the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam the credit and resources of the Court of Hyderabad have been constantly declining. The disgrace which fell upon the Nizam's army in the unfortunate contest with the Mahrattas at Khurdlah, reduced the military character of the Court of Hyderabad to the lowest point of degradation. The treaty in which that defeat terminated completed the humiliation of the Nizam: you will remember that he was compelled to sacrifice a large portion of territory, to engage to pay a fine of three crores of rupees, and to submit to the captivity of his minister Azim ul Omra, who was carried a prisoner to Poonah. ✓ Azim ul Omra resided at Poonah during the late convulsions in the Mahratta governments, and bore a very distinguished part in supporting Nana through the various revolutions which followed the sudden death of the Peishwa Mahda Row. For these services Nana had agreed to sacrifice all the benefits acquired for the Mahratta state against the Nizam by the Treaty of Khurdlah. But the event has been, that after the recovery of his own power, Nana has insisted on the cession of one-fourth part of the territory, and on the payment of one-fourth part of the fine stipulated by that treaty. So that the final result is a considerable diminution of the territory and resources of the Nizam, added to all the effects which might naturally be expected to be produced upon his domestic peace and foreign consideration by so heavy a loss both of power and honour. The two rebellions of the Nizam's son Ali Jah, and of the son of Dara Jah, are stated to have arisen from the contempt into which the Nizam's authority had fallen at home; and although those rebellions have been quelled, the collections of the revenue have been so severely affected, as well by them as by the

detention of Azim ul Omra at Poonah, that the resources of the country are not likely to recover the shock for some time.

The effect of these causes has been very much to lower the value of the Nizam's power in the scale of the neighbouring states. He has been obliged to submit implicitly to the will of the government of Poonah; the Rajah of Berar has exacted large contributions from a part of his territory, and Tippoo (although endeavouring to gain him as an ally,) has omitted no occasion of expressing the utmost contempt for his abject situation.

But the most striking feature of change in the state of the Nizam's affairs since 1793 is the alteration which has taken place in his military establishment. This, at first view, might appear an improvement of his political strength; but whatever may be your judgment on that question in a general view of it, you will, I am persuaded, concur with me in opinion, that the alteration which has taken place in the Nizam's military establishment, since the peace of Seringapatam, has nearly disqualified him from co-operating with us as an ally in the cases for which that treaty meant to provide.

The Nizam since the peace has greatly reduced his cavalry and other troops, and in the meanwhile has considerably augmented the corps of Raymond, of the nature and principles of which I have given a description in my Letter No. I. The corps of Raymond now forms the great force of the Nizam's army; and although very deficient in point of discipline and skill when compared with our troops, is stated to be more capable of performing useful service in the field than the whole army furnished to us by his Highness in the late war with Tippoo. On the other hand, perhaps the existence of this corps, united as it is in the cause of France, connected with Tippoo, and animated by that spirit of intrigue which would lead it to mix in every distraction of the state, if not to disturb the internal peace of the country by originating the causes of confusion, may be considered as a circumstance of positive weakness in the frame of the Nizam's government. Azim ul Omra certainly has felt the force of this argument, and by consenting to the introduction of the corps of Boyd and Finglass, appeared to be aware that the corps of Raymond might eventually gain the ascendancy, which it might be difficult to reduce within any bounds of moderation, and

which might hereafter overthrow the power of a minister, or dictate the succession to the throne itself.

But with respect to our alliance, and to the value of the guarantee under the treaty of Paangul, the altered state of the Nizam's army places him in a condition worse than that of absolute inefficiency. In a war with Tippoo, or in the still more aggravated case of a war with him and France, the forces of the Nizam must become useless (if not dangerous) to us, precisely in proportion to the exigency of the case in which our cause should demand the aid of our allies. I have stated this argument already in my Letter No. I., to which I refer you; with this additional observation, that I cannot conceive the case in which we could take the Nizam's French troops with us into the field, without the utmost hazard of treachery, nor the case in which we could leave them behind us, without providing an equal force to watch their movements. Recollecting that this corps is the only military force of any kind of efficiency which we can expect from the Nizam in the event of a war with Tippoo and France, you will judge without difficulty what answer should be given to the question which I have proposed upon this part of the subject.

I have already observed how much the posture of the Nizam's affairs is altered with relation to the balance of power between him and the Mahratta states, and how much he has been weakened and degraded by the Treaty of Khurdlah, and by the manner in which it has been carried into execution. In this view it has been a favourable circumstance to the Nizam, (and is perhaps that cause to which alone he is indebted for the preservation of any degree of strength, or even of his throne,) that the distractions of the Mahratta empire have so shaken the power of the Peishwa, and disturbed the unity of the confederation of the principal chiefs, as to have very much impaired their means of carrying on any considerable joint military operation. Notwithstanding this circumstance, I still consider the Nizam to be in a much weaker state, even with relation to the Mahrattas, divided and broken as their power now is, than he was at the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam.

This leads me to submit to your consideration my ideas on the actual condition of the Mahratta empire. I am aware

that some opinions have been thrown out from very respectable quarters, the tendency of which appears to lead towards a sentiment approaching to satisfaction in the dissensions and divisions which have lately taken place among the Mahrattas. I always considered the precise situation in which the Mahratta empire stood, after the peace of Seringapatam, as the most favourable to our interests. The powers of the different co-estates were then sufficiently balanced amongst each other to prevent any danger of that degree of union which could at any time bring the whole of their force to operate in one consolidated mass against the British possessions. On the other hand, the influence of the Peishwa, or head of the co-estates, and of his minister Nana, was such as to enable them to bring into the field a respectable force, whenever their engagements with us might require such an effort. This appears to me to be the position in which we ought to endeavour to maintain the Mahratta states; in which neither the government of Poonah, nor any branch of the empire, should obtain such an ascendancy as might enable it to concentrate the formidable strength of the whole against us, while the head of this great body should still preserve such a degree of power over several of the leading chiefs, as to become a respectable ally to us in the moment of necessity. The present posture of the Mahratta power is directly the reverse in one respect of that which I have described. Fortunately no one of the co-estates, nor the head of the empire, has yet acquired the means of wielding the united force of the whole body; but while some of the chiefs have made great and valuable acquisitions of dominion, and considerably increased their military strength, the authority and influence of the Peishwa has rapidly declined; and it could not now be expected that any respectable body of chiefs would be disposed to prosecute, under his direction, any common view or joint operation with any degree of zeal or vigour. This has been the effect produced by the late series of revolutions at Poonah. Looking to the most important question for our consideration—namely, the extent of the assistance which we may expect from the Mahrattas, if we should have occasion to call for their aid under the engagement subsisting between us, I have viewed those revolutions with regret, and I cannot now see their consequences in any more favourable light, as

far as they regard us, than that of a positive diminution of the strength of those barriers which it was the policy of the Treaty of Seringapatam to raise against the power of Tippoo. I have avoided entering into a detailed account of the respective positions of each of the great Mahratta chiefs, wishing to call your attention to the more essential and pressing part of the subject. But I believe you will find the circumstances of each branch of the Mahratta power to have varied since the year 1793 nearly according to the following statement:—

Scindiah has made large acquisitions of territory, and improved the discipline of his troops; he has also acquired great influence at Poonah, but it may be doubted whether the death of Mahdajee Scindiah has not been a greater loss to the power of this branch of the empire than will be compensated by any of these advantages. The character of Dowlut Row Scindiah and of his ministers is such as to render the power of this branch much less formidable than it was in the lifetime of Mahdajee Scindiah.

The Rajah of Berar has made some progress in power since the peace of Seringapatam, at the expense of the Peishwa, of the Nizam, and of some Patan princes in Malwa. His strength and consideration are said to be upon the increase.

Tuccojee Holkar's power was on the decline even before his death, since that period the political weight of this family has been greatly diminished by intestine divisions between the successors of Tuccojee.

The chiefship of Purseram Bhow is extinct, and that of Hurry Pundit has lost the greater part of its credit and power.

I have already spoken of the Peishwa; the events which have reduced his importance are familiar to you. I will only add this remark, that the jealousy which must naturally subsist between the present Peishwa and his minister Nana (who at one period of the late revolutions at Poonah supported Chimna Appa, the younger son of Bajerow, the present Peishwa) is a circumstance likely to present additional obstacles to any vigorous exertion of the force of the government of Poonah, if it does not produce some new convulsions in its frame. I believe it may justly be said, that since the founda-

tion of the government the power of the Peishwa never was so inconsiderable in the general scale of the Mahratta states as it is at this moment.

Having thus stated to you my reasons for apprehending that the efficiency of both the allies on whom we are to depend for aid in any future contest with Tippoo is so much impaired since the year 1793, that we could not look to them at this juncture for the same degree of assistance (whatever that may have been) which Lord Cornwallis derived from their cooperation in the late war with that prince. (I now beg leave to call your attention to certain circumstances in our situation, intimately connected with our political weight in India, and with our means of encountering again, at any early period, the pressure of war.)

The despatches which accompany this letter will inform you of the death of the Nabob Vizier Azoph ul Dowla, and of the very extraordinary scenes which have passed in Oude since that event. The event itself I should have considered in the abstract as highly favourable to our interests, being persuaded that under the reign of Azoph ul Dowla it would ever have been impracticable to have carried into permanent effect any reform in the disordered finances and undisciplined army of that prince. With the assistance of Tofuzul Hussein Khan, the new minister of Oude, it might have been hoped that the succession of a new prince might have opened more favourable prospects. But the strange and unfortunate circumstances attending the succession of Vizier Ali seem to lead to a situation of affairs in Oude which, for some time, must impair the strength of that frontier, and render the country more open to the impression of a foreign enemy. Almas Ali is said to be ready to take the field with a very respectable force; and the Rohilla chiefs, of whose persevering spirit we have had a recent experience, are also mentioned as being upon the point of an insurrection: the whole country is represented to be in a state to require the presence of a large military force, for the maintenance of internal peace and good order. This state of our affairs in Oude must be deemed a positive diminution of our disposable force; I trust that the activity (perhaps even the mere presence of our troops) may reduce the insurgents to submission. But while any ambiguity remains respecting the permanency of the set-

tlement made in favour of Vizier Ali—while the same turbulent spirit shall exist among the Rohillas, and the military power of Almas Ali continues undiminished, it can never be safe to withdraw our troops; and it must be remarked that the danger of withdrawing them would be increased exactly in proportion to the pressure of the necessity of employing them against any foreign enemy. You will find that the Governor-General states his conviction, without reserve, that the approach of Zemaun Shah towards the frontier of Oude would become the signal of general revolt and plunder in that province. In the meanwhile I cannot consider the call for the employment of our troops in quelling the spirit of insurrection in another quarter to be yet so little urgent as to leave us free to act against an enemy on that side without apprehension of our own subjects. I allude to the present state of the coast of Malabar. I find that a treaty has been signed with the Pyche Rajah; but as far as I can collect from the despatches, it does not appear to me that his submission has been so complete, or his power so broken, as to warrant a sentiment of security either in his weakness or in his sincerity. This circumstance again must operate as a diversion of our force in the event of war. With respect to our financial resources I refer you to the same despatches for an account of the general embarrassment both of public and private credit, and the difficulty of raising money for public credit, even at the exorbitant interest of 12 per cent., with the combined advantage of a remittance. The great expense of the long intended and suddenly relinquished expedition to Manilla, must of necessity increase both the difficulty and the exigency of raising further loans.

To this view of our situation must be added the state of our dependencies of Arcot and Tanjore, as represented by the Madras government, both with respect to the disaffection and refractory spirit of the Nabob and Rajah, and to the decline of the permanent sources of public revenue. I hope I shall not be suspected of wishing to draw a gloomy or exaggerated picture of the altered aspect of our affairs since the peace of Seringapatam; my only wish is to fix your attention, as I have fixed my own, on the true points of our weakness, for the purpose of considering the speediest means of recovering our strength. I know that the fortunate events of

this most glorious war have given us an ascendancy over every European nation in India, such as we never before possessed ; but I cannot shut my eyes to the diminution which our weight in the scale of the country powers has suffered, and is likely to suffer still more, if the means of checking the progress of the evil be much longer neglected. Nor can I refuse my assent to the truth of a proposition which I now think it my duty to urge to you with great earnestness, that unless effectual and vigorous measures be taken for quelling the disturbances in our own provinces and in those of our dependencies, I do not see how we can again be prepared to meet an enemy of any respectable force in the field. To the distress of our finances I am persuaded your most anxious attention will be given without delay, and you may rely on receiving from me the most ample communications on that subject upon my arrival in India.

In reviewing our political situation in India, particularly with regard to our comparative power of curbing the attempts of Tippoo, I ought not to omit the consideration of the relative strength of that prince as it exists in the present moment, and as it stood at the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam.

Since that period of time he has enjoyed perfect internal tranquillity : While our allies all around him have been distracted and exhausted by domestic rebellions, successive revolutions, and mutual wars, he has been employed in recruiting the sources of his strength, improving his revenues, and invigorating the discipline of his armies. It is true that he must now have nearly lost all hope of assistance* from France, or from any other European power ; but that hope was long cherished by him, and it encouraged him to the great exertions which have unquestionably added to his military strength. He has been very active for some time past in his applications to the Courts of the Native Powers, endeavouring to stir them up against us. He certainly applied for that purpose to the Nizam, and (during the absence of Azim ul

* It is true there were no French Troops disposable at the Mauritius, and France seemed at that time too much engaged in Europe to spare troops for the East ; but Tippoo was not aware of these circumstances, and had sent Ambassadors to the Mauritius at this very period, of which Lord Mornington could not then be apprised.

Omra at Poonah) he made a very strong impression upon the politics of the Court of Hyderabad, where he now has a Vakeel, and where he certainly has many partizans, as well in the corps of Raymond as in the service of Umjid ud Dowla, a chief of a considerable faction called the Paungah party, and in that of Imtiaz ud Dowlah, nephew to the Nizam. Tippoo has also sent Vakeels to Poonah, with the same object of raising a spirit of hostility against us. His success, I believe, has not answered his wishes in that quarter.

But the most remarkable step which Tippoo has lately taken, is his communication with Zemaun Shah. The declared projects of Zemaun Shah, added to the attempts which he has recently made towards carrying them into execution, must, in their general impression and effect, be considered as an accession of strength to the cause of Tippoo. If an invasion of Hindostan should ever seriously be attempted by Zemaun Shah, the diversion of our force, which would be occasioned by such an event, would offer the most favourable opportunity to an attack from Tippoo on our possessions in the Peninsula. No mode of carrying on war against us could be more vexatious or more distressing to our resources than a combined attack upon Oude and the Carnatic. It is not impossible that the late intercourse between Tippoo and Zemaun Shah had for its object, on the part of the former at least, some such plan of joint operation. I know that it is the fashion to treat the projects of Zemaun Shah very lightly. In the despatches you will see an account of his force, and you will find a detail of all the intelligence obtained respecting his future intentions, as well as of the causes likely to obstruct their execution. The result of an examination of these materials upon my mind is a conviction that Zemaun Shah has not abandoned his project of invading Hindostan, and that the safest means of rendering that project abortive will be to consider it as practicable, and to take the best precautions against it which the advantages of our situation and the interval of time can furnish. The fact is that Zemaun Shah was able to advance to Lahore without opposition from the Seiks: whatever circumstances recalled him into his own dominions, the above-mentioned fact well deserves attention, because it contradicts all the conjectures

and opinions which had been so confidently formed with respect to the obstacles which Zemaun Shah would meet in his passage from his own dominions to ours. The nation of the Seiks was said to be the first barrier against him, and it was asserted this barrier alone would be insuperable. He contrived, however, to pass through the country of the Seiks unmolested, and, if I am rightly informed, he has since endeavoured, not without success, to negotiate a treaty with some of the leaders of the various factions which distract that nation. Should he succeed in establishing an amicable intercourse with any large body of the Seiks, it would greatly facilitate the success of his supposed project of invasion. Between the country of the Seiks and the frontier of Oude no obstacle remains but the Mahratta Power. It is perfectly well known that when Zemaun Shah reached Lahore the Mahrattas were by no means in a condition to check his progress. They had no army in that quarter which could have been opposed to him in the field. Scindiah was at that time at Poonah with the greater part of his force deeply engaged in the intrigues and revolutions of which that place has been so long the scene. If Zemaun Shah had not been recalled by some domestic cause (of which the true nature does not seem yet to be thoroughly understood), there cannot be a doubt that he might have penetrated through the possessions of Scindiah, in the neighbourhood of Delhi and Agra, without difficulty, if not without opposition. From the accounts which I have received of the military force of Scindiah, I do not believe that he alone would be able to cope with the army of Zemaun Shah, and therefore I do not feel that we should be secure at any time if we relied on his single efforts to check the approach of the invading force. With the experience of this critical state of affairs in my mind, I cannot consider the idea of an invasion from Cabul as a mere visionary danger. It does not appear to have been so considered by the present Government of Bengal, who have stated it as one of the leading circumstances which called for an augmentation of their native infantry.

To recur, therefore, to the view of the political balance of power in India, which I was endeavouring to submit to you, I think myself compelled to estimate the force of Tippoo with reference to the projects of Zemaun Shah, and to the possi-

bility of their (at least limited) success; and on this ground I must conclude that Tippoo's consideration has received additional weight since the year 1793.

If the facts be true which I have stated on both sides of this enumeration of the comparative circumstances of our situation in India, and of those which affect the situation of Tippoo, it must be admitted that he has rather gained than lost weight in the period of time described, and that the consistency, unity, and efficiency of our side of the balance has suffered no inconsiderable degree of diminution. In my Letter No. I., from this place, I have opened to you some parts of the general outline of those measures which appear to me to be best calculated to restore the Native Powers of India and ourselves to the same position in which we stood in 1793, as far as the change of times and circumstances will admit. So far from viewing any plan tending to this object, as an innovation upon our system of Indian government, I feel it to be my duty to state such a plan, in conformity to the instructions which I had received from you at the time of my departure, and to every principle which I have at any time imbibed from you on this interesting subject. *The balance of power in India no longer exists upon the same footing on which it was placed by the peace of Seringapatam. The question therefore must arise, how it may best be brought back again to that state, in which you have directed me to maintain it.*

My present view of the subject is, that the wisest course would be to strengthen the Mahrattas and the Nizam, by entering into a defensive alliance with the former against Zemaun Shah, and by affording to the latter an addition of military strength, and the means of extricating himself from the control of the French party at Hyderabad.

In framing a treaty of defensive alliance against Zemaun Shah, the object to be sought would be the securing an efficient force to be in the field in due time to check the progress of Zemaun Shah in the Mahratta territory of Delhi, or at least of Agra: the danger to be avoided would be the drawing our troops farther beyond the line of the frontier of Oude than might be necessary for securing the fair common objects of the alliance. To this treaty I would make the Nizam a party. The treaty should not contain a hostile word against

Zemaun Shah, excepting only with reference to the single case of his projects of invasion; and it should be communicated to him with assurances of our determination never to molest him in his own dominions, nor to suffer him to approach ours. I have sufficiently stated all that relates to the Nizam in my Letter No. I., to which I refer you also for my opinion of the possibility of removing the grounds of jealousy between him and the Mahrattas, or at least of checking the hostile attempts of either party upon the power of the other.

You will perceive that the course of my opinions would also lead me to take every step consistent with the rules of caution and moderation for restoring to the Peishwa such a degree of power as might render him able to fulfil the subsisting engagements between us and the Mahratta empire.

The most pressing part of the whole subject seems to be the state of Oude, of the coast of Malabar, of the Carnatic, and of Tanjore. With respect to the disturbances in Oude I trust that the exertions of Lord Teignmouth and of Sir Alured Clarke will have done a great deal before my arrival. I think this the occasion to remark to you, that I have met no person who does not complain of the insufficiency of our force in cavalry in Bengal and Oude. Our new native regiments are yet scarcely formed, and there is but one regiment of European dragoons in that quarter, which also is nearly inefficient, from having been imprudently and unnecessarily exposed to the violence of the heat. There is a very good and more than complete regiment of dragoons here (the 8th), which, having been here for near two years, is well seasoned for the Indian service. It would be a very acceptable guest in Bengal, and might become very useful, not only in the event of any attempt of Zemaun Shah, but also in quelling the disturbances in Oude, and in serving as a model to our newly-raised native cavalry. I confess, that under all the present circumstances of India, I should be glad to see one or two more King's regiments of infantry in Bengal. There is a very fine regiment now here (the 84th), which has been thoroughly seasoned, and is extremely strong in point of numbers. At all events I hope you will reinforce our cavalry without delay, and at the same time send us some good cavalry officer to form the new corps.

With respect to the coast of Malabar I shall never think our affairs safe in that quarter until the whole tribe of peculators and plunderers has been severely punished, and until the Pyche Rajah has been reduced to unconditional submission. Our possessions on the coast of Malabar will become an incumbrance to us if they are not speedily brought into some condition of order. A more active and vigorous control is necessary. I cannot speak of Arcot and Tanjore until I have been upon the spot. You will find by the despatches, that in consequence of a failure in the payment of his kists, a part of the Rajah's country is fallen into our hands. The present state of India does not perhaps, on the whole, offer the most favourable occasion for the new settlement of the Musnud of Tanjore. If I should see cause for delay I shall not hesitate to postpone the deposition of the present Rajah to a more convenient time, according to the discretionary powers vested in me by the orders of the Secret Committee.

The only point which remains for consideration is the conduct to be observed towards Tippoo. You will find in the despatches that the Supreme Government still retain their opinion respecting our right to the district of Wynaad; but as they have directed that an amicable inquiry should take place on that question, the execution of your orders will become more easy.*

I have adverted in this Letter to the increased assiduity with which Tippoo has endeavoured to raise animosities against us among the Native Powers, and to his intercourse with Zemaun Shah. I wish to know from you, whether we ought to suffer, without animadversion and spirited representation, such open acts of hostility on the part of Tippoo? My ideas on this subject are, that as on the one hand we ought *never to use any high language towards Tippoo, nor ever attempt to deny him the smallest point of his just rights*, so on the other, where we have distinct proofs of his machinations against us, we ought to let him know that his treachery does not escape our observation, and to make him feel that he

* Mr. Dundas's verbal orders to Lord Mornington (given at Walmer Castle, in presence of Mr. Pitt, in October 1797) were to *restore* Wynaad to Tippoo without requiring any equivalent.

is within the reach of our vigilance. At present it appears to me that he is permitted to excite ill will against us wherever he pleases, without the least attempt on our part to reprehend either him for the suggestion, or the Court, to whom he applies, for listening to it.

This examination of the political state of India leads me to look at the situation in which we should find ourselves in that quarter in the event of the speedy conclusion of a peace with France.

The best peace we can expect will restore to the French all, and to the Dutch (whom I conceive as French under another name) a great part of their former possessions in India. The condition of the several Native Powers, both with relation to each other and to our interests, is more favourable to the success of French intrigue than it has been at any period since the peace of Seringapatam. We must therefore expect to be assailed on all sides by the combined operations of every species of instrument which can be set to work for the purpose of undermining the foundations of our credit, character, and power. You can best judge whether it may be possible to introduce into the Treaty of Peace any restrictions which shall tend to check, in any degree, the violence of this evil. But if there be truth in the views which I take of the state of India, and of the probable conduct of the French whenever they shall again obtain even their former footing in that country, how powerful an argument arises against permitting them to receive any addition of strength which might render them more respectable in the general scale of Indian power. I am persuaded that the possession of Ceylon, either in the hands of France or of her bond-slave Holland, would enable the French interests in India to rise, within a very short period, to a degree of formidable strength never before possessed by them. On this subject I find no difference of opinion in the minds of any person acquainted with India. The possession of Ceylon is universally held to be indispensable to the preservation both of our power on the Continent and of our commerce on the seas of India.

I am led by this observation to add a very few words with relation to this place:—

Before my arrival here I had formed very high ideas of the intrinsic value of the Cape as a colony, but I had not esti-

mated so highly its value with reference to the defence of our trade to the East, and of our territories in India.

You will have received from Lord Macartney such ample details with respect to the real value of this colony in point of revenue, and of every species of resource, that I shall say no more than that I am convinced it would require a long tract of time to render the Cape an object of any consideration in this view. You must consider it as a possession which cannot furnish the means of maintaining its own expense, and you must look for its value in the positive advantages it would afford to the enemy as a military and naval station for offensive purposes against you, and in the relative advantages which can be imagined to a power compelled to maintain a large European force in India. The climate is remarkably healthy, so much so that the appearance both of the officers and soldiers stationed here bears striking testimony to the fact; you will hardly see regiments in England of so healthy an appearance as those which have been here for any time. The heat is however frequently very severe, so that a soldier who has been here for a year or two is well accustomed to be exposed to a very ardent sun, and receives a sort of preparation for the climate of India. The advantage of this circumstance has lately been proved in India, where the regiments which had passed through the seasoning of this climate have arrived and continued in much better health than those which proceeded thither directly from Europe, or which remained here but for a very short period of time. As a depot, therefore, for the maintenance of a military force in India, the Cape is invaluable; and to the enemy, in this view, it would furnish easy means of pouring in troops either upon the coast of Coromandel or of Malabar, in such a state of health as to be able to encounter at once all the inconveniences of an Indian climate. With this opinion you may judge with what serious apprehension I should see this place in the hands of the enemy, to whose political consideration in India such a possession would always be a powerful accession, but at no time so formidable as in the present disturbed state of the Native Powers.

As a naval station I look upon the Cape to be still more important. Many ships in the Indian and China trade make the land upon the outward, and all upon the homeward-

bound, passage. The course of those even which keep farthest to the southward never is more distant from the Cape than two or three degrees of latitude. An enemy's squadron stationed at the Cape, could not fail to intercept the greater part of our trade to and from the East, without being under the necessity of making any very distant cruizes. We should find it impossible to check the operations of such a squadron, unless we could continue to send out with every trading fleet from Europe a convoy of such considerable force as must compel us greatly to increase our present naval establishments. The expense of fitting out such large fleets of ships of war, victualled and stored for the whole voyage to India or China, would be enormous; and here, in my opinion, is the point of the question upon which the whole argument must turn—which would be the heavier expense? to retain the Cape, keeping up a large naval and military establishment here, and using it as an outpost to your Indian empire, or to leave the Cape in the hands of the enemy, and by so doing incur the necessity of increasing to a vast amount the protecting naval force requisite for the defence of your Indian and China trade? The expense of the Cape in our hands, however large, must not be estimated at so much positive loss. There are two points of view in which that loss may be considered to be compensated by a proportional diminution of expense in other establishments. The army stationed at the Cape might always be looked upon as a part of the Indian force, and a correspondent saving ought to be made in the expense of your European army in India. Your Indian and China ships might, under proper regulations, be victualled at the Cape at a much cheaper rate than in Europe; consequently, their valuable cargoes both outward and homeward might be increased in proportion to the smaller quantity of tonnage occupied by their provisions. Instead of taking six months' provisions from Asia or Europe, they need not take more than three, and the vacant tonnage might serve for an augmentation of their cargoes of merchandize. In this view a great advantage would result to the East India Company from the possession of the Cape. The whole of this comparative statement might be reduced to calculation, and it would not be difficult for you at once to estimate the several articles of expense which must be incurred by the public in

either event, of retaining the Cape or of abandoning it to France.

But I doubt whether, with the Cape in the hands of the enemy, it would be possible for you to maintain your Indian trade or empire, unless you could acquire some other settlement on the southern continent of Africa. This I know to be Lord Macartney's opinion; and if this opinion be just, the question of the expense of maintaining the Cape will be materially varied.

To bring back this discussion to the point from which it proceeded, I trust you will bear in mind the state of the Native Powers in India at this moment; and recollecting that the greatest advantage which we now possess in the present deranged condition of those interests, which had been so wisely and judiciously balanced by the Treaty of Seringapatam, is the utter exclusion of any preponderant European Power from the scale of Indian politics, you will contend strenuously against any concession in the peace with France which may place the security of our Eastern trade and empire at her mercy.

Believe me, dear Sir, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

P. S. On reading over my letter I find that I have omitted to state one consideration relating to the value of the Cape as a military station. I believe the necessity of retaining Ceylon is now admitted universally. With the Cape in the hands of an enemy, would it be possible to retain Ceylon for any long period of time?

No. IV.

Lord Mornington to the Nabob of Arcot.

April 27th, 1798.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HIGHNESS,

It has given me great satisfaction to learn from General Harris that your Highness enjoys a good state of health. My first enquiries upon my arrival at Fort St. George were respecting your Highness's welfare.

I return your Highness many thanks for the several obliging messages which I have had the honor to receive from you.

I am very anxious to take the earliest opportunity of paying you my respects in person, and of presenting to you several letters which I am charged to deliver to you from his Majesty the King of Great Britain, from H. R. H. the Prince of Wales, H. R. H. the Duke of York, and the Marquess Cornwallis.

I will wait upon your Highness with great pleasure at any hour that you will be pleased to appoint on to-morrow, or any day that may be agreeable to you.

I have the honor to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

I date this letter from one of your Highness's houses in which Gen. Harris has placed me.

No. V.

The Prince of Wales to the Nabob of Arcot.

Carlton House, October 14, 1797.

The Nobleman who will deliver this Letter to your Highness, it is with the greatest satisfaction I inform you, is a particular friend of my own—he is justly celebrated for his great talents; and his private character being that of honour, moderation and mildness, must necessarily recommend him to the confidence and good opinion of your Highness.

I could say much more upon this subject, but when I acquaint you, that his Majesty had previously bestowed upon him the most eminent marks of royal favour, I am sure it must

be deemed useless to suggest any other proof how acceptable such a nomination must be to the interests of your Highness.

I shall conclude with expressing a hope that your Highness may long continue to enjoy that health and prosperity to which your exalted rank and character entitles you.

I am your affectionate Friend,
G. P. W.

No. VI.

Marquess Cornwallis to the Nabob of Arcot.

Whitehall, 17th October, 1797.

This letter will be delivered to your Highness by Lord Mornington, who is appointed Governor General, and who will pass some days at Madras on his way to Bengal.

Lord Mornington is my friend, and as I know that he entertains the same sentiments with myself respecting the affairs of India, I can venture to promise that he will behave towards you with kindness, and endeavour to promote your welfare and happiness.

Your Highness must remember the many conversations that we had on the situation of your father and your family, and the condition of your country, and how strongly I represented to you the distresses which your father had brought upon himself by listening to the advice of those Europeans who flattered him only to serve their own purposes, instead of trusting to the friendship and honor of the Company's Government.

I have frequently heard you confess that no European ever came to Chepauk House, but with an intention to take your father's money, and you gave me reason to believe that when you succeeded to the sovereignty of the country, you would endeavour to secure yourself from the attempts of a similar nature by removing to a greater distance from the scene of intrigue and corruption.

Whatever your present determination may be, I recommend to you to speak your mind openly and freely to Lord Mornington, whom you may safely trust, and who has no object in view but your interest and that of the Company, which in

the opinion of all men who wish well to both parties, must ever be inseparable.

I am your Highness's sincere Friend,
CORNWALLIS.

No. VII.

George III. to the Nabob of Arcot.

George the Third, by the Grace of God King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Christian Faith, Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburgh, Arch Treasurer and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, &c.,—To his Highness the Nawaub Omdal-ul Omrah Mayeen ul Mulk, Assad-ud Dowlah, Hussein Ally Cawn Bahawder Zulfattar Tung Sepah Surdan, Sovereign of the Carnatic, Payenghaut, and Ballanghaut.

Your Highness's letter of the 19th of March, 1796, has been safely delivered to us by our faithful servant Admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone, and we are convinced your Highness will learn with pleasure that, in order to give this excellent officer a proof of our entire satisfaction with the services he had rendered to our Crown, to your Highness, and to the East India Company during his command in India, we have conferred upon him a mark of our Royal favor by raising him to the dignity of the peerage in our kingdom of Ireland.

The happiness we at all times derive from your Highness's friendly correspondence has been on this occasion deeply affected on observing the differences which appear to exist between your Highness and our faithful servant Lord Hobart, who, whatever momentary inconvenience your Highness may have experienced from his conduct, we are confident could be actuated by no other motive than an anxious desire to ensure the permanent welfare and honor of your Highness, and the happiness and prosperity of your people.

These important considerations we well know to be also the grounds of your Highness's conduct, and we earnestly recommend to you to be assured that the Counsels of our Ministers at home, and the wishes of the East India Company and its Servants, are ever directed to these objects.

The East India Company has appointed our right trusty and right well beloved Cousin and Councillor, Richard, Earl of Mornington, in our kingdom of Ireland, Baron Wellesley in our kingdom of Great Britain, and Knight of the most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, to be Governor General in India.

Our experience of his conciliatory temper, and many eminent virtues and abilities in various offices he has held for many years under our Crown, induced us to recommend him to this high and important station. These distinguished qualities are so many pledges to us, that the exercise of the power vested in him will be such as to conciliate your Highness's entire confidence and esteem, and that your Highness will endeavour on all occasions to cultivate his friendship and good will, by co-operating with him in all his salutary views for the happiness of your Highness, and of your subjects, and for strengthening and confirming the engagements of amity and union subsisting between your Highness and the East India Company.

From our experience of the felicity derived from our constant paternal love and care of all our subjects, we are persuaded your Highness will best promote your individual happiness and tranquillity, by shewing yourself on all occasions just, benevolent and merciful to all those whom the Almighty has placed under your protection, by calling to His presence your august Father, His former servant.

This line of conduct, an inviolable fidelity in all your engagements, and an unreserved confidence in, and support of, the measures the wisdom of the Earl of Mornington may suggest, cannot fail to ensure to your Highness the continuance of the most sincere friendship on the part of the East India Company, and of our alliance and protection.

We embrace this opportunity of informing your Highness that, on the 11th of this month, one of our fleets obtained a most brilliant and decisive victory over the grand fleet of Holland, of which more than one half was taken and is brought into our ports. An event so glorious to our arms, and of such importance to the security of all our possessions, and of India in particular, will, we are persuaded, afford your Highness great satisfaction.

We have only further to assure you of the lively interest

we take in every thing that concerns your Highness, and the happiness we at all times feel when your Highness's friendly letters are delivered into our hands.

And so we bid you farewell.

No. VIII.

Memorandum at Fort St. George.

Fort St. George, May 8, 1798.

His Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic, having expressed his desire, that a new arrangement should take place with respect to the Polygars, and to several other points, communicated by his Highness in conversation and in writing to Lord Mornington, and his Highness having also complained, that under the present arrangement of his monthly payments, he was compelled at a particular period of every year to raise money upon assignments of the revenues of the country, which forms the security for the payment of the Company's military subsidy, Lord Mornington declared his cordial disposition to enter upon the consideration of his Highnesses propositions, provided his Highness would consent to permit the servants of the Company, to become the managers of the several districts in the Carnatic mortgage for the payment of the annual military subsidy. This condition Lord Mornington proposed, as the only effectual remedy which could be applied to the injurious system of anticipating the revenues of the mortgaged districts by loans and Tunkhwahs, or other modes of assignment; a system, which the Honorable the Court of Directors has declared to be contrary to the letter, and subversive of the spirit of the treaty of 1792.

No. IX.

From Governor Duncan.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 23rd May, 1798.

I beg leave, on the occasion of this first communication, to assure your lordship that it's not having been earlier has cer-

tainly proceeded from no other motive than a reluctance to appear forwardly intrusive on your lordship's time, having otherwise little else to impart than what will have much sooner reached you through the correspondence of the Commissioners in Malabar and of the Board here, with the Government of Fort St. George, and with the acting Governor-General; nor have our latest advices from the coast tended hitherto to throw any satisfactory light on what may be the Sultan's intentions, but should he have been induced to more peaceable councils, so fortunate a change must, no doubt, have been the happy effect of the influence of your lordship's opportune arrival, and of its consequences.

Being still, however, uncertain here as to the event, I think your lordship may consider as meriting some degree of attention, the following memoranda, collected from such information as could be furnished by Captain Smedley and the officers of the *Raymond*, from the opportunities they had whilst in company with their captors of deriving insight into the views of the French as connected with Tippoo; all which seems but too corroborative of the other indications on the same subject, which were such as to have induced us very earnestly to convey all the knowledge we possessed on the subject to the Admiral, with the hope of thereby frustrating the arrival of succours to Tippoo by the way of Mangalore, as might, no doubt, have been ensured but for the early departure of the *Suffolk* and *Arrogant* to the other coast, which was immediately followed by the surprise and capture of our Indiamen, the loss from which to the Company will not, including the *Amelia* destroyed by fire, exceed four lacks and thirty thousand rupees, instead of the very large amount which by the newspapers it appears to have been understood to amount to on the other side of India, and we have taken measures to provide against the recurrence of such a misfortune by fixing the seat of the commercial residency at Cannanore, under the guns of which fortress several Indiamen may at a time, or separately, find effectual protection from any enemy.

With the best wishes for the success and honour of your lordship's administration, and the sincerest desire to contribute towards it by every exertion that in my station I can

make, as well as thence to merit and enjoy the gratification of your lordship's correspondence and advice.

I have the honor to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's very obedient humble servant,

The Rt. Hon. the Earl of MORNINGTON, K. P. JOHN DUNCAN.

&c. &c. &c., Bengal.

[The Memoranda gives the evidence of some English prisoners on board *La Preneuse* French frigate, as to a copy of the proceedings at the Isle of France, in reference to Tippoo Sultaun's embassy having been hung up in the state cabin of *La Preneuse*, whose officers repeatedly inquired whether Tippoo had not already declared war against the East India Company.]

No. X.

Minute of the Governor-General on Tanjore. 31st of May, 1798.

I take this early opportunity of communicating to the Board the annexed Letter, delivered to me by the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors, containing the final judgment of the Government at home upon the important question of the succession to the Musnud of Tanjore; together with the orders to the Government of Fort St. George, and to myself for executing that judgment. Upon my arrival at Fort St. George I had the satisfaction to learn that the general state of India in relation to the internal situation of our possessions, as well as to external politics, was such as would admit of the immediate execution of the orders of the Secret Committee, but other material considerations occurred to my mind which led me to conclude that some modification in the manner of carrying those orders into effect was necessary, for the purpose of securing the attainment of the substantial ends of justice, to which the views of the Secret Committee were principally directed.

By the annexed despatch the appointment of a Commission to examine and report the real state of the country of Tanjore is ordered, as a step preparatory to the ultimate measure of placing Serfagee upon the Musnud.

From the best information which I could collect during my stay at Madras, I am convinced that while a large portion of the country shall remain in the hands of the present Rajah, and while his authority shall be acknowledged to be lawful, the inquiries of such a Commission would be embarrassed in every shape, and frustrated in the end; and that the final result would prove equally prejudicial to the interests of Serfoguee, and highly injurious to the prosperity and happiness of the people of Tanjore.

To enable the Commission to prosecute their inquiries with any prospect of success, it would be necessary that they should have access to all the accounts of the Palace, and that they should have powers to require the attendance of all persons whom they might deem capable of furnishing them with information respecting the real state of the country.

It could not be expected that the present Rajah would willingly give his consent to an inquiry which must terminate in exposing his evil administration, or that, if he could be prevailed upon to acquiesce in such a measure, he would not oppose to its progress obstacles which no diligence or activity could overcome, and which must render the whole investigation abortive.

The report of a Commission so embarrassed must have proved insufficient to answer the views entertained by the Secret Committee of founding upon it the basis of a new settlement for the country of Tanjore.

In addition to this consideration, it would have been impossible to expect that a Commission under such circumstances could have produced a report within any short period of time. The information which I received at Madras convinced me that no report could be made by such a Commission within a shorter space of time than ten or twelve months; a degree of delay as contrary to the spirit of the orders of the Secret Committee as to the substantial purposes of justice.

It could never have been in the contemplation of the Government at home, after the solemn adjudication of the Musnud to Serfoguee, to postpone to so distant a day, by an act of their own, his final restoration to his acknowledged rights.

For so long a period of time it would not have been possible, by any degree of vigilance, to have concealed the real

object of the inquiry from the anxious mind of the present possessor of the Musnud of Tanjore.

Under such circumstances Amer Sing would no longer have felt any interest in the welfare of the country, or in fulfilling the stipulations of the Treaty of 1792 with regard to his payments to the Company; and it cannot be doubted that he and his adherents would have endeavoured, by every means in their power, to protract the investigation, in order to avail themselves of the interval for the purposes of extortion and embezzlement.

The consequences to the interests of Serfogee, to those of the Company, and to the welfare of the people of Tanjore, are evident.

To have appointed a Commission without the consent of the present Rajah, and to have empowered them to act independently of his authority, would have been considered by him, as well as by the other powers of India, as a violation of the Treaty of 1792, to which we are bound to adhere so long as we continue to recognize him as the lawful Prince of Tanjore.

To obviate these difficulties, I determined previously to my departure from Fort St. George to place Serfogee upon the Musnud with all practicable dispatch, and to direct that the necessary inquiries into the state of the country should be made after his accession; when I have no doubt that they may be prosecuted with facility, and may furnish materials for a final arrangement of the affairs of Tanjore conformable to the orders of the Secret Committee, and equally beneficial to all parties.

The inquiry into the relative rights of Serfogee and Amer Sing having been prosecuted principally at this residency, and it being necessary for the honour and reputation of the British name to accompany the deposition of the latter with a full explanation of the grounds on which so important a measure was determined, I did not think it advisable to issue my final orders to the Government of Fort St. George until I had been enabled, by a reference to those who had been employed in the conduct of the inquiry in Bengal, to frame a distinct statement of its nature and object.

Accordingly I have postponed my ultimate instructions to the Government of Fort St. George until the present mo-

ment; it is now my intention to direct that Government to place Serfogee upon the Musnud of Tanjore without further delay.

I propose to leave it to that Government to make such arrangements as they may deem advisable for carrying this measure into execution in the most expeditious manner, and for guarding against any disturbance or insult to the Rajah, Amer Sing, or his family. I trust, however, there are no reasons to apprehend any such event.

It will be proper, notwithstanding, before the present Rajah is apprised of the intentions of Government, that precautions should be taken for preventing the removal of any of the public treasure, jewels, or papers from the Palace; and I think it advisable that the resident, the commanding officer of the troops, and any other persons whom the Government of Fort St. George may direct to accompany the Resident for that purpose, should be ordered to fix their seals on the apartments in which such papers or effects are lodged, until Serfogee shall be established on the Musnud.

No time should be lost in removing Amer Sing from Tanjore to whatever place the Government of Fort St. George may think proper, and a suitable guard should be stationed with him for his protection: his future place of residence will be determined by circumstances.

I have prepared for the Rajah, Amer Sing, to be delivered to him on announcing the decision of the Company, a letter, communicating the grounds of the judgment in favour of the right of Serfogee, and assuring him that his person shall be protected; and that whatever shall be adjudged to be his private property, and not to belong to the Sircar, shall be secured to him, together with a suitable provision for his maintenance so long as he shall conduct himself in all respects to the satisfaction of the Government of Fort St. George.

Immediately after Serfogee shall have been placed upon the Musnud, it will be proper to cause a proclamation (of which I now lay a copy before the Board), with translations in all the country languages, and copies of all the questions stated to the Pundits regarding the succession both here and at Fort St. George, to be fixed up in the most public places in Tanjore.

A letter has also been prepared, to be delivered to Ser-

fogee on communicating to him the decision in favour of his right to the Musnud; and the Government of Fort St. George shall be instructed to require, at the same time, his assent to the following stipulations, which, however they may be authorized to modify in case any circumstance of which I may not at present be apprised, should render such modification necessary:—

First, That he will acquiesce in the appointment of a Commission, to consist of Company's servants, for the purpose of inquiring into the present state and resources of Tanjore.

Secondly, That he will allow the Commission to have access to all the public accounts and records of the country, whether deposited in the Palace or elsewhere.

Thirdly, That he will cause the attendance of all persons whom the Commission may require to appear before them for the purposes of their inquiry; and that he will afford them every assistance in his power for the speedy and successful accomplishment of it.

Fourthly, That until the Commission shall have closed the proposed inquiry, and until the arrangements which may be agreed upon in consequence shall have been carried into effect, the Treaty of 1793 shall continue in full force, in the same manner as if no change had taken place in the succession, and consequently the servants of the Company shall retain the management of the Soubahs, which have been assumed in consequence of the failure of Amer Sing in the payment of his kists.

Fifthly, That whenever the Commission shall have terminated the proposed inquiry, he will consent to such arrangements as the Government of Fort St. George, with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, may deem expedient for the better management of his country, and particularly for the due administration of justice; and also for securing to the Company the more regular discharge of their existing and future demands on Tanjore.

Sixthly, That he, jointly with the Government of Fort St. George, will engage to afford full protection to the persons of Amer Sing and his family, and that he will secure to Amer Sing such property as that Government may determine not to belong to the Sircar; and also that he will pay to Amer Sing punctually, through the Government of Fort St. George, such

sum for his maintenance as that Government may think reasonable, so long as Amer Sing shall conduct himself in every respect to their satisfaction.

Considering the disorders that have prevailed in Tanjore since the accession of Amer Sing, the little experience which Serfogee can be supposed to possess with respect to the management of his affairs, and his want of proper officers for the conduct of business, added to the heavy demands which he must discharge immediately upon his accession, I am convinced that it would be equally conducive to his interests, and to those of the Company, that in addition to the several stipulations which I have now detailed, Serfogee should consent to transfer the entire charge of the country of Tanjore to the Government of Fort St. George for a period of one or more years after his accession, that Government engaging to be accountable to him for whatever should be collected from the country beyond the amount of the annual sum due to the Company under the Treaty of 1792, and also affording him a sufficient allowance for the maintenance of his rank.

I do not however think it proper to direct the Government of Fort St. George to make any proposition to him to this effect. The Secret Committee have most justly remarked, that as it is our duty to interfere in the settlement of the succession to the Musnud of Tanjore, for the purpose of remedying that injustice which originated in our former interference, so it would afford just cause of reproach against us, if, after such a lapse of time, the Native Powers of India were to observe us interfering in the present instance in order to carry into effect any forfeiture in our own favour. I deem it of the greatest importance to the national honour, that no grounds should be afforded for suspicion, that the change in the succession had been dictated by a desire to extend our influence in the country, or by any other motives than those of a strict regard to justice.

Should, however, the Rajah be sensible of his inability to enter on the immediate arrangement of the country, and express a desire to the Government of Fort St. George that they should for that reason assume the temporary charge of it, that Government will have my sanction to acquiesce in his wishes on the terms I have already stated.

Should the Rajah determine to undertake the charge of the

part of the country which has not been assumed under the Treaty of 1792, I am of opinion that every indulgence ought to be shown to him with regard to his first payments, and that the provisions of the Treaty of 1792, for cases of failure, should not be put in force against him until he has had adequate time to effect his payments from the resources of the country.

To this indulgence, however, I think it will be proper to annex a condition, that the Rajah shall pay due attention to the recommendation of the Commission in the selection of his ministers, and of his other principal officers, as the only means of convincing us that the indulgence will not be abused.

I am also of opinion that, if it should be found necessary, the Government of Fort St. George should assist the new Rajah, by guaranteeing to the Soucars the repayment of such pecuniary advances as they should make to him for the cultivation of the country, provided that the amount of such advances be limited and applied by the advice and under the superintendence of the Commission. The Commission should also be empowered to require from the Rajah such security as they may deem sufficient to preclude the difficulties that might arise from the failure of the Rajah in the repayment of any sum advanced to him by the Soucars upon the credit of the Company.

I recommend that the Commission should consist of three persons; and as I am satisfied that the Government of Fort St. George are equally sensible with myself how deeply the honour of the Company and of the British nation is concerned in repairing the injuries which the country of Tanjore and its lawful prince have sustained by the usurpation of Amer Sing, and how much the attainment of this important object must depend on the conduct of the Commission, I have the fullest confidence that they will select for it those servants of their establishment who are best qualified to discharge so sacred a trust.

The Government of Fort St. George will furnish the Commission with such detailed instructions as they may think proper. I recommend to their particular attention the following points, which appear to me of essential importance, but which I would authorise that Government to adopt, with

such alterations as they may think the circumstances require.

Besides obtaining the most exact information of the state and resources of the country, the attention of the Commissioners should be directed to lay a foundation for its future improvement.

For this purpose they should endeavour to recall the inhabitants, who are said to have emigrated from Tanjore during the administration of Amer Sing, by offers of pecuniary aid or by such other measures as they may deem most likely to prove effectual; but above all their attention should be directed to the repair of the mounds and water-courses, and other works of a similar nature.

All oppressive taxes and exactions, and other abuses which may have been introduced under the administration of Amer Sing should be abolished, and such arrangements as local circumstances will admit, should be made for defining, as far as may be practicable, the rights of the cultivators of the lands, and of all other persons, from whom the revenues of the country of whatever nature may be collected.

I trust that little difficulty will arise in introducing these arrangements into the districts already under the charge of the servants of the Company, or in obtaining the Rajah's consent to the extension of them to the Soubahs which have not been assumed, should the Rajah retain those Soubahs under his charge.

With a view of securing to the people the benefit of those arrangements, and the advantages of effectual protection in their persons and properties, the attention of the Commission should be directed by the instructions of the Government of Fort St. George to the speedy establishment of Courts for the Administration of Justice in civil and criminal cases. Upon this subject, which I deem to be one of the most important branches of the powers to be delegated to the Commission, it does not appear to me at present proper, or indeed practicable, to give any detailed orders; but I shall take the earliest opportunity, after the receipt of the report of the commission, to lay before the Board such a system for the better administration of justice in Tanjore as shall appear suitable to the circumstances of that country, and to the manners and customs of the inhabitants.

With regard to the nature of the further security which it may be proper to require from the Rajah for the more regular discharge of his payments, I am not at present prepared to offer any decided opinion on this important subject until I shall have received the report of the Commission to be appointed for ascertaining the real extent and nature of the resources of Tanjore. This subject must, however, form one of the early objects of the attention of the Commission, and I shall be anxious to receive their sentiments, with the opinion of the Government of Fort St. George, respecting it.

My inquiries during my continuance at Fort St. George were directed through every channel of information which I could discover, to ascertain how far the expectations of the Secret Committee with respect to the improvement of the revenues of Tanjore, and to the consequent augmentation of the Rajah's annual payments to the Company, were likely to be fulfilled. The result of this investigation, which, however, was necessarily incomplete, leads me to apprehend that the Secret Committee have formed rather too sanguine a calculation of the expected produce of the revenues of Tanjore. The amount of those revenues depends entirely upon the annual price of grain, which fluctuates every year, according to the state of the crops in Tanjore, and to the necessities of other countries. In 1793, the year upon which the Committee found their calculation, the effects of war, and famine in the neighbouring countries, had caused an extraordinary demand for the exportation of grain, which necessarily raised the price in Tanjore far beyond the usual average. Whatever increase may be expected from future improvements in the management of the country, I cannot find, upon the produce of the year 1793, an expectation of a permanent augmentation of revenue to the extent supposed by the Secret Committee.

I think it my duty to suggest these doubts with respect to the probability of any considerable increase of receipts from the Rajah of Tanjore, for the purpose of calling the attention of the Board to a subject which has anxiously engaged that of the Secret Committee, and which will demand the most ample investigation whenever the report of the Commission shall have furnished sufficient information to enable me to pursue it with effect.

MORNINGTON.

No. XI.

To the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bombay, 3d June, 1798.

As I left England on the 18th of February, this letter, and those which accompany it, will probably give you the first information of my *intended* nomination to the Government of Ceylon. I can call it as yet no more than intended, as I received orders from Mr. Dundas to take my departure on board of the first fleet that should sail; and to wait for my commission and instructions at Bombay. What that commission and those instructions may be, I cannot positively say; I am pretty well assured that Mr. Dundas's intention is to avoid, as much as possible, the inconvenience of giving up the island at present to the Company, and the very great one of rendering it entirely independent of the Company's Government; but in what manner these ends will be accomplished, I cannot pretend to guess. By a debate in the India House, which your Lordship will read in the papers, and which took place since I left London, it seems as if Mr. Dundas had given a promise, that in case the island should be preserved at the peace, the Crown would resign it to the Company; but for this supposition I have no authority but the newspapers, and my private opinion of the propriety of the measure. All that I know is, that when I left London, three weeks before my embarkation Mr. Dundas had decided that my nomination and that of the other political and military servants of the Government should derive from the Crown; but that at the same time I should be put under the direction and controul of the Governor General. The revenues of the island were to be given immediately to the Company, so that in respect to the administration of them, I should be precisely in the situation of the Presidents of Madras and Bombay, but without a Council. Such being (as I hope it will) the spirit of my instructions, the words of my commission can signify very little. For I am so perfectly convinced of the necessity of all the parts of the Great Indo-British Empire being actuated by one spirit, that I shall consider myself exactly in the same situation with the Govern-

ments of Madras and Bombay, not only in *effect*, but even in *form*, as far as the consciences of the Crown lawyers, and the King's Ministers will allow. In all probability (whether we keep the island or no), I shall be the last King's Governor of it; and as I hope to remain all that time under your direction, I trust that the anomalous nature of my situation will not occasion any inconvenience to either of us.

I have the honour in the meantime to remain, with the greatest respect and regard,

My dear Lord,

Your most obedient and faithful Servant,

FREDERIC NORTH.

No. XII.

To the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bombay, 5th June, 1798.

I have written another private letter to the Governor General, who, I suppose, will wish to account for the arrival in India of a person unhouseled, unappointed, unannealed as I am; with seven or eight more of his Majesty's Servants in embryo, who, like myself, have as yet no security for their employment but the word of Ministers; a sea voyage of four months, and the expense of necessary preparations. From a conversation which I had with you last summer, I should imagine that my appointment to the government of Ceylon would not surprise you. Mr. Dundas, however, did not communicate his intentions on that subject to me till very late in November. Too favourable an idea of the resources of that island had at that time made him resolve on keeping it entirely in the King's hands; of which system, however, more mature reflection made him see the inexpediency and, as it was thought impossible to treat about a possession already ceded to the Company, he at length determined to retain the government and the sovereignty for the Crown, but he gave up to the Company the entire administration and disposal of the revenue, instructing at the same time the future Governor to consider himself as under the direction of the Governor General. How this was to be accomplished was taken *ad referendum*; but the unfortunate person destined

to that employment, together with the Secretary to the Government, and the Clerks in the office, was obliged to set out from London in January, and from the Isle of Wight in February, under the assurance of finding commissions and instructions at Bombay. As our passage has been rather a short one, I am not surprised at the non-arrival of those very necessary papers; and as, in the short time of my service, I have had many proofs of the spirit of patience and long suffering with which the public officers are blessed, from the chiefs to the lowest clerks, in respect to the expedition of instruments, which vulgar minds would have prepared, written, and dispatched in half an hour; I cannot say that I shall be much astonished if I do not receive them these three months. What I am more anxious about is the substance and nature of them. There are so many objections to be made to every arrangement hitherto proposed, and such considerable changes appear to have taken place in the intentions of Government, (if one may judge from the speeches of their friends in the India House) since I left London, that I am perfectly uncertain how the business will be settled. At the same time I have the satisfaction of knowing that I have taken every step in my power to render every possible arrangement easy and simple. My appointments are to be ten thousand a-year, commencing from the day of my embarkation, which was the thirty-first of January. Those of Mr. Cleg-horn three thousand, and those of the other gentlemen employed, altogether fourteen hundred and fifty. The Commander-in-Chief is, I hope, to be Lieutenant Governor; but that is not quite certain. I own that I think the sending out more Europeans than necessary to a Government so little likely to remain with the Crown, may occasion much inconvenience, and I took care in my recommendations to avoid, as much as possible, any incumbrance to the Crown or the Company on that head.

Lord Clive was expected to leave England in March or April. I am glad to find that India has so many charms besides the *beaux yeux de la cassetta*, that men with sixteen thousand a-year in possession, and two and twenty thousand in expectancy are enamoured of her; and I am very glad that those charms were not discovered sooner lest my poor little island of cinnamon should have been carried off by some more

powerful suitor than an indigent younger brother. But what really gives me great pleasure is that Lord Clive is a very good-natured, right-headed, sensible man, and exactly the person we could wish for—you, as a *tributary Prince*, I as a *neighbouring Potentate*.

I have little public news to tell you, and that little by no means comfortable; every body engaged in abusing the assessed taxes or the modifications in them. Threats of invasion on rafts of half a mile long by a quarter broad, which all but sailors think impossible; the first peer of the realm toasting the sovereignty of the people at a Jacobin meeting, and a great depression of spirits (God knows why) throughout the country, are what I left in England. Since that a Portuguese ship we spoke with near the Canaries, informed us that the Spanish fleet was at sea, and Lord St. Vincent's gone after it.

Your dear country, Ireland, is as troublesome as ever; though the new Commander-in-Chief seems to be liked both by castle and country. It is reported that the Chancellor and the Government there are no longer very cordial, but I do not absolutely know the truth of that report.

In France a new *Fructidor* was every moment expected, in which Barras and François de Neufchateau, the new Moderatists, would probably be sent to Guiana. Switzerland had been invaded, made peace with, and invaded again, and Rome was on the point of being devoured by an irruption of Cispadanes, and France, on a pretence of a riot at Rome executed by themselves, in which a French General was murdered; the fate of the German Empire was uncertain; so was the disposition of the new King of Prussia. At first it had a favourable appearance, but politics are so profligate at present, that a share of plunder may overturn the wisest and honestest determinations.

Believe me ever with the sincerest regard,

My dear Lord,

Your most obedient faithful Servant,

FREDERIC NORTH.

No. XIII.

To General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 9th June, 1798.

Although I imagine that the enclosed Proclamation must have reached you, I think it most advisable to transmit a copy of it to you. There seems to be so little doubt that the Proclamation really was published at the Mauritius, that it must become a matter of serious discussion between this Government and Tippoo. How such a discussion may terminate it is utterly impossible to say. Perhaps the result of it may be to prove that M. Malartic has exaggerated, or wholly misrepresented the intentions of Tippoo; but on the other hand, if Tippoo should choose to avow the objects of his embassy to have been such as are described in the Proclamation, the consequences may be very serious, and may ultimately involve us in the calamity of war. I wish you to be apprised of my apprehensions on this subject, and to prepare your mind for the possible event. You will, therefore, turn your attention to the means of collecting a force, if necessity should unfortunately require it; but it is not my desire that you should proceed to take any public steps towards the assembling of the army before you receive some further intimation from me.

I have the honour, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XIV.

Extract from a Minute of the Gov. General, [Financial] 12th June, 1798

In urging the necessity of attempting the reduction of our expences, I do not mean to recommend that species of improvident economy which in this country, above all others, would ultimately prove real profusion, and the source of every abuse. I do not mean to deprive persons holding laborious and responsible stations of the liberal reward to which they are justly entitled, and which ought upon every ground, both of policy and justice, to furnish them with the means of acquiring a competent fortune, and of returning to their native country within a moderate period of service. This principle in my opinion is

the foundation of the present system of government in India; and it should always be held sacred and inviolable in every attempt to revise the Indian establishments. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe, that establishments of such magnitude and intricacy as those of the British Empire in India, should not in the course of time require frequent revision.

Without therefore pledging myself to the amount of any saving which may ultimately appear practicable, I propose immediately to commence a general revision of all public establishments of Bengal, and to direct the adoption of a similar measure at Madras and Bombay, as well as at all our subordinate settlements, and in all our recent acquisitions from the enemy.

My intention is that the revision of the Civil Establishment of Bengal, should be made under my own immediate superintendence, with the assistance of the acting President of the Board of Revenue, Mr. Bebb, one of the Members of the Board of Trade, and the Accountant General, &c. Mr. Tucker sub-secretary in the Judicial and Revenue Department.

These gentlemen, I propose to appoint to be a committee for the purpose already mentioned; Mr. Tucker to act as Secretary to the Committee.

The proceedings of the Committee may be laid before the Board, either when the enquiry shall be completed, or occasionally, as circumstances may require.

No better principles can I think be prescribed for the conduct of the proposed measure, than those laid down in the minute of Lord Cornwallis, recorded on the proceedings (v. No. 13.) in the secret and separate department of the 31st January, 1788, when the last general revision of the Establishments under this Presidency took place.

I recommend, therefore, that the Committee shall be furnished with such parts of those proceedings as relate to the Civil Establishments, together with copies of all papers relating to the alterations which have been subsequently made on them; in order that the Committee may know the grounds on which all the existing Establishments have been formed, and consequently may be able to judge, how far change of circumstances or any other cause, may have ren-

dered any alteration necessary, either in the constitution of any Department of Government, or in the allowances annexed to any existing office. Any relief in the Military branch of our expences, must arise either from reductions in the effective strength of the Army, or in the number of Troops on field allowances, or from the reform of any Offices or Official Establishments, which may be found superfluous.

A reduction of our effective strength, attended with any degree of danger to the public safety, would frustrate its own object. On the other hand, whenever it shall appear, that the circumstances which led to the late augmentation of our Military Establishments no longer exist, and that no new causes have arisen to require the maintenance of so large a force, it will be our duty to relieve the finances of this Government from that part of our heavy Military charge.

It will be my care to watch with the utmost degree of anxiety, the favourable moment when this desirable measure may be adopted, without incurring that risk, which might defeat its expected effects.

Without entering into any minute detail of the actual state of the Political system of India, it will be sufficient to observe, that, although I perceive no circumstance either in the present disposition, or in the actual strength and condition of the Native Powers, which should afford reason to apprehend the approach of hostilities from any quarter, I do not think it consistent with prudence to reduce our Army, until we shall have been enabled to ascertain with more accuracy the designs of Tippoo Sultan, and of Zemaun Shah, and until the settlement of the Province of Oude shall have acquired more vigour and consistency. In the mean while, however, I request that the Commander in Chief, will undertake on the principles prescribed by Lord Cornwallis in the minute of the 31st January, 1788, the revision of such parts of the Military Establishments as are neither connected with the effective strength of the Army, nor with the pay and allowances of the different Ranks fixed by the Honorable the Court of Directors, and by this Government.

At present, I shall propose to reduce merely two articles of our Military Charges, which rest on grounds entirely distinct from any to which I have adverted.

The first, the regiment of Hindostannee cavalry, purchased

for two lacs of rupees from Mr. De Boigne, in February, 1796; which I propose to transfer to the Nabob Vizier on the same terms.

I am aware that it is desirable to reduce rather than to augment the force of the Vizier. Whatever troops, however, it may be thought advisable for him to maintain, should be capable of effective service, this regiment may be substituted in the room of any other corps that he may be induced to disband.

The troops now quartered in the Fort of Allahabad, are I understand at present upon the Vizier's allowances, and the Commander in Chief has stated to me sufficient reasons, for continuing that indulgence to them until the 1st August next, but from that period I think it would be advisable (and I have the satisfaction to state the concurrent opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, as will appear by his minute upon this subject), that those allowances should cease, and that in future the garrison of Allahabad, should receive the same allowances with that of Chunar. Quarters will of course be provided for the European troops at Allahabad, and no reason can exist against placing them in every respect on the same footing with those attached to the garrison of Chunar.

The revision of the several branches of our revenue may very properly be referred to the same Committee appointed to revise our Civil Establishments under my inspection. It is not possible to form any accurate estimate of the improvement of our resources which may be the result of such an inquiry; I am aware that the demand of Government on the landholders is fixed in perpetuity, and consequently that no addition can be made to the land revenue. Even under different circumstances, I would not recommend any additional assessment, considering the land to be already taxed as highly as is consistent with the interests of the Company and the prosperity of the country. Perhaps, however, regulations for accelerating the recovery of outstanding balances might be devised, without injury or oppression to the landholders, or to the cultivators of the soil.

The customs, the stamp duties and the tax on spirituous liquors, may admit of considerable improvements either in the mode of collection, or by the variation of the rates, and other

sources of revenue may be devised without injury to the country.

In directing the extension of these measures to the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, I shall propose the regulations of their civil and military establishments on the same principles of justice and liberality which constitute the rules of this Government. It will also be a leading object of my propositions on this part of the subject to connect with the reform of the Civil Establishments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and of our territories upon the coast of Malabar, the introduction of the system of internal administration of justice and collection of revenue established in Bengal with so much advantage to the Government and to the people.

The extension of this system to our possessions upon the coast is an object of great anxiety to the authorities in England.

Under all the circumstances of the present moment, I do not think it would be advisable to propose the reduction of any part of the effective strength of our armies on the Coast of Coromandel or Malabar.

The Governments of Fort St. George and of Bombay should be directed to revise the several branches of their revenue in the same manner as shall be adopted at this Presidency; I trust that I shall find in the Governments of Fort St. George and of Bombay, as well as in their Servants selected for the execution of these important measures, the same degree of zeal for the public interests and of alacrity in promoting their improvement, which I have had the satisfaction to observe in every department of the Company's Service in Bengal. The situation of our affairs, although happily exempt from any immediate danger of the calamity of war, demands the most spirited exertions of every upright Servant of the Company, as well as the cordial co-operation of every sincere friend to the prosperity of the British interests in India.

MORNINGTON.

No. XV.

To Tippoo Sultaun.—Written the 14th June, 1798.

Immediately on my arrival in Bengal Sir Alured Clarke communicated to me your friendly letter to him, stating that some people of the Coorgah country, having descended from the woods and mountains, had fixed their residence in the villages of Kauntamunghe and Coloorbogee, &c.

[Recapitulate the contents of the letter.]

Sir Alured Clarke has also communicated to me your answer to the letter from the late Governor-General, Sir John Shore, respecting the claims of the Company and of your Highness to the district of Wynaad, bordering on Tambercherry. Being anxious to afford you every proof in my power of my sincere desire to maintain the good understanding which had so long subsisted between your Highness and the Company, I made it one of the first objects of my attention to examine all the papers existing on the Company's records, as well respecting Wynaad as the district of Sauleah, in which it appears that Kauntamungle and Coloorbajee are situated. From these papers I find that not only the right to the districts of Wynaad and Sauleah has remained in doubt, but also to the district of Amerah, and Ersawaraseemy, and to some other considerable territories on the side of Malabar. Your Highness is well aware that it is a maxim among states who are sincerely disposed to maintain the relations of amity and peace, to bring all contested points of this nature to a speedy determination. A seasonable and temperate discussion of those differences of opinion, which must occasionally arise between Powers of the most pacific disposition, tends to prevent quarrels between their subordinate officers, and to obviate the misrepresentations which each party is apt in such cases to make to the respective Governments. This is the most friendly as well as the most prudent course, and will always defeat the views of interested and designing persons, who may wish to foment jealousy, and to disturb the blessing of peace. For this object Lord Cornwallis, the Nawab Nizam Ali Khaun, and the Peishwa Pundit Perd'haun wisely provided in the treaty of peace concluded with your Highness at Seringapatam, by establishing

a regular mode of bringing to an amicable adjustment, with the knowledge and approbation of all parties, any questions which might hereafter arise between your Highness and any of the allies respecting the boundaries of your adjacent territories. I am persuaded that it is your Highness's disposition to maintain faithfully your public engagements with the Company. On my part you will always meet with a religious adherence to every article of the treaties subsisting between us. On this occasion, therefore, it is my intention to depute a respectable and discreet person to meet, upon your frontier, such of your officers as your Highness may please to name, for the purpose of conferring together, of discussing the grounds of the respective claims, and of satisfying each other on all points respecting which any doubts may be entertained on either side.

It would not be consistent with your Highness's high reputation for justice and good faith to refuse to enter into this candid investigation; I therefore entertain no doubt that as soon as you shall have fully understood the nature of this representation you will afford every facility to the conduct of the necessary inquiries, and will use your endeavours to bring them to a speedy determination; and for this purpose that you will, without delay, direct your officers at Koual Bunder (or Mangalore) to enter into conference with those deputed by the managers of the Honourable Company's affairs on the coast of Malabar. The result of the conferences will be communicated to me by the Government of Bombay with all practicable dispatch; and you may rely upon it, that after regular discussion shall have taken place, according to the established law of nations, and to the practice uniformly observed on every occasion of disputed boundary which has arisen between your Highness and the allies since the conclusion of the Treaty of Seringapatam, I will not suspend for one moment the full acknowledgment of whatever shall appear to be your just right.

In the meantime, as the districts of Amerah and Souleah have been in the possession of the Coorgah Rajah for several years, your Highness will no doubt see the propriety and justice of recalling the troops sent into the neighbourhood of Souleah. Your Highness must be sensible that until I have been satisfied of the justice of your claims in a regular and

amicable manner, I will never suffer any of the Company's allies or dependants, whose country and interests I consider to be in every respect the same as those of the Company, to be forcibly deprived of territories of which they have so long held possession. With the most cordial disposition to maintain the intercourse of friendship with your Highness, I trust that I shall always meet an equal return on your part; and therefore I cannot but lament that your Highness did not immediately resort to the established channels of peaceable negociation, in place of stationing a military force upon the frontiers of the territory possessed by an ally of the Company. Confident, however, that your Highness, upon a full review of all the circumstances of the case, will be equally inclined with myself to conform to the dictates of justice, I am satisfied that after our respective officers shall have conferred together, and explained to each other all matters that remain in doubt, we shall have no difficulty in terminating these long depending questions to our mutual satisfaction.

(A true copy)

MORNINGTON.

N. B EDMONSTONE, Persian Translator to Gov.

No. XVI.

*Extract of Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to the Governor-General in Council of Bengal, dated 18th June, 1798.**

“ We take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you that we have received information from His Majesty's ministers that a very large armament of ships, troops, military stores, &c. has been lately fitted out at Toulon, and that it sailed from thence on the 19th ult. Although the ultimate object of this armament has not been ascertained, it is not improbable, from many circumstances that have transpired, and from the spirit of daring adventure by which the French have been actuated during the present war, that its destination may be for India, either (having first taken possession of Egypt) by way of the Red Sea, or by Bussora. His Majesty's ministers have therefore informed us, that immediate measures

will be taken for a considerable augmentation of the European force in the East Indies; you may therefore expect that not less than 4,000 seasoned and disciplined troops, and perhaps a larger number may be sent to the Company's settlements with all possible expedition, part of which will, we trust, reach India not many months after the receipt of this despatch. Should the expedition, notwithstanding the measures taken by His Majesty's Government to intercept and defeat it in the Mediterranean, reach Egypt, and be destined for India by either of the routes we have mentioned, a part of His Majesty's fleet, consisting of two men of war and probably a sloop, now under dispatch for India, will be ordered to be stationed in the Straits of Babelmandel, and in the Gulph of Persia, for the purpose of intercepting any force that may be proceeding to India that way.

"A copy of a Proclamation, issued at the Mauritius in the month of March last, has been transmitted to our several presidencies by Mr. Pringle, the Company's agent at the Cape of Good Hope. We are unable to judge whether this Proclamation be in reality what its import declares it to be, and Tippoo has really conceived any hostile designs against the British empire in India, or intended merely as a feint, with a view to embroil us with that prince. Our respective Governments will, of course, have taken such precautionary measures in consequence as appeared to them necessary and applicable to existing circumstances.

"Our empire in the East has ever been an object of jealousy to the French, and we know that their former Government entertained sanguine hopes of being able to reach India by a shorter passage than round the Cape of Good Hope, and we have no doubt that the present Government would risk a great deal, and even adopt measures of a most enterprising and uncommon nature, for the chance of reducing, if not annihilating, the British power and consequence in that quarter of the world. To effect this, without the aid and previous concert of one of the Indian Powers, seems almost impossible, and would scarcely be attempted. In the present situation of India, Tippoo appears to be the fittest instrument to be employed in the furtherance of such ambitious projects.

"It is highly improbable that Tippoo should have entered

into any league with the French without some apparent preparation on his part of an hostile nature in furtherance of their designs. If such, therefore, shall have been the case, it would be neither prudent nor politic to wait for actual hostilities on his part. We therefore recommend, that if you shall not have adopted the necessary measures for bringing Tippoo to a satisfactory explanation before the receipt of this despatch, that you should immediately take the proper steps for so doing, accompanying this inquiry with such a disposition of your force as may give effect to it; and should you judge, either from his answers, or from the steps he is taking, that his designs are such as the French Proclamation represents, and that he is making preparations to act hostilely against us, we think it will be more advisable not to wait for such an attack, but to take the most immediate and most decisive measures to carry our arms into our enemy's country, not failing at the same time to make known to the Powers in alliance with us the necessity of such measure, and that we have not in view a wanton attack upon our inveterate enemy with a design to augment our own power, but a necessary and justifiable defence of our own possessions, and calling upon them for the assistance they are under engagements to furnish us.

“ But although we have thus recommended energy, firmness, and decision in your conduct towards Tippoo, we rely upon your using the latitude allowed you in the preceding paragraph with the utmost discretion, that we may not be involved in a war in India without the most inevitable necessity, of which necessity we leave you to be the sole judges. And as it is impossible for us to conjecture, should either the Proclamation circulated at the Mauritius be founded, or the force now in the Mediterranean be really destined for India, what measures the implacable revenge and rash enterprise of the French may induce them to undertake against the British power in India; we can only exhort our several Governments to be constantly upon their guard, and watchful against surprise, by not only keeping the troops in perfect order for action, and our forts and garrisons in constant preparations of defence, but if it shall appear necessary, by encouraging military associations amongst our civil servants and others, as in this country, which may be prepared to act on any emergency; and in carefully keeping in view every channel through which

it may be possible for France to get an European force out to India, and taking precautionary measures to prevent it.

“We have transmitted copies of this despatch to our Governments of Madras and Bombay.”

No. XVII.

To General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, June 20, 1798.

You have before this time received my letter inclosing M. Malartic's Proclamation, and advising you of the probability of my being under the necessity of making a serious representation to Tippoo Sultaun on that subject. I now take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you with my final determination. I mean to call upon the allies without delay, and to assemble the army upon the coast with all possible expedition. You will receive my public instructions in the course of a few days. Until you have received them it will not be proper to take any public steps for the assembling of the army, but whatever can be done without a disclosure of the ultimate object, I authorise you to do immediately, intending to apprise you by this letter *that it is my positive resolution to assemble the army upon the coast*. I wish to receive from you, by express, a state of the force which you can put in motion immediately, and within what time you can make any large additions to it.

By the same express you will also have the goodness to inform me what station you deem the best for assembling a force with a view of marching directly to Seringapatam, and at what period the army must move for that purpose, so as to reach Seringapatam before the coast of Malabar shall become safe for the approach of any naval force. I will send you, as soon as possible, the largest supply in specie which I can procure. If you could dispatch your answers to my questions by any fast-sailing vessel, and could send with your answers any intelligent officer, who might be capable of entering into all the details of your force; of the seasons, and all other circumstances connected with the object of striking a sudden blow against Tippoo before he can receive any fo-

reign aid, you would greatly assist me in the arrangement of my measures upon this serious occasion.

You may rely upon my unremitting attention to whatever communications you may make to me, and upon my most cordial support in all your exertions.

You will of course feel the absolute necessity of keeping the contents of this letter secret.

MORNINGTON.

No. XVIII.

From General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Madras, 23rd June, 1798.

Your lordship's favour of the 9th is just received.

Sir Hugh Christian sent the Proclamation to this Government by the same opportunity as to yours, and we had the honour to forward your lordship our answer to Sir Hugh the 7th instant.

For my own part I have no doubt (as matters now stand with the French) but Tippoo will explain away our just grounds of complaints, although I am convinc'd he has committed himself to the full extent of the Proclamation.

His inveteracy to us will only end with his life, and he will always seize any opportunity that offers to annoy us; but, notwithstanding this, and that the political circumstances of India are now much in our favour, it perhaps still remains a matter of serious consideration whether, in our very great want of cash, and the effect our being engaged in war in this country may have on the affairs in Europe, it would not be better that he should be allowed to make the amende honorable if he be so inclined, than that we should avail ourselves of the error he has run into, and endeavour to punish him for his insolence. On my part your lordship may depend on my following your instructions most implicitly. In respect of my secrecy on the point, and until I hear further from you I shall only quietly move a battalion or two towards the point of assembly, and one of which was predetermined for the place it now will go to. The 36th might move from Pondicherry to Arnee, as we have in the latter unoccupied bar-

racks for Europeans; but for this I must wait Sir Alured Clarke's final determination on that corps. A supply of grain to our garrisons is actually in forwardness according to regulation, and it will be very easy to make additions where necessary, without any suspicions arising.

It was very pleasing to hear that your lordship has some cash to send us; but it is necessary you should understand, that the whole mentioned will not more than make up our known deficiency to the end of September, and our debts are so injurious to our credit, that until something is done in liquidation of them, we cannot expect to raise a rupee by loan.

With the greatest respect and esteem, &c. &c.

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. XIX.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 26th June, 1798.

You will have received my public and private letters respecting the late conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and the steps to be taken in consequence. I wish you would furnish to me, without delay, any intelligence which you may have received respecting the publication of the Proclamation at the Mauritius, or the conduct of the ambassadors of Tippoo during their residence in that island. I also wish to receive your latest advices respecting the state of Tippoo's force, and of his actual preparations for war. I am sorry that your Government should have addressed to Admiral Rainier a letter which my public duty compels me to disapprove. You know the sincerity of my wish to support the authority and dignity of the Government of Fort St. George, which I consider to be intimately and inseparably connected with my own. But the general protection of India belongs to me, and forms one of the most material branches of my arduous responsibility. In the discharge of this duty I shall always expect to be assisted by the co-operation of the other presidencies; but if they offer opinions to the commanders of His Majesty's squadrons with respect to the distributions of the naval force for the general purposes of defence, without re-

ference to me, or any previous knowledge of my intentions, the utmost degree of confusion must be the result, and my views for the public safety must be wholly defeated. The public letter which I have sent to you in Council upon this occasion is intended as a general rule for the conduct of the Government of Fort St. George on all similar occasions, and I trust that you will have the goodness to recommend the observance of this rule both to your Council and your successor. Without full previous communication on all points of this nature, there can be no hope of our serving the public with advantage or credit. Nothing could have given me more pain than the necessity of authorising a word in any of my public letters which might bear the appearance of a sentiment of disapprobation of the conduct of the Government of Fort St. George, under your administration; but I felt it the more necessary, by a public expression of my opinion, to prevent the measure to which I have adverted, from becoming a precedent. You will not suppose that such a feeling of public duty can be at all connected with any diminution of my respect and esteem for you; sentiments which I shall always retain, and which I am happy on every occasion to avow.

MORNINGTON.

No. XX.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Madras, 6th July, 1798.

I received your Lordship's favour of 20th ult. late on Tuesday evening, the 3d inst., and I must confess that the momentous importance and magnitude of the subject created reflections which for a time totally absorbed every other consideration. Adverting, however, to your Lordship's wish of speedy communication, and really myself thinking it of infinite consequence, my first step was to countermand the *Bombay* frigate, on the eve of sailing as convoy to a transport with stores for the fleet, and which the *Victorious* took charge of.

I then directed my thoughts to find such a description of person as your Lordship was desirous should accompany my answer, and did not hesitate in fixing on Major Beatson as

particularly qualified to give your Lordship the fullest satisfaction on every point that you may refer to his judgment. Revolving the subject of the 20th June in my mind most part of the night, the magnitude of the difficulties to be encountered in an attempt to strike a sudden blow before he can receive any foreign aid, by the cessation of the monsoon, on the other coast, occurred to me so forcibly, and have by subsequent reflection become so deeply impressed upon my mind, that I should think myself culpable if I did not mention my thoughts on the subject, even though your Lordship had not requested information from me. Although the same points have unquestionably occurred to your Lordship, yet the practical experience of them may readily be supposed to have made stronger impressions on my mind than any idea of them that could have been conveyed by a different way to your Lordship.

The dilatoriness, indecision, and cowardice of our allies are beyond belief to those who have not been eye-witness to these qualities in them, and there is a moral assurance that not one of them will take the field, or be of the least use to us, even admitting that their own situation presented no obstacle to their joining us at any period, until we have secured a position to cover their advance, or gained a decided advantage over Tippoo. Thus they acted with Lord Cornwallis, and as that conduct was governed by principles which have undergone no change, a repetition of it must be expected.

From these data it is to be argued that any sudden blow must proceed entirely from ourselves; and this cannot, I conceive, be attempted without a very large reinforcement from Bengal, aided by the Bombay army. When the reinforcement from your Presidency could join us I need not speak of, but the Bombay army could not begin to assemble until the cessation of the monsoon on the other coast, the period at which I understand that your Lordship had hoped the important object in view would be in an advanced state of accomplishment. The last is a difficulty that might perhaps be rendered of less importance by your Lordship's exertion in despatching a more ample force from Bengal; but the difficulties which press here are, I fear, insuperable: Draft and carriage cattle, even for the defensive army, in

Statement, No. 1, cannot be collected, to enable us to do more than merely reach the Baramahal before the monsoon in October, or to repel the incursion of an enemy. No. 2, from Mr. Cockburn, the best informed man, perhaps, in India on this subject, fixes nearly the same period for the equipment of the defensive army; but such a force as should be capable of undertaking the siege of Seringapatam with a reasonable prospect of success, could not in all probability reach the place before the 1st of February.

The last point I have to observe on is certainly the most material,—the feeding the army when it has arrived at the point we wish. This difficulty obliged Lord Cornwallis to relinquish the idea of besieging Seringapatam the first time he marched against it, and but for the almost despaired of co-operation of the Mahrattas, it would have been doubtful whether he would ever have been able to return to it again.

These considerations, the little dependence to be placed on our allies, and the facility of communication with the Bombay army by Puligauchery, with the importance of possessing the Coimbatore country, incline me at present to be of opinion, that when we engage in this momentous undertaking, it will be advisable to do it to the southward, by attempting the Cauveryporam Pass; but this point, and the seasons for the junction of the armies of the different coasts, and for the final enterprize to be undertaken;—how far the aid of the Nizam and Mahrattas, or one or other, may be essential to our success in the attack?—whether it may be practicable to subsist an army during the siege without any assistance from those Native Powers?—what posts should be selected for magazines, so as to have the shortest and most secure line of communication by which to receive supplies?—and the grand subject of Brinjaries, whether the Native Powers assist us or not?—are considerations on which there is not now any time for me to enlarge further, but on which I can with confidence refer your Lordship to Major Beatson for solid information. Your Lordship will also find great assistance from Lieut.-Colonel Scott; and on the subject of feeding and carriage, I know no one who can give more correct information than Captain Sandys, or on whom more dependence can be placed for honest execution of orders in that line. Notwithstanding, however, the short-

ness of time, and the aid your Lordship will otherwise have from the practical knowledge of the three gentlemen I have named, I should have felt it incumbent on me to have stated my sentiments in a more detailed and connected manner, on a subject of such moment to the national interests, if your Lordship had not the advantage of Sir Alured's complete knowledge of this army, and the resources of the Carnatic. Upon the latter subject your Lordship is also perfectly informed, from the pressing representations of this Government and the letter I had before the pleasure to write to you, and both must have convinced you that the whole expense of the war must be borne by your Presidency. Your Lordship may perhaps be inclined to send the *Bombay* back immediately with treasure; if not, I think it necessary to mention that we had intended to send her for Bombay when the season for making a favourable passage should arrive, in consequence of a communication from Mr. Duncan, representing how much they required her assistance on that coast. Now, my Lord, having taken such a range of the subject as I trust you will not be displeased with receiving, I have only to assure you that, however I may think it right to point out difficulties, there can be none in such of your orders as it may be my part to perform, which I shall not cheerfully and zealously attempt to overcome. I should not, however, close this letter without informing your Lordship that I have apprized Admiral Rainier of the importance of preventing any communication of the French with the Malabar coast. The various subjects which press upon my mind in deliberating upon this serious undertaking, and the urgent necessity of a prompt communication, render it far from improbable but that some points may have been imperfectly stated; if however, upon more mature consideration, any inaccuracy shall appear to have crept in, your Lordship may depend that I shall have candour immediately to acknowledge and correct the error.

Be assured, my dear Lord,

I am with esteem,

Your Lordship's faithful and obedient Servant,

GEO. HARRIS.

P. S.—For your Lordship's further information I send Colonel Close's answer to the questions I put to him connected with this subject, to which I have subjoined such observations as have appeared to me necessary.*

I also send a memorandum I have just received from Mr. Webbe, in consequence of my request that he would state his sentiments in writing upon the possible event of a war with the Sultan, owing to the Mauritius Proclamation, and upon the practicability of striking a sudden blow against him before he could receive any foreign aid. From the hurried perusal which I have made of it, I observe that he has taken too partial a view of a question of too great a magnitude to be decided by our present limited means of knowledge. That he has assumed as a fact that the choice of peace for some time to come, or war at the present period, rests with us, not adverting to the probability if Azim ul Omra be really disaffected towards us, of his hereafter joining Tippoo and the French, and the equal chance of the Mahrattas being induced, when they are able, to unite in the league against us, scarcely noticing the strong circumstance that the Islands can now afford him no farther aid; passing over the immense benefits that will be secured by success, and the advantage with which we shall enter upon a war having a perfect knowledge of his country, and possessing a strong chain of posts on our frontiers, with a faithful country in the rear; and, lastly, that the French, at the conclusion of a peace, will possess the desire they now feel of subverting our Indian Empire, and that the Sultan will at that period be fully prepared to assist their purposes, if he should not be now arrested in his progress. These, however, are considerations which belong to your Lordship's better judgment to decide, and I should not have troubled you with the memorandum if I did not feel an anxiety that you should be prepared to meet all the arguments which will be stated with so much virulence by the opposition at home against the author of the war, if unfortunately we should be compelled to that calamity.

No. XXI.

From Mr. Josias Webbe, Secretary to the Government of Madras.

6th July, 1798.

Memorandum for General Harris, in consequence of his late conversation upon the possibility of an early rupture with Tippoo Sultaun.

That M. Malartic's Proclamation is genuine I have no doubt, because it is a termination perfectly consistent with an intrigue which, from respectable intelligence at the time, there was reason to believe on foot previous to the departure of his ambassadors for the Mauritius; but whether we should take measures at this period for punishing or preventing the effect of this negociation, is the most momentous question which can be proposed in this place. Upon this question it is certainly my duty to state my ideas; but the shortness of time does not admit of any arrangement.

As all questions of national war should, I suppose, be determined by the national interest, it is natural to advert to the state in which India was placed by the Treaty of Seringapatam, because that state was considered at the time we had the means of changing it, as most advantageous to the British interests. The principle of our policy then was, the preservation of Tippoo as a Power of India, and the balance between him, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam by our superior influence and force. Whether this principle has been superseded by other notions in Europe I know not; but whether any attempt can now be made to introduce a new order of things without a greater danger of evil than a chance of good, I doubt.

Tippoo, if he has not advanced in actual strength, has certainly the vantage ground: the three other Powers have certainly receded from the condition they were in at the Treaty of Seringapatam. The shock which the balance between the Nizam and the Mahrattas sustained from the warfare that was allowed to terminate in the Treaty of Kurdlah has driven him from his position, and the distractions which have since prevailed at Poonah, incapacitate them from holding their ordinary sphere, while the force of the English is checked and retarded by the pressure of the French war.

In the discussions which took place upon the political state of India, when the expedition against Manilla was under contemplation, it was, I believe, acknowledged that the confusion at that time in the Mahratta empire was such as to render any exertion of their strength improbable, or at least not formidable. The subsequent confinement of Nana Furnavees, the eccentric irregularity of young Scindia, and the want of power in the Peishwa, certainly corroborated that notion, which, if it then left us little to apprehend from their enmity, can now give us little to expect from their friendship. The only respectable part of the Nizam's force is under the uncontrolled command of the French party: that influence has increased, and whether our inertia during the contest between his Highness and the Mahrattas may have alienated the disposition which his ministers once manifested towards ours, whether it is the natural consequence of a prevailing interest inimical to us, we have much reason, from Captain Kirkpatrick's late correspondence, to apprehend that our weight at Hyderabad is not great. The Nizam's irregular troops proved, during the last war, one of our serious impediments: his efficient force could hardly be employed, certainly not trusted, under the command of Perron. In respect to ourselves, a very large proportion of the coast army is detached, our means of resource curtailed by the war in Europe, and our credit in this country, at least upon this coast, bankrupt. If, therefore, with all the advantages we possessed in the year 1790, with the hearty and effectual co-operation of the Mahrattas, and with the friendship of the Nizam, our operations against Tippoo were not made successful without the greatest difficulty, I am fearful that, under the general change of circumstances which I have mentioned, and which I believe to be correct, an attack upon him now is more likely to end in discomfiture than victory.

But let us descend to more particular considerations. Although we have every reason to be satisfied that Tippoo's army has been kept in a state efficient and prepared to meet the events, which there might be reason to expect from the general appearance of convulsion throughout India, yet in the same discussions on the subject of the Manilla expedition, both Sir J. Shore and Lord Hobart were of opinion that he was not likely to hazard a rupture without a very

large reinforcement from the French. Whatever may be the object of Tippoo's embassy to the Mauritius, or whatever may be the event of it in Europe, the late intelligence from the islands, which leaves us no room to doubt that the military have been sent to France, and the French marine dispersed, satisfies me that no immediate co-operation can take place; and consequently, that no rupture is to be apprehended but by our own provocation.

This argument I urge in the perfect conviction that during this unprecedented contest in Europe, peace in India is indispensably necessary, and that it ought not to be risked without the prospect of positive advantage. If, however, it should be argued, that this very conjunction of circumstances which I have mentioned, should impel us to make an immediate effort against Tippoo, I answer that all our former united and unexampled exertions were made against Tippoo single, and unsupported by the French; but, single and unsupported as he was, except by the natural obstacles which oppose our progress, the exertions of the allies were only successful. For this I refer to the chance by which Bangalore fell, to the condition of Lord Cornwallis's army before the junction of the Mahrattas, in May 1791, to the difficulty with which the battering train was advanced to Seringapatam in the second campaign, to the condition of the Bombay army, and to the state in which our own army returned after the conclusion of peace. With the war well advanced, with our preparations and arrangements on foot for twelve months before, and with such a combined alliance as may be now despaired of, it still cost Lord Cornwallis two campaigns before he could besiege Seringapatam.

From the intrigues at Seringapatam, and the consequent embassy to the Isle of France, I have no doubt that the French emissaries were employed in persuading Tippoo to hostilities with us, under promises of immediate assistance. This the Sultan appears to have considered insufficient ground to provoke a war; but if he should be provoked to war by us, I conceive there would be a material difference of circumstances; for though the French might find great difficulty in persuading him to war, from the great difficulty of furnishing the force he requires, yet if he should be absolutely plunged into a war, they would find it easily practicable

to foment and keep it alive. Hostility with Tippoo, if it should be known before the conclusion of peace, would inevitably tend to protract the war in Europe, or even to revive it if peace should have been made. The French, despairing perhaps of any successful attempt upon England itself, would leave nothing unattempted to subvert, or at least curtail, our Indian empire. This argument is of the more force, because a very small increase of French soldiers is a very material addition to Tippoo's strength.

In the event of hostility, I take it for granted the object will be to make it a war of alliance against Tippoo. I doubt that it is practicable to obtain the assistance of the Mahrattas: the present disunion of the chiefs renders a hearty co-operation impossible. The assistance of any party, if even it could be persuaded to risk the danger of absence from its own territories, might have the natural effect of throwing its adversaries into the opposite scale. If such an event should take place, the Mahrattas would remain, as they now are, balanced against each other, while Tippoo, freed from the apprehension of their united force, would be at liberty to employ his whole cavalry against us. It is known to every officer in the field, that during the last war the Nizam's cavalry were a heavy incumbrance to us; and if, notwithstanding the apparent change in Azim ul Omrah's dispositions towards us, we should be disposed to rely on the fidelity of his Royal Highness's infantry under the command of M. Perron, it is not extravagant to anticipate an event which has already happened, that marching into the Mysore country with his Highness in alliance, we were compelled to march back again with his Highness in alliance against us. In respect both to the Mahrattas and the Nizam, I think there is no reasonable ground to expect effectual assistance from either until we should strike some signal blow. Neither of them were hearty in the cause during the last war before the fall of Bangalore.

Not to dwell upon the possible predicament in which we should be placed by a refusal of the allies to execute their engagements, let us look to our own means of equipping a force sufficient to support a remonstrance to Tippoo upon his embassy to M. Malartic. It must never be forgotten that

the army under General Medows in the month of November, 1790, consisted of about 5,500 European and 18,400 native *seasoned* men, and that even this army was augmented by troops from Bengal before it marched against Bangalore. By the returns you have now received, a body of about 14,000 men can be drawn together, including Lascars and pioneers; a force so inadequate to an offensive war, that you could not venture to quit the Carnatic. From Ceylon you could draw no reinforcements; but, on the contrary, might be called upon to increase the force on that island in the event of our army invading the Mysore country. The whole reinforcement must be sent from Bengal; of what extent it could be we have no means of judging, but it is obvious that it must be so large as to place its arrival here at a very remote distance. The superiority of Tippoo in cavalry, and the greater rapidity with which he moves, would render it impracticable to proceed to the attack of Seringapatam without establishing a systematic chain of posts for depôts of stores and provisions. That he has endeavoured to frustrate this is evident from his policy in the destruction of Ossoor and Bangalore, and in making Seringapatam his only or principal fortification. By the former it is his intention to increase the difficulty of our approach by lengthening the line of our operation, and by the latter to oppose such impediments as to make the capture of Seringapatam impracticable in the course of one campaign. The Cauveryporam pass is yet unexplored; but I understand that the route from thence to Seringapatam lies through a barren country, so much interspersed with jungle as to be extremely adverse to the march of an army. The Gugulhelts pass is no longer thought of. As nothing therefore short of the capture of Seringapatam can justly be considered as striking an effectual blow against Tippoo, the achievement of any immediate success appears to me to be utterly impracticable.

This idea, then, of striking an immediate blow being abandoned, let us look to the slow and regular equipment of an army for the invasion of Mysore. The different corps could, I believe, be assembled at Walajahbad in about two months from the time of their being ordered to march. The equipment of bullocks for the army, with its train of field artillery,

could not, according to my estimation, be accomplished before the month of January; but in respect to a train of battering guns, sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam, I can form no notion; nor do I believe Mr. Cockburn can, of the time when it could be furnished with cattle. This period of the season (January) is, by the experience of Lord Cornwallis's campaign, too late for the establishment of a dépôt at Bangalore and the siege of Seringapatam in the same season; for though we should be able to put Bangalore in a state to admit of its becoming a dépôt, we could not avoid being overtaken at Seringapatam by the monsoon, which sets in in May. Hence the necessity of a second season, and probably of a second equipment of bullocks, before an efficient army could invest Seringapatam. Supposing it however there, and joined by the Bombay army (the difficulty of which it is here unnecessary to consider), I doubt whether there are any well-grounded expectations that they could feed themselves. The experience of Lord Cornwallis's army proves that we were unable to supply ourselves, or to open our rear for the admission of Brinjaries until we had been joined by the Mahratta army, and the whole country embraced.

At present there is no grain at Arnee or Vellor, and I believe no considerable quantity could be stored in the forts of the Bara-Mahal before the harvests of November. The vessels which bring grain from the northern ports and from Bengal do not arrive here before the months of September and October.

Upon the whole there are sufficient grounds for concluding that the whole of the coast army which could be assembled would be incapable of offensive operations, and that they could not be put in motion before the month of January. How far, and at what period, they may be in a condition to make a serious attack upon Tippoo must depend upon the extent and time of reinforcements from Bengal; and as nothing of consequence could be undertaken without them, the time of our making any serious impression must be proportionably delayed.

Meanwhile the movement of our troops and military preparations could not escape the vigilance of Tippoo: his resources are always more prompt than our own; and, as great

part of his army is said to be in a state of field equipment, our attempt to strike a blow at him is likely to produce an invasion of the Carnatic before we are in a situation to resist him; for, as Tippoo can, in my opinion, have nothing to apprehend from the Mahrattas, his whole attention will be directed to us. A comparison between his own and his father's wars, with the late experience of his own misfortunes, has taught him that our strength depends upon our supplies. The crops of the Bara-Mahal would be his first object; and the consequences of such a policy, which he has manifested by the demolition of Bangalore and Ossoor, might fix the war in the Carnatic, until by the consumption of our supplies, and the failure of our resources, we should be compelled to accept his terms of peace.

When the war of 1790 begun, the funded debt of this Presidency was 17 lacks of pagodas, the Company's credit high, and the rate of interest low. Very large subscriptions were in consequence made within the course of a few days to a 12 per cent. loan; large supplies of dollars brought hither in the Canton ships, and intended for the China investment, were converted to the purposes of the war, and immense remittances were made from Bengal, as well in specie as by bills. At present the funded debt of this Presidency is 51 lacks of pagodas; the Company's credit so low, that their eight per cent. paper bears a discount of 18 and 20 per cent.; and the scarcity of money so great, that their 12 per cent. bonds do not pass but at a discount of 4 per cent. Every mode has been tried without effect to raise money at this Presidency: our only means of supply is from Bengal. The bills which we have in consequence been long compelled to substitute for ready money payments have overstocked the market, and consequently pass at a discount. After repeated and urgent applications for money, we have been disappointed for want of funds in Bengal; and at this very moment, when the expenses of the military establishment for the ensuing months cannot be provided for without specie from thence, the only sum which we can confidently expect is, as I understand, immaterial in comparison with our wants.

The deficit in the present resources of this government is at least 18 lacks of pagodas; the expense of an army of

14,000 men in the field is, pag^s * , and the expense of providing carriage for them, pag^s 34,700 per month.

Nothing can be more urgent than our representations to Bengal upon the state of our finances, except the necessities which produced them. It is a fact, that without assistance in money from thence, our military expenses, upon the peace establishment, cannot be provided for beyond the month of September. I am afraid, therefore, that far from being in a state to equip an army for the field, we shall scarcely have the means of marching the different corps to Walajahbad, while the state of the treasury renders it utterly impracticable to make any suitable advance for draft and carriage cattle.

I have not studied to exaggerate any part of this memorandum; but seeing that our resources have, by the mere operation of the war in Europe, been reduced to a state of the greatest embarrassment, and having no hope of effectual relief but in peace, I can anticipate none but the most baneful consequences from a war with Tippoo. If this war is to be a vindication of our national rights, it is clear that we cannot undertake it in less than six months; and this delay, with a reference to our national interests, may probably admit of its being postponed till we attain sufficient strength to prosecute it with vigour. But if war is inevitable, and the present are judged the most advantageous circumstances under which it can commence, I fear that our situation is bad beyond the hope of remedy.

This memorandum only reaches to that period at which your military inquiries commence, they will require no less serious reflection, and must occupy the thoughts of those who are to direct as well as of those who are to execute the operations of the war. For myself, I ought to apologize for the freedom of these opinions, but the desultory manner in which they are stated, will acquit me of all premeditated intention to give offence, and time does not admit of any amendment.

J. WEBBE.

* Blank in the original.

No. XXII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right. Hon. Henry Dundas, &c. &c. &c.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, July 6, 1798.

With my Letter, No. 5, dispatched overland, I transmitted to you a copy of the Proclamation issued by the Governor of the Isle of France, so long ago as the month of February last.* The first appearance of this Proclamation at Calcutta was in a newspaper of the 8th June, and the apparent impudence and rashness of divulging to the world the matter which the Proclamation contains, induced me to doubt its authenticity, until within a few days of the date of my last despatch to you, when I received authentic copies of the Proclamation from Lord Macartney and from Sir Hugh Christian at the Cape. Even in the state of uncertainty which preceded the receipt of the despatch from the Cape, I thought it advisable, by a private letter, dated 9th June, to call the attention of the Governor of Fort St. George to the possibility of my being compelled to assemble the army upon the coast at an early period.

Since that time I have received information, the correctness of which being corroborated from various quarters, enables me to state the nature and circumstances of Tippoo's late conduct in a connected form.

Tippoo dispatched two Ambassadors to the Isle of France, who arrived at that island at the close of the month of January, hoisted Tippoo's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord Ouest, were received publicly by the French Government with every mark of distinction, and entertained at the public expense during their continuance in the island. Previous to their arrival, no idea existed in the island of the probability of a war between Tippoo and the Company, nor the least rumour of an intended levy of men to be made for Tippoo in that quarter.

The Proclamation issued two days after the arrival of the Ambassadors, was assiduously circulated through the town of Port Nord Ouest, and publicly distributed at the house inhabited by the Ambassadors. One of the Ambassadors spoke the French language, and they were accompanied by a person in the Turkish dress who spoke French and English

* See Appendix.

with uncommon correctness and fluency, and also appeared to be master of most of the country languages. This person had been known at Bussorah under the name of Abdoolah, at Surat under that of Dervish, and at the Mauritius passed under that of Talamas: he appeared to answer the description of one of the Agents of France mentioned by Mr. Wickham. The Ambassadors openly and on every public occasion avowed the propositions contained in the Proclamation; and Talamas's conversation, though with more appearance of caution and mystery, corresponded in substance with theirs.

An universal belief prevailed in the Isle of France, subsequent to the arrival of the Ambassadors, that Tippoo would make an immediate attack on the British possessions in India, but the temerity of his design was the subject of general ridicule.

You will observe in the Proclamation a direct reference made to the powers of the Ambassadors with respect to settling the pay and final discharge of the recruits to be raised. The Ambassadors publicly acted under this reference, and concluded engagements with the recruits in the name of Tippoo. Propositions were also made to a large body of the regular troops of France to enter into the service of Tippoo. This was rejected, and these troops some time afterwards were embarked for France,* in consequence of the disturbances which prevailed in the island. But notwithstanding the rejection of the proposition made to the main body of the French force in the island, one hundred officers (few of much experience or skill) and fifty privates of the lowest class of the democratic rabble of the island, were actually enlisted under the Proclamation. With this force the Ambassadors embarked on the 7th March, under every public honour from the Government, on board the French frigate, *La Preneuse*, declaring an intention of proceeding to the Island of Bourbon for the purpose of obtaining additional levies of men. The force so raised has since been landed at Mangalore, about the middle of April. Accounts vary with respect to their number, but the most probable intelligence is, that it does not exceed two hundred. Whatever may be its amount, the whole force has been received

* Batavia was their subsequent destination.

into Tippoo's service with public marks of favour and honour.

But whatever construction may be put upon the policy of M. Malartic in this extraordinary measure, the intentions of Tippoo Sultan admit of no question. He has entered into offensive and defensive engagements with the French, collected a force under those engagements, suffered that force to land in his country, admitted it into his service, and declared publicly through his Ambassadors that his preparations of war are complete, and that their object is the entire subversion of the British empire in India.

That he has not yet obtained a force equal to the magnitude of his design is a fortunate circumstance for our interests, but no justification of his aggression. The rashness, imbecility, and consequent ill success of his councils can never be admitted to palliate the unqualified hostility of his actions; and on every principle of public faith, and of the law of nations, it cannot be denied that he has violated the subsisting treaties between him and the Company, and that his proceedings have been equivalent to a declaration of war.

Under such circumstances it became not only my right but my duty to take advantage of the moment of his actual weakness, and to strike an immediate blow against his possessions, for the purpose of frustrating his preparations for war before he could receive the succours which it appears by the Proclamation he had demanded from the Executive Directory of France, as well as from the Government of Mauritius.

The objects which appeared to me the most desirable, as well as the most easily attainable, were, first, to seize the whole maritime territory remaining in his possession below the Ghauts, on the coast of Malabar, in order to preclude him from all further communication by sea with his French allies. Secondly, by marching the army from the coast directly upon his capital, to compel him to purchase peace by a formal cession of the territory seized on the coast of Malabar.

Thirdly, to compel him to defray our whole expense in the war, and thus to secure the double advantage of indemnifying us for the expense occasioned by his aggression, and of reducing his resources, with a view to our future security.

Fourthly, to compel him to admit permanent residents at his court from us and from our allies, a measure which would enable us at all times to check his operations, and to counteract the intricacies of his treachery.

Fifthly, to make the expulsion of all the natives of France now in his service, and the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen, both from his army and from his dominions, conditions of any treaty of peace with him.

Every motive of justice and policy appeared, and still appears, to me to demand the adoption of this or of some similar plan for reducing the power of Tippoo to such a condition as shall render him unable to avail himself of the solicited assistance of France, or of any other collateral aid which the course of future circumstances may offer to him, for the prosecution of his declared design of expelling the British nation from India.* The measure is not less necessary for the purpose of applying a seasonable check to the rising influence of France in India.

The present state of our army in the opinion of all military men, leaves no doubt of the ultimate success of the plan which I have stated; and if its speedy accomplishment had appeared to me as certain as its ultimate success, I should not have hesitated one moment in ordering the movement of the troops for that purpose. But upon consulting the persons most conversant with military details, I found that the actual state of the frontier fortifications of the Carnatic, of the train of artillery, and of the stores of grain and other provisions, was such, as not to admit of any sudden movement of a large force, although it appeared certain that such a force might be collected within a very short space of time. I also found that the expense of making the necessary preparations would be very heavy, and that the result was likely to lead to a protracted and expensive, although, according to every opinion, a successful war.

The present reduced state of the courts at Poonah and Hyderabad admitted no hope of immediate assistance from either of those powers, and the embarrassment of our finances, which had so lately engaged my most serious attention, now pressed with accumulated weight upon my mind. Under

* This was the language of Tippoo's circular to the Princes of India.

all these circumstances, I felt with the utmost degree of pain and regret, that the moment was unfavourable to the adoption of the only measure which promises effectual and permanent security to the territories committed to my charge, and that such a step was absolutely impracticable without a considerable reduction of the commercial investment, attended by all the destructive consequences which such a blow must produce upon the trade of the Company, upon their pecuniary affairs at home, upon the welfare of their subjects in India, and finally, upon the general situation of the public revenue and credit of Great Britain. I was also aware of the evil effects which the mere fact of a war breaking out in this quarter might produce in England, under all the anxiety and pressure of the present moment.

These reflections led me to the determination of relinquishing the idea of making an immediate attack upon the possessions of Tippoo; but I still felt that our reputation and honour, as well as our future security, demanded that I should not suffer his late proceedings to pass without notice; and I am persuaded that you will agree with me, that our tacit submission, under an insult and injury of so offensive and aggravated a nature, would greatly elevate the credit and hopes of Tippoo and of France, and occasion a proportionate depression of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies, and of all the Native Powers of India. On the other hand, the result of his embassy having only served to expose his treachery, and the weakness of the enemy in this part of the world, a remonstrance of a firm but temperate spirit will be sufficient to satisfy our honour, and to convince the Native Powers that our moderation alone induces us to abstain from that more rigorous course of which his conduct would furnish the ample justification, and of which our strength insures the certain success. I have therefore called upon Tippoo to make a public disavowal of the proceedings of his Ambassadors; to declare distinctly the nature of his intentions towards us and our allies, and particularly to explain, without disguise, the destination of the force raised in the Isle of France, and lately landed at Mangalore.

I have communicated the Proclamation in question, together with a statement of all the circumstances attending the

transaction, to the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad; and I have claimed their concurrence in the representation to be made to Tippoo, and the co-operation of their respective forces in the event of Tippoo's refusing to listen to the joint remonstrance of the allies, and of his compelling us to resort to arms.

The experience of Tippoo's recent conduct evidently proves that we may be deceived, if we found our calculation of his movements upon the ordinary principles of prudence and discretion. It is therefore possible that he may reject our moderate requisition, and suddenly involve us in a war. I have therefore thought it prudent to direct the army to be assembled upon the coast of Coromandel, and similar measures of preparation to be taken at Bombay, but with no intention of employing any part of the force in active operations, unless Tippoo should either refuse to make the required explanation, or should at once commence war against our possessions. The nature of the present crisis appears, however, both to demand and to favour the execution of further measures of precaution, which will afford additional security to us in the event of war, and which may contribute to avert that calamity.

In my Letters, Nos. 1 & 2, dispatched by Admiral Pringle from the Cape of Good Hope, I submitted to you my apprehensions with respect to the declining state of our alliances in India, to the unfavourable change which had taken place in the relative situations of the several states of India with reference to our interests; and above all, I warned you of the growing influence of France in the armies and councils of the Native Powers. I now feel the full weight of the evil which I then anticipated. With a due confidence in the single strength of our own arms, we must acknowledge that, without the co-operation of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and particularly of the latter, at least to the extent of facilitating our convoys of provisions and stores, a protracted campaign in Mysoor would be attended with great difficulty, if not with danger. The situation of the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad is become much more alarming than I stated it to be in my letters from the Cape. If Tippoo were to attack us in the present moment, we could derive no assistance whatever, either from the Nizam or from the Peishwa;

both those powers, in their actual condition, being utterly disqualified from fulfilling their defensive engagements with us. Scindiah, who, with the greater part of his army, has been for a long time in the neighbourhood of Poonah, has imprisoned Nana Furnavese, has usurped the whole authority of the Peishwa, leaving however his person at liberty, and at the same time has threatened the dominions of the Nizam.

In the meanwhile the French army at Hyderabad has been augmented to the number of 14,000 men; and although the death of M. Raymond, and the resumption of the Jaghire granted for the maintenance of the army, have to a certain degree reduced the political power of this faction, yet the command having been conferred on another Frenchman, and the number of the corps greatly increased and its discipline considerable improved, the French party at Hyderabad cannot be said to be in any degree less formidable to the independence of the Nizam, or to our interests, than I represented it to be in my letters from the Cape; and I learn by letters received this day from the Resident at Hyderabad, that since M. Perron has taken the command, numbers of French officers have been added to it, and more are expected, although the routes by which they are introduced into the Deccan are as yet unknown. The danger to be apprehended from this party is much aggravated by two circumstances which have recently happened; the one that Scindiah has placed the corps lately commanded by M. De Boigne in the hands of a Frenchman; the other, that Tippoo Sultan (who was supposed to have been apprehensive of the growth of a French faction at Seringapatam) has manifested a disposition to admit French officers and privates to an unlimited extent into his service. It is probable the expectation of crushing the Nizam and the Peishwa, by a co-operation with the French officers in the armies of the Nizam and Scindiah, as well as the hope of founding upon the ruins of the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad an influence which might rival if not destroy the British power, may have reconciled Tippoo to the perilous experiment of cultivating French principles in an Asiatic court. Azim ul Omra, the Nizam's minister, is fully aware of the present danger of the Nizam's dominions: exposed to the attack of Scindiah on the one side, and to

the intrigues of the French faction on the other, and he has repeatedly applied for an increase of the British detachment serving with the Nizam, promising that our agreement to that increase shall be immediately followed by the dismissal of the whole of Perron's corps. A common apprehension of the designs of Scindiah has produced an union of interests between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah; and negotiations have been in agitation, with a view to their mutual security against that danger which threatens equal destruction to both. On the other hand, the Peishwa has expressed his desire to enter into new engagements with us, and the Resident at Poonah has declared that if, under the circumstances of Tippoo's preparations, it were thought advisable to send a British detachment to Poonah, Scindiah could not on any just ground object to such a movement, and that the mere presence of a British force would effectually restore the power and authority of the Peishwa. There can be no doubt that the inefficient state of our alliances has been one main ground of Tippoo's late proceedings; and this circumstance may account in some degree for the audacious and confident spirit which marks the character of those measures. In the present posture of affairs, the position of Scindiah's army operates as an effectual check upon the motions of both our Allies, and prevents either from affording us the assistance to which we are entitled by treaty. Thus Scindiah in reality renders the most useful service to Tippoo, and frustrates the whole object of our defensive alliance; in the meanwhile dissensions have broken out in the army of Scindiah, whose violence, impetuosity, and injustice have disgusted all the ancient connections of his family. His dominions upon the north-western frontier of India are in a state approaching to general revolt; and, although in the present weakness of the internal governments of the Nizam and the Peishwa, Scindiah is viewed with terror by both, there is no doubt that he is not in a condition to oppose any measures which we might think necessary to take for restoring the consideration and strength of either; and it is more than probable that the result of such measures would be to restrain his projects of aggrandizement and ambition, and to induce him to return peaceably into his own dominions. In this conjuncture, therefore, neither the Nizam nor the Peishwa are likely to view

with any jealousy the assistance which we might chuse to afford to either, while any opposition to such an arrangement on the part of Scindiah would be wholly unjustifiable and ineffectual. The enlargement of our subsidiary arrangements with the Nizam, and the conclusion of similar engagements with the Peishwa under similar restrictions, confined to the case of defence against Tippoo, would have been justifiable measures under any circumstances, but the aggression of Tippoo places the arrangement on the most impregnable grounds of justice with respect to Scindiah or any other Power, while the accidental coincidence of the interests of the Peishwa and of the Nizam affords a reasonable expectation of success.

Under all these circumstances, I have thought it advisable to give to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad a power of requiring a body of troops from Bombay and from Madras, directing that the dismissal of the French army at Hyderabad should be a necessary condition of the increase of the British detachment at the Nizam's court, and connecting the whole arrangement with various advantages which we may hope to secure by a new system of treaty, both with the Nizam and with the Peishwa. And I have further ordered that no step towards a new arrangement should be taken at either Court without the previous consent and approbation of the other, and without their mutual acceptance of my arbitration for the final adjustment of all subsisting differences between them.

It was necessary on this occasion to instruct the Resident at Hyderabad, with respect to the succession to the Nizam's throne in the event of his death. As the Nizam has lately admitted Secunder Jah, his eldest son, to the personal exercise of certain acts of sovereignty, which admission is deemed at that Court a virtual nomination to the succession, as Secunder Jah is a friend to the British interests, and as none of the younger sons can reach the throne by any other means than by the assistance of the French and Tippoo (with whom they are intimately connected,) and by the total destruction of our influence, I have directed the Resident to support the right of Secunder Jah. The detail of the principles of this decision will be forwarded to you by the next despatch.

Overtures of the most friendly nature have been made to

this Government by the Rajah of Berar, who has entered into engagements with the Nizam for the purpose of restraining the ambition of Scindiah; without deciding at present how far it may be advisable to cultivate a closer connection with the Rajah of Berar, it is my intention to send an Ambassador to his Court, with the double view of ascertaining his precise objects, and of checking the motions of Scindiah, who will take alarm whenever the news shall reach him of any intercourse being established between this Government and the Rajah of Berar.

I have lately received a letter from Zemaun Shah, containing a declaration of his intention to invade Hindostan, and a peremptory demand of the assistance of the Nabob Vizier and of mine, for the purpose of delivering Shah Aulum from the hands of the Mahrattas, of restoring him to the throne of Delhi, and of expelling the Mahrattas from their acquisitions on the north-western frontier of India. It is very difficult to form a conjecture with respect to the probability of Zemaun Shah's being able to execute his romantic design: That he entertains such a design is unquestionable; and whatever may be the result, it is prudent to be on our guard, and in the meanwhile to derive every collateral advantage from his declaration. I have therefore transmitted the Shah's letter to Scindiah through the Resident at Poonah, with the view of suggesting to Scindiah the possible danger of his hereditary dominions; and I have expressed my entire disapprobation of the ambitious projects of Zemaun Shah, and my disposition to enter into defensive engagements with Scindiah, for the purpose of frustrating the threatened invasion, declaring to Scindiah that, whenever he shall return into his own dominions, he will find the British Resident at his durbar prepared to conclude such a defensive treaty, in which it is my wish to include all the Allies of the British Government.

I have also signified to Scindiah, in the most amicable terms, my desire to witness his prosperity within the limits of his own dominions. As Scindiah must be perfectly aware of the disturbed state of his dominions, and must know that we hold his fate in our hands, I have every reason to hope that my endeavours to restore our Allies to the power of fulfilling

their engagements with us, will not be delayed by any opposition from him. But feeling the great importance of preventing the destruction of the power of the Peishwa and of the Nizam, whose dominions, in the event of Scindiah's success, would immediately be divided between Scindiah, Tippoo, and the French, and whose ruin would furnish the most solid foundation for the power of the latter, I have directed the Resident at Poonah, if pacific representations should be rejected by Scindiah, to inform him that the British force will be employed for the protection and support of the authority of the Peishwa, and if necessity should demand, the employment of the force for those purposes, I have authorized that measure, provided, in the opinion of the commanding officer of the detachment, the force should be deemed adequate to the service required. I trust, however, that no such necessity will occur, and that Scindiah's sense of his perilous situation and real interest, added to the state of his army and of his dominions, will induce him to abandon his project of annihilating our allies; and I therefore hope that, in the course of a few months, I shall have the satisfaction to find, that the result of these arrangements will have produced a considerable check to the growing influence of the French in India, will have effected the re-establishment of our allies in some degree of credit and efficiency, and will have restored the general balance of power upon the foundations on which it stood at the conclusion of the Treaty of Seringapatam. In any view, the effect of such a change in the face of affairs must be favourable to us, it may induce Tippoo to postpone the execution of his comprehensive plans of vengeance, or if not, it will enable us to frustrate them with more facility and dispatch.

A full detail of my communication with Tippoo, with Scindiah, and with the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, together with a more particular statement of the principles upon which the whole arrangement is founded, will be dispatched overland by express to the Secret Committee in the course of a few days; in the meanwhile I thought it would afford you satisfaction to receive, by the earliest opportunity, the general outline of the system which I have deemed it my duty to pursue.

While Tippoo shall possess the means of a ready intercourse with the French by sea, our possessions in India must for ever be exposed to alarm and danger, unless we are always careful to maintain our preparations for war in such an advanced state, as will at any time afford us the facility of sudden and rapid movements of our military force; I have therefore directed the government of Fort St. George to take immediate measures for placing in a respectable posture of defence such of the frontier fortresses as Lord Cornwallis directed to be maintained; and I have ordered that a provision of grain, sufficient for a large army in the field for three months, be constantly stored in these fortresses, and that monthly returns of their state be forwarded to me. I have also ordered that a large train of artillery be immediately provided, and constantly kept in readiness for use in the field, either at Arnee or Vellore, and that periodical reports of the condition of this train of artillery be made to me. I propose that these two regulations, although they must be the source of considerable expense, should be permanent, until some material alteration shall take place, either in the appearance of affairs in Europe or in India.

Having thus submitted to you the general view of the steps which I have taken for providing against the event of a war with Tippoo, I should think myself guilty of a breach, both of public duty and of private friendship, if I withheld my conscientious opinion, that the interests of the Company in India can never be secure while Tippoo Sultaun shall retain the ready means of intercourse by sea with the French Government. His remaining territory on the coast of Malabar is his most powerful instrument of war; and in my decided judgment, it would be the most economical policy which could be adopted to seize the first just occasion of depriving him of so formidable an engine of hostility, even at the sacrifice of a temporary suspension of the investment, and of a considerable present expense. Upon this important subject I wish to receive your instructions without delay. If the war should continue in Europe, there is little doubt that the impetuosity of Tippoo will afford frequent justifiable opportunities to this Government of reducing his power. My wish is to know distinctly whether the Company be prepared to encounter the temporary inconvenience which must be en-

dured before they can obtain permanent security for their possessions in India.

The orders of the Court of Directors, and the opinions of this Government, have uniformly concurred in declaring, that "the landing of any considerable French force in Tippoo's country must be the signal for an attack upon him."

I wish to know exactly, whether the term "considerable," which I observe is constantly used, is to be construed as a limitation of my discretion. It appears to me that the landing of any French force in Tippoo's country is a sufficient ground of war, upon every principle both of justice and of policy; but more especially, after the public declaration which he has made of his designs against our possessions. Any other construction will compel this Government to remain an inactive spectator of his preparations for war in conjunction with France; provided only that these preparations be made gradually, and that the French force be introduced into his country in small detachments.

The systematic introduction of French officers into the service of all the Native Powers of India, which Mr. Wickham describes as the fixed policy of France, has been pursued with unremitting assiduity and extensive success; if Tippoo should at any time be enabled to derive succour from France, his movements might be seconded by the general co-operation of large bodies of French adventurers, who are known to maintain a concert in all parts of India.

The destruction of the French army at Hyderabad would certainly operate as a considerable check to the growth of this formidable evil: the corps of Perron being the mainspring of all the designs of the French party in India. But the only effectual barrier against the irruption of France into India would be our possession of the whole of Tippoo's maritime territory.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXIII.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

6th July, 6 o'Clock, P.M.

At the instant of our closing the packet, a letter is arrived from Mr. Torin, saying that the Rajah agrees to the treaty

of 1792, and to such other arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon for the honour and interest of both parties.

After this the Rajah adverted to his youth and inexperience, to the difficulties he should have to encounter, and expressed a wish for assistance for a time from the Honourable Company.

Mr. Torin informed the Rajah, that upon that subject, as no interference could take place but what was formally and explicitly specified by himself, he, Mr. Torin would postpone the subject for a few days, as the Company would wish this application to spring from his full conviction of the benefit to be derived from it.

Yours, faithfully,
GEO. HARRIS.

No. XXIV.

Hon. Frederic North to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bombay, 7th July, 1798.

I have not as yet received any letters from England, at which I am more angry and afflicted than surprized; as I know, and you will find, that business in our offices at home loses its importance in proportion to its distance. I am, however, much less uneasy than I could imagine I should be in a state at once so uncertain, so embarrassed, and so ridiculous. Governor Duncan keeps me most hospitably in his house, and I find many objects of amusement in the languages and customs of the people here. How much more interesting must they be in your great capital, where so many men of learning and genius are employed in elucidating them. Mr. Duncan tells me that the celebrated Captain Willford, now at Benares, has prepared for the press a long and very learned dissertation on the knowledge which the Hindoos had of geography, and that he proves from the Puranas that they had an intimate acquaintance with *Britestan* or Britain, with the rivers Thames and Severn, and with the history of the Island as given by Geoffery of Monmouth. As Captain Willford is extremely modest, and wants encouragement to produce the fruits of his labours, Mr. Duncan is afraid that the departure of Lord Teignmouth, who was his declared patron, may have reduced him to silence, but I took the liberty of

assuring him that such a man as Captain Willford, and such a production as his, will certainly be encouraged and protected by your Lordship.

Your most faithful and obedient humble Servant,
FREDERIC NORTH.

No. XXV.

*The Earl of Mornington to J. A. Kirkpatrick, Esq. Acting Resident
at Hyderabad.*

(Secret.)

SIR,

Fort William, 8th July 1798.

I transmit to you an authentic copy of a Proclamation published by the Governor General of the Isle of France, during the residence of two Ambassadors from Tippoo Sultaun on that Island. The Proclamation purports to be a declaration of certain propositions communicated to the French Government, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, by his Ambassadors, then on the spot.

It enumerates those propositions with a particularity of detail which would not have been hazarded in the presence of the Ambassadors, had it not corresponded with the substance of the communications made by them to the French Government.

In addition to the arguments founded in the nature of the Proclamation, and in the facts of its publication under the eyes of the Ambassadors, I am in possession of evidence which leaves no doubt upon my mind of the concurrence of the Ambassadors in every part of the Proclamation; and I cannot suppose that they would have ventured to exceed the limits of their instructions from Tippoo Sultaun in a matter of such serious importance as the conclusion of offensive and defensive engagements with the French Government. Under this Proclamation, 150 officers and privates were actually raised in the Isle of France for the service of Tippoo, and for the purposes avowed in the Proclamation; and that force has since been landed at Mangalore, and received into Tippoo's army with peculiar marks of honour and distinction.

4. This circumstance is sufficient to prove that the proceedings of the Ambassadors have obtained the sanction of their Sovereign, who has thus confirmed and avowed the pro-

positions made through them to the enemy, by a solemn, public, and personal act. Having thus entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French Government; having collected, in conjunction with that Government, a force openly destined to act against the British possessions; having avowed, through his public Ambassadors, that he has actually made preparations of war for the express purpose of attempting the subversion of the British power in India; and having declared that he only waits the effectual assistance of France to prosecute his design, Tippoo Sultaun has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Allies, and has committed a direct act of hostility against the British Government in India.

That he has yet obtained no formidable assistance from the enemy, is undoubtedly a fortunate circumstance for the British interests, but the temerity and consequent ill success of his councils, in no degree palliates the offensive nature of an aggression so unprovoked, and of a violation of faith so public and undisguised. It is not improbable, that he may still expect to receive a more effectual succour from France; but there is every reason to hope, that any attempt to furnish him with assistance from that quarter, would be frustrated by the vigilance and superior power of his Majesty's fleets.

It is, however, difficult to ascertain the precise motives which may stimulate the violence of his temper to action; and his late embassy to the Isle of France is a sufficient proof, that revenge against the British Nation in India, is an object which he is capable of pursuing with more zeal than discretion.

Under such circumstances, it is prudent to be prepared to repel the attack which he has openly menaced, and as our future security, our reputation, and our honor, demand that he should be reduced to the alternative, either of making such satisfaction to the allies, as they may hereafter require for the injury which he has committed, or of risking another contest with the British power, it is advisable to arm for the purpose of supporting whatever requisition we may deem it necessary to make to him, when our respective preparations shall be sufficiently advanced to enable us to act with effect.

The 10th and 13th articles of treaties of alliance be-

tween the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, provide that "if Tippoo should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the others shall join to punish him, the modes and conditions of which, shall be hereafter settled by the three contracting parties."

I desire that you will immediately communicate to Azim ul Omra in a formal manner the accompanying proclamation, and explain to him the nature of the propositions which it contains; you will also notify to him the landing of the French force at Mangalore, and declare to him in my name, that I consider the whole transaction as a violation of treaty, and a direct act of hostility on the part of Tippoo; and that I claim the assistance and co-operation of the Nizam under the 10th Article of the Treaty of Paungul. You will, however, add, that although I should feel myself completely justified in making an immediate attack upon the territory of Tippoo, my disposition to preserve the tranquillity of India, induces me in the first instance to afford him an opportunity of restraining the excess of his violence, before it shall have involved him in the calamity of war.

With this view you will apply to Azim ul Omra to signify to the Nizam my wish that he should now express his disposition to concur with the Peishwa, and with me, in making a demand of satisfaction from Tippoo Suldaun. The nature and extent of the demand, as well as the time of making it, to be hereafter concerted between the allies. You will inform Azim ul Omra that a similar application has been made to the Peishwa: the Resident at Poonah will be directed to communicate to you the progress of his proceedings at that court under the instructions which he will have received from me. As soon as you shall have received from Poonah the notification of the Peishwa's concurrence in the propositions made to him on this part of the subject, you will send me immediate advice of it.

If Tippoo Suldaun, in the career of his ungovernable passions, should refuse to make the satisfaction which shall be demanded of him by the allies, hostilities will become inevitable; and you will signify to Azim ul Omra that I have already taken the necessary precaution of assembling the forces of the Company with a view to that event, entertaining no doubt that in such a contingency, the Nizam will be ready

to afford to the common cause of the allies, the effectual co-operation of his force.

Although I have thought it expedient to communicate my instructions to you in the foregoing order, I am sensible that their effectual execution will be impracticable, unless some previous measures be taken for restoring the independence of the Nizam's government, by delivering it from the influence of the French party, and from the hostilities menaced by Scindiah, as well as from the danger of future attacks on the part of the Mahrattas.

The present crisis demands a serious and dispassionate review of the relative interests of the powers united by treaty for the purpose of securing an effectual barrier against the inordinate ambition and implacable revenge of Tippoo Sultaun.

It has been painful to observe that since the conclusion of the Treaty of Seringapatam, two great branches of the triple Alliance have been engaged in mutual contests, of which the result has terminated in their mutual weakness; whilst the common enemy has remained at rest, improved his resources, and increased his strength. The unfortunate animosity between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, while it has tended to foment and aggravate the distractions in the former Court has contributed to reduce the latter to the lowest degree of weakness and humiliation. In the meanwhile the French faction at the Court at Hyderabad has grown to such a formidable degree of power, as to control on many serious occasions the councils of that state, and to menace an ascendant influence in the eventual succession to the throne of the Nizam.

Although the death of Mons. Raymond, and the resumption of the Jaghire which had been granted to him, have in some degree reduced the political influence of the French army at Hyderabad, it now forms the only efficient part of the Nizam's military strength; its numbers have been lately increased; its discipline considerably improved: and it possesses sufficient activity and power to attempt and accomplish objects of the most prejudicial nature to the independence of the Court of Hyderabad, to the common interests of the Nizam and of the Peishwa, as well as to those of the British nation in India. In the event of a war with Mysore, there can be no doubt that the wishes and interests of this part of

the Nizam's army must be favorable to the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, more especially under the actual circumstances of his having concluded an alliance with France, and having admitted a body of French troops into his service. If the French troops of the Nizam did not afford Tippoo open assistance, at least they could not be brought into the field against him without the utmost danger to the cause of the allies; nor could they be suffered to remain in the Deccan during the continuance of the contest, unless checked by the presence of an equally powerful force, which must in that case be diverted from the common objects of the war, and must operate as a positive diminution of our effective strength in the field.

It appears, however, nearly certain, that in the present weak state of the Nizam's government, the French corps in his service would openly join Tippoo Sultaun, and by a sudden blow endeavour to seize the Nizam's territories, and to secure them to the dominion of France, under an alliance offensive and defensive with Tippoo Sultaun.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the success of such a design must be highly injurious to the interests of the Court of Poonah, especially when it is considered that it must be the interest and inclination of Scindiah (who entertains a large body of infantry in his service, under the command of a French officer), to engage with Tippoo Sultaun and the French upon conditions fatal to the existence of the Peishwa's authority, and even of his office. The junction which might thus be effected between the French officers with their several corps in the respective services of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo, might establish the power of France and India upon the ruin of the states of Poonah and of the Deccan. The Court of Hyderabad, therefore, in its present condition, is more likely to prove the source of additional strength to the common enemy of the Nizam, of the Peishwa, and of the Company, than to afford useful assistance to any branch of the triple alliance.

From my letter to the Resident at Poonah, of which I enclose you a copy, you will observe that I have instructed him to state to the Peishwa, the arguments of prudence and policy which should induce him to view the restoration of the Nizam to a just degree of consideration and power, as an ob-

ject intimately connected with the Peishwa's own emancipation from the undue influence by which he is now oppressed, as well as with his future security against the violence of Tippoo Sultaun, and of Scindiah.

I refer you to the same letter for the particulars of my instructions to Colonel Palmer, and of the measures which I have authorised him to pursue for enabling the Peishwa to fulfil his engagements under the triple alliance.

I am persuaded that the Azim ul Omra will at once perceive the advantages which must result to the interest of the Nizam from the restoration of the due authority of the Peishwa, accompanied by the arrangements which I have proposed. Under those arrangements the power of the Peishwa would operate as a constant restraint upon the motions of Scindiah, of Tippoo, and of the French, who are equally the enemies of the Peishwa and of the Nizam, and who menace equal danger to the tranquillity and independence of both.

Immediately upon receiving this despatch you will communicate to Azim ul Omra the whole of the proposed arrangements with respect to the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, as detailed in this letter, and in that addressed to Colonel Palmer; and you will explain to him fully the principles upon which the arrangement is founded, the various objects which it embraces, the means by which it is to be carried into effect, and the ends which it is intended to accomplish, with relation to the interests of all the parties concerned.

You will at the same time apprise him without disguise, that the execution of the whole and of every part of the plan must depend upon the mutual consent of the Nizam and of the Peishwa. You will further express to Azim ul Omra that although I have viewed with great concern and anxiety the progress of the calamities which have disturbed the tranquillity of the two courts, it is now a matter of cordial satisfaction to me to perceive that the result of those misfortunes promises an union of sentiment between the Nizam and the Peishwa, and affords a prospect of re-establishing the triple alliance on its original basis. You will also urge to Azim ul Omra the credit and honor which it would reflect on his administration, if through his means the Nizam and the Peishwa should be enabled to derive reciprocal advantage and

permanent security from a state of confusion which appeared to threaten their common ruin.

I rely upon your ability and zeal for the public service to state the details of these important measures to Azim ul Orma with every circumstance of advantage. Your communication should be unequivocal and unreserved; no part either of the principles or details of the arrangement requires any degree of concealment, my object being to unite all parties on the firm ground of their genuine interests.

You will at the same time declare to Azim ul Omra, that the recent conduct of Tippoo Sultaun having rendered it my right and duty, in conformity with the laws of my country, to take effectual measures in concert with the allies for the mutual defence of our respective possessions; I am now at liberty to express my sincere disposition to attend to the propositions which he has so frequently made for the extension of our subsidiary engagements with his Highness; and you will signify my anxious desire to interpose the friendly mediation of the Company for the adjustment of the unfortunate differences which have so long subsisted between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

You will further state, that I have authorised you to enter into an immediate negotiation with Azim ul Omra for increasing our present detachment with his Highness to the number of six thousand men, including those now serving with his Highness; under the following conditions:—

i. That the services of the increased detachment, be subject to the same conditions of limitation and restriction as the present detachment, unless the Peishwa, at the instance of the British Government, should hereafter consent to any variations in those conditions.

ii. That satisfactory and effectual provision be made for the regular payment of the detachment, and that the arrears of the Peishwa on the part of the Company be regularly balanced against the arrears of Subsidy on the part of his Highness.

iii. That the whole corps officered by Frenchmen, and which was named the corps of Raymond, and is now commanded by Monsieur Piron, be immediately disbanded. The French officers and privates to be conveyed to Europe at the expense of the Company, in ships to be provided for that purpose by the Government of Fort St. George, at a con-

venient port, to be named by that Government. For this purpose the officers and privates are to proceed to the place appointed by that Government, which will stipulate to treat them with every degree of consideration due to their rank : they will not be subject to any further restraint than such as is absolutely necessary for effecting the purpose of conveying them to Europe. A stipulation to be entered into by the Resident in my name, that the officers and privates so embarked shall be sent to France as soon as possible after their arrival in any port in Great Britain, and not be detained for any cartel or exchange of prisoners, nor be considered as prisoners to any other effect than the security of their return to their native country. Such of the native officers and privates as the Nizam may wish to retain in his service to be drafted into the corps of Mr. Finglass, or into any other corps in his Highness's service under the command of British, or of officers of any country but France. The European and native deserters from the Company's army on the coast to be excepted from this part of the arrangement, and to be delivered up to the Government of Fort St. George.

iv. His Highness to stipulate for himself, his heirs and successors, that the natives of France, shall be for ever excluded from his armies and dominions.

You will urge to Azim ul Omra in the strongest terms, the necessity of his taking every precaution to prevent the propositions for the dismissal of the French party from transpiring ; and you will suggest to him, the propriety of dispersing the corps in small parties, for the purpose of facilitating its final reduction, and of preventing the officers and privates from passing into the service of Tippoo or of Scindiah. If the French officers should obtain information of the measures in agitation with respect to them, and should be allowed to unite themselves into one body, there is every reason to apprehend, that they would endeavour to excite commotion, or that they would attempt to retire with their corps into the service of the enemies of the Nizam.

You will consider the Nizam's acceptance of my arbitration, between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and Scindiah, upon the principles stated in my letter to Colonel Palmer, as well as his Highness's consent to the proposed arrangements at Poonah, and to the several conditions stated

in paragraph No. 24, of his despatch, to be necessary preliminaries to the measures, which I have authorized you to take for delivering the Nizam from the power of the French faction established in his dominions. Should Azim ul Omra consent in the name of the Nizam, to the proposed conditions, you will then require the march of the troops from Fort St. George, or from such station as the Government of that Presidency shall have appointed for the detachment, with a view to its speedy march to Hyderabad.

It would be useful to me to learn your sentiments, with respect to a new treaty of general defence with the Nizam: and to any new objects which it might embrace with relation to our interests at the Court of Hyderabad; to this treaty I should wish the Peishwa to be a party.

You will inform Azim ul Omra, that under the circumstances of Tippoo's preparations of war against us, and of the hostilities with which Scindiah menaces the dominions of the Nizam, the British detachment at Hyderabad, will have orders to protect his Highness's person; and to support his authority against any attack which Scindiah may make upon either, as well as against any attempts of the French party; and you will understand it to be my intention, to vest you with full powers to direct the employment of the troops in both cases, in such manner as circumstances may render advisable, provided that in the opinion of the commanding officer, the strength of the detachment shall be deemed adequate to the performance of the service required. You will however apprise Azim ul Omra, that it is my wish to mediate between Scindiah, and the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, under the condition detailed in my letter to Colonel Palmer, and you will consider the provisional agreement of the Nizam to this offer of mediation, between his Highness and Scindiah, as another necessary preliminary to the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad.

The whole scope of my views, is to re-establish our means of defence against the avowed designs of Tippoo, by restoring to our allies that degree of consideration and strength, which they possessed at the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, and which it was the object of that treaty to secure on solid and permanent foundations; an object inseparably connected with the security of the British possessions in India.

Since the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam, a material change has taken place in the situation of almost all the states of India, both with relation to each other, and to the interests of the British Government. The revolutions at Poonah, have impaired the influence of the constitutional head of the Mahratta empire, and deranged the whole system of the balanced powers and interests of the several confederate Mahratta states.

Both the Peishwa and the Nizam, whose respective power it was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to strengthen and uphold, are now depressed and weakened; the former by the intrusion of Scindiah, and the latter by the threatened hostilities of the same chieftain, and by the establishment of a French faction in the center of the Deccan. The co-operation of these two members of the triple alliance has been rendered impracticable by the progress of their mutual contention and intrigues, while the internal convulsions of each state have diminished the resources of both.

In this scene of general confusion, the power of Tippoo Sultaun alone (to restrain which, was the policy of all our alliances and treaties) has remained undisturbed and unimpaired, if it has not been augmented and improved.

The final result to the British Government, is the entire loss of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, and the establishment of a French army of fourteen thousand men, in the dominion of one of our allies, in the vicinity of the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, and on the confines of the Carnatic, and of the Northern Circars.

It is now become an urgent duty to make an effort for the arrangement of a system, the disorder of which already menaces our safety, by exposing us to the hazard of a war without the aid of an Ally; while on the other hand the influence of France acquires daily strength in every quarter of India, under the progressive system of introducing French officers into the armies of all the Native Powers. The principles of justice, good faith, and moderation, enjoined by Parliament and by the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, must form the basis of those comprehensive measures, the execution of which is demanded by the exigency of our present situation, and is favoured by the peculiar cir-

cumstances of the moment. Pursuing no schemes of conquest or extension of dominion, and entertaining no projects of ambition or aggrandizement, either for ourselves or for our Allies, it is both our right and our duty to give vigour and effect to our subsisting alliances and treaties, by restoring to our Allies the power of fulfilling their defensive engagements with us. Through the means of moderate and pacific representations, confirmed by the force of our own example, it must also be our policy to convince the several powers of India that their real interest consists in respecting the rights of their neighbours, and in cultivating their own resources within the limits of their several territories. To these efforts we must add a firm resistance against the intrusion of any foreign power which shall endeavour (to the prejudice of our alliances and interests) to acquire a preponderant influence in the scale of Indian politics, either by force or intrigue; but the primary object of all our vigilance and care must be the destruction of every seed of the French party, already grown to so dangerous a height, and still increasing in the armies and councils of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo. The exclusion of the influence of France from the dominions of the native states, is not more necessary to the preservation of our own power, than to the happiness and prosperity of this part of the world.

In this first communication with you, I have thought it advisable to apprise you of the leading principles which will regulate my conduct towards the native powers; and I have taken a general view of the actual state of our political relations, in order to enable you to act with more confidence and dispatch upon such questions of detail, as may occasionally call for the exercise of your judgement, in promoting the objects of your mission.

In pursuing the various topics connected with the subject of this despatch, I shall add my instructions, with regard to the conduct to be observed by the British detachment, in the event of the death of the Nizam.

If the question involved nothing more than the performance of our obligations under our subsidiary engagements with the Nizam, it would be sufficient to direct that the detachment should remain neuter until the succession should be finally decided, and that it should then be placed under

the orders of the Prince who might establish himself as the musnud.

But in the present state of India, our interests and those of our allies, are materially concerned in the principles and connections of the person upon whom the succession to his Highness may devolve, and consequently no time should be lost in determining the part which we shall take on the occasion of the Nizam's decease.

The cases for which it is necessary to provide, may be reduced to four.

i. The formal nomination of Secunder Jah to the succession.

ii. The death of the Nizam without any formal nomination of a successor.

iii. An attempt (in either of the preceding cases) of one of his Highness's younger sons, or of any other competitor to usurp the musnud in exclusion of Secunder Jah.

iv. An actual or asserted nomination of any of his Highness's younger sons to the exclusion of Secunder Jah.

In the first, second, and third cases, the right of Secunder Jah, would be indisputable.

From the natural right of Secunder Jah, founded on the priority of his birth, added to his having been admitted by the Nizam to the personal exercise of a portion of the sovereign authority, under circumstances equivalent to a virtual nomination, I trust there is little apprehension of a nomination, of any of the younger sons, whilst his Highness shall retain the full possession of his faculties.

It is far from improbable, however, that the enemies of Secunder Jah, of Azim ul Omra, and of the British interests at Hyderabad, aware of the importance of inducing his Highness to nominate a successor of their selection, may avail themselves of the weakness of his last moments to prevail on him by misrepresentation or other acts, to nominate one of his younger sons; or in the event of his Highness's death during the absence of Azim ul Omra, and of the friends of Secunder Jah, the enemies of Secunder Jah, may assert that his Highness had made a nomination of one of the younger sons; and under such circumstances, the falsehood of that assertion may be difficult of proof.

43. It is not my wish to interfere in the succession to the

throne of the Nizam, in repugnance to the established laws or customs of India. On the other hand, I hold it to be my absolute duty, to prevent the regular order of the succession from being disturbed, either by domestic faction, or by foreign intrigue or force, to the prejudice of a Prince, the establishment of whose right is so intimately connected with the security of the British interests in India.

Although primogeniture may not be considered to give the same absolute and exclusive right to succession in India, as it does in Europe, it is invariably deemed the strongest title, and is rarely superseded excepting in the cases of disaffection, or of positive disqualification.

So far from these, or any other grounds of objection being applicable to Secunder Jah, it is well known that his Highness has given the strongest indications of his favorable intentions towards Secunder Jah, by entrusting that Prince with his seal, and empowering him to perform certain acts which are reserved exclusively for the sovereign.

Sufficient proof has already appeared of the interest which Tippoo, and the French take in the exclusion of Secunder Jah, and of their determination to interfere in the succession to the throne of the Nizam. During the absence of Azim ul Omra at Poonah, when the French army at Hyderabad was neither so formidable in point of numbers or of discipline as in the present moment, Monsieur Raymond obtained the most decided influence over the councils of the Ministers then in power; a permanent establishment was given to the French in the Deccan by the grant of a large Jaghire to Mons. Raymond; the British detachment was dismissed; and a considerable body of Tippoo's troops was encamped on the Nizam's frontier; a close correspondence was established between Tippoo and Imtiaz ud Dowlah through Medina Saheb; the enemies of Secunder Jah openly sought the assistance of Tippoo, and of the French, with a view of influencing the succession; and according to the opinion of the Resident at Hyderabad, the event of the Nizam's death in that crisis would have left the throne absolutely at the disposal of M. Raymond.

A similar plan may be again attempted, and its success would necessarily involve the destruction of Azim ul Omra and of Secunder Jah, together with the consequent annihi-

lation of the British influence at Hyderabad: all hope of re-establishing the balance of power in India as it existed at the peace of Seringapatam would then be precluded. The countries of the Nizam would in such an event become in effect a dependency of France; and the partizans of that nation, in conjunction with Tippoo and with the body of their countrymen lately received into his pay, would have the means of endangering the existence of the British power in India.

That danger would be greatly aggravated by the approach of Zemaun Shah, who has formally announced to me his intention of invading Hindostan.

The moment is arrived when we must either determine to support the rights of Secunder Jah, founded on priority of birth and on the virtual nomination of the Nizam in full possession of his faculties, against any actual or asserted nomination of any of the younger sons, under all the circumstances of suspicion which must attend such a transaction, or we must submit to the certain establishment of the influence of Tippoo and of France in the Deccan, and to the equally certain destruction of our own.

I have therefore no hesitation in declaring my firm determination to support the succession of Secunder Jah, as being essentially connected with the security of all the interests committed to my charge. The execution of this determination will be attended with little difficulty should his Highness's death be protracted until after the proposed augmentation of the subsidiary engagements with him shall have taken place. The French party at Hyderabad will then be no longer in existence, and so powerful a body of our troops as will then be in the service of his Highness, will be sufficient to preclude either foreign or domestic opposition.

It is more than probable, however, that his Highness's death will take place before the proposed engagements can be carried into effect.

With a view to the probability of this case, I have resolved to direct the Government of Fort St. George immediately to station a force, consisting of not less than two regiments, in whatever position may be deemed most eligible for affording you the necessary assistance in supporting the right of Secunder Jah; and I authorize you, in the event of

the death of the Nizam, or whenever you may understand from Azim ul Omra that the death of his Highness is likely to take place within a very short period of time, to order the commanding officer of this force (who will be directed to obey your instructions) to march directly to Hyderabad.

Considerable advantages might arise from your communicating this determination to Azim ul Omra, but as it is to be apprehended that he would avail himself of such a communication to serve his private purposes, and as a disclosure of my determination on this point, either to the Nizam himself, or to the Mahrattas, or to Tippoo, might lead to very serious inconveniences, you will take every possible precaution to prevent this part of my instructions from transpiring until the death of the Nizam, or the certainty of the near approach of that event, shall render it necessary to impart my determination to Azim ul Omra.

Having received overtures of a very friendly nature from the Rajah of Berar, who has requested the presence of a British Resident at his Court, I have despatched an Ambassador to Nagpore with full powers to ascertain the precise nature of the Rajah's views. You will make such use of your knowledge of this circumstance as you may think most advantageous in the present state of affairs; without deciding what benefits to the common cause of the Allies may result ultimately from this Embassy, it may be expected that the appearance of an established intercourse between this Government and that of Berar, may lead Scindiah to form serious reflections upon his own situation, and may tend to give additional confidence to the adherents of the Peishwa and of the Nizam.

Although the previous consent of the Peishwa to the arrangements intended to be made at Hyderabad is highly desirable, and is therefore in the first instance to be stated to Azim ul Omra as a necessary preliminary to the increase of our detachment, yet should Col. Palmer inform you that the plan detailed in this letter has failed at the Court of Poonah, either from the Peishwa's rejection of the proposed conditions, or from the success of Scindiah's operations in that quarter, or from any other cause, you will notwithstanding proceed with all practicable dispatch to carry into effect such parts of these instructions as shall appear to you prac-

licable at the Court of Hyderabad. Reserving always to the Peishwa the power of acceding hereafter to the new system of alliance, and with that view continuing in the new subsidiary treaty with the Nizam the restrictive terms of our present subsidiary engagements with his Highness. The arrangement will indeed be very incomplete without the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, accompanied by his full concurrence in the measures to be taken at Hyderabad; but as the great danger to be averted is the growth of the influence of Tippoo and of France in India, it is evident that the failure of the proposed plan at Poonah would increase the necessity of providing for the existence of the Nizam, and of destroying the French party at his Court.

From your reply to the further information required of you respecting your passport for Hybut Rao, I am not altogether certain whether you considered this Government as pledged to exempt him and his followers from the payment of the duties at Gya, if you should be of opinion that this indulgence would materially conduce to conciliate his son, Ragotim Rao, and to render him favorable to the British interests at Hyderabad, I authorize you to assure Ragotim Rao that Hybut Rao's payments, on account of the persons who actually accompanied him, shall be returned to him at Hyderabad as soon as the amount of those payments can be ascertained. I rely upon you, however, to render this concession the source of advantage with respect to the proposed arrangements, and also to provide effectually against any future attempt to convert so peculiar an indulgence into a precedent for further applications of a similar nature.

I entirely approve of your repeated representations to the Court of Hyderabad on the subject of the surrender of the deserters; in the present moment, however, it would not be advisable to agitate this question, otherwise than as it is connected with the instructions already detailed in this despatch; but if the proposed engagements with his Highness should not take effect, I desire you will, without delay, insist peremptorily on the surrender of all the deserters from our army, whether Europeans or Natives, now entertained in the service of his Highness.

Having your whole correspondence now under my con-

sideration, I shall shortly furnish you with orders on such points of detail as require a reply.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

SIR,

Fort William, July 8th, 1798.

I return you many thanks for your two obliging letters, the first upon the subject of my arrival at this presidency; and the second, transmitting a packet of letters from Europe. I am fully persuaded, that my endeavours to promote the public interest, will be cordially seconded by your acknowledged experience, ability, and integrity. On the other hand, I trust you will always act with the fullest confidence of my unqualified support, and that you will on all occasions be persuaded, that I place a reliance on your character, which will induce me by every possible means to give strength, energy, and dispatch to the operations of the Government committed to your particular charge.

You have already received my instructions with regard to Tippoo Sultaun. In a few days, I shall communicate to you a copy of the representation, which I propose to make to him in conjunction with our allies, and also of my letters to the Presidents at Poonah and Hyderabad. My first object will be to enable the allies to fulfill their engagements with us. For this purpose, I mean to empower the Resident at Poonah to require from your Presidency as large a force as you can spare, not exceeding two regiments of native and one of European infantry, and one company of artillery. There can be no danger in the present moment of an attack upon Bombay, therefore, this force may safely be spared. If it should appear necessary, however, you may draw one Native regiment from the coast of Malabar, which may be replaced by one from that of Coromandel. You will inform the Government of Fort St. George of your intentions in this respect, for their guidance in the execution of the conditional orders, which they will have received from me.

I have communicated these suggestions to you, for your

private information, in order that you may be better prepared to receive the instructions, which will be dispatched to you in a few days. I request that you will use every degree of caution, to prevent the nature of my intentions from transpiring, until the moment of putting them into execution shall arrive; you may, however, impart the contents of this letter to the Commander-in-Chief, requesting that no measure may be taken, which may indicate the destination of the force. You may also shew this letter to my friend Mr. North, and communicate to him such further despatches, as you shall receive from me upon this important subject. The documents which I propose to have the honor of transmitting to you in a few days, will fully explain to you the whole extent and nature of my present views, as well as the principles from which they proceed.

Notwithstanding present appearances, I trust we shall not be involved in war with any power in India, and my object is to prevent that calamity by every possible effort.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort William, 8th July, 1798.

I am very much flattered by the obliging expressions contained in your private letter of the 12th June. You may be assured that it is a matter of real satisfaction to me that the affairs of this Government at the Court of Poonah should be in the hands of a person of your talents and experience in a moment the most critical to our interests. You will learn by my public instructions, the nature and extent of the general system of policy with respect to our alliances, which in my judgment the present crisis absolutely demands. I have the fullest confidence in your zeal for promoting the success of a plan which is founded on principles of justice and moderation, and intended to conciliate the real interests of all parties to be affected by its execution. There are only a few points which have been omitted in my public instructions, as being more properly the subjects of a private communication. If any opportunity should offer of restoring Nana on conditions

favourable to our interests, and consistent with the general tenor of my instructions, I think that such an event might tend to secure the permanent advantages of the proposed plan; but I feel that it would be difficult to reconcile the Peishwa to this measure, and that Azim ul Omra would probably view it with jealousy. Notwithstanding these objections, I am persuaded that the experience and wisdom of the person in question would give great vigour to the new arrangements, could he be induced to consider them as connected with his own interests. If you should concur with me in this opinion, you will meet with my support and approbation in any steps which you may take for the restoration of Nana. You will observe in the detailed instructions, that I have deducted one Native regiment from the force which I supposed you might immediately obtain from Bombay. This is a matter of necessity arising from a fuller investigation of the subject. Should you apprehend that the force which I now offer may not prove equal to the proposed object, you will of course make no application to Bombay, and you will signify your determination in this respect by express to me, to Bombay, and to Hyderabad.—I have just now received your letter of the 23d June, and entirely approve all the steps you have taken, and propose to take. Nothing in that letter appears to me to require any further observations from me. With the most implicit reliance on your faithful and diligent discharge of the duty which the present circumstances impose upon you.

I have the honor to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P.S. In the abstract of this despatch, I cautioned you against making any communication to the Peishwa of my intention with respect to the French army at Hyderabad. It was necessary to observe caution until measures could be taken at Hyderabad for dispersing the French army in small parties, as it is probable that such a dispersion will have taken place before you can receive this despatch, I have given you full liberty to apprise the Peishwa of the nature of the arrangement to be adopted at Hyderabad, feeling that it would be very improper to use any concealment at Poonah or at Hyderabad with respect to the real object of the negotiations at either Court. The deficient enclosures will be forwarded by the next dawk.

No. XXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

8th July, 1798.

I transmit to you an authentic copy of a Proclamation published by the Governor General of the Isle of France, during the residence of two Ambassadors from Tippoo Sultaun on that island.

It is difficult to ascertain the precise motives which may stimulate the violence of Tippoo Sultaun's temper to action; and his late embassy to the Isle of France is a sufficient proof that revenge against the British nation in India is an object which he is capable of pursuing with more zeal than discretion.

Under such circumstances, it is prudent to be prepared to repel the attack, which he has openly menaced; and as our future security, our reputation, and our honour demand that he should be reduced to the alternative, either of making such satisfaction to the Allies as they may hereafter require for the injury which he has committed, or of risking another contest with the British Power, it is advisable to arm for the purpose of supporting whatever requisition we may deem it necessary to make to him, when our respective preparations shall be sufficiently advanced to enable us to act with effect.

The 13th Article of the Treaty of Poonah provides that "If Tippoo should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the others shall join to punish him, the modes and conditions of which shall be hereafter settled by the three contracting parties." And the declaration of the Durbar of Poonah of the 3d of July, 1793, explanatory of this article, states "if a breach of engagement occurs on the part of Tippoo with respect to either of the Allies, let that Ally advise the other Allies thereof, when having understood the said breach of engagement we will admonish him, and if he does not attend to the admonition, then let the States act agreeably to the treaties which have been formed."

Adverting to your letter of the 1st June, I take this occasion to declare that Baajy Rao would not be justified in attempting to evade the obligation contracted by the Peishwa under this article. The defensive stipulations in the Treaty

of Triple Alliance must be presumed to have been intended by the contracting powers to operate, not as personal but as real engagements, binding the three states, and not merely the persons whose names are inserted in the treaty. Upon established principles of public faith, the obligation of the article in question must therefore be deemed to pass to the Peishwa for the time being, although the treaty does not expressly include the heirs and successors of the prince whose signature it bears. In 1796, when an application for co-operation against Tippoo was made under the same article by this Government to Chimna Appa, then holding the office of Peishwa, the idea of the defensive obligations of the treaty being merely personal to Madha Rao was never suggested; and Chimna Appa united, without hesitation, in the joint representation then made to Tippoo by the Allies.

The objection, therefore, is unsupported by the practice of the Court of Poonah, in the only case which has yet arisen with relation to that Court under the article in question; but even if the practice of the Court of Poonah had been different in this instance, it never would be admitted to derogate from a known and fundamental maxim of the law of nations, "That treaties of a defensive nature (unless limited in express terms) are not merely personal contracts with the reigning prince, but permanent obligations binding the faith of the State, into whatever hands the supreme power may devolve." I therefore desire that you will immediately communicate to the Peishwa, in a formal manner, the accompanying Proclamation, and explain to him the nature of the propositions which it contains; you will also notify to him the landing of the French force at Mangalore, and declare to him in my name that I consider the whole transaction as a violation of treaty, and a direct act of hostility on the part of Tippoo; and that I claim the assistance and co-operation of the Peishwa under the 13th article of the Treaty of Poonah. You will, however, add, that although I should feel myself completely justified in making an immediate attack upon the territory of Tippoo, my disposition to preserve the tranquillity of India induces me in the first instance to afford to him an opportunity of restraining the excess of his violence, before it shall have involved him in the calamity of war. With this view you will signify to the Peishwa my wish that he should

now express his disposition to concur with the Nizam and with me in making a demand of satisfaction from Tippoo Sultaun: the nature and extent of the demand, as well as the time of making it, to be hereafter concerted between the Allies. You will inform him that a similar application has been made to the Nizam,; and as soon as the Peishwa shall have signified his concurrence in the proposition made to him on this part of the subject, you will notify that event by express to the Resident at Hyderabad. The Resident at Hyderabad will be directed to communicate to you the progress of his proceedings at that Court under the instructions which he will have received from me. For your full information and guidance I transmit to you a copy of those instructions. If Tippoo Sultaun, in the career of his ungovernable passions, should refuse to make the satisfaction which shall be demanded of him by the allies, hostilities will become inevitable; and you will signify to the Peishwa, that I have already taken the necessary precaution of assembling the forces of the Company with a view to that event, entertaining no doubt that in such a contingency, the Peishwa will be ready to afford to the common cause of the allies the effectual co-operation of the Mahratta force.

Although I have thought it expedient to communicate my instructions to you in the foregoing order, I am sensible that their effectual execution will be impracticable, unless some previous measures be taken for re-establishing the Government of Poonah in that degree of power which it possessed before the death of the late Peishwa; and I entirely concur with you in lamenting the distractions which "by dividing and weakening that state, have subjected it to the undue influence of Scindiah, and nearly disqualified it for affording us the assistance which we are entitled to claim by treaty in any war with Tippoo."

In considering the actual situation of the Government of Poonah, it is necessary to advert also to that of the other ally, whose co-operation it was equally the object of the same treaty to secure to us in the same event.

The present crisis demands a serious and dispassionate review of the relative interests of the powers united by treaty for the purpose of securing an effectual barrier against the

inordinate ambition and implacable revenge of Tippoo Sul-taun.

It has been painful to observe, that since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, two great branches of the triple alliance have been engaged in mutual contests, of which the result has terminated in their mutual weakness, while the common enemy has remained at rest, improved his resources, and increased his strength. The unfortunate animosity between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, while it has tended to foment and aggravate the distractions in the former Court, has contributed to reduce the latter to the lowest degree of weakness and humiliation. In the meanwhile the French faction at the Court of Hyderabad has grown to such a formidable degree of power as to control, on many important occasions, the councils of that state, and to menace an ascendant influence in the eventual succession to the throne of the Nizam. Although the death of M. Raymond and the resumption of the Jaghire, which had been granted to him, have in some degree reduced the political influence of the French army at Hyderabad, it now forms the only efficient part of the Nizam's military strength; its numbers have been lately increased, its discipline considerably improved, and it possesses sufficient activity and power to attempt and to accomplish objects of the most prejudicial nature to the independence of the Court of Hyderabad, to the common interests of the Nizam, and of the Peishwa, as well as to those of the British nation in India.

In the event of a war with Mysore, there can be no doubt that the wishes and interests of this part of the Nizam's army must be favorable to the cause of Tippoo Sul-taun, more especially under the actual circumstance of his having concluded an alliance with France, and having admitted a body of French troops into his service.

If the French troops of the Nizam did not afford Tippoo open assistance, at least they could not be brought into the field against him without the utmost danger to the cause of the allies; nor could they be suffered to remain in the Deccan during the continuance of the contest, unless checked by the presence of an equally powerful force, which must in that case be diverted from the common objects of the

war, and must operate as a positive diminution of our effective strength in the field.

It appears, however, nearly certain, that in the present weak state of the Nizam's Government, the French corps in his service would openly join Tippoo Sultaun, and by a sudden blow endeavour to seize the Nizam's territories, and to secure them to the dominion of France under an alliance offensive and defensive with Tippoo Sultaun. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that the success of such a design must be highly injurious to the interests of the Court of Poonah, especially when it is considered, that it must be the interest and inclination of Scindiah (who entertains a large body of infantry in his service under the command of a French officer) to engage with Tippoo Sultaun and the French upon conditions fatal to the existence of the Peishwa's authority, and even of his office. The junction which might thus be effected between the French officers with their several corps in the respective services of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo, might establish the power of France in India upon the ruins of the states of Poonah, and of the Deccan. The Court of Hyderabad therefore in its present condition is more likely to prove the source of additional strength to the common enemy of the Nizam, of the Peishwa, and of the Company, than to afford useful assistance to any branch of the triple alliance.

I rely upon your ability, experience and zeal for the public service to state with every degree of advantage, the arguments of prudence and policy which should induce the Peishwa to view the restoration of the Nizam to a just degree of consideration and power, as an object intimately connected with the Peishwa's own emancipation from the undue influence by which he is now oppressed, as well as with his future security against the violence both of Tippoo Sultaun and of Scindiah.

If the Peishwa can be made sensible of his real interest in the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, he cannot view with jealousy or suspicion any assistance which I may think it advisable to afford to the Court of Hyderabad for that desirable purpose.

The same train of reflection will lead him to acknowledge the benefit which must result to all parties from accepting my arbitration between the Courts of Poonah and

Hyderabad and Scindiah, for the amicable adjustment of all subsisting differences upon the permanent basis of reciprocal interests and mutual advantage.

In your letter, No. 17, dated on the 1st of June, you state your opinion that "the authority of the Peishwa would be restored by the appearance of a strong British force at Poonah, and that Scindiah under the circumstance of Tippoo's recent aggression could on no pretence object to such a movement of our troops, nor in his present condition be able to oppose it." It is not my intention either to give any just cause of offence to Scindiah, or to assist the Peishwa in any hostile attempt against him, however I may disapprove his late violent and oppressive measures, and lament their injurious consequences to the strength of our ally. But it must be an essential part of our preparations for counteracting the avowed hostility of Tippoo, to place our allies in a condition to fulfil their engagements with us; and if the presence of a British force at Poonah be necessary to the accomplishment of this object as far as respects the Peishwa, it is my strict right to furnish him with such assistance; nor can Scindiah, with any colour of justice resist this step, although the consequence of it must be to compel him to retire from Poonah: for he cannot be ignorant that his present position obstructs the operation of the triple alliance, and thereby affords the most effectual aid to the cause of Tippoo.

I therefore empower you to inform the Peishwa that you have my authority to furnish him with a strong force from Bombay, whenever he shall require their presence at Poonah, provided he shall stipulate to secure the regular discharge of the pay of the detachment, in a manner satisfactory to you; and shall agree to certain other conditions stated in a subsequent part of this despatch.

I have directed the Government of Bombay to order the troops to march as soon as they shall receive a requisition from you to that effect. You will state to the Government of Bombay the strength of the force necessary to secure the proposed objects; and if the force required should not exceed one regiment of native infantry, each battalion completed to one thousand men, a company of artillery, and one regiment of Europeans, I should hope, assistance to that extent might be immediately furnished from that Presidency. To this

force they would probably be able to add another native regiment after the breaking up of the monsoon. The commanding officer will be ordered to obey your directions respecting the employment of the troops when arrived at Poonah.

Before, however, you engage to furnish the Peishwa with the proposed force, you will take care to explain to him that it is my intention to increase the British detachment now in the service of the Nizam with a similar view of enabling that Prince to fulfil his engagements with us in the event of a war with Tippoo. You will add, that the additional force to be furnished to the Nizam, will be subject to the same restrictions and limitations with regard to its employment, as the detachment now in his Highness' service, and that no enlargement or alteration of those restrictions or limitations will be made without the previous knowledge and consent of the Peishwa. You will also make a formal tender to the Peishwa in my name of my arbitration between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and Scindiah, and you will declare to him my decided opinion that his own authority can neither be restored, nor ultimately secured, without a cordial union between the two Courts; nor can that union be firmly cemented by any other means than the arbitration of the British Government, which must always feel an equal interest in the welfare, dignity, honor and strength of both parties. You will further state to the Peishwa, the advantages which he would derive from a settlement of all contested points between him and Scindiah under my mediation. You will also declare my wish that he should bind himself by treaty to exclude for ever all natives of France from his armies, and from his dominions; a measure essentially necessary to the preservation of his own authority, which would be exposed to perpetual hazard from the admission of the agents of French intrigue. The state of the Nizam's Government has for some time past afforded a sufficient example of the danger to be apprehended from the introduction of the natives of France into an Asiatic Court. After having fully explained all these points to the Peishwa, you will consider his consent to the increase of the British detachment in the service of the Nizam, to my arbitration of the subsisting differences between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad and Scindiah,

and to the exclusion of the French from his armies and dominions, as a necessary preliminary to the measures which I have authorised you to take for restoring the Peishwa to his due authority and power in the Mahratta Empire. I have already observed, that the present position of the army of Scindiah operates as an effectual assistance to the cause of Tippoo Sultaun; if an alliance offensive and defensive had been formally concluded between those two powers, Scindiah could not render a more acceptable service to Tippoo, than he now performs by holding in check both the allies of the Company. You will, however, omit no endeavour to conciliate the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the measures which I have empowered you to take for restoring the authority of the Peishwa, and you will assure Dowlut Rao Scindiah that I feel the most sincere desire to maintain and improve the relations of amity and peace with him, and that it will always give me pleasure to receive accounts of his prosperity within his own dominions, and to witness the stability of his just authority and power over his own subjects.

At the same time you will represent to him that the continuance of his army in its present position renders our allies, the Peishwa and the Nizam (especially the former), unable to fulfil their defensive engagements with us in the actual crisis of Tippoo Sultaun's preparations for offensive war; and that it would therefore be esteemed a testimony of friendship and good will towards this Government if Dowlut Rao Scindiah would return within the limits of his own dominions.

You will at the same time deliver to Scindiah the accompanying letter from me communicating a paper lately received by the Resident at Lucknow from a Vakeel of Zemaun Shah. I forward to you a copy of my letter to Scindiah, and of that paper; by which you will perceive, that Zemaun Shah has announced his intention of invading Hindostan, and has demanded the cooperation of this Government and of the Nabob Vizier for the purpose of delivering Shah Allum from the hands of the Mahrattas, and of expelling them from their possessions on the north-western frontier of Hindostan.

I authorize you to assure Scindiah that I will use every effort to counteract the designs of Zemaun Shah, being re-

solved to resist to the utmost extent of the power vested in me, the attempts of any invader, who shall endeavour to disturb the established States of India in their actual possessions. You will further suggest to Scindiah that as soon as he shall arrive in his own dominions, he will find the British Resident at his Durbar prepared to enter into defensive engagements with him for the mutual protection of his territories, of those of the Nabob Vizier, and of the Company against the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, and that it is my intention to propose a similar defensive treaty to all the British allies in India. You will inform Scindiah that if contrary to my expectations he should not return to Hindostan for the purpose of assisting in person in the protection of his dominions against the menaced attack of Zemaun Shah, I will take no concern in the security of a country abandoned by its own sovereign, and I will limit the operations of the British troops exclusively to the defence of our own territories and of those of the Vizier. In addition to whatever Scindiah may apprehend from Zemaun Shah, he must be sensible, that in the present disturbed state of his dominions and of his army, his fate is in our hands; but it would not be proper to make any direct intimation to him of our sense either of his danger, or of our own power with relation to the internal condition of his Civil and Military Government. This instruction is not meant to apply to the cases of Scindiah's obstructing the march of the British detachment from Bombay, or of his entering into engagements with Tippoo either against the Peishwa or the Company. In any of those cases, I empower you to state distinctly to Scindiah that I shall deem myself justified in acting offensively against his dominions in Hindostan.

The proposition to be made to Dowlut Rao Scindiah appears to be so reasonable, that I have formed a strong expectation of its success. If he should be induced by your representations to retire from Poonah, it is my intention upon his arrival in his own dominions to offer to him my mediation between him, the Peishwa, and the Nizam, for the purpose of establishing peace between those powers. You will apprise him of my intentions in this respect, at the moment which shall appear to you most favorable to such a communication. I now proceed to give you my instructions with

respect to the employment of the force which I have authorized you to require from Bombay. If Scindiah should disregard the representations which I have directed you to make to him, you will apprise him in the first instance that you have power to employ the British force for the protection of the Peishwa's person, and for the support of his authority. Accordingly, if Scindiah should attempt to obstruct the march of the British detachment from Bombay to Poonah; or if, after its arrival at Poonah he should not conform to the orders of the Peishwa, enjoining him to retire to his own territories; or if (according to the suggestion stated in the 11th paragraph of your letter to me, No. 19, of the 12th of June) he should manifest an intention of soliciting the succour of Tippoo in the prosecution of hostilities against the Peishwa; or if he should enter into any engagements with Tippoo, of a nature dangerous to our safety, I authorize you, in each of these cases, to employ the British troops in active operations against Scindiah, provided that the force detached from Bombay shall in the judgment of the commanding officer be deemed adequate to the service required.

You will communicate my letter to Scindiah to the Peishwa at such time as you may think most proper.

Although I have entered into so particular a detail with respect to the communications to be made to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, placing great reliance on your discretion, I authorize you either to vary the mode of those communications or wholly to omit them, and to withhold my letter to Scindiah, according to your judgment, on all the circumstances of the case, and you may look with confidence to my approbation of any measures which you shall pursue for the purpose of removing Dowlut Rao Scindiah from his present position, provided those measures be not inconsistent with the general spirit of my instructions.

I concur with you in opinion that the treaty of triple alliance is very defective, inasmuch as it does not specify the amount of the aid to be furnished by each of the contracting parties in the event of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun. Your letter of the 1st of June states that, "the Peishwa is very desirous of entering into new engagements with us, and that a new treaty with him might comprize many new objects."

I am ready to enter into the consideration of a new

treaty with the Peishwa, provided it be founded on the basis of his present engagements with us, that it be consistent with the tenor of our treaties with other powers, and that it contain no stipulation of an offensive tendency, or calculated to disturb the general peace of India. But before I can consent to contract any new engagements with the Peishwa, I must require his full and unqualified acknowledgment of the binding force of the treaty of Poonah upon him, and upon that State. Should he attempt to evade the obligations of that treaty, under the pretence stated in your letter of the 1st of June, I never will place any reliance on his faith, nor will I enter into any engagements with him of any kind. But as I am persuaded that you will, without difficulty, convince him of the injustice and danger to his own interests of endeavouring to shake an acknowledged principle of public faith, I trust no obstacle will occur to the commencement of the proposed negociation, which I authorize you to open under the reservations and exceptions already stated.

I refer you to the correspondence in the years 1792 and 1793, relative to the guarantee treaty then in agitation between this Government and those of Poonah and Hyderabad, and I desire that you will communicate to me such articles of a new engagement as you think would be either acceptable to the Peishwa, or desirable for us, before you make any formal propositions to the Ministers of the Peishwa.

You will understand that I do not mean to prevent your opening conferences for the purpose of collecting the general sentiments of the Court of Poonah respecting a new treaty, but merely to caution you against either making or receiving any formal propositions of detail before you shall have apprized me of the nature and extent of the Peishwa's views and of your own.

There is one point however, upon which you may make a direct offer at the moment which may appear to you most favourable. You may inform the Peishwa that I am disposed to enter into the same subsidiary engagements with him, which now exist or shall hereafter be contracted between this Government and the Nizam.

You will however take care in negotiating any subsidiary treaty not to agree to furnish any European troops, excepting the requisite proportion of artillery men, and also not

to demand in any case, nor to accept without previous reference to me any assignment of territory, or of revenue for defraying the payment of the troops to be furnished. It is entirely contrary to the whole object and policy of the arrangement proposed in this letter to extend the territory of the Company at the expense of any of the parties concerned. It would be injurious to our character that any circumstance attending the negotiation should betray the symptoms of that species of irregular ambition which is utterly repugnant to the disposition of this Government.

It would be desirable that the Nizam should be made a party to any new engagements which we may contract with the Peishwa; the Nizam's participation might facilitate the restoration of harmony between the two States, tend to secure their future union and cooperation, and strengthen the revived authority of the Peishwa.

You will communicate to the Resident at Hyderabad with all practicable dispatch, the result of your endeavours to obtain the Peishwa's consent to the several conditions proposed in this despatch.

The Resident at Hyderabad will be directed to govern his conduct by the nature of the information which he shall receive from you with respect to those important points.

The whole scope of my views is to establish our means of defence against the avowed designs of Tippoo, by restoring to our allies that degree of consideration and strength which they possessed at the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, and which it was the object of that treaty to secure on solid and permanent foundations; an object inseparably connected with the security of the British possessions in India.

Since the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam a material change has taken place in the situations of almost all the States of India both with relation to each other, and to the interests of the British Government. The revolutions at Poonah have impaired the influence of the constitutional head of the Mahratta Empire and deranged the whole system of the balanced powers and interests of the several confederate Mahratta States. Both the Peishwa and the Nizam, whose respective power it was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to strengthen and uphold, are now depressed and weakened, the former by the intrusion of Scindiah, and

the latter by the threatened hostilities of the same chieftain and by the establishment of a French faction in the centre of the Deccan. The cooperation of these two members of the triple alliance has been rendered impracticable by the progress of their mutual contentions and intrigues, at the same time that the internal convulsions of each State have diminished the resources of both.

In this scene of general confusion, the power of Tippoo Sultaun alone (to restrain which was the policy of all our alliances and treaties) has remained undisturbed and unimpaired if it has not been augmented and improved.

The final result to the British Government, is the entire loss of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, and the establishment of a French army of fourteen thousand men in the dominions of one of our allies, in the vicinity of the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, and on the confines of the Carnatic and of the northern Circars.

It is now become an urgent duty to make an effort for the arrangement of a system, the disorder of which already menaces our safety by exposing us to the hazard of a war, without the aid of an ally, while on the other hand, the influence of France acquires daily strength in every quarter of India, under the progressive system of introducing French officers into the armies of all the native powers. The principle of justice, good faith, and moderation enjoined by Parliament, and by the orders of the Honorable the Court of Directors, must form the basis of those comprehensive measures, the execution of which is demanded by the exigency of our present situation, and is favored by the peculiar circumstances of the moment.

Pursuing no schemes of conquest or extension of dominion, and entertaining no projects of ambition or aggrandizement either for ourselves or for our allies, it is both our right and our duty to give vigor and effect to our subsisting alliances and treaties, by restoring to our allies the power of fulfilling their defensive engagements with us. Through the means of moderate and pacific representations, confirmed by the force of our own example, it must also be our policy to convince the several powers of India, that their real interest consists in respecting the rights of their neighbours, and in cultivating their own resources within the limits of their

several territories. To these efforts, we must add a firm resistance against the intrusion of any foreign power, which shall endeavour (to the prejudice of our alliances and interests) to acquire a preponderant influence in the scale of Indian politics, either by force or intrigue. But the primary object of all our vigilance and care must be, the destruction of every seed of the French party already grown to so dangerous a height; and still encreasing in the armies and councils of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo. The exclusion of the influence of France from the dominions of the native states, is not more necessary to the preservation of our own power, than to the happiness and prosperity of this part of the world.

In this first communication with you, I have thought it advisable to apprise you of the leading principles, which will regulate my conduct towards the native powers; and I have taken a general view of the actual state of our political relations, in order to enable you to act with more confidence and dispatch upon such questions of detail, as may occasionally call for the exercise of your judgment, in promoting the objects of your mission.

Having received overtures of a very friendly nature from the Rajah of Berar, who has requested the presence of a British Resident at his court, I have dispatched an ambassador to Nagpore, with full powers to ascertain the precise nature of the Rajah's views. You will make such use of your knowledge of this circumstance, as you may think most advantageous in the present state of affairs. Without deciding what benefits to the common cause of the allies may result ultimately from this embassy: it may be expected that the appearance of an established intercourse between this Government and that of Berar, may lead Scindiah to form serious reflections upon his own situation, and may tend to give additional confidence to the adherents of the Peishwa and of the Nizam.

You will consider this letter as an answer to all those addressed by you to this Government, down to the date of your despatch of the 19th June.

I am, &c. &c.,
MORNINGTON.

No. XXIX.

From Tippoo Sultaun to the Governor General.

Received 10 July, 1798.

Your Lordship's friendly letter* containing the agreeable intelligence of your arrival at Calcutta, and your taking charge of the Company's affairs, reached me at the happiest of times, and afforded me a degree of pleasure and satisfaction that cannot be adequately expressed upon paper. May the Almighty prosper to your Lordship this event! By the divine grace, the exalted fabric of union and attachment, and the firm foundations of friendship and harmony between the two states, are in full strength. To adhere to the obligations of existing treaties, is a constant object with me. Your Lordship is from your heart a friend and well wisher, and I am confident will hold in mind the observance of union and concord. I hope you will continue to gratify me by letters notifying your welfare.

No. XXX.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Stuart.

SIR,

Fort William, July 14, 1798.

Mr. Duncan will have communicated to you the instructions of this Government of the 13th of July. Knowing your zeal for the public service, as well as the superiority of your military talents, I have the fullest confidence that you will execute that part of the important arrangement in question which shall come within your department, with alacrity, vigour, and dispatch. You will soon be apprized of the whole extent and tendency of the plan in agitation; until that period I must request you to give me credit when I assure you, that I consider its success to be indispensable to the security of our possessions in India.

There is another point which appears to me to call for your vigilant attention, and although it is my intention to forward, by an early opportunity, the directions of this Government on some parts of the subject, I should be glad in

* The letter alluded to being merely complimentary, is omitted.

the first instance to receive the advantage of your opinion and of Mr. Duncan's.

It appears nearly certain, by the last accounts from Europe, that the French will soon either conquer Portugal or compel that power to sign a disgraceful treaty of peace. In either case it is more than probable that the French will endeavour to obtain possession of Goa, either by directing a force against it, or by a formal cession, which perhaps may be made a secret article of the peace with Portugal.

Should Portugal fall into the hands of France, either by conquest or by treaty, I have no hesitation in declaring that I would make every effort to secure Goa from the same fate; and with this view I would offer to the Portuguese Governor of that settlement, the same terms proposed to the several Dutch Governments in India; if these terms should be rejected, I should immediately attempt the reduction of Goa, provided such a measure appeared practicable.

I wish to know whether you have any reason to hope that the Portuguese Governor would admit a British garrison into Goa, and if he would, what force you think necessary for that purpose, and what means you would suggest for furnishing it. I should also wish you to state to me, without reserve, any measure which appears to you likely to frustrate the supposed designs of the French against Goa, and what force you would think necessary for the reduction of that place in its present state.

I need not urge the importance of the settlement in question to a person of your experience and knowledge in the affairs of India.

It will give me great satisfaction to have the advantage of your correspondence, and your free opinion upon every subject within the reach of your observation will be received by me as a personal favour.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXI.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer, Poonah.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort William, July 14, 1798.

In addition to the suggestions offered in my last letter, I wish to recommend two points to your attention; the first will be best stated by the following extract from my letter of this date to the Acting Resident at Hyderabad:—

“In framing the new subsidiary engagements with the Peishwa, I desire you will endeavour to restrict the employment of the British troops within his Highness’s dominions, to those important cases in which his person or authority shall really be endangered, and that you will provide effectually against the use of the British force in those disgraceful services against petty renters and Zemindars, which more properly belong to Sebundy corps.”

You will attend to this suggestion, which applies equally to the employment of the British force to be detached to Poonah, if it should continue there under a subsidiary treaty. The second point will also be explained by another extract from the same letter:—

“It is very desirable that a body of the Nizam’s troops shall be stationed upon the frontier of the Peishwa’s dominions, for the purpose of co-operating with our detachment in the restoration of order at Poonah. You will urge this measure to Azim ul Omra, but you will not advise the march of the troops until you have learnt from Colonel Palmer that such assistance is both necessary and acceptable to the Peishwa.”

This extract requires no comment; you will regulate your conduct according to the intimation which it suggests.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort William, July 14, 1798.

I return you many thanks for your several private communications, and I am happy to avail myself of an early op-

portunity to express my approbation of your diligence and activity in the discharge of the important duties of your mission. I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from the extensive knowledge, experience, talents, and integrity of Major Kirkpatrick, during the period of my continuance at the Cape. As he expressed a desire of being near my person, it is my intention to offer him the situation of my Military Secretary whenever he shall arrive in India; and as it is probable that he may touch at Madras, I mean to despatch a letter to meet him at that Presidency, suggesting to him the service which he might render to the public, by adding the exertion of his talents to yours in the present crisis of affairs, and by visiting you for a short time, if his health should admit of such a journey.

My detailed instructions to you and to Colonel Palmer, which accompany this letter, will make you fully acquainted with the whole plan, of which the abstract was forwarded to you on the 8th of this month. A few points remain to be recommended to your attention.

It is very desirable that a body of the Nizam's troops should be stationed upon the frontier of the Peishwa's dominions, for the purpose of co-operating with our detachment in the restoration of order at Poonah. You will urge this measure to Azim ul Omra, but you will not advise the march of the troops until you have learnt from Colonel Palmer that such assistance is both necessary and acceptable to the Peishwa.

In framing the new subsidiary engagements with the Nizam, I desire you will endeavour to restrict the employment of the British troops within his Highness's dominions, to those important cases in which his person or authority shall really be endangered, and that you will provide effectually against the use of the British force in those disgraceful services against petty renters and Zemindars, which more properly belong to Sebundy corps; this is an essential point. Your own discretion will sufficiently warn you of the caution and secrecy to be observed in the first step towards the proposed general plan. Above all, you must take care to provide for the effectual dispersion of Perron's corps at the earliest possible period. The Government of Fort St. George have my orders

to apprise you of the station appointed for assembling the two regiments intended for Hyderabad. The officer who will command the regiments sent from Fort St. George will be senior to Lieut.-Colonel Hyndman, and will take the command of the whole force.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXIII.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Madras, July 14, 1798.

Our preparations are going on with every possible energy consistent with the necessary regard to secrecy, which I shall maintain until I can be informed from General Floyd, that the corps south of the Coleroon are prepared to move across it, and I shall not fail to keep your Lordship constantly advised of the progress of our equipment, and of the effect which it may appear to have on the minds of the enemy.

Your Lordship will observe that I have forborne to offer any opinion upon the political part of this question, and this not from any disposition to withhold my sentiments upon any subject of importance to the national interests, but from a consciousness of my inability to assist your Lordship's judgment.

Amidst the trouble of my present situation, it is indeed a great consolation to me that the momentous duty of determining whether we must endure the calamity of war or remain peaceful as we now are, does not belong to me, but is entrusted to a person so well qualified to decide it. This remark appears a proper introduction to my reply to that part of your Lordship's letter of the 26th ult. which respects the letter written by this Government to Admiral Rainier. It had been so customary for Lord Hobart almost *to direct* the fleet, that the secretary drafted the letter, and we passed it as an ordinary occurrence without the most distant idea that we were transgressing the strict line of our duty. In inadvertence therefore, not in any degree of infringing upon your Lordship's responsibility, this measure originated; and whilst I shall acknowledge the propriety of the public admonition

we have received, I cannot but feel gratified by the sentiments which your Lordship has been pleased to express in your private explanation.

I am, with great regard,
Your Lordship's faithful and obedient Servant,
GEO. HARRIS.

No. XXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 15th July, 1798.

I transmit with this letter, a despatch from this Government in the Secret Department, which I must request you not to record until you receive further communications from me. The measure directed to be executed in the secret despatch, requires the utmost degree of promptitude, as well as of caution. My object is to restore the Nizam to some degree of efficiency and power. The measure forms part of a much more extensive plan for the re-establishment of our alliances, previously to the moment when Tippoo may expect to be enabled to attack us. The whole of my arrangements will shortly be communicated to you; at present, I shall only recommend to you in the most earnest manner, the speedy and effectual execution of the measure directed in the annexed despatch; as I know your honest zeal for the public service, and the activity which accompanies it, I look with confidence to the accomplishment of my anxious wish for the success of that part of my plan, which is now committed to your charge. I imagine, that the best position for assembling the troops destined for Hyderabad, would be in the Guntoor Circar. You will feel the great importance of selecting a proper officer for this very arduous command. The British force at Hyderabad, after the proposed addition, will amount nearly to seven thousand men, officers and artillery included. It is my intention if the plan should succeed, to recall the Bengal regiment, and to draw the whole detachment for Hyderabad from Fort St. George. This will preserve a unity of discipline, as well as prevent jealousies in the detachment. You will at once feel, that such a command, is an object for the ambition of your most distinguished officers.

I need not recommend the most strict attention to secrecy in the whole of this proceeding; the least intimation of my design, would instantly set the whole French faction at Hyderabad in motion, and frustrate the whole of my views. It will be necessary to apprize the acting Resident at Hyderabad, of the intended station of the troops, in order that he may communicate with the commanding officer. I repeat my reliance on you for the expeditious and effectual performance of this service, of which the importance in my estimation is so high, that in addition to my applause on public grounds, I shall consider your cordial co-operation as a great claim on my private gratitude. I take this opportunity of suggesting to you, the expediency of as great an attention to economy in the mode of assembling the army, as may be consistent with the great object of persuading Tippoo Suldaun, that we are really prepared to repel his menaced attack, or to demand such satisfaction for his late conduct, as we may deem just. The objects of economy and effectual preparation would be perhaps best combined, by ordering *native troops only* to take the field, and drawing the Europeans into the frontier garrisons with all necessary equipments; I do not mean to disarm, until I shall have effected all my objects of renewing the efficacy of our alliances, and of obtaining satisfaction from Tippoo; I think, however, that I shall be able to accomplish all my measures without a war; and the ultimate effect of them will be, either wholly to avert that calamity for a considerable period of time, or to enable us to meet it with increased strength.

You will soon receive my ideas with respect to a permanent plan for the defence of the Carnatic, by constantly keeping considerable stores of grain in the frontier fortresses, and by establishing a train of artillery at Arnee and Vellore, to be always maintained in a state of readiness for the field. I am aware of the expense of the measures of precaution, but I am persuaded that if we do not provide the permanent means of moving our army suddenly into Mysore, as the occasion may require, we never shall be safe in the Carnatic.

I have received your letter with an account of your orders to the Resident at Tanjore, which I entirely approve. You will perceive that I had anticipated the want of the questions and answers of the Pundit, and that I despatched the ori-

ginals to you on the 16th of June. You will communicate the whole proceeding to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad for *their* information *only*, and not to be imparted to their respective Courts. I am sorry that Mr. Cockburn does not go to Tanjore, and very anxious to know the names of your Committee, on whose report much will depend.

I am, &c. MORNINGTON.

There can be no objection to the public mention of your expectation of the 33rd* regiment, I should even be glad that the news reached Tippoo, as it would convince him that I am in earnest. Should Tippoo desire from you any explanation of our preparations, you will be so good as to refer him to me for an answer. If you should be of opinion, that the not encamping the European forces will be likely to leave Tippoo to doubt the seriousness of my intentions, I beg you will not attend to my suggestions, with respect to the measure of stationing the English regiments in the frontier garrisons, my object being to impress the mind of Tippoo with serious apprehension.

No. XXXV.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort William, 18th July, 1798.

The intelligence conveyed in your letter, No. 23, of the 27th June, leads me to apprehend that the contest between Scindiah and the Peishwa may have terminated unfavourably to the latter before you can have received my instructions of the 8th instant.

If that event should unfortunately have taken place, it is still my wish that you should endeavour to execute such parts of those instructions as appear to you to be practicable, and for this purpose you will concert measures with the Government of Bombay and the Acting Resident at Hyderabad.

I despatch this letter to you by express, lest in the event which I apprehend, you should be induced to suppose that it might be my intention to abandon all hope of carrying into

* Then at Fort William, Bengal, Colonel Wellesley being Lieutenant Colonel, and ordered to Madras by Lord Mornington.

effect any part of the general arrangement communicated to you in my despatches of the 8th instant.

You will have observed from my letter of the 8th instant to the Acting Resident at Hyderabad that even the total failure of the negotiation at Poonah will not prevent me from making an effort to recover the power and authority of the Nizam.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 18th July, 1798.

I return you many thanks for the despatch received by the *Bombay* frigate yesterday at 4 o'clock P.M. The frigate met with such bad weather on her passage that she could not touch at Masulipatam, and she arrived here without Major Beatson, and so much disabled that she will require a repair at Diamond Harbour before she can return to sea.

The information with which you have furnished me is sufficient for my present purpose, and I cannot express, in terms equal to my real sentiments, my cordial approbation of the zeal with which you have entered into all my views for the public service, and of the alacrity, diligence and correctness with which you have executed all the commissions which I entrusted to your charge. I perceive however that the object and principle of my late directions to your presidency, are not thoroughly understood, for your satisfaction therefore I will state very shortly a summary view of both. I have obtained the fullest evidence of the nature of Tippoo's design against the British power in India, and I have been apprized that in conformity to the public declaration of his Ambassadors he has actually made preparations for carrying that design into effect.* At what moment he may think fit to strike the blow which he has openly menaced, must always be a matter of conjecture; the interests and wishes of France are decidedly in his favor, the precise period of time when she may be able to afford him assistance must be uncertain, it is

* See Appendix.

equally uncertain whether the impetuosity of his temper will suffer him to wait for that assistance; various events in India might offer opportunities which he might deem (and perhaps with reason) favorable to the success of his hostile projects, and without pretending to estimate the considerations which may govern his conduct, it is evident that while we remain without a soldier prepared to take the field in the Carnatic, and without an ally to assist our operations, we yield to this implacable adversary the decided advantage of selecting the time and mode of his long meditated attack against our defenceless possessions.

Under these circumstances I have never considered that the option between temporary peace and immediate war resided in our own hands; the motionless condition of our army on the coast, contrasted with the advanced state of Tippoo's preparations, places in his hands not only that option, but the choice of the moment of conquest; for in our present weakness, his first assault must be successful, whatever might afterwards be regained by our perseverance and resolution.

The true state of the question therefore is, whether by continuing unarmed and unallied we shall abandon the issues of peace, war, and certain victory, to the discretion of a vindictive enemy, or whether by resuming the power of meeting him in the field, we shall place in our hands the advantages now possessed by him.

With this view of the subject, the assembling our forces, and the placing ourselves in a state of preparation for war at least equal to that of the enemy, appeared to me from the first moment of the authentication of the proclamation to be measures not of choice, but of irresistible necessity, and of indispensable duty. But I did not stop at this point; my decided opinion was and is, that every practicable reduction of the power of Tippoo is warranted by the principles of justice, and demanded by those of policy: and I therefore determined, in the first instance, to endeavour to anticipate the execution of his projects of vengeance by attacking him on all sides without delay, and thus intercepting his means of availing himself of the solicited aid of the French or of any other assistance, which might be presented to him by the variable course of Indian politics. But I never proposed to undertake any attack upon him, of which the success would

be doubtful in the judgment of those, whose opinions must always govern my discretion on every question of military detail; and although my judgment remains unaltered with respect to the justice, policy, and even indispensable necessity of an effectual reduction of Tippoo's power, I have not undervalued the practical difficulties of such an attempt in the present moment.

The delay which must attend any movement of the army upon the coast, and the immense expense of protracted military operations had made a considerable impression on my mind, previously to the receipt of your letter, despatched by the *Bombay* frigate; and I had in consequence of that impression, relinquished all hope of effecting, within any short period, the only operation which can afford permanent security to our possessions on the coast.

Your letter, together with the opinion of Colonel Close,* confirmed the decision which I had already taken, and proved that any effectual blow against the power of Tippoo must be deemed utterly impracticable under the present circumstances of the army at your Presidency.

But the orders which I originally gave for assembling the army upon the coast, although pointed more particularly at the object of an immediate attack upon Seringapatam, were founded (as I have already stated) upon principles independent of the judgment which I might hereafter form of the practicability of that object. The measure of assembling the army and of continuing it, if not in the field, at least in a state of forward preparation, is indispensable to the present defence of the Carnatic, the security of which it is my duty to establish upon foundations more solid than can be found in the forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun. In addition to this most pressing object, my views at every period of this crisis have been extended to other general measures essentially connected with the security of our power in India, and with our means of restraining the enmity of Tippoo. I have always known that

* These letters presented the state of the Madras army in a very alarming point of view,—namely, as not being capable of defending the E. I. Company's territories, much less of carrying on offensive operations, particularly in a country like Mysore, protected by an almost impregnable fortress as Seringapatam was considered.

an offensive war of any long duration in Mysore would be difficult if not impracticable, without the co-operation of the Peishwa, and of the Nizam, at least to the extent of facilitating the supplies of provision to our army in the field. A principal branch therefore of the precautions, which from the first moment I proposed to take for our general defence, was the restoration of those two members of the triple alliance to the power of fulfilling their engagements with us. And it was always my intention that a negotiation, accompanied with other measures for that purpose, should precede any attack upon Tippoo. This part of my plan I have not abandoned, it is now in train with every fair prospect of success.

I have annexed to this despatch copies of several letters from the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, and of my recent instructions to them. These papers will furnish you with a complete knowledge of the actual dispositions and interests of the two Courts, as well as of the nature of the system which I have framed for the purpose of uniting them with us upon the original basis of our subsisting treaties of defence against Tippoo.

You will observe that my views have also been directed to avert another danger which I have long considered with great apprehension and which is now aggravated by the inclination which Tippoo has manifested to admit large bodies of Frenchmen into his armies.

The growth of a French party in the councils and armies of the several native powers of India had attracted my attention before I left Europe; this evil has now reached an alarming height, and if not checked, will soon produce convulsions in the system of Indian politics, which may facilitate the introduction of the power and influence of France, and expose ours to imminent hazard. The French army at Hyderabad is the main root of this mischief, and I feel it to be a most urgent point of my duty to extirpate it without delay.

In considering the annexed papers, you will perceive what erroneous notions have been formed at Madras of the temper and views of Azim ul Omra and the Mahrattas, as well with respect to the reciprocal relations of the two Courts towards each other, as to their common disposition towards the British Government. The moment is very favorable for adjusting their mutual differences, and for reconciling both

parties to co-operate with us against Tippoo. I do not expect that Scindiah will be able to oppose any effectual obstacle to the success of a plan founded on the real interests of all parties, and calculated to conciliate the approbation of all the ancient friends of his family, and of all who possess any degree of personal influence in his armies or dominions. It would be impossible to carry this plan into execution, without accompanying it by a respectable state of preparation in the Carnatic; as it cannot be supposed that Tippoo would remain an inactive spectator of our negotiations at Poonah and Hyderabad, unless he were checked by an appearance of our ability to move upon his frontiers. Our preparations are the necessary consequences of those which he has made, and it would neither be rational nor just in him to consider them as provocations of war. If the fear of an attack from him in the early stage of our preparations, is absolutely to preclude us from making them, we are indeed upon most unequal terms with him, and we must then at once determine to leave our fate at his disposal. For it will then appear that we dare not take the common precautions of defence, while he with impunity enters into an offensive alliance with the French, for the declared purpose of expelling the British nation from India. Having already stated to you, that I no longer entertain any idea of an immediate attack upon Tippoo, it will follow that my objects must for the present be limited to those measures of general preparation and defence, which are absolutely necessary for enabling us to recover the efficiency of our alliances, to repel any attack which Tippoo may make upon us, or eventually to support any representation, which we may hereafter judge it advisable to make to him.

It is not my intention to forward any despatch to Tippoo until the allies shall have concurred in it,—shall be ready to second our demand, and until our preparations shall be considerably advanced. The nature of our remonstrance to Tippoo, will be determined by the circumstances of the moment when it shall be made.

I now proceed to state to you another part of my general plan for the protection of the Carnatic. The result of my earliest enquiries into the nature and condition of the military establishments on the coast; convinced me, that there

existed a radical defect in them, which rendered them peculiarly ill adapted to secure the principal object of their institution, more especially in the actual state of Tippoo's preparations, of his temper, and of his power. It is impossible for any human foresight to ascertain the precise time when an attack from Tippoo may be expected; but it is a matter of public notoriety that he will attack the Carnatic, whenever circumstances shall appear to favor his declared design. To counteract such a design, and to avert the dreadful evils which must attend even the most limited practical execution of it, the character of the enemy, and the nature of his force require that our *protecting* force should be so constituted, as to be capable of sudden and rapid movements at a short notice. But the want of an establishment of draft bullocks, the want of a regular system for the speedy collection of the carriage bullocks from the country, the inadequate stores of grain and other supplies necessary for the provision of our army in the field, the defects in the regulations for providing camp equipage, and lastly, the want of a regularly established train of artillery with all its proper equipments, nearly disqualify the army upon the coast for any speedy operation, even of a defensive nature.

This was my opinion previous to the receipt of your despatch, from the perusal of which, and of the paper accompanying it, I am compelled to declare that I have received the most alarming impressions of the totally defenceless state of the Carnatic, in the present condition of our army, as well as of the utter inefficiency of that force, for any present purposes even of the most limited nature of mere defence. The report of your Adjutant General, states distinctly, that the army in the Carnatic under its present circumstances cannot be put in motion, even for the purpose of defending that valuable possession, under a shorter notice than six months. A body so tardy in its operations, cannot be deemed a sufficient check upon the rapid and active movements, which are supposed to form the characteristic qualities of the adversary to whom it is opposed.

If the opinion of your Adjutant General is to be deemed correct, I have no hesitation in declaring that the army upon the coast, notwithstanding its high state of discipline, and the acknowledged gallantry, activity and skill of its officers,

must be considered as an useless burthen upon the finances of the Company; being from its constitution, wholly unserviceable in the emergency of that species of war, which it must ever expect to encounter, until the character of the enemy and the nature of his force shall be entirely changed. It cannot be doubted that if Tippoo in consequence of his alliance with France, had received the aid of one or two regiments, either from the Mauritius or from France, he would immediately have attempted an irruption into the Carnatic with the whole force of his cavalry, which although diminished is still considerable. In such an event if the Adjutant General's opinion be correct, your army could have opposed no obstacle to the progress of Tippoo for many months. The state of Tippoo's preparations is supposed to be such, as to enable him to move with facility and celerity even for the purposes of offence, while the condition of our protecting force is represented by the Adjutant General to be such, as will not admit of its moving *even for the purpose of defence*, before the commencement of the ensuing year. The acknowledged talents and experience of your Adjutant General, will not allow me to treat his opinion lightly upon a subject so important as that which was submitted to his consideration; I am persuaded, that he is incapable of attempting to exaggerate difficulties, and I can conceive no motive which could induce him to endeavour to impede the progress of measures, which it is his duty to execute with the full exertion of his zeal and ability; yet if I am to receive his judgment implicitly, I cannot view it in any other light, than that of a sentence of disqualification upon your army, as far as relates to the primary object of its institution; namely, "defence against a sudden invasion of the Carnatic." I am, however, aware that this sentence of disability is mitigated in a considerable degree by your judgment and that of Mr. Cockburn, to both of which on every account, I pay the greatest deference and respect. But even from the result of your opinion it appears, that it would be nearly three months, before the army could be enabled to move even for operations of a defensive nature. This my dear Sir, is a most serious consideration to me, who am charged with the arduous responsibility of preserving from injury, every part of the British empire in India, I am determined not only to apply an immediate remedy to this

evil, but to encounter the expense which I know must be incurred, in providing a permanent security against the future return of the peril of our present situation. With this view I mean to record my sentiments in the secret department upon the difficulties which obstruct the movements of your army; this step will be followed by a direction to your Government to report to me in council, the most eligible plan for enabling the army upon the coast to be in constant readiness to take the field expeditiously, upon any sudden emergency. On your report, combined with such information as I shall receive from the Commander-in-Chief, and from other authorities here, I propose to ground a permanent system for the necessary purpose already stated. In the meanwhile the measure which it is my intention to suggest to you for our present defence, will lay the foundation of a more regular establishment of your means of taking the field in future, and will co-operate in promoting my ultimate object. My wish now is, that you should immediately encamp the native troops in such a position as you may deem most eligible for expelling any invasion of the Carnatic; that you should draw the European force immediately into the frontier garrisons; and if your point of union should be, as I suppose it must be, the Baramahl, that you should encamp the European force also there before the period of the monsoon.

You will also immediately procure the necessary draft bullocks for the artillery; it is my opinion that a permanent establishment of these will be absolutely necessary for your future safety.

The carriage bullocks must be hired immediately, according to Mr. Cockburn's suggestion; some system must hereafter be regularly introduced into the country, in order to facilitate the collection of these upon all future emergencies.

Grain and other necessary provisions must be stored in whatever place shall be judged most proper for such a dépôt. I am persuaded that means must be found of constantly maintaining upon the frontiers such a store of grain as would serve a large army for at least six months in the field.

The train of artillery must be provided without delay; this will serve as a foundation for a permanent establishment of artillery, to be always ready for use; the camp equipage, will be furnished of course; but the best mode of providing

articles in future will be a leading object of your report to me.

Thus I have endeavoured to open to your view the general outline of my arrangements for frustrating the united efforts of Tippoo and of France. My leading objects are—to place your army in a respectable state of preparation for the present, and to enable it to move with alacrity and expedition on any future emergency. To restore to our Allies the power of fulfilling their defensive engagements with us, both now and hereafter; to destroy every seed of the French party, now growing up in the heart of the dominions of one of our principal Allies, and on the confines of our own. By the natural and necessary effect of this change in the political state of India, to strengthen our barriers against the resentment and violence of Tippoo Suldaun, and to place in our hands the option of reducing his power according to our discretion, instead of abandoning our tranquillity to his mercy.

All these objects appear to me to be attainable; but if they should not be attained, the blame shall not be imputable to any failure of diligence or labour on my part.

I am extremely pleased with the accounts from Tanjore; and I flatter myself that the country will at length become a scene of order and affluence, an honour to the government of the Company and of the Rajah, and an increasing source of profit to both.

Believe me, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Fort William, July 18, 1798.

I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge your two very interesting letters, Nos. 57 and 58.

The intelligence which they contain corresponds in a striking manner with the view which I had taken in my instructions to you and to Colonel Palmer of the 8th inst. of the actual state of affairs at the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and leads me to form a confident expectation that my proposed arrangements for restoring to us the benefit of the

triple alliance, will be brought to a successful issue, unless my endeavours should unfortunately be frustrated by the success of Scindiah's designs upon the power of the Peishwa before Colonel Palmer can have received my despatches of the 8th inst. In your letter, No. 58, you relate a singular instance of the penetration of Azim ul Omra, who, as you will have observed, has anticipated nearly the whole principle and object of my instructions of the 8th inst. Although I consider this coincidence of sentiment as a very favourable circumstance in many points of view, I am apprehensive that it may be difficult to convince Azim ul Omra of the fact of my first instructions to Colonel Palmer having been despatched on the same day with those addressed to you.

I think it necessary to authorize you to declare that I have had no correspondence whatever with Colonel Palmer previously to my despatch of the 8th inst. You will naturally observe to Azim ul Omra, that he has foreseen nearly the whole of my plan with this material exception, that the fundamental principle of my instructions, both to you and Col. Palmer, is an unreserved communication to each Court of the propositions to be made to the other; and that the full previous knowledge and consent of all parties forms an essential condition of the whole arrangement. This circumstance will afford sufficient proof of my sincerity; and, indeed, I cannot conceive what possible motive could be assigned for my preferring the interests of the Peishwa to those of the Nizam, or for my undertaking any negotiations at Poonah without his Highness's participation.

But I repeat it, the best answer to any such suspicion is to be found in the whole tenor and spirit of my instructions to you and to Colonel Palmer.

I shall wait for your reply to my letter of the 8th of July before I furnish you with my instructions upon any other points stated in your last despatches.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVIII.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Madras, July 22, 1798.

When your Lordship hears of our difficulties from the want of cash, you will not be surprized that we begin to be very anxious to hear from you on this subject.

Yesterday we advertized your ten years' proposal, from not having a better to offer, but much cannot be expected from it, as in the present state of exchange between the Presidencies it would be a great advantage to purchase your bills, and send them to be placed in your remittance. To equalize the exchange, we must remit the pagoda at nine shillings, which we did not think ourselves authorized to offer.

We have also advertised that proposals will be received for bills on Bengal, and from which I have some expectations, or should be under the necessity of entirely stopping our preparations, and which partially is the case, having stopped a further provision of bullocks (draft) than will move our field train and some arrack carts. I have not brought the corps from the westward of Wallajawbad out of cantonments, and I had intended to send the 36th into Arnee instead of allowing them to remain on field allowances, but shall wait until I hear further from your Lordship. A few days will always join the troops from the cantonments of Arcot, Conatore, Arnee, and Vellore, as their carriage and camp equipage are ready.

General Floyd informs me the 3d N. C. (the first corps ready with him) begins to cross the Coleroon the 17th or 18th, and will be five or six days in effecting the passage from his having but three boats; his Majesty's 19th dragoons and 12th infantry will follow in about eight days. Any one of these corps would enable us to watch Tippoo should he come to see us.

The camp at Wallajawbad will consist of his Majesty's 12th and 36th regiments, 19th dragoons, 3d and 4th N. cavalry, 1st B. 1st N. infantry, with the 74th and two corps of N. I. in the cantonments.

A few days will always join these to the corps at Arnee and Arcot, &c. as carriage and camp equipage is now all

ready. This, from absolute want of cash to make any further preparation, must be the state until your Lordship supplies us. I have now, my Lord, to address you on the subject of the French prisoners whom I have been much urged to send to Calcutta, but have refused until I know your pleasure:—

1. As being well acquainted with the nuisance they would be in Fort William.
2. As I am doubtful whether, under the Capitulation of Pondicherry, we can send them any where but to Europe without being guilty of a breach of it; and
3. As we can get vessels here that will engage as cartels, and which I should instantly have closed with, but that I do not think it safe to despatch them without convoy, for fear of their going to Mangalore instead of Old France.

I remain, with truth,

Your Lordship's

Faithful and obedient Servant,

GEO. HARRIS.

P. S. We have appointed the Commission for Tanjore, consisting of Mr. Torin, Mr. Harris (not even an acquaintance of mine), and Mr. Stratton, as youngest member and Secretary. Your Lordship has a pretty good notion of the difficulties attending the finding proper members who are not more usefully employed.

The above young men have lately conducted themselves very much to their credit; Mr. Harris in a business of a similar nature, in the Ramnad country, and Mr. Stratton as Secretary to the Court of Cutcherry.

Your Lordship's favorites, Messrs. Cockburne and Lushington are positively against accepting the country from Serfugee, and I join them most cordially—but particulars will be forwarded by the *Sybelle*, and then your Lordship will decide.

The amount of fixed pay and allowances of the army now under orders for the *Field*, is - - - Pagodas 91,449

Additional in the Field, - - - 1,18,105

2,09,554

No. XXXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, the 25th July, 1798.

From the enclosed copy of my letter to the Resident at Hyderabad, you will observe that I consider it of essential importance that the part of the proposed engagements with the Peishwa and the Nizam which relates to the dismissal of the French from the service of the two Courts, and the future exclusion of all persons of that nation from their respective dominions, should be finally ratified with all possible expedition.

You will accordingly take the necessary steps for obtaining without delay from the Peishwa a separate engagement comprising all the proposed stipulations in my letter of the 8th instant, regarding the French. The engagement should be concluded subject to my approbation, and should be forwarded to me with all practicable despatch for my ratification.

It is not improbable that the apparent reconciliation between Nana and Scindiah, has been founded on engagements injurious to the rights and authority of the Peishwa. Should this conjecture prove well founded, there is little room to expect that Bajee-Row will ever consent to Nana's restoration to his former influence in the administration of affairs, especially when it is considered that the grounds of the enmity between Bajee-row and Nana are of a nature which would appear to preclude any hope of a sincere reconciliation.

To use our influence for the restoration of Nana to his former power, in opposition to the Peishwa would be unjust. I have great doubts also of the policy of such a line of conduct. For it could not be expected that Bajee-row would adhere to engagements which subjected him to the control of the implacable enemy of his family, and such an arrangement might be expected to terminate either in an application to Scindiah for his assistance against Nana, or in a connection with Tippoo to the prejudice of the triple alliance.

Your communication with the parties will best enable you to judge of the consideration to which these conjectures are entitled. Should you be of opinion that the recent injuries which Bajee-Row and Nana have mutually sustained

from Dowlut Rao are likely to induce them to forget their former animosities, and that Nana can be restored to his former power, or placed in any other situation in the ministry at Poonah without danger to the immediate success of the proposed arrangements, or to their future stability, I shall readily acquiesce in such stipulations as you may make in his favor.

You will consider the instructions which I have given to the Acting Resident at Hyderabad for forwarding an account of the result of his proceedings under my instructions down to the latest date by the overland despatch which will proceed from Bombay by the 1st September next, as equally intended for your guidance.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XL.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

July, 29th, One P.M. 1798.

Your Lordship's private and public letters of 13th inst. are this moment received. You may rely that no time shall be lost in giving directions for carrying into effect the orders they convey, the moment I have determined in what manner your intentions will be best effected, and which in the scattered state of our troops to the northward, and owing to the urgent demands for them in other quarters requires much consideration.

July 30th.—Having turned the subject much in my mind last night and this morning, I am come to the resolution to acquaint your Lordship with two or three points by express before I finally determine from whence the force shall be brought.

That unless we receive from Bengal a supply of money before the end of August, we positively cannot proceed.

That the marine battalion should be sent with every possible expedition to Masulipatam, and the 33d. here.

That the force you have ordered cannot be assembled in the Guntoor Circar before the end of August, as a battalion, if not two, must go from the centre division, and where, it is to be observed, we have not a man to spare if an attack is

made ; and lastly, that the execution of your Lordship's orders for sending round the men of the 36th on the arrival of the 33d must be suspended if possible.

I sent an order last night for steps to be taken for the 11th regiment to be assembled, hoping that the force could have been furnished from the Circars, but shall stop them for a few days, as I am now convinced half of it must march from here.

Depend on every possible exertion, and that although depressed by want of cash, I do not despond, and am always very faithfully your Lordship's obedient Servant,

GEO. HARRIS.

No. XLI.

From Tippoo Sultaun to the Governor-General.

(Dated 1st Suffer, 1213, or 18th of July,)

[Received 2d of August, 1798.]

In happy time I had the pleasure to receive your Lordship's letter, which afforded me great satisfaction, and its friendly contents have been understood—(vide letter written 14th June). Since the time that the country of Nuggur and Koriaul was first subjugated, the Talooks of Ameera and Souleah, in which (latter) Kamtamungle and Coloorbajee are situated, have belonged to Koriaul, and this proved and confirmed by the records of a century.—The names of the persons who paid the collections of those Talooks to the officers of Koriaul, of those who collected the revenues of them, and the accounts of advances made to the Ryots for the purposes of cultivation, are contained in those records, and from the first establishment of the authority of this Sircar down to the year 1220 of Mohummed, they have been attached to the country of Koriaul. The Coorga people have had no concern in them. Indeed, between the above Talooks and the Coorga country vast hills interpose. By the Treaty of Peace, the Talooks of Ahmednuggur, otherwise called Chuckloor, belongs to my Sircar, and Wynaad (or Wynaur) is a Kurreah (or village with its appertaining lands) among the Kurreahs of Ahmednuggur above the Tambacherry pass. The territory of the Company is below that pass, and the hills form a barrier between.

Your Lordship has written that "subordinate officers are naturally inclined to make misrepresentations to their respective governments in such trivial cases, and to foment jealousies and disturbances."—It is certain, then, that in plain and simple cases, the representations of interested people will not have any weight or credit whatever with your Lordship. Nevertheless as your Lordship is desirous of obtaining an explanation and removing doubts, orders have been issued to the officers of Koriaul to confer with the persons who may be appointed from the Malabar side; and fairly to ascertain and remove all doubts, a person of rank shall also be deputed by me for this business. By the favour of God the bonds of friendship and union are firmly drawn between the two States, and I am to the last degree disposed to give additional strength to the beneficial system of amity and peace.

Believing me gratified by the agreeable intelligence of your Lordship's welfare, I hope you will always continue to rejoice me by your exhilarating letters.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. XLII.

The Hon. Jonathan Duncan to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 2d August, 1798.

I lose no time in acknowledging the honor and gratification I have experienced in the receipt of your Lordship's communication of the 6th ult., that reached me on the 30th of last month; and from the obliging expressions in which I am encouraged, and shall certainly feel every inclination to discharge the particular duties dependent on me in a manner to afford satisfaction to your Lordship, whose instructions and advice, whenever I may be favored with either, can never fail to have their full operation on my conduct.

Having imparted to the Commander-in-Chief, as well as to the Hon. Mr. North, the particulars relative to the measures in deliberation respecting Tippoo, the former has furnished me with the state and disposition of our forces, whence it appears that the present garrison of Bombay consists of the King's 75th regiment, two companies and

a half of artillery, one regiment of native infantry, six companies of the grenadier battalion of N. I. and about half the marine battalion, composing an effective force of 815 Europeans, and 2,320 Natives, besides 360 gun-lascars, without arms; and of the Sepoys, about seven hundred are at present unfit for field service; neither can the marine battalion be relied or reckoned on, as a part of the garrison, because their numbers are constantly fluctuating, and are no more than sufficient for their proper duties.

Tannah, in Salsette, is garrisoned by invalids, and a detachment of two companies of native infantry from Bombay; Surat, by one company of Europeans from the Company's regiment in Malabar; half a company of artillery, and the local battalion of Sepoys.

In Malabar, we have the 77th regiment, and the Company's European regiment (excepting the company detached to Surat, and the detachment on board of the *Bombay* frigate) three companies of artillery, and three regiments and a half of native infantry, exclusive of the pioneers, gun-lascars and Sebundy corps. Thus by the present distribution of our forces, the far greater part of our army is in the province of Malabar, and so situated that, from the season, it cannot immediately be called up to service in the northern quarters.

Under these circumstances, General Stuart (whose zeal for the service and professional ability I dare say your Lordship is fully aware of) thinks that, without much hazard, so large a force can hardly be detached from the garrison here, as to the greatest number your Lordship's letter adverts to; or of more than 500 men from the 75th regiment, with one company of artillery and complement of gun-lascars, and also the six companies of the grenadier battalion, making 350 men, with the 2d battalion of the 4th regiment, consisting of 900, composing in all 1250 sepoy; it being at the same time further observed by our Commander-in-Chief, that the emergency of the case could perhaps alone warrant our sparing such a great proportion of the force, which is not even now deemed adequate to the defence of this place were it attacked, and it will consequently be necessary to supply and replace them, without delay, by drafts from Malabar. The General also intimating that, in the intermediate time, and until the arrival of the reinforcements (which can hardly be looked to

before the end of September or middle of October), he will not be inclined to hold himself responsible for the consequences, in case of any attack on Bombay, which, although not a probable event, seems still within the range of possibility; and desiring likewise to notice, for your Lordship's observation, that we should have found less difficulty in sending a force from Malabar, where the greatest part of our army is stationed, and the troops ready for field-service, all, except what must be left in the garrisons of Cannanore, Cochlin, and Paulghaut, with one native regiment (as I calculate) to preserve the peace throughout the districts, to which the Sebundies alone are not adequate; so that I hardly suppose we could safely send from Malabar above 3,000 Native Infantry from the force at present stationed there, whether to come up here, or to act in that quarter in co-operation with the Madras army, and there is certainly more material danger in withdrawing any part of our force from Malabar, at this moment, than might be probably incurred by sending all the 3000 men in question to act against the Sultaun's territories in that quarter; for, whilst the troops were acting within the observation of the Malabar chieftains, these latter would, at least, be quiet, during our successful progress; but if they see the troops withdrawn, as it were altogether, by bringing them up to Bombay, they will be apt to ascribe it to our necessities and weakness; and to presume accordingly; for they one and all continue still uneasy under the yoke, we have been endeavouring to impose on them, and are only manageable by policy, aided by the appearance, at least, of a competent military force.

Having thus submitted to your Lordship the General's opinion and my own, as it is our duty;—be assured I shall, when your further instructions arrive, leave nothing undone to give them the fullest possible effect, and shall in the mean time, write to Fort St. George, as your Lordship has suggested.

Your Lordship may in this and in all other instances rely on my secrecy; but there will, I fear, be no disguising the object of our preparations; because, the notoriety of Malartic's publication (which I long prevented getting into the newspapers here, and until they were printed in the Bengal ones) leaves but one general belief, that your Lordship must unavoidably adopt the measures now in meditation; and which I do

also most fervently join my own wishes to those of your Lordship, may yet terminate in the confirmation of the public peace.

I must still add the farther opinion of General Stuart, that, if so great a draft of troops be made from this Presidency, it will be absolutely necessary to raise another native regiment. He at the same time doubts, whether the Madras Government will be able to spare us a man; in which case, I might perhaps obtain one or two battalions from the Rajah of Travancore, on the terms of the treaty with him, if your Lordship approves of that expedient.

I have the honor to remain with the utmost consideration,

My Lord, your Lordship's

Most obedient and very humble servant,

JONATHAN DUNCAN.

No. XLIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, 6th August, 1798.

I have received your letter of the 27th ultimo.

Considering the advance of Golaum Mahommed Khan towards Rohilcund without my sanction, as a decisive proof of his intention to create disturbance, I have communicated the intelligence which you have transmitted respecting him to the commanding officers at Futtelghur and Cawnpore, and have desired them to hold in readiness such part of their force as they may judge necessary for suppressing any commotion which may be excited by Golaum Mahommed and his adherents.

You will also apply to the Nabob to furnish a body of his troops to be stationed at Nujeebadad or at whatever place may be found advisable, and you will, in concert with the Vizier, direct Nussur Ullah Khan to have recourse to every means in his power for preventing any of the Rohillaes from joining Golaum Mahommed. Nussur Ullah Khan must be ordered to apprehend and send to Lucknow any persons who may be detected in favoring the views of Golaum Mahommed.

You will communicate to Major Generals Craig and Stewart such farther information as you may receive respecting the designs of Golaum Mahommed Khan, and you will concert

with those officers and with the Vizier the detail of the measures which may be necessary for preserving the tranquillity of the country.

In the meanwhile no time should be lost in obtaining the Vizier's consent to the removal of the whole of the family of Golaum Mahommed, including his sons, together with any treasure which the family may have in their possession to Benares.

You will have received my letter to the Vizier pressing him for the payment of the arrears of his subsidy. As I am persuaded his Excellency possesses ample means of discharging the whole arrear without waiting the receipt of the collections from the country, I desire that you will urge to him, in the strongest terms, my expectation that he will immediately resort to whatever resources of any description he can command for the purpose of fulfilling his engagements.

My intention of visiting Lucknow has suspended my answer to your several letters, but as I have thought it advisable to postpone my visit to that place for some time, I shall proceed without delay to the consideration of the various points on which you have desired my instructions.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort William, 7th August, 1798.

Your Highness's Letter gave me great satisfaction; at the same time that it reached me, I received from the Commissioners in Malabar, their final opinion upon the subject of Wynaad. After a full examination of every circumstance relating to your rights and to those of the Company, I am now convinced that Wynaad was not ceded to the Company by the treaty of peace, and therefore that it belongs to your Highness. As it never will be my wish to contest the smallest particle of your Highness's rights, I have directed the Commissioners to make a formal acknowledgment of the justice of your claim to Wynaad, which district you will occupy whenever it may suit your pleasure. As some doubts however remain whether the Tambacherry Pass be not included

in the cessions made to the Company, by the treaty of peace, I have directed the officers of the Company to confer on that subject, with the person to be appointed by your Highness. All question between your Highness and the Company with respect to Wynaad, is now brought to a happy conclusion:—The right to the Tambacherry Pass, and to the Talooks of Ameerah and Souleah and Ersawaraseemy still remains for discussion. You will find me sincerely disposed to consider the several questions relating to these districts, with the same impartiality, of which I have endeavoured to afford your Highness an unequivocal testimony in the final settlement of your claims upon Wynaad.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. XLV.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Madras, 7th August, 1798.

My last letter to your Lordship, of which I now transmit a duplicate, was in a more desponding strain than you were probably prepared to receive; but if it had been my wish to soften the truths which it contained, I should have deemed it treacherous to your Lordship to have done so, for as the responsibility of the orders rests exclusively with your Government, it was especially incumbent on me to apprize you of the difficulties which opposed their execution, that you might be enabled to send us early and effectual succour.

The situation of a person to command the detachment* has been justly considered an object of the greatest importance; after the fullest enquiry my choice has fallen upon Lieut.-Colonel Roberts commanding the 11th native regiment; he was at Hyderabad with it till relieved by the Bengal detachment, and gave great satisfaction to the Nizam and his Ministers. Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple, the brother-in-law of Lieut.-Colonel Roberts is the second in command, and an

* This refers to the portion of troops which the Governor General ordered to be assembled in the Guntoor Circar (see Map) for the purpose of marching on Hyderabad, in order to disarm the French legion of 11,000 men then in the service of the Nizam.

officer of high military character: he was also before at Hyderabad, and is the officer who so much distinguished himself at the taking of Raibor. But as Sir Alured Clarke is perfectly acquainted with their characters, I beg to refer your Lordship to him for more particular information. It will appear somewhat extraordinary to your Lordship (upon a perusal of the accompanying minute read in Council the 13th instant, but withdrawn for the present) that the required detachment would have been nearly ready at this time if the want of money had not afforded so serious an objection, and if I had not been much importuned to refrain from the measure, and perhaps convinced that I should have met with much counteraction which in my present temporary situation it would have been troublesome to overcome. The receipt of your instructions placed the measure in a stronger point of view, and yesterday I delivered to the Council the minute No. 2.

Objections were, as I expected, enumerated, but as I declared my resolution to take the measure upon myself; and execute it with my own funds if no public money could be obtained, the opposition was silenced, and my arrangements were instantaneously put in execution. I must confess to your lordship, that this minute has relieved the disquietude of mind under which I wrote my last letter; because I feel that I have done my duty towards the public and myself, in adverting to the difficulties to which we are exposed; whilst I have at the same time, placed your lordship's wishes in the best possible train of accomplishment, and write this letter under a determination to use my unceasing endeavours for their effectual and speedy completion. In the various considerations that will engage your Lordship's mind in deliberating upon the great question, that of the limited powers allowed to the Commander-in-Chief on the coast, will not escape you. In the event of hostilities, I should most earnestly wish your lordship to be here, and the Commander-in-Chief in India to be in command of the army; for although I have no doubt your Lordship would endeavour to prevent the certain bad consequences of placing me in the command, without an extension of my previous powers, I am thoroughly convinced, that the service would most essentially benefit by your Lordship's presence at Madras.

The outline of your Lordship's ideas for the defence of the Carnatic, appears to me perfectly correct; and so sensible am I of the necessity of stores and a train in advance, that you will have a plan immediately laid before you, for putting the Pettah of Kistnagherry into a state for a depôt. The unusual swelling of the rivers at Trichinopoly, and our total want of preparation in every way, not a boat being ready, and the Nabob's people doing nothing, has caused a delay in that quarter, which might have been most fatal, had Tippoo come down when he first received intelligence of our preparations.

I am my Lord,
Your very faithful and obedient servant.

GEO. HARRIS.

No. XLVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-Col. W. Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, 9th August, 1798.

Your letter of the 13th July, No. 28, is now before me.

In the 11th paragraph, you state the probability of the Peishwa's endeavouring to save his person by joining the forces of the Nizam; but you add your apprehension, that he may find it difficult to effect his retreat if Scindiah should determine to seize him in the city.

Under such circumstances, it is possible that the Peishwa might be able to effect his retreat with more facility, if he were to direct his motions towards Bombay, and to join our troops.

If therefore the Peishwa shall have consented to the propositions contained in my instructions to you of the 8th July, I authorize you to offer him a retreat at Bombay, and to assure him, that he will be received with every mark of respect and friendship, and that his person will be protected with the most exact attention.

You will take care to give sufficient notice to the Government of Bombay, if the Peishwa should be likely to avail himself of this offer, in order that they may prepare for his reception.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, acting Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort William, 11th August, 1798.

I have received your letter of the 24th July, to which I now return my answer.

By referring to my detailed instructions of the 8th July, you will perceive that the arrangements which I propose, are not limited to a mere enlargement of our existing subsidiary engagements with the Nizam.

I collect from your letter, that Azim ul Omra would be likely to require three conditions in addition to those stated in the abstract of my instructions of the 8th July, before he would consent to accede to my propositions.

The first, an engagement to support the succession of Scunder Jah.

Secondly, the power of employing the British detachment, in carrying into effect various measures of internal reform in the Nizam's dominions.

Thirdly, the extension of my proposed arbitration of the existing differences between the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, to any cases of difference which may hereafter arise.

It is my decided intention to support the succession of Scunder Jah. But I have directed you to conceal that intention from Azim ul Omra for the present, under an apprehension that the disclosure of it might excite suspicion and jealousy in the mind of the Nizam.

If, however, you should be of opinion that this communication could be made to Azim ul Omra, without any danger of the nature which I apprehend, I authorize you to act accordingly to your own discretion in this respect.

With regard to the employment of the British detachment within the Nizam's dominions, it appears to me that I have already laid down the rule with sufficient clearness in my letter of the 14th July; in which I have directed, that the employment of the British troops, in his Highness's dominions, shall be restricted to those important cases in which his person or authority shall be endangered, and shall not be extended to those services, which more properly belong to Schundy corps.

This rule would certainly admit of the employment of the detachment in the cases stated in your letter of the 24th July, nor am I aware of any objection to the use of the British troops, under the direction of the Nizam's ministers, in services connected with the introduction of a system of internal reform into his Highness's dominions.

If the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, shall concur in accepting my arbitration of their subsisting differences, there will be every reason to hope, that they would be prepared to receive a similar security against the effects of any disputes which may hereafter arise. It never was my intention to confine my interposition to the circumstances of the present moment, my object being to unite the interests of the two courts, upon a permanent basis.

My wish unquestionably is, that the Company should for the future, be placed in the situation of a mediator between the other two branches of the triple alliance, and should hereafter by a timely interposition of good offices, prevent them from engaging in contests, which must eventually impair the strength of both parties, and defeat the ends of the triple alliance.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVIII.

[Minute of the Governor-General in the Secret Department.]

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. Fort William, August 12, 1798.

In communicating to the Board an authentic copy of the proclamation issued by the Governor-General of the Isle of France, during the residence of the Ambassadors of Tippoo Sultaun in that island, I informed the Board that I would prepare the detail of such measures, as appeared to me most advisable for the purpose, of frustrating the united efforts of Tippoo Sultaun and of France. Accordingly I have laid before the Board, for that necessary purpose, a number of propositions, connected in their principle as well as in their object, and I have endeavoured to carry the proposed system of measures into execution with every practicable degree of diligence and despatch. When it

is remembered that I did not take charge of this Government until the 18th of May, that the proclamation did not make its first appearance at this Presidency until the 8th of June, and was not authenticated here until the 18th of June, I trust it will appear that I have proceeded with as much expedition as was compatible with the due consideration of the various and important questions which demanded my decision.* Although the leading objects of the several propositions which have been adopted by this Government may be collected from my late correspondence with the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and with the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, it may be useful to review, with more particularity, the circumstances which have suggested this system of measures to my judgment. My present intention, therefore, is to explain and illustrate the principles upon which that system is founded, the means by which I hope to carry it into effect, and the ends which I expect to accomplish by its ultimate success and permanent establishment. In this retrospect of my conduct, I shall disclose, without hesitation or reserve, the whole train of reflections which has passed in my mind during the agitation of this intricate and extensive subject; and I shall avow, without disguise, every successive variation of my opinion, and every instance in which I have reluctantly submitted my unaltered judgment to the pressure of practical difficulties; nor shall I deny that I have ultimately pursued a course, far within the limits of that, to which the sense of my own duty and character, the clearest principles of justice and of policy, the unquestionable rights and interests of the Company, and the honour of the British name in India, would have directed me, if the obstacles to my progress had not appeared absolutely insurmountable.

The various considerations which have successively engaged my attention may be stated in the following order:—

* The Minute of the Governor-General, (see p. 54) respecting the financial distress of India, bearing date 12th June 1798, demonstrates that it required deliberation before increased expenses were to be incurred; and it also proves that Lord Mornington had attentively examined the whole question of the pecuniary embarrassments in which his Lordship found the East India Company's territories involved.

First,—The nature and character of the recent proceedings of Tippoo Sultaun.

Secondly,—The rights and interests of the Company, and the principles of my duty arising out of those proceedings.

Thirdly,—The circumstances which might suspend or limit the actual exercise of those rights, the immediate and complete establishment of those interests, and the satisfactory discharge of that duty.

Fourthly,—The intermediate precautions which might be adopted during the suspension of more effectual measures, and the securities which might now be provided against the return of our actual danger.

The first consideration required an attentive examination of the proclamation issued at the Isle of France, together with all the collateral circumstances accompanying that extraordinary publication. The proclamation made its first appearance at Calcutta in a newspaper of the 8th of June.

Upon the first view of the subject, I was much inclined to doubt the authenticity of the proclamation. It seemed incredible that, if the French really entertained a design of furnishing aid to Tippoo, they would publicly declare that design, when no other apparent end could be answered by such a declaration, excepting that of exposing the project in its infancy to the observation of our Governments, both at home and in India, and of preparing both for a timely and effectual resistance. It did not appear more probable that Tippoo (whatever might be his secret design) would have risked so public and unguarded an avowal of his hostility; however, even under these circumstances, I thought it advisable to transmit a copy of the proclamation to the Governor of Fort St. George, in a private letter of the 9th of June, apprizing him that, if the proclamation should prove authentic, it must lead to a serious remonstrance from this Government to Tippoo, the result of which remonstrance must be uncertain; my letter, therefore, directed him to turn his attention to the means of collecting a force upon the coast, if necessity should unfortunately require such a measure.

The first regular authentication of the proclamation which I received was contained in the letter from Lord Macartney, of 28th March, and in that from Sir Hugh Christian of the same date, received on the 18th of June. It could now no

longer be doubted that the proclamation actually had been issued by the Governor General of the Isle of France. Still, however, it might have remained a question whether this step might not have been taken without the concurrence of Tippoo Sultaun, and for the promotion of some separate object of the French Government, unconnected with his interests and unauthorized by his consent. From the accounts which I had received of the state of the Isle of France, I was led to believe that the object of Mr. Malartic might have been to clear the Island of the adherents to the cause of the present Government of France, rather than to afford any effectual assistance to Tippoo. It appears, however, from a more accurate investigation of evidence, that the ship (which first conveyed to the Isle of France those accounts of the last revolution in France, and of the violent measures projected against the Isles of France and Bourbon, which occasioned the late disturbances at Port Nord Ouest, and the expulsion of the French national troops from thence) did not reach the Isle of France until Tippoo's Ambassadors had departed from thence on their return to Mangalore. The assistance afforded to Tippoo cannot therefore have been connected with the recent commotions in the Isle of France. However, I do not apprehend, unless some new revolution shall happen in the Isle of France, that Tippoo Sultaun will be able to derive any considerable aid from that quarter. But whatever may have been the motives of Monsieur Malartic in this transaction, the object of Tippoo Sultaun was always plain and clear, although, fortunately for our interests, his success has not yet been answerable to the extent of his design. Of the object of that design, I soon possessed ample proof, arising from the best evidence which the nature of the case could admit. In the first place it appeared, by the general tenor of the letters from the Cape, as well as by every public account which had been given of the transaction, to be an undisputed fact, that Tippoo despatched two Ambassadors to the Isle of France, and that the proclamation in question was published subsequently to their arrival and during their residence in that island. These facts would perhaps have been sufficient, without further inquiry, to warrant a strong presumption that this proclamation, purporting to declare the object of the embassy, must have been framed with the con-

sent and knowledge of the Ambassadors of Tippoo, then on the spot, and must have corresponded with their instructions from their sovereign, whose orders they would scarcely have ventured to exceed in a matter of such serious consequence as the conclusion of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French. In order, however, to obtain the most accurate information with respect to the circumstances attending the reception of the embassy, the publication of the proclamation, and the conduct of the Ambassadors, I examined, upon oath, some respectable persons who were present in the Isle of France during the residence of the Ambassadors at Port Nord Ouest. From the concurrent testimony of these persons, since corroborated by intelligence from various quarters, I obtained a connected account of the whole transaction.

Tippoo despatched two Ambassadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived there at the close of the month of January 1798. They hoisted Tippoo's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord Ouest, were received publicly and formally by the French Government with every circumstance of distinction and respect, and were entertained during their continuance on the Island at the public expense. Previously to their arrival, no idea or rumour existed in the Island of any aid to be furnished to Tippoo by the French, or of any prospect of a war between him and the Company. The second day after the arrival of the Ambassadors, an advertisement was published of the same purport as the proclamation, and immediately afterwards the proclamation was fixed up in the most public places, and circulated through the town. One of the Ambassadors was perfectly conversant with the French language. A person accompanied the embassy from Mangalore, who was habited in the Turkish dress, who spoke French and English with uncommon correctness and fluency, and who appeared to possess considerable knowledge and talents, and to be well acquainted with most of the country languages of India. This person had been known at Bussorah by the name of Abdoolah, at Surat by that of Derwish, and in the Isle of France passed under that of Talamas, under which last name he had also passed in Bengal, where he resided for some years. The Ambassadors (far from protesting against the matter or style of the proclamation) held, without reserve, in the most public

manner, the same language which it contains with respect to the offensive war to be commenced against the British possessions in India; they even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distributed at their own house. Talamas's conversation, though with more caution and mystery, corresponded in substance with theirs. In consequence of these circumstances, an universal belief prevailed in the Island, that Tippoo would make an immediate attack upon the British possessions in India, which opinion had gained so much force, that the persons who gave this evidence, and all those who arrived at that period in India from the Isle of France, expected to find us at war with Tippoo, but they all concurred in declaring, that the temerity of Tippoo's design had excited general ridicule in that Island. The Ambassadors were present in the Island when the French Government proceeded to act under the proclamation in question, and they aided and assisted the execution of it, by making promises in the name of Tippoo for the purpose of inducing recruits to enlist; they proposed to levy men to any practicable extent, stating their powers to be unlimited with respect to the numbers of the force to be raised. The Ambassadors aided and assisted in the levy of 150 officers and privates for the service of Tippoo, under the terms and for the purposes of the proclamation. Few of the officers are of any experience or skill, and the privates are the refuse of the lowest class of the democratic rabble of the Island. Some of them are volunteers, others were taken from the prisons and compelled to embark, several of them are Caffres and people of half-cast. With such of these troops as were volunteers, the Ambassadors entered into several stipulations and engagements in the name of Tippoo.

On the 7th of March, 1798, the Ambassadors embarked on board the French frigate *La Preneuse*, together with the force thus raised, and they publicly declared an intention of proceeding to the Isle of Bourbon, with the hope of obtaining more recruits for the same service.

The proclamation, therefore, originated in the arrival of the Ambassadors at the Isle of France, was distributed by their agents, was avowed in every part by their own public declaration, and finally was executed according to its tenor by their personal assistance and co-operation.

The proclamation itself furnished the most powerful in-

ternal evidence of the concurrence of the Ambassadors in all its essential parts, the principal facts stated therein are—

“That Tippoo Sultaun, through two Ambassadors despatched for the purpose to the Isle of France, had addressed letters to the colonial assembly of the Isle of France, to all the Generals employed there, and to the Executive Directory of France, and had made the following propositions:—

“1st. That he desired to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French, and offered to maintain at his expense, during the continuance of the war in India, whatever troops should be furnished by the French, and to supply (with the exception of certain stores) every necessary for carrying on the war.

“2d. That he had given assurances that all his preparations were already completed, and that the generals and officers would find every thing necessary for carrying on a species of war, to which Europeans have not been accustomed in their contests with the Native Powers in India.

“3d. That he only waited for the succour of France to declare war against the English, and that it was his ardent desire to expel the English from India.”

Upon the ground of these facts, the proclamation recommends a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo; and it concludes by assuring “all the citizens who shall enlist, that Tippoo will give them an advantageous rate of pay and allowances, *which will be fixed by his Ambassadors*, who will also engage, in the name of their sovereign, that the Frenchmen who shall have enlisted in his army, shall never be detained there after they shall have expressed a desire of returning to their native country.”

The avowed purport of this proclamation is to acquaint the inhabitants of the Island with the propositions made by Tippoo Sultaun, through his Ambassadors then on the spot. It enumerates those propositions with a particularity of detail which could never have been hazarded in the presence of the Ambassadors if the facts stated had not been correctly true, or if the propositions enumerated had varied in substance from those communicated by the Ambassadors under the orders of their sovereign. But the last paragraph of the proclamation connected with the conduct of the Ambassadors as already described, establishes in the clearest manner their

participation in the whole transaction. That paragraph contains a direct reference to the powers of the Ambassadors, and engages on their behalf that they shall enter into certain stipulations in the name of their sovereign with respect to the pay and final discharge of such French subjects as shall enlist in his army under the conditions of the proclamation. The accounts which I have received from the Isle of France concur in stating, that the Ambassadors openly acted under this part of the proclamation, and in the name of Tippoo entered into engagements and stipulations with the recruits according to the assurances specified in the proclamation. Monsieur De Bue, now master attendant at Mangalore, stated to one of the witnesses whom I examined, the whole substance of the engagements which had passed personally between him and the Ambassadors, all of which engagements referred immediately to Tippoo's intention of commencing war upon the Company, with the aid of the French force then about to be levied; and it is certain that without some such engagement not a man would have been raised in the Isle of France for the service of Tippoo. It appears from the evidence which I have collected, that the Ambassadors had not brought to the Isle of France a supply of treasure sufficient for advancing bounty money to the recruits. It was stated that an apprehension of the English cruizers had prevented the embarkation of treasure for this purpose, and no doubt was entertained that if the Ambassadors had been better provided with money, they might have raised a much greater number of men, who refused to engage on the mere security of promises in the name of Tippoo.

The Ambassadors, together with the force thus collected during the time of their mission in the Isle of France, landed from the frigate, *La Preneuse*, at Mangalore, on the 26th of April, 1798. Accounts vary with respect to the exact number of the force landed; the most probable are that it did not exceed 200 persons. Tippoo (far from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of the conduct of his Ambassadors in any part of the transaction) formally received them, and the officers and leading persons so landed with public marks of honour and distinction. One of his Ambassadors resided for some time with the French recruits in a fortress near Mangalore, and the Sultaun has admitted the whole levy of officers

and men into his service. Referring, therefore, to the conduct of the Ambassadors in the Isle of France to their arrival at Mangalore with the force levied in consequence of their mission, and finally to the reception of the Ambassadors and of the French recruits by Tippoo Sultaun, the following conclusions appeared to me to be incontrovertibly established :—

First,—That the Ambassadors despatched by Tippoo Sultaun to the Government of the Isle of France proposed to that Government an alliance, offensive and defensive, against the British possessions in India, which alliance was accepted by that Government, and its acceptance formally notified by a public proclamation.

Secondly,—That the Ambassadors were charged with letters from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory of France, which letters were stated to contain the same proposition, and that the Ambassadors delivered these letters to the Governor General of the Isle of France for the purpose of transmission to France.

Thirdly,—That the Ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, gave public assurances that he had actually completed the necessary preparations for commencing immediate hostilities, and that he only waited the arrival of succours from the French to declare war against the Company, for the express purpose of expelling the British nation from India.

Fourthly,—That the Ambassadors demanded unlimited military succour from the French, and levied a military force in the Isle of France with the declared object of commencing immediate war against the British nation in India.

Fifthly,—That this force has been actually landed in Tippoo's country, and publicly admitted into his service with signal marks of approbation; and that the Ambassadors have been received with similar distinction.

Sixthly,—That Tippoo Sultaun (by receiving with public marks of approbation his Ambassadors, who had concluded in his name an offensive and defensive alliance with the French; and by admitting into his service the military force raised for effecting the objects of that alliance) has personally ratified the engagements contained in the proclamation of the Governor General of the Isle of France, and has proceeded to act under those engagements conformably to the tenor of that proclamation.

Seventhly,—That although the succour actually received by Tippoo Sultaun under his offensive alliance with the French is inconsiderable, yet the tenor of the proclamation, the proposition made to the French Government for unlimited military aid, &c. &c., and the declarations of the Ambassadors prove, that it was the intention of Tippoo Sultaun, to receive into his service the largest force which he could obtain, for the purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company in India.

Having thus entered into offensive and defensive engagements with the enemy, having proceeded to collect in conjunction with the enemy, a force openly destined to act against the possessions of the Company, having avowed through his public Ambassadors, that he has compleated his preparations of war for the express purpose of attempting the entire subversion of the British Empire in India, and having declared that he only waits the effectual succour of the French to prosecute offensive operations; Tippoo Sultaun has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Company, and has committed an act of direct hostility against the British Government in India.

Before I proceeded to apply the principles of the law of nations to the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, it appeared proper to enquire what had been the conduct of the Company towards him for some years past, and whether he had received any provocation to justify or to palliate his late proceedings.

Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Seringapatam, the British Governments in India, have uniformly conducted themselves towards Tippoo Sultaun, not only with the most exact attention to the principles of moderation, justice, and good faith; but have endeavoured by every practicable means to conciliate his confidence, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit. Some differences have occasionally arisen with respect to the boundaries of his territory bordering upon the confines of our possessions on the coast of Malabar; but the records of all the British Governments in India will shew, that they always manifested the utmost anxiety to promote the amicable adjustment of every doubtful or disputed point; and that Tippoo Sultaun has received the most unequivocal proofs of the constant disposition of the Company to acknow-

ledge and confirm all his just rights, and to remove every cause of jealousy, which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace.

The servants of the Company in India, have not however been ignorant of the implacable sentiments of revenge, which he has preserved without abatement since the hour of his last defeat. It has always been well understood, that Tippoo Sultaun's resentment was not to be appeased by any conciliatory advances on our part, nor by any other means than the recovery of his lost power, the disgrace of the British arms, and the ruin of the British interests in India. With such views it was expected that he would eagerly embrace the first favorable occasion of striking a blow against our possessions; and his intrigues at the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, together with his Embassy to Zemaun Shah, (although managed with such a degree of caution as to avoid the appearance of direct acts of aggression,) were sufficient indications of an hostile mind. But none of these circumstances have in any degree affected the conduct of the Company's servants towards him, and the correspondence between him and the late Governor General, and the letters from Bombay on the subject of the district of Wynaad, furnish ample proofs of a sincere desire to bring that question to a fair issue, "*with the consent and knowledge of both parties,*" according to the tenor of the 7th article of the treaty of Seringapatam; I appeal to the letter which I despatched to him soon after my arrival in Bengal, proposing an amicable adjustment of the same question, as well as of his recent claims upon certain parts of the district of Coorga, for a testimony of the pacific spirit which has marked my first communication with him; although, perhaps, a less mild representation might have been justified, by his unwarrantable precipitation in stationing a military force on the frontier of Coorga, before he had made any trial of the prescribed and regular channels of negotiation. Tippoo Sultaun cannot therefore alledge even the pretext of a grievance to palliate the character of his recent acts; he has indeed alledged none, but has constantly professed the most sincere desire to maintain the relations of amity and peace with the Company. In his letters to Sir John Shore (written a short time before the return of the Mysorean Ambassadors from the Isle of France,

and received at Fort William on the 26th April, 1798, the day on which the French force landed at Mangalore) Tippoo declares, "that his friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord established between the two states." And he signifies his desire that "Sir John Shore would impress Lord Mornington, with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between the two states."

This is not the language of hostility, nor even of discontent. From what disposition in the friendly heart of Tippoo these amicable professions have proceeded, how they are connected with a regard to truth and justice, or calculated to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord, and to impress me with a sense of the Sultaun's friendship, can now admit of no question, since it is now proved, that these letters were written at the very moment, when Tippoo was in anxious expectation of the hourly arrival of that military succour, which he had solicited from the enemy for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company's possessions.

The motive therefore of Tippoo Sultaun, was no other than that avowed in his correspondence with the enemy, and published under the eyes of his own Ambassadors, "*an ardent desire to expel the British nation from India.*"

It appears highly probable, that he was instigated by the promises and exhortations of the Government of France, (whose emissaries have reached his councils) to hasten the execution of a project, in which every consideration of interest, and every sentiment of passion would induce the French to embark with a degree of zeal, ardour, and rancour not inferior to his own.

The importance of these possessions to all the most valuable interests of Great Britain, has pointed the particular attention of the Government of France to the destruction of our empire in India. The prosperity of our settlements in India, has long been the primary and undisguised object of the jealousy of France, avowed by all her ministers in every negociation, and by all her rulers in every stage of her innumerable revolutions; Tippoo therefore might reasonably hope, that if the cessation of hostilities on the continent of Europe, should at any time enable the French directory to

turn their views to the disturbance of the peace of India, such an adventure would be among the earliest of their operations.

The conclusion of a peace upon the continent of Europe, the weak state of the internal Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad, the existing dissensions, apparently precluding all co-operation and concert between those two powers, added to the growing strength of a French faction in every part of India, may have appeared both to Tippoo and to the French to offer a favorable opportunity for the prosecution of their joint design. The premature disclosure of this design may perhaps be imputed rather to the policy of M. Malartic, than to the imprudence of Tippoo; whether the scope of that policy was to involve us in a war with Tippoo, or to expose his treachery to our view, is yet a matter of doubt; but whatever circumstances occasioned the premature disclosure of the design, whether the design was wisely or rashly conceived; whether it has partially succeeded, or entirely failed, are questions, the solution of which in no degree affects the offensive nature of an aggression so unprovoked, and of a violation of faith so flagrant and unqualified. The history of the world scarcely furnishes an instance, in which any two powers have united in confederacy or alliance precisely with the same motives. The party proposing an offensive alliance against the Company, cannot be absolved from the consequences of such an act, by any apparent or real indifference in the party accepting such a proposal. The conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, therefore, cannot be correctly estimated by reference to the supposed motives of Monsieur Malartic. From the application of the acknowledged principles of the law of nations to the facts of this case, I formed my judgment of the rights of the Company, and of my own duties with reference to the aggression of Tippoo. The course of reasoning which I pursued may be stated in the following manner.

The rights of states applicable to every case of contest with foreign powers, are created and limited by the necessity of preserving the public safety; this necessity is the foundation of the reciprocal claim of all nations to explanation of suspicious or ambiguous conduct, to reparation for injuries done, and to security against injuries intended.

In any of these cases, when just satisfaction has been de-

nied, or from the evident nature of circumstances cannot otherwise be obtained, it is the undoubted right of the injured party to resort to arms for the vindication of the public safety; and in such a conjuncture, the right of the state becomes the duty of the Government, unless some material consideration of the public interest should forbid the attempt.

If the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the Courts of Hyderabad, Poonah and Cabul, or even if he had entered into any negociation with France, of which the object was at all obscure; it might be our duty to resort in the first instance to his construction of proceedings, which being of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory explanation. But where there is no doubt, there can be no matter for explanation. The act of Tippoo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified and unambiguous declaration or act of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither explanation, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India. To affect to misunderstand an insult and injury of such a complexion would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear; no state in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tippoo; the correspondence of our Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah sufficiently manifests the construction which it bears at both those Courts; and in so clear and plain a case, our demand of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect of spirit or of power, the result of such a demand would therefore be, the disgrace of our character, and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies, and of every power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Tippoo's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate attack; if, on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France, would persist in the denial until he

had reaped the full benefit of them; and finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the accession of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions, with an alacrity and confidence inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case the idea therefore of demanding *explanation* must be rejected, as being disgraceful in its principle, and frivolous in its object. The demand of *reparation*, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be applied to cases of intended injury, excepting in those instances, where the nature of the reparation demanded may be essentially connected with security against the injurious intention.

Where a State has unjustly seized the property, or invaded the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation may be made by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has been infringed; but the cause of our complaint against Tippoo Sultan, is not that he has seized a portion of our property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our territory which he might again cede, or violated a right which he might hereafter acknowledge; we complain, that, professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction; he has prepared the means and instruments of a war of extermination against us; he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy for the declared purpose of annihilating our Empire: and he only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow against our existence.

That he has not yet received the effectual succour which he has solicited, may be ascribed either to the weakness of the Government of Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own Councils; but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by the amount of the force which he has actually obtained; for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited; we know that they were addressed not merely to the Government of Mauritius, but to that of France, and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full ex-

tent of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate and treacherous enemy: against an enemy of this description, no effectual security can be obtained otherwise than by such a reduction of his power, as shall not only defeat his actual preparations, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence.

To this species of security our right is unquestionable, upon the grounds already stated. But it cannot be supposed that Tippoo Sultaun will voluntarily concede to us a security of this nature against the effects of his own resentment, treachery and ambition, and against the success of the most favorite projects of his mind.

Since, therefore, the principles of justice and of the law of nations entitle us to such a security, and since we cannot possibly obtain it by the voluntary concession of Tippoo Sultaun, it is the right of the Company to compel him to yield it; and it is equally my duty to use that compulsion without delay, provided the interests of the Company committed to my charge be not more endangered by the attempt, than by the unrestrained progress of his preparations for war.

In proportion to the continual progress of Tippoo's preparations, he will acquire more decisively the advantage of holding in his hands the issues of peace and war, together with the power of selecting the time and mode of his long meditated attack upon our possessions. He has not yet obtained any formidable accession of strength from his alliance with France, nor is it probable that any such accession will reach his country within a short period, certainly not before the close of the monsoon on the coast of Malabar; while he shall retain the ready means of intercourse by sea with the French Government, it cannot be doubted that they will use every endeavour to assist him with military aid, and to instigate him to war. The arrival of one or two French regiments would probably induce Tippoo to commence offensive operations, and the assistance even of so small a body of Frenchmen might become alarming in the actual state of the native armies of India. The systematic introduction of French officers into the service of all the native powers, is described

by Mr. Wickham as the fixed policy of France, adopted with a view of establishing the most certain means of subverting the foundation of our power. This system has been pursued in the armies of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of many other inferior powers with unremitting assiduity, and extensive success. If Tippoo should be allowed to derive from France such succour as would induce him to act offensively against us, his earliest movements would probably be seconded by the general insurrection of the various bodies of French adventurers, who are incorporated in the service of the several native powers, and who maintain a concert and correspondence in every quarter of India. Under such circumstances, it would be prudent to take advantage of the actual crisis, in which the hostile design of Tippoo has been clearly manifested, but the means of accomplishing it have happily disappointed the ardor of his hopes. In this moment of his comparative weakness, of his disappointment, and of his probable dejection, no policy could be more wise than to strike such an instantaneous blow against his possessions, as should effectually frustrate his preparations for war, and should render him unable to avail himself of the aid of France whenever it may arrive.

The inconsiderable amount of the force which he has already received from France, while it cannot limit our just right to reduce his power, affords a strong argument of policy in favour of an immediate attack.

It is therefore evident that the rights and interests of the Company concur to demand from this Government every practicable effort to anticipate the execution of his projects of vengeance by attacking him on all sides without delay. In this train of reasoning I was confirmed by adverting to the general tenor of the orders of the Court of Directors, and of the proceedings of this Government with reference to the contingency of a French force landing at any time in the territories of Tippoo Sultaun.

The orders of the Court of Directors uniformly enjoin that the landing of a French force in Tippoo's country should be "the signal for our attack upon him." The construction of those orders by the late Governor General in his instructions to the President in Council of Fort St. George of 12th September, 1796, appears to have been, that the number of the

French force should be *considerable* in order to justify our attack. But I am persuaded that the real intention of the late Governor General in those instructions, could not have been to declare, that the justice or policy of attacking Tippoo was hereafter to be measured solely by the magnitude of any French force landed in his country.

It is certainly true that, on the one hand, the landing of a considerable French force in Tippoo's country would be an unquestionable indication of his hostile intentions against the British power, while on the other hand the landing of a few French officers and privates, and even their admission into the service of Tippoo, might, under certain circumstances, be supposed to manifest nothing more than a disposition to improve the general discipline of his armies, without implying any formed design of war against the Company or their Allies. This, I am persuaded, is the only view in which the late Governor General in Council could consider the magnitude of the French force landed in Tippoo's country as the foundation of a rule for limiting the discretion of the Company's governments in such a contingency. On the present occasion, the hostile intentions of the Sultaun are unequivocally manifested by the proclamation, by the declarations and conduct of his Ambassadors, and by their demand of French troops to an unlimited extent. Connected with these circumstances, the landing and admission into the Sultaun's armies, even of a less considerable force than that which he has received, would be deemed, under the just construction of the opinions both of the Court of Directors and of this Government, "a signal for our attack upon him."

My determination, therefore, was fixed to attack Tippoo with every degree of practical despatch.

The objects which appeared to me the most desirable, as well as the most easily attainable, were,—First, To seize the whole maritime territory remaining in his possession below the Ghauts on the coast of Malabar, in order to preclude him from all future communications by sea with his French allies.

Secondly, By marching the army from the coast of Coromandel directly upon his capital, to compel him to purchase peace by a formal cession of the territory seized on the coast of Malabar.

Thirdly, To compel him to defray our whole expense in the war, and thus to secure the double advantage of indemnifying us for the expense occasioned by his aggression, and of reducing his resources with a view to our future security.

Fourthly, To compel him to admit permanent Residents at his Court from us and from our Allies, a measure which would enable us at all times to check his operations, and to counteract the intricacies of his treachery.

Fifthly, That the expulsion of all the natives of France now in his service, and the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen, both from his army and dominions, should be made conditions of any treaty of peace with him.

With this plan in view, I directed that the army upon the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay, should be immediately assembled; and I entertained a very sanguine hope that active operations might have been commenced so early as, with the co-operation of his Majesty's squadron on the coast of Malabar (which Rear-Admiral Rainier had promised), might have secured the effectual reduction of Tippoo's power before any assistance could have reached him from France. But I never proposed to undertake any attack upon him, of which the success could be doubtful in the judgment of those whose opinions must always govern my discretion in every question of military detail.

The avowed designs of Tippoo, the state of his preparations for war (which, notwithstanding his late disappointment, was certainly forward as far as regarded his own troops), the uncertainty of the motives which might impel the violence of his temper to action, and my knowledge of the indiscreet zeal with which he has frequently pursued his favourite object of revenge against the British power, all concurred to urge the necessity of placing ourselves in a state of preparation for war at least equal to that of his army. These measures appeared to me not matters of choice, but of indispensable duty. I could not suffer the security of the Carnatic to rest on so precarious a foundation as the forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun and of his French allies. To resume the power of meeting him in the field, and to replace in our hands the option which he then possessed, of accommodating the time of attack to circumstances and events, appeared to me to be the most prudent step which could be immediately adopted, whatever

might hereafter be the service to which our force might be applied. The orders, therefore, which I gave for assembling the army (although pointed more particularly at the execution of the plan of operations, which I have just now detailed) were founded upon principles independent of the practicability of that plan, and were connected not only with the immediate defence of the Carnatic, but with other comprehensive measures of permanent precaution and security, to which my views have been extended at every period of this crisis.

When I submitted my ideas of the time and objects of the proposed attack upon Tippoo to those military authorities, which I shall always consider with respect, it seemed to be their opinion, that the state of our army admitted no doubt of the ultimate success of the plan which I had proposed. If its speedy accomplishment had appeared to them as certain as its ultimate success, I should not have hesitated a moment in directing the commencement of offensive operations; but I found that, instead of deriving to the interests of the Company the inestimable advantages of a sudden and rapid reduction of Tippoo's means of offence, the result of such an attempt was likely to lead to a tedious, protracted, and expensive, although ultimately successful, war. The obstacles which arose were of a nature not to be surmounted by any degree of present activity or resolution, although they originated in causes which I trust may be removed by future diligence and perseverance.

The result of my earliest inquiries convinced me that radical defects existed in the military establishments on the coast of Coromandel, which would render it impossible to put our army in that quarter in motion soon enough to effect the object which I proposed. The opinions which I received from military authorities here, with respect to the impossibility of making any sudden or speedy military movement on the coast of Coromandel, were afterwards confirmed by the concurrent testimony of the Governor of Fort St. George, and of the Adjutant General of that establishment. I have entered into a particular consideration of this testimony in a Minute recorded in the Secret Department of the 20th July, to which I desire to refer on this part of the subject. The letter* of the Government of Fort St. George of the 10th

* See Appendix.

of July proceeds far beyond the limits of any opinion which I had ever formed or heard with respect to the difficulty of restraining the hostility of Tippoo; in that letter the President in Council even deprecates the ordinary precautions of defence, lest they should draw down the resentment of the Sultaun upon our unprotected possessions.

The expense of a protracted war, and the evil effects which such a calamity must produce on the trade of the Company, upon their pecuniary affairs at home, upon the welfare of their subjects in India, and upon the general state of the public revenue and credit of Great Britain, now pressed with great weight upon my mind, and the embarrassment of our finances aggravated all the difficulties of my situation. The question was now entirely changed; the plan which I had originally had in contemplation was nothing more than a military expedition of short duration, of no heavy expense, and of certain success, with the additional advantage that success would certainly exonerate our finances, and throw the whole expense of the undertaking upon the enemy, who had provoked it. But it now appeared that I could not hope to effect any of my proposed objects without encountering the expense and inconvenience of a long war.

In this state of the question, the condition of our Allies occurred as an insuperable obstacle to our progress. Although the assistance of the Peishwa and of the Nizam might not have been deemed indispensable in an expedition of the nature which I have described; I have always been apprized that an offensive war of any long duration in Mysore would be difficult, if not impracticable, without the effectual aid of the Peishwa and of the Nizam, in facilitating the supplies of provision to our army in the field.

The state of the Courts of Hyderabad and of Poonah afforded no hope of their early cooperation with us; and although I had determined to take the most expeditious measures for restoring both our Allies to the power of fulfilling their defensive engagements with us, I could not expect to derive any benefit from those measures for a considerable period of time; and it would have been imprudent to have undertaken offensive operations, with the prospect of a continued war, until the efficiency of our alliances had been previously secured. Under the accumulated pressure of all these

difficulties, I felt, with the utmost degree of disappointment and regret, that the moment was unfavourable to the adoption of the only measure which appeared to me sufficient to satisfy the rights and interests of the Company and the exigencies of my own duty; I was therefore compelled to relinquish the idea of striking an immediate blow against the possessions of Tippoo Sultaun. But the circumstances which thus suspended the actual exercise of the rights and the immediate establishment of the interests of the Company, could not absolve me from the duty of providing, without delay, every degree of intermediate security which might now be attainable, by adopting such a system of preparation and defence as might enable us to repel any attack which Tippoo might make upon us, or to support any demand of satisfaction, which we may eventually deem it advisable, in concert with our Allies, to make to him.

The sense of this duty induced me to propose to the Board the several orders and instructions which have been forwarded to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, from the 8th of July to the present time.

The principles upon which these instructions and orders are founded will be best illustrated by referring to the nature of our actual danger, as well as to the causes which have contributed to produce it.

No comprehensive or satisfactory view can be taken of this subject without adverting to the whole system of our defensive alliances with the Native States, and to the various circumstances which have affected or which now influence the general balance of power in India.

The primary objects of the Treaties of Poonah and Paungul, combined with the Treaty of Seringapatam, were to diminish Tippoo Sultaun's means of future aggression, by reducing his resources and territory, and to provide an efficient defence against him by strengthening the Peishwa and the Nizam, by uniting their interests with ours, and by securing their cooperation in any future war with Mysore. On the other hand, a part of the policy of the Treaty of Seringapatam seems to have been to preserve to Tippoo Sultaun that degree of power which might enable him to maintain a balance with the Mahrattas and the Nizam in such a manner that the interposition of our force might always turn the scale.

It is evident that the policy of this system has been entirely frustrated by the course of recent events, and that neither the Peishwa, the Nizam, nor Tippoo Sultaun now retain the same relative position which they held at the conclusion of the Treaty of Seringapatam, either with respect to one another or to our interests.

Since the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam, the power and resources of the Court of Hyderabad have been constantly declining. The disgrace which fell upon the Nizam's arms in the unfortunate contest with the Mahrattas at Kurdlah reduced the military character of the Court of Hyderabad to the lowest point of degradation. The treaty in which that defeat terminated completed the humiliation of the Nizam; he was compelled to sacrifice a large portion of territory, to engage to pay a fine of three crores of rupees, and to submit to the captivity of his minister, Azim ul Omra, who was carried a prisoner to Poonah. Azim ul Omra resided at Poonah during the late convulsions in the Mahratta Government; and, although a prisoner, bore a very distinguished part in supporting Nana through the various revolutions which followed the sudden death of the Peishwa, Mahda Row. For these services Nana agreed to relinquish all the benefits acquired by the Peishwa against the Nizam, under the Treaty of Kurdlah.

But the Peishwa, Bajee-row, having called in the assistance of Scindiah to check the overgrown power of Nana, Scindiah persuaded the Peishwa to violate the engagements concluded with Azim ul Omra; and the event has been, that the Peishwa has insisted upon and obtained from the Nizam a cession of one-fourth part of the territory, and the payment of one-fourth part of the fine stipulated by the Treaty of Kurdlah.

In addition to so heavy a loss, both of power and honour, the internal resources of the Nizam's Government have not yet recovered the derangement occasioned by the rebellions of Ali Jah, and the son of Dara Jah; by the unfortunate contest with the Mahrattas; and by the detention of Azim ul Omra at Poonah.

The effect of these causes has necessarily been to reduce the consideration of the Nizam in the scale of the neighbouring states; and in this weak and degraded condition he has been for some time past menaced by the army of Scindiah,

stationed in the neighbourhood of Poonah. But the most striking feature of change in the state of the Nizam's affairs since 1793, is the alteration which has taken place in his military establishment. The Nizam, since the peace of Seringapatam, has greatly reduced his cavalry and other troops, and considerably augmented the body of infantry commanded by French officers, and known by the name of Raymond's corps.

The corps of Raymond had been in the service of the Nizam before the last war with Tippoo Sultaun, and in 1792, when it served with Lord Cornwallis's army, its strength was not greater than 1,500 men at the highest estimation, and its discipline very defective. At the battle of Kurdlah, in 1795, its strength amounted to about 11,000 men. During the rebellion of Ali Jah, and in a variety of service in which the corps has since been employed, it has acquired experience and skill, and it is now composed of thirteen regiments of two battalions each, amounting in the whole to upwards of 14,000 men. Its discipline, according to every recent account, is very considerably improved, insomuch that, although inferior to our native force, it is said to be superior, in nearly an equal proportion, to the ordinary scale of the infantry in the service of any of the Native Powers. Besides field pieces to each regiment, a park of 40 pieces of ordnance, chiefly brass, from 12 to 36 pounders, with a well trained body of artillery men (including a number of Europeans) is attached to the corps. A foundation has also been laid for raising a body of cavalry to act with the corps of infantry. The chief officers of this corps are all Frenchmen of the most virulent principles of jacobinism; many of the privates served originally with the French native force at Pondicherry, and the whole corps constitutes an armed French party of great power, zeal, and activity. The efforts of this party are continually employed to magnify the power, resources and success of France, and to depreciate the character, force, and credit of Great Britain in the eyes of the Court at Hyderabad; and it appears by authentic intelligence, that wherever any detachment of this corps has been stationed for any considerable time, a most unfavourable impression has been produced against the character of the British nation.

The death of Monsieur Raymond, which happened a few months past, appeared likely to impair the influence of this

corps at the Court of Hyderabad; and accordingly Azim ul Omra took that opportunity to resume the large Jaghire which had been allotted for the pay and maintenance of the corps, but another Frenchman of the name of Peron has succeeded to the command: his disposition is described to be violent and brutal; and his principles do not appear to differ essentially from those of Raymond. The corps, as now constituted, forms the most considerable and only efficient part of the Nizam's military establishment, and retains such a degree of ascendancy over the councils of the Nizam, as to be an object of serious alarm to Azim ul Omra.* This corps has been recruited, in the proportion of one-third of its total numbers from our territories, and from those of the Nabob of Arcot, and partly from deserters abandoning our service.

Distinct proof has been given of the assiduity and success of the emissaries employed by Monsieur Baptiste (the second in command to Monsieur Peron, and stated to be of a very designing and artful character) for the purpose of exciting mutiny and sedition, and of inviting desertion amongst our sepoys stationed on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions. A considerable desertion of our troops took place in that quarter some time ago, and nearly 500 men, with several native officers, who deserted on that occasion, are now serving in Monsieur Peron's corps. The repeated applications of our Resident for the surrender of these deserters have hitherto been frustrated by the prevailing influence of Monsieur Peron and of his army, and by the weakness of the Nizam's Government, which Azim ul Omra has declared to be unable to control the overbearing spirit and formidable power of the French faction. After a protracted negotiation, Azim ul Omra has at length, with much difficulty, and by an extraordinary effort, obtained the surrender of two Subadars, who were the principal contrivers of the desertion.

Monsieur Peron and his officers maintain a correspondence with a faction at the Nizam's Court denominated the Paugah

* In addition to the command of this corps, M. Raymond had the entire conduct of the Nizam's Ordnance, with an allowance of 50,000 rupees monthly; the Ordnance has since been placed under the command of M. Peron, and he derives great influence from so important a charge.

party, being composed principally of the officers of his Highness's body guard of cavalry.

The Paugah party has long been connected with Tippoo Sultaun, and is entirely adverse to Azim ul Omra, and to all the friends of the British interests at the Court of Hyderabad.

It must not be forgotten, that in the year 1796, during the detention of Azim ul Omra at Poonah, the French faction, with the assistance of the Paugah party, prevailed upon the Nizam to dismiss the British detachment, and took such measures in concert with Tippoo (a large body of whose army marched in this crisis to the frontier of the Nizam's dominions) as would have enabled them to dispose of the succession to the Musnud according to their pleasure, if the Nizam's death had happened in that critical conjuncture. At this period of time, the French contrived to obtain the grant of the large Jaghire, since resumed; this grant (which comprized the district of Maiduck, containing* 2,142 square British miles, situated to the northward of Hyderabad, and producing an annual revenue of eighteen lacs of rupees) may be considered as the first step towards the establishment of a territorial revenue; and there can be no doubt that it would have led to that necessary foundation of European power in India, if the death of Monsieur Raymond had not enabled Azim ul Omra to frustrate the project. The French officers at Hyderabad maintain a direct correspondence with their countrymen in the service of Tippoo Sultaun, and of Scindiah. The latest accounts from the Resident at Hyderabad state, that French officers and adventurers arrive continually at Hyderabad to reinforce Monsieur Peron's corps, although the routes by which they gain access to the Deccan are as yet unknown.

This French party, connected as it is with the prevailing factions in the Court of the Nizam, corresponding with Tippoo Sultaun, zealous in the cause of France, and actuated by a spirit of intrigue, which would lead it to mix in every distraction of the State, if not to originate internal confusion, must be considered as a circumstance of positive weakness in the frame of the Government of Hyderabad. Azim ul Omra

* The Company's Jaghire in the Carnatic contains 2,436 square British miles.

is fully aware of the magnitude of this evil, and dreads the growth of a party which he can no longer restrain within any bounds of moderation, and which already threatens to subvert his power, and to disturb the regular order of succession, if not to destroy the throne itself. With respect to our interests, and to the value of our defensive alliance under the treaty of Pangul, the change in the Nizam's military establishments places him in a condition worse than that of absolute inefficiency, and renders the Court of Hyderabad a source of additional strength to our enemies, rather than of useful assistance to any branch of the Triple Alliance. The dangers to be apprehended from the existence of Peron's corps are not to be estimated merely by the actual state of its discipline, of its numbers, or of its influence over the councils of the Nizam: our views of this danger must be extended beyond the present moment. The French army at Hyderabad must be considered not only as a powerful aid to the cause of France in the present crisis, but as the basis of a permanent French faction in India; on which, according to the opportunities of fortune, and the variation of circumstances and of events, the activity of the enemy may establish a strength of the most formidable kind, either in peace or war.

It requires no labour of argument to prove the benefits which must be derived to the cause of France, even in time of peace, from the establishment of an army of 14,000 men, commanded by natives of France, in the heart of the dominions of one of our principal allies, in the vicinity of our most active enemy among the native powers, and on the borders of a vulnerable part of our own dominions. In the event of peace, no more convenient channel could be provided for the intrigues of France, no more useful point of union for the numerous adherents to her principles, and emissaries of her designs. And it cannot be doubted, that the natural effect of the unchecked and rapid growth of such an army at the Court of the Nizam must be, to detach that Court from our interests, and to fix it absolutely in those of our enemy.

But in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, or in the still more aggravated case of a war with him, aided by a French force, what assistance can we expect from the Nizam, the main body of whose army is commanded by the corres-

pondents of Tippoo, natives of France, distinguished by their zeal in the cause of that country, and united with the whole body of French adventurers now established in India?

Under such circumstances, the force of the Nizam would become useless and even dangerous to us, precisely in proportion to the exigency of the case, in which we should require its services.

If the French troops of the Nizam did not afford Tippoo open assistance, at least they could not be brought into the field against him without the utmost danger to our cause; nor could they be suffered to remain in the Deccan during the continuance of the contest, unless checked by the presence of an equally powerful force, which must, in that case, be diverted from the objects of the war, and must operate as a positive diminution of our effective strength in the field. It appears however nearly certain, that in the present weak state of the Nizam's Government, the French corps in his service would openly join Tippoo Sultaun, and by a sudden blow, endeavour to seize the Nizam's territories, and to secure them to the dominion of France, under an alliance offensive and defensive with Tippoo Sultaun. This danger is aggravated by the present position of Scindiah's army, and by the disposition and present views of that Chief; he now entertains a large body of infantry in his service under the command of a French officer; and it might be expected that he would readily engage with Tippoo Sultaun (with whom he is supposed to have lately opened a negotiation) and with the French, upon the conditions of a partition of the territories and authority of the Peishwa and of the Nizam. The junction which might thus be effected by the French officers in the several armies of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo, might establish the power of France in India upon the ruins of the States of Poonah and of the Deccan. Under all these circumstances therefore it is evident, that the Court of Hyderabad in its present condition (whatever may be its disposition to use every effort for our assistance) is not only disqualified from cooperating with us as an ally against Tippoo, but furnishes him with powerful means of prosecuting his designs against us, and offers every temptation to the ambition of France.

Such being the condition of the Nizam, it will be found

that the Peishwa, who forms another branch of the triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, is not more able to fulfill his defensive engagements with us.

The precise situation in which the Mahratta Empire stood after the peace of Seringapatam, was the most favourable to our interests: the several co-estates were then so equally balanced as to prevent any danger of that degree of union which might concenter the formidable force of the whole in one consolidated mass, either against the British possessions, or against any other established power in India; nor had any one member of the Empire attained such a degree of strength as to be able singly to encounter our force. On the other hand, the Peishwa, the acknowledged and constitutional head of this extensive confederation, aided by the abilities of his Minister Nana Furnavese, possessed a sufficient influence over several of the leading Chiefs to render him a respectable ally, and to furnish him with the means of bringing a considerable force into the field.

From the period of the peace of Seringapatam to that of the death of Mahda Row, the danger appears to have been, that the address of Nana might have drawn too great a weight into the scale of the Peishwa's power, and have enabled the Government of Poonah to wield the united force of the whole Mahratta Empire. At the battle of Kurdlah the Peishwa was assisted against the Nizam by the contingents of most of the confederate chieftains of the Mahratta Empire; and the power of the Nizam was greatly endangered in that state of the Peishwa's authority and force. But Nana's ambition or jealousy having induced him, upon the sudden death of Mahda Row, to attempt the disturbance of the regular order of succession by intruding an adopted child upon the throne, opened the way to those successive intrigues and revolutions which for some time past have distracted the Mahratta Empire. Without pursuing the various changes and convulsions of the Government of Poonah during the period described, it is sufficient to observe, that their progress naturally tended to weaken the Sovereign power, and has terminated in the imprisonment of Nana, in the ruin of his influence, and in the suspension of the power and authority of the reigning Peishwa, under circumstances which menace the abolition of his office.

Scindiah, who in this changeable scene has alternately taken part with the present Peishwa and with Nana, has at length overpowered both, and has been for some time past so far master of the Government of Poonah, that the Peishwa could not, in his present condition, command the cooperation of any considerable body of the Mahratta chieftains, nor afford us any assistance against Tippoo Sultaun.

During the course of the events which have contributed to weaken and degrade the Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad, their mutual animosities and opposition of interests have risen to such a height as to render all cooperation between them utterly impracticable. The efficiency of our system of defensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun has therefore been impaired, not only by the respective weakness of each of our allies, but by the difficulty of uniting them in any common view or joint operation.

In the meanwhile Tippoo Sultaun has enjoyed a state of internal tranquillity nearly uninterrupted. While our allies have been distracted and exhausted by faction, rebellion, revolution and war, he has been employed in improving the discipline of his armies, and in repairing the vigour of his resources; he has alternately endeavoured, but without success, to gain the Peishwa and the Nizam to his cause; he however possesses a considerable influence at the Court of Hyderabad, in consequence of his connections with the corps of Raymond, and with other factions adverse to the British interests at that Court. It is also known, that he despatched an embassy to Zemaun Shah, whose design of invading Hindostan has been recently announced in a formal manner to this Government, and to the Nabob Vizier.

That Zemaun Shah really entertains the romantic project of invading Hindostan cannot admit of a doubt; this was the opinion of the late Governor General, in which I entirely concur.

It has been supposed that Zemaun Shah, in his late march towards Hindostan, was recalled from Lahore into his own dominions, either by some domestic dissention, or by the apprehension of an attack from some of the States in the neighbourhood of his Kingdom. And it was hoped that the same causes might for some time obstruct the execution of his declared project, but the last despatches from the Acting

Resident at the Court of Scindiah state a report, that Zemaun Shah is now relieved from all apprehensions, either of internal rebellion or of foreign invasion; and his inclination as well as his ability, to move his army towards the frontier of Hindostan, at the close of the rainy season, are now universally credited. It must be recollected, that upon a recent occasion, Zemaun Shah advanced to Lahore without meeting any formidable opposition from the Seiks; although it had formerly been asserted, that the country of the Seiks would always prove an insuperable obstacle to his progress. Between the country of the Seiks and the frontier of Oude no barrier exists to check the motions of the Shah, excepting the power of Scindiah. The dominions of Scindiah at present are so weakened by internal dissensions as to be in a state nearly defenceless, while Scindiah continues at Poonah with the main body of his army, and while his tributary Chiefs, remaining in Hindostan, are notoriously disaffected to his cause, and are prepared to seize any favourable opportunity of annihilating his power.

Zemaun Shah cannot be ignorant of these advantages, and if they should tempt him to invade Hindostan, the diversion of our force which would be occasioned by such an event, would offer the most favorable opportunity to an attack from Tippoo upon the Carnatic, it is not improbable that the object of the intercourse between Tippoo and Zemaun Shah was, (on the part of the former at least) some such plan of joint operation.

The present position of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's army, operates as a double advantage to the cause of Tippoo. The absence of Scindiah from his dominions in Hindostan, invites the invasion of Zemaun Shah and favours its success; while the presence of Scindiah's army at Poonah holds both our allies in check. The weight of Tippoo's power in the general balance, must therefore be considered to have received an augmentation, not only by the declared projects of Zemaun Shah, and by the possibility of their (at least limited) success, but by the operations of Scindiah in addition to all the other events which have concurred to impair the efficiency of our defensive alliance.

In the mean while, the Government of Fort St. George, whose peculiar duty it is to watch the operations of Tippoo Suldaun, and to communicate to me every circumstance re-

lating to the growth of his power, have distinctly stated in their letter of the 10th of July, that "his resources are more prompt than our own, and that a great part of his army is supposed to have long been in a state of field equipment." So sensible indeed is the Government of Fort St. George to the terror of Tippoo Sultaun's arms, as to be apprehensive of making any effort for resisting their progress, lest Tippoo should anticipate the tardiness of our preparations by the rapidity of his own, and should overrun the Carnatic, before our army could even move for its defence.

It is difficult to describe the pain and regret, which that letter from the Government of Fort St. George occasioned in my mind; nor can I conceive that it is calculated to raise any other emotions in the mind of any friend to the prosperity of the British interests, or to the honour of the British name in India. If the facts and arguments stated in that letter be correct, it must now be admitted, that the glorious successes of the last war in Mysore, the wisdom which balanced the relative interests and forces of the belligerent powers at the conclusion of Peace, and finally the great expense incurred by the Company in the progressive increase of their military establishments on the coast, have terminated in no better result, than to render Tippoo's power absolutely invincible, and to place the disposal of our fate in his hands. For if the sentiments of the Government of Fort St. George, be founded upon a just estimate of the relative conditions of Tippoo Sultaun and of the Company in India, he possesses the ready means of attack, while we cannot venture to resort even to those of defence; but, with a full knowledge of his hostility, of his offensive alliance publicly concluded with the enemy, and of his continual and advanced preparations for war; we must submit to remain unarmed, because any attempt to counteract his design might possibly accelerate its execution. This argument against the prudence of preparing for our defence would become stronger every day in proportion to the progress of Tippoo's hostile preparations; until at length, we should be reduced to the alternative either of implicit submission, or of incurring a much greater risk than any, which can now be apprehended from assembling our defensive force. Although I am not disposed to adopt the sentiments of the Government of Fort St. George on this subject, I ac-

knowledge with great concern those defects in the military establishments on the coast, which will not admit any large proportion of that army to move for several months; those defects certainly constitute so many additional advantages in the scale of Tippoo's power; and in this view, they become objects of the most serious consideration, and form a principal feature of the danger which it is the duty of this Government to avert, by counsels of another spirit, than that of despondency, and by measures of another character, than that of inaction, or of implicit submission to the will of the enemy.

I have now examined the principal causes of that danger, as they are to be traced in the variable course of events since the peace of Seringapatam; the nature of our actual situation, arising from the combined effects of these causes, will best appear, by a summary review of the facts which I have already enumerated in detail.

Tippoo Suldaun having manifested the most hostile intentions towards us, possesses an army of which a considerable portion is now in readiness to take the field for purposes of offence; he has increased the number of his French officers, and has solicited, and may possibly receive further assistance from the French; he may also receive assistance from the several corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of many other native powers. He may be assisted by the invasion of Zemaun Shah, and by the direct cooperation of Scindiah. On the other hand, our protecting force upon the coast of Coromandel cannot be put in motion within a shorter period than three, (or according to the Adjutant General Lieutenant Colonel Close, than six) months, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic; our allies in the mean while, are utterly unable to fulfil their defensive engagements with us; the Peishwa being depressed and kept in check by the intrusion of Scindiah, and the Nizam by the vicinity of that chieftain's army, and by the overbearing influence of an army commanded by French officers, and established in the center of the Deccan. While we remain in this situation, without a soldier prepared to take the field in the Carnatic, and without an ally to assist our operations in the event of an attack from Tippoo, we leave the fate of the Carnatic to the discretion of Tippoo; we suffer the cause of France to acquire hourly accessions of

strength in every quarter of India; we abandon our allies the Nizam and the Peishwa to the mercy of Tippoo and of Scindiah in conjunction with the French; and we leave to France the ready means of obtaining a large territorial revenue, and a permanent establishment in the Deccan, founded upon the destruction of our alliances.

Under all these circumstances the situation of the British empire in India is, without doubt, extremely critical, but in my opinion, by no means alarming. For in the very difficulties of our actual situation are to be found the means, not only of averting the danger of the present moment, but of providing permanent security against the future return of a similar crisis. A common apprehension of the designs of Scindiah has fortunately produced an union of interests between the Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad; and notwithstanding some occasional symptoms of that spirit of duplicity and intrigue which marks the character of every Asiatic Court, Azim ul Omra and the ministers of the Peishwa seem to be sincerely convinced, that a renewal of amicable engagements between the Peishwa and the Nizam is equally necessary to the safety of both. On the one hand it appears, that the Peishwa cannot expect to be speedily emancipated, or effectually defended from the undue influence of Scindiah, without the assistance of the Nizam; and on the other hand, it is evident, that the restoration of the just power and authority of the Peishwa would operate as a constant restraint on the designs of Scindiah, of Tippoo, and of the French against the independence of the Court of Hyderabad. Under these circumstances it appeared to me that neither the Peishwa nor the Nizam, would be likely to view with jealousy any assistance which we might think it advisable to afford to either, for the purpose of reviving the triple alliance against Tippoo on its original basis, and of enabling the contracting parties to fulfil their respective engagements. This expectation constituted a fundamental principle of my instructions to the residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, of the 8th of July. Their subsequent correspondence has furnished abundant proof, that my view of the disposition of the two courts was not erroneous; since it appears, that while I was occupied in framing a system of measures for uniting the Nizam and the Peishwa upon the firm ground of their reci-

procal interests, a treaty was actually concluded between those two powers at Poonah, with a view to the same object; the ratification of this treaty on the part of the Nizam, has been delayed by Azim ul Omra; but there appears every reason to hope, that the interposition of our arbitration will accommodate every point of difference. Our arbitration has already been earnestly solicited by both parties, and I am persuaded that it will be both acceptable and efficacious whenever it shall be interposed.

The encreasing alarm excited at the Court of Hyderabad, by the intemperate conduct of M. Piron and of the French army, would dispose Azim ul Omra to receive with gratitude any offer of assistance towards the destruction of so powerful and dangerous a faction; and the existing jealousies between the French officers, would facilitate the dismissal of the corps. Azim ul Omra has recently expressed in the strongest terms his wish of being enabled by our assistance, to accomplish this most desirable measure. The only obstacles which appear likely to occur to a general accommodation, are the impetuosity and violence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, whose continuance in his present position would operate as an effectual assistance to Tippoo, and would preclude the possibility of restoring either the Peishwa or the Nizam to any degree of efficiency or consideration. But the absence of Scindiah from his own dominions, and the ungovernable excesses of his temper, (however to be lamented as having contributed to those events which have impaired the power of our allies,) have at the same time weakened the sources of his own power, have occasioned a spirit of faction and revolt in his own dominions, and have disgusted all the ancient friends and connections of his family, together with every respectable adherent to his cause. His violence towards the female relations of his family has raised a considerable party against him amongst his own followers; and his signal treachery in the imprisonment of Nana, from which he hoped to derive the free use of Nana's treasure, has terminated in rendering that resource inaccessible to him, at the very moment when it is most indispensable to his necessities. He is therefore now surrounded by an army clamorous for pay, is destitute of pecuniary resource, and is unsupported by any one respectable friend. His principal minister, a person of considerable ex-

perience, and bearing the highest character of any of his followers, has expressed to the Resident at Poonah in the most distinct terms an entire disapprobation of Scindiah's late conduct, and an earnest wish for an accommodation between Scindiah and the Peishwa through our mediation, and for the peaceable return of Scindiah to his dominions in Hindostan; Scindiah himself has manifested no disinclination to receive the advice of the Resident at Poonah; whose discretion has hitherto limited the extent of his interference; but from what has already passed, it is reasonable to hope, that Scindiah, in the present distressed state of his affairs, will give a favorable attention to any just and moderate proposition, urged with the full authority of his Government. In the mean while, the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, offers a new motive to recal Scindiah to the protection of his own dominions, and he must be sensible not only that his security, in the event of such an invasion must depend in a great measure on the co-operation of the British troops, but that in the present disturbed condition of his possessions and of his army, we hold his fate in our hands.

In this posture of affairs, any opposition to our interference for the re-establishment of our alliances, would be equally ineffectual and unjustifiable on the part of Scindiah; and various considerations of policy and interest will concur to render him cautious of taking any step, which might afford us just cause of offence. The last despatches from Poonah afford a hope that Nana, Furnaveese and the Peishwa, may find it their interest to forget their mutual animosity; any accommodation between them would lead greatly to facilitate an arrangement, embracing the respective interests of the Peishwa, of Scindiah, and of the Nizam.

Such are the circumstances of the present moment, which appear to me to favor the execution of that comprehensive system of precaution and defence demanded by the exigency of our actual situation. The mode in which I have endeavoured to carry this system into effect has been suggested by the following considerations. The Court of Hyderabad has repeatedly and earnestly solicited an increase of the British detachment in the service of the Nizam, under an assurance that the French corps of Piron would be dismissed from his Highness's service immediately upon the arrival of the additional

British force. This proposition has hitherto been embarrassed by conditions of a nature incompatible with our engagements at Poonah, and the late dissensions between the Nizam and the Peishwa have precluded all hope of any amicable adjustment of this difficulty. It was therefore thought advisable by the late Governor-General in Council to resort to the expedient of encouraging the introduction of British adventurers into the service of the Nizam, for the purpose of counterbalancing in some measure the influence of the French army at Hyderabad. With this view, the corps commanded by Mr. Finglass has received the protection and encouragement of the Acting Resident, and has been augmented to the number of 8,000 men.

The policy of this expedient always appeared to me very doubtful, and I have entertained serious apprehensions that the measure might ultimately furnish additional recruits to the cause of France, instead of counteracting her influence. In the most favorable view, however, this expedient could only be considered as a palliative of the evil: it could not be expected that such a force as that of Mr. Finglass would enable the Nizam to disband the corps of Piron; it must therefore have been evident at all times, that nothing less than a considerable and permanent increase of our regular subsidiary force at Hyderabad could empower the Nizam to extricate himself from the hands of the French faction, so solidly established in his dominions.

I have already stated my reasons for thinking that the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad would no longer afford any cause of jealousy to the Peishwa; and under all these circumstances, I have availed myself of the late conduct of Tippoo and of Scindiah, to propose that measure, subject in the first instance to the previous consent of the Court of Poonah: I have accompanied this proposition with a condition, that the arbitration of this Government shall be accepted for the final adjustment of the points of difference still remaining between the two Courts. These points are now so few, and the requisitions of the Court of Hyderabad of a nature so just and moderate, that I entertain a confident expectation of effecting an accommodation upon principles equally advantageous to both parties.

I have already observed that one of the most dangerous

circumstances attending the establishment of the French party at Hyderabad, is the influence which they are likely to possess in directing the succession to the throne, whenever it shall become vacant by the death of the Nizam.

Secunder Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam, would be the natural successor, unless the regular order of succession should be disturbed by domestic faction, foreign intrigue, or force; for, although priority of birth may not be considered to give the same absolute and exclusive right to succession in India as it does in Europe, it is invariably deemed the strongest title, and is rarely superseded excepting in case of disaffection, or of positive disqualification. So far from these or any other objections being applicable to the title of Secunder Jah, it is well known that the Nizam has given the strongest indications of his favorable intentions towards Secunder Jah, by entrusting that Prince with the custody of his Seal, and by empowering him to perform certain acts which are reserved exclusively for the Sovereign. This admission to the personal exercise of a portion of the sovereign authority during the life of the Nizam is deemed equivalent to a virtual nomination to the throne; and there is no reason to suppose that the Nizam will nominate any of his younger sons to the exclusion of the heir apparent, unless his Highness should be prevailed upon in the weakness of his last moments to commit an act of such flagrant impolicy and injustice.

Secunder Jah is connected by marriage with the family of Azim ul Omra, and his establishment upon the throne would give great additional security to the British interests at the Court of Hyderabad: on the other hand, none of the younger sons can hope to reach the throne by any other assistance than that of the French party, and of Tippoo Sultaun. Sufficient proof has been stated of the interest which Tippoo and the French take in the exclusion of Secunder Jah, and of the attempts which they have already made to interfere in governing the succession. These attempts may be renewed, and their success would necessarily involve the destruction of Azim ul Omra and of Secunder Jah, together with the consequent annihilation of the British influence at Hyderabad; all hope of re-establishing the balance of power in India as it existed at the peace of Seringapatam, would then be precluded; the countries of the Nizam would in such an event become in

effect a dependency of France, and the partizans of that nation, in conjunction with Tippoo, and with the body of their countrymen lately received into his pay, would have the means of endangering the British power in India.

Under all these circumstances, the same principles which suggested the necessity of increasing the British detachment at Hyderabad, demanded that it should be employed to support the succession of Secunder Jah, as being essentially connected with the permanency of our influence at Hyderabad, and with the effectual exclusion of the interference of Tippoo and of France.

I have therefore authorised the Resident at Hyderabad to employ the British troops in this service, if their assistance should hereafter become necessary; but I am persuaded that the mere presence of our force, accompanied by the knowledge of my firm determination to support the regular order of succession, will preclude every movement either of foreign or domestic opposition.

The arrangements proposed for the service of the Nizam will be very incomplete, unless connected with the restoration of the Peishwa to a due degree of authority and power, and preceded by the cordial approbation of the Court of Poonah. But the great danger to be averted is the growth of the influence of Tippoo and of France in India. It is therefore evident, that the failure of the proposed plan at Poonah would increase the necessity of providing for the safety of the Nizam, and of destroying the French party at his Court. If, therefore, the Peishwa should either refuse his assent to the propositions to be made to him, or if from the success of Scindiah's operations, or from any other cause, those measures which relate to the Court of Poonah should be frustrated, I have still deemed it advisable to direct the Acting Resident at Hyderabad to carry into effect the increase of the British detachment, and such other parts of my instructions as may appear practicable, reserving always to the Peishwa the power of acceding hereafter to any treaty which we may conclude with the Nizam, and continuing with that view the restrictive terms of our present subsidiary engagements with the latter, as far as they relate to the interests of the Peishwa. The dismissal of the French corps at Hyderabad would not fully answer the views with which I

have proposed that measure, if the officers or European privates were permitted to enter into the service of any other native power although I should think them less dangerous in any service than in that of the Nizam. I have endeavoured not only to secure the expulsion of the French from Hyderabad, but also their immediate return to their native country. I have therefore required that the French officers and privates should be delivered up to the Government of Fort St. George, in order that they may be immediately conveyed to Europe; the Nizam is under no engagements either with the Government of France or with the French officers to continue them in his service, and he possesses the full right to dismiss them whenever he shall think fit. The exorbitant power which M. Piron and his army have acquired at Hyderabad, as well as their immoderate abuse of it, will justify the Nizam in taking whatever measures may appear most effectual for the purpose of securing himself against a faction so formidable not only to the independence of his Government, but to the safety of his own person, and to the existence of his throne. With the same view, I have made it a preliminary condition of the whole plan, that the Nizam, his heirs and successors shall for ever exclude the French from their armies and dominions.

The corps of Mr. Finglass, after the establishment of a considerable British force at Hyderabad, will no longer be liable to the full force of the objections which I have stated against the policy of encouraging such a body of adventurers in the service of the Nizam; this question, however, does not require an immediate decision; we shall possess ample means of deciding it according to our discretion, if our propositions to the Court of Hyderabad should be attended with success. The consent of the Nizam to such parts of the proposed arrangements as relate to the re-establishment of the Government of Poonah is required as a necessary preliminary to the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad. My intentions being to take no step in the first instance at either Court without the full knowledge and concurrence of the other; a principle, the strict observance of which to every degree of practicable extent, appears to me to be the only effectual mode of removing all causes of jealousy, of uniting

the confidence of both parties, and of bringing them to a dispassionate consideration of their mutual interests.

The parts of the proposed arrangement which relate to the re-establishment of the Government of Poonah were suggested by Colonel Palmer's letter of 1st of June, in which he states "that the authority of the Peishwa would be restored by the appearance of a strong British force at Poonah, and that Scindiah, under the circumstances of Tippoo's recent aggression, could on no just pretence object to such a movement of our troops, nor in his present condition be able to oppose it."

The whole tenor of the subsequent advices from Poonah tended to confirm this opinion: for while it appeared evidently impossible that the authority of the Peishwa could be restored otherwise than by foreign assistance, there seemed to be every rational ground of expectation, that the mere appearance of our troops would induce all the leading Chieftains of the Mahratta empire to unite in support of the Peishwa, and that such an event would not be unacceptable even to the followers of Scindiah. The Peishwa himself has earnestly solicited the aid of a body of our troops, and has expressed the fullest sense of the necessity, as well as reliance on the efficacy of such a measure for the restoration of his authority and for the protection of his person.

On the other hand, the danger of the Peishwa increased from day to day; the assistance which he had solicited from the Nizam was not likely to reach him before his fate had been decided; and the expectation even of any assistance from the Court of Hyderabad, notwithstanding the conclusion of the late treaty, appeared to rest on a very precarious foundation. In this situation, the direct interposition of this Government by moving a detachment of troops to Poonah was the only measure on which we could rely with any degree of certainty for averting the immediate destruction of our interests at that Court.

The Resident at Poonah was therefore authorized to require a detachment of troops from Bombay, but previously to so decided a step, it was deemed proper that the Resident should require of the Peishwa his consent to the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad, his acceptance of our

arbitration between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and his exclusion of the French from his armies and dominions.

With a view of securing the lasting benefit of this arrangement at the Court of Poonah, it is intended that a proposal shall be made to the Peishwa to enter into permanent subsidiary engagements with us of a similar nature and extent with those which shall be concluded at the Court of Hyderabad.

With the same view, the Resident at Poonah has been directed to take such measures as may appear to him most likely to interest Nana Furnaveese in the success of this general arrangement of the affairs of the two Courts.

The last despatches from Poonah afford every reason to hope, that the abilities and experience of Nana may be successfully employed by Colonel Palmer in effecting the return of Scindiah to his own dominions, and the consequent restoration of the Peishwa.

The impediments which Scindiah opposes to the success of this arrangement will probably disappear whenever the union of the two Courts, cemented by our interposition, shall become a matter of public notoriety.

The treasure of Nana is the only resource in which Scindiah can find the means of appeasing the clamours of his discontented army; and Colonel Palmer will avail himself of any favorable opportunity of connecting the interests of Nana with those of Scindiah and of the Peishwa, in such a manner as shall enable Scindiah to retire with safety into his own dominions, without affording him the power of effecting any other military movement.

Being desirous of conciliating the real interests of all parties, I have instructed Colonel Palmer to make the most amicable propositions to Scindiah, and to urge the policy of his return to his own dominions by pointing out their actual danger during his absence, by offering our co-operation against the menaced invasion of Zemaun Shah, and our mediation with the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad; and I have made the consent of those Courts to our mediation of their respective differences with Scindiah an indispensable preliminary of the arrangements which regard the restoration of their own independence. Scindiah cannot reject our pro-

positions on any ground which would not immediately place him in the rank of a declared enemy to us, and of an avowed auxiliary to Tippoo Sultaun.

In this case, therefore, we must have recourse to compulsion; and I have authorized the Resident at Poonah to use it in the last and, I trust improbable, extremity.

Such are the measures which I have proposed, with a view to restore the efficiency of our alliances, and to check the growth of the French party in the Deccan.

I have already stated the reasons which convinced me (against the opinion of the Government of Fort St. George) that the assembling the army on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay, was absolutely indispensable to the defence of the Carnatic, under the circumstance of Tippoo's declared designs and acknowledged preparations for war.

The fatal policy of neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of the enemy's equipments has been felt more than once on the coast of Coromandel, and, I repeat it, I cannot, consistently with any sentiment of duty, consent to rest the security of the Carnatic, in the present crisis, on any other foundation than a state of active and early preparation for war. But if I had looked only to the success of those measures which are now depending at the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad (measures essentially involving our present and future means of checking the implacable enmity of Tippoo), I should on that ground alone have proposed to assemble the army upon the coast of Coromandel, at Bombay, and upon the coast of Malabar.

It is impossible to suppose that Tippoo would not employ every effort to prevent the revival of our defensive alliances; and it would, therefore, be nearly certain that his advanced state of preparation for war, and his renewed connection with the French, would tempt him to interfere in the affairs of the Nizam and of the Peishwa, and to assist the views of Scindiah at Poonah, and of M. Piron's army at Hyderabad. It therefore became necessary to check the motions of Tippoo Sultaun, by assembling an army upon his frontier during the continuance of our negotiations with our allies.

I have adverted, in the course of this Minute, to those defects in the constitution of the army upon the coast which have impeded its early movement in the present critical conjuncture. The measures which I have proposed for the cor-

rection of those defects are absolutely necessary, in my judgment, to our future security in the Carnatic. The detail of those measures will appear in my Minute in the Secret Department of the 20th July, and in the letter to the Government of Fort St. George of the same date.*

I am fully aware of the expense to be incurred in establishing any improved system, which shall enable the army on the coast to keep pace with the promptitude of Tippoo's resources, and to move with an alacrity and expedition equal to his.

If, however, the proposed increase of our subsidiary engagements at Hyderabad should take place, it is my intention that the whole detachment, consisting of three regiments, should be furnished from the establishment of Fort St. George. The force thus stationed at Hyderabad will afford an effectual security to the northern Circars against Tippoo Sultaun, or against any other foreign enemy. The duty of the Circars will then require no larger a proportion of troops than may be sufficient to maintain the internal police and good order of the country. It will not therefore be requisite, in the event of peace, to raise more than one regiment at Fort St. George, to replace those serving with the Nizam. This arrangement will operate as a saving of the expense of two regiments upon the establishment of Fort St. George, and will furnish a fund at least adequate to the permanent charges of the new establishments of artillery, draft cattle and grain, which our recent experience has proved to be indispensable for the purpose of enabling the army on the coast to take the field expeditiously, on any sudden emergency.

In this view, the restoration of our defensive alliances against Tippoo is essentially connected with the improvement of our system of defence in the Carnatic; and the assistance afforded to the Nizam will become (without any increase of expense) the source of additional vigour and activity to our army upon the coast.

Deeply as I lament the obstacles which have prevented us from striking an instantaneous blow against the possessions of Tippoo, I expect to derive considerable advantage from the success of that system of precaution and defence which I have been compelled to substitute in place of an immediate war.

* These measures are detailed in the Governor-General's letter to General Harris, of the 18th July, 1798.—See page 135.

The enlargement of our subsidiary engagements at the Court of Hyderabad, combined with the establishment of similar engagements at the Court of Poonah, will become a great augmentation of our strength, attended by no increase of charge, and possibly by a diminution of our military expenses.

The two detachments will form a considerable army, stationed on the most vulnerable part of Tippoo Sultaun's frontier, in a position which will at all times facilitate our approach to his capital, by securing the protection of our convoys of provisions. A force so stationed will operate as a perpetual restraint upon any movements which Tippoo might be disposed to make towards the frontier, either of the Carnatic, of the Northern Circars, or of Malabar. It will also impede any cooperation between the armies of Scindiah and of Tippoo; and will induce the former to remain within his own dominions, where his motions will again be checked by the vicinity of our army on the frontier of Oude.

In such circumstances, it must always be the interest of Scindiah to cultivate our friendship in preference to that of the French, or of any native power. Thus he may become an useful ally to us in the event of Zemaun Shah's approach to the frontier of Hindostan; and the prospect of that event must render him anxious to secure our protection. On the other hand, the success of his present ambitious and unjustifiable views against the Peishwa would fix him in the interests of Tippoo Sultaun and of France, with the accession of whatever strength he might be able to collect from the remnants of the empire which he would have overthrown.

The influence which we shall naturally derive, both at Hyderabad and Poonah, from the presence of so large a body of our troops, will enable us to prevent any aggression on either side, by the constant interposition of our good offices with both parties, to restrain every symptom of a revival of their former spirit of jealousy and contention.

Our endeavours may then be successfully directed to the desirable object of preserving unimpaired the strength and resources of the two powers, on whose cooperation we must rely for assistance in the event of any war with the state of Mysore; and while we prevent our allies from weakening themselves by repeated contests, we may expect that such an

interference in the disputes of the native powers, so far from tending to foment divisions, and to occasion war, will prove the best security for the general tranquillity of India, as well as the most solid pledge of our disposition to preserve that blessing from interruption.

However comprehensive and intricate the proposed system may appear at the first view, it will soon be evident to all the powers of India, that the fundamental principle of our policy is invariably repugnant to every scheme of conquest, extension of dominion, aggrandisement, or ambition, either for ourselves or for our allies. Consistently with this principle, it is our right and duty to restore the vigour and efficiency of our defensive alliances; but beyond the limits of this principle, we entertain no project of altering the condition, of reducing or of raising the power of any established state in India. On the other hand, the same principle justifies and demands our firm resistance to the intrusion of any foreign power which shall attempt to acquire a preponderant influence in the scale of Indian politics, to the prejudice of our defensive alliances, and of our just interests. The establishment of our subsidized force at Poonah and Hyderabad will afford effectual means of guarding, not only against any such intrusion, but against the undue growth of any native power. While we possess so formidable a force in the center of India, no such event can happen without our knowledge and consent.

The last question which remains for consideration is, what shall be the nature and extent of that demand of satisfaction which we shall make from Tippoo Sultaun, whenever we shall have completed the system now depending at the Courts of our Allies, and shall have brought our army in the Carnatic to a state of preparation for the field?

It is evident from the facts which have come under my observation in the course of this discussion, that our safety requires a further reduction of the relative power of Tippoo Sultaun.

The policy of the Treaty of Seringapatam certainly was not to maintain Tippoo's power upon such a scale as should leave him a constant object of alarm and apprehension to the Company. That he has been so for some years past cannot be denied by any person acquainted with the records either of

this Government or of that of Fort St. George. The ~~present~~^{present} is the second crisis within the last two years, in which Government has thought it necessary to assemble the army on the coast, for the sole purpose of checking his motions.

The vague and inaccurate nature of our intelligence with respect to the extent of his force and to the state of his preparations, added to the facility which he possesses of receiving emissaries and succours from France by Sea, have contributed to encrease the anxiety of the Company's Governments; and our intercourse with him has been of an unsettled and ill defined character, destitute of the advantages either of peace or of war. Under such circumstances, the continuance of Tippoo's power in its actual state, must prove to the Company a perpetual source of alarm, vexation and expense.

The reduction of his means of offence might be effected, either by a positive diminution of his territory and resources, or by a proportionate increase of power and efficiency on our side of the balance, accompanied by such additional securities as might enable us to ascertain at all times the nature of his intentions, as well as his power of carrying them into effect, and to restrain, if not wholly to preclude, his intercourse with France.

The diminution of his territory on the coast of Malabar, would certainly be the most effectual mode of precluding his intercourse with France, as well as of preventing his movements towards the Carnatic. But it does not appear probable that this most desirable security can ever be obtained by the mere terror of our arms. It must be purchased at the expense and hazard of war. Any considerable reduction of his resources must probably be purchased at the same price.

I have already stated the nature and tendency of those steps which have been taken, for confining the power of Tippoo within narrower limits by the operation of the proposed system of alliance, of subsidiary engagements, and of improvement of our defences in the Carnatic.

The success of this system will unquestionably operate as an effectual restraint upon the power of Tippoo, and will so strengthen our barriers against him as to afford a rational expectation, that we may be enabled to obtain from him without incurring the hazard of war, a very considerable aug-

mentation of security with respect to all those points, which now form the most alarming features of his power.

I have already stated those points to be, the secrecy of his operations; his continual intercourse with the French, and constant state of equipment for war.

Our demand of satisfaction for his late infraction of treaty, should be so framed as to apply correctives to each of these evils; and such a demand might be founded on principles of moderation and justice so clear and indisputable, as would place the refusal of Tippoo in the most odious light, and in that event prove to all India the necessity of our resorting to arms.

We might distinctly state to Tippoo, that we entertain no view of encroaching upon his territory or of diminishing his resources; and we might appeal to the late restoration of the district of Wynaad, for an unequivocal proof of this disposition.

We might declare, that after a most unprovoked violation of treaty on his part, we do not intend to demand any cession of dominion or payment of money; but will content ourselves with obtaining those ordinary pledges of an intention to abstain from hostilities, which all civilized nations in a state of peace, are in the established habit of requiring reciprocally from one another; we might insist on an unequivocal and final explanation of the real nature of our relation with him; declaring, that we will no longer submit to that ambiguous and anxious state, in which the allies have been placed by his conduct for some years past; we might signify our determined resolution, either to establish with him a real and effectual peace, accompanied by the customary intercourse, by the mutual exchange of good offices, and by all other securities which maintain the continuance of that blessing, or to wage war upon him, until we have removed the causes of our apprehension and danger by the entire destruction of his power.

This declaration might be made jointly by all the allies, and it might be followed by requiring Tippoo to receive at his Court an established Ambassador from each of the allies, according to the practise of all civilized nations in a state of peace, offering at the same time to admit Ambassadors from him on equal terms.

The force levied by him under his offensive alliance with France, having been raised for the express purpose of aggression upon the Company, can be considered in no other light than that of a signal of hostility, while it shall remain in his service. He must therefore be required to disband it without delay, and to remove it from his dominions.

The anxious desire of the French to destroy the British power in India, the nature of Tippoo's acknowledged connection with them, and the interest which they must always feel in instigating him to war, demand the further requisition, that he should enter into an engagement for himself, his heirs and successors, to exclude the French from his armies and dominions for ever.

The advantages resulting from these concessions on the part of Tippoo, would be very considerable.

The residence of an Ambassador at his Court, would not only restrain the execution of any hostile designs which he might hereafter form, but would provide an authentic source of intelligence, from which we might always derive timely information of his motions. This measure might also ultimately lead to the establishment of an amicable intercourse with Mysore; for Tippoo may perhaps at length be convinced, that his wisest policy would be to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of his present dominions, rather than to risk the loss of what he still retains, by attempting to regain what he has lost.

The dismissal of the French corps raised at Mauritius would discourage other adventurers of that nation from attempting to engage in the service of the Suldaun; and with a British Ambassador on the spot, it would be difficult for him to evade the engagements by which he would have bound himself to exclude the French from his armies and dominions.

The combined effect of these two measures would therefore be, if not wholly to preclude, at least to embarrass to a very great degree his intercourse with our enemy. He may also at length perceive that he never can hope to make any lasting impression upon the British power, without the aid of a large French force; and that he never can admit such a force into his dominions, without the utmost danger to his own independence.

The revival of our alliances, the appearance of our armies

in the field, and the presence of a part of the British squadron on the coast of Malabar, will probably incline Tippoo to listen to requisitions of this nature. He will soon perceive that we possess ample means of annihilating his military force, and I trust he will also be convinced, that we have no object in view beyond our own security, and that we are really desirous of maintaining the relations of amity and peace with him, as long as he shall rest contented with his present dominions, and shall relinquish his vindictive projects against ours.

If Tippoo should accede to the substance of the requisitions which I have suggested, I entertain a sanguine hope, that with the efficiency of the triple alliance not only restored but considerably strengthened, with a large army at Hyderabad, and another at Poonah, with a Resident established at Seringapatam, and with the exclusion of the French from the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun, of the Nizam, and of the Peishwa, we may be enabled to look confidently to a long continuance of tranquillity in India. The growth of the French power in India, would no longer be a matter of apprehension, Scindiah (or whoever shall succeed to his dominions in Hindostan), would become an useful auxiliary against the threatened irruption of Zemaun Shah; the military charges on the coast of Coromandel, might then safely admit of reduction; this Government would not then be perpetually alarmed with rumours of Tippoo's equipments, and of impending invasions of the Carnatic. We should no longer suffer in time of peace all the solicitude, and hazard, and much of the expense of war; and the continuance of tranquillity would be ensured not more by the predominance of our power, than by the moderation manifested in using it for the sole purpose of obtaining permanent security, and genuine peace.*

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* The letter from the Government of Fort St. George of the 10th July, 1798, (referred to at page 178) is grounded on Mr. Welbe's memorandum of the 6th July, (see page 72) namely, that the Madras army was incapable of any offensive operations, and barely adequate to the defence of our own territory; it deprecated also any demonstration which might induce Tippoo to invade the Carnatic. The letter is inserted as a note at page 214.

No. XLIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Fort William, 14th August, 1798.

I have received your private letter of the 30th ult. Your communications relating to Colonel Kirkpatrick give me great pleasure, and I am happy to find that the situation in my family which I have left open for him is likely to prove acceptable to him.

Azim ul Omra's reception of my propositions has afforded me the highest satisfaction; nor could it be expected that he should pledge himself to a greater extent on the first communication of a plan embracing so many complicated interests.

In directing the Government of Fort St. George to hold two regiments in readiness to march at your requisition to Hyderabad, I desired that those regiments might be accompanied by the ordinary proportion of field artillery; and my intention is, that the artillery which may be sent with those regiments shall be permanently stationed with the Nizam, he of course paying the charge attending it. If the proportion of artillery sent with the detachment from Fort St. George should appear insufficient, Azim ul Omra will find me sincerely disposed to accommodate that point to his wishes, by making any addition which may be deemed requisite.

I shall hereafter take into consideration your observation respecting the exchange at which the pay of the Bengal troops serving at Hyderabad is now issued. I think it proper at the same time to acquaint you, that it is my intention ultimately, that the corps stationed with the Nizam shall be composed entirely of troops from the establishment of Fort St. George.

The total inability of the Nizam to extricate himself from the power of the French party without our assistance formed one of the primary considerations, which induced me to propose to him the extension of our subsidiary engagements.

The anxiety with which Azim ul Omra presses for the arrival of the additional subsidiary force from Fort St. George as an indispensable preliminary to the destruction of the French party, is a sufficient confirmation of the opinions which I had formed of the dangerous strength of that party,

and of the absolute necessity of our interference for the purpose of restraining its overbearing influence.

It could never have been expected by me that the Minister should take any other step towards the dismissal of Peron's army previously to the arrival of our regiments, than that of dispersing the corps of which it is composed, so as to prevent their forming a junction either with a view of exciting a commotion in his Highness's dominions, or of retiring into the territories of any other power. It is indispensably necessary indeed that the intended dismissal of the French party should be kept secret until the Minister shall possess the means of attempting it with a certainty of success. With the aid of the additional force which we have agreed to furnish, I should hope that he will be enabled to carry this part of the plan into execution without any material difficulty. Perhaps even a smaller British force might be deemed adequate to this service; if you should be of opinion that it can be successfully accomplished by the Bengal troops now serving at Hyderabad, and a part of the additional force ordered to march thither on your requisition, (supposing that any unforeseen obstacle should impede the immediate march of the whole of the two regiments from Fort St. George) you have my sanction to make the attempt with the smaller force.

For the reasons however stated in my letter to you of the 25th ultimo, it is indispensably necessary, at all events, that the Nizam should, without delay, formally bind himself by a written engagement to my propositions respecting the French party, as well as to every other preliminary condition of the proposed arrangements, leaving the mode and time of carrying those arrangements into effect to be determined by the arrival of our additional subsidiary force.

I consider such preliminary articles to be the basis of a definitive treaty which shall comprehend the general interests of each branch of the Triple Alliance. On the signature of such articles you must insist, before you despatch your orders, for the march of the additional detachment. The actual disbanding of Peron's corps will, of course, follow the establishment of our troops at Hyderabad.

The nature of these measures requires great despatch, the ordinary delays of an Asiatic Court would defeat the whole system.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. L.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 16th August, 1798.

I have just now received your express of the 30th July, to which I return an answer without delay.

The despatch of the *La Virginie* has been delayed by the sudden death of my poor friend Captain Hunt, who died to the unspeakable grief of all his acquaintance, on Friday last, after an illness of a few days.

The charge of the ship is entrusted to Mr. Evans, the first lieutenant, who will sail in the course of two or three days at farthest, and will convey to you a supply of money to the amount of not less than ten nor more than fifteen lacs of rupees. I trust that this supply will reach you within fifteen days from the departure of *La Virginie*.

A part of the 33rd regiment, with my brother, Colonel Wellesley, embarked the day before yesterday for Fort St. George, and the remainder is to follow to-morrow.

If the force which I have directed to be assembled shall really be ready to move from the Circars towards Hyderabad before the end of August, I trust it will be in time to accomplish the important objects which I have in contemplation.

The Marine battalion will be embarked for Masulipatam, partly on board the *Bombay* frigate, and partly on a ship freighted for the purpose on the 25th of this month.

Upon consulting with the Commander-in-Chief, we are of opinion that the defence of these provinces, under all the circumstances of the present moment, absolutely requires that the men of the 36th regiment should be embarked for Fort William immediately upon the arrival of the 33rd at Fort St. George, and I therefore request that the execution of this suggestion may not be suspended, but as I am anxious to afford you every possible assistance, I this day signified in Council my intention to authorize you to detain the 29th regiment of dragoons, which must soon arrive at your Presidency from England; you will not attempt to mount the men, but I trust that you will find this regiment in its dismounted state useful for the purpose of garrison duty.

You will consider this as a formal authority for the detention of the 29th regiment.

I take this opportunity of replying to such parts of your letters of the 12th and 14th July as have not been noticed in my public despatches.

The mode of obviating the inconvenience likely to arise from the number of your French prisoners has been anticipated by my proposition made through Mr. Wellesley, and I trust you may already have found some means of conveying them to Europe.

I do not think that the regiment of Meuron would be a very safe guest in Bengal if its disposition should be what you apprehend; should your apprehension prove well founded, I would recommend it to you to devise some means of sending it to Europe.

The 29th will make a very safe part of the garrison of Fort St. George.

Your letter of the 14th July suggests some doubts of Tippoo's participation in the proclamation issued in the Isle of France. I have had the means of ascertaining from a variety of respectable evidence, as well as from an examination of the collateral circumstances of the case, that Tippoo was unquestionably a party to the proclamation.

The motives of Monsieur Malartic are more ambiguous, but I am persuaded you will not think this circumstance any palliation of the conduct of Tippoo.

Tippoo certainly expected very considerable assistance from the Isle of France, and he would probably have obtained it if his Ambassadors had carried with them a sufficient treasure to advance bounty money to a large number of recruits; but an apprehension of the English cruizers prevented the embarkation of treasure, and to this defect more than any other is to be imputed the failure of the whole plan. The ship which conveyed to the Mauritius the first intelligence of the last revolution in France, and of the violence intended against that Island, did not arrive until after the departure of Tippoo's vakeels. This intelligence occasioned the disturbance in the Island; the proclamation, therefore, did not originate in any intention to quell those disturbances by relieving the Island of the restless spirits concerned in them. It is an incontrovertible fact (on which I leave you to make your own comment) that no rumour or notion of a war between Tippoo and the Company, or of a levy of men for his service, existed

in the Island of Mauritius previously to the arrival of Tippoo's Ambassadors, and that the proclamation issued a few days after their arrival.

I have detailed the whole of this argument in a minute recorded in the Secret Department, which I will forward to you for your private perusal, and for that of Lord Clive.*

Tippoo's letters to the Executive Directory of France, soliciting their aid against the Company, were despatched from the Mauritius in the month of March; you are aware that the general expectation in that Island is, that a force will soon be sent from France for the purpose of reducing the Island to obedience. Such an expedition may easily be connected with the plan of affording succour to Tippoo, and I think it highly probable that a part of the great naval preparations now making in France may be destined for this rational purpose, rather than to the impracticable project of invading England; in this opinion Sir Hugh Christian and Lord Macartney entirely concur with me.

Captain Malcolm's report of the state of Tippoo's preparations leaves no doubt on my mind that the Sultan expected to have derived from the French such succour as would have enabled him immediately to commence active operations against us. It does not appear to me that the Sultan yet despairs of the aid of France.

With regard to the effect which our preparations may have upon Tippoo's mind I have sufficiently expressed my opinion in my private letter to you of the 16th July. That opinion has been confirmed by every subsequent event; and I should be ashamed to hold for one hour the post which I now fill, if I had been so weak as to suffer any vague apprehension of the possible effect of our preparations on the capricious temper of the Sultan, to deter me from taking effectual measures for our permanent security against his declared designs.

Your letter of the 6th July enclosed a memorandum,† which I should not have thought deserving of my notice if you had not called my particular attention to it, as containing the arguments which were likely to be urged with virulence by the opposition at home, in the event of our being engaged in a war with Tippoo.

* Vide Minute of the 12th August, 1798, p. 159.

† See p. 72.

Although no man accepts with more gratitude any correction of his own opinions, I feel an instinctive repugnance to any remarks evidently originating in a spirit of discontent and faction; I therefore read in a very cursory manner the memorandum which you had so justly described; I leave you then to judge with what astonishment and concern I found the whole substance of that memorandum recalled to my memory by your public letter of the 10th July;* to that letter my pub-

* The following is the letter referred to :—

From the Secret Department to the Earl of Mornington, K.B.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 10th July, 1798.

We have had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 20th ultimo,* directing us to take measures, with the utmost degree of expedition, for assembling the army, under this Government, at such a situation as we may judge most convenient for its marching against Seringapatam; if such a measure should, hereafter, be found necessary.

Upon this most momentous question we shall wait, with the utmost solicitude, the result of your Lordship's final deliberation. Mean while, we beg to assure you of our most cordial cooperation, in any system of measures which you may judge expedient, to frustrate the designs of the enemy.

With this view, we have taken the measures immediately necessary for assembling such part of our troops, as can be spared from the defence of our forts, and the protection of our districts; of this force we inclose a return amounting to 14,144 rank and file, including gun Lascars and pioneers.

The Commander-in-Chief has recommended Walajahbad, as the most convenient place at which to assemble the army, with a view either to offensive or defensive operations; and, in compliance with his recommendation, we have accordingly fixed upon that situation, as the general rendezvous of the troops.

We shall issue immediate orders for providing a sufficient quantity of draft and carriage cattle for the camp equipage, and field train of this army, but as the equipment of a battering train, sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam, must be attended with an immediate very heavy expence, we shall postpone any orders for this purpose, until we receive your farther directions.

In the mean time, we consider it our duty to suggest the ideas to which the immediate performance of your orders has given rise.

The army which it is possible for us to draw together, is incapable of offensive operations; and must receive very large reinforcements from Bengal, before it can be in a condition to make any serious attack upon the Mysore country. The time and extent of those supplies depend upon your Lordship in council, but the assistance which we require in troops

* See p. 64.

lic duty compelled me to return an answer which it was very painful to me to dictate. I can only repeat my sincere assurances already offered to you on a similar occasion, that no unfavourable impression of your intentions, nor abatement of

is so great, as must necessarily fix the period of our offensive operations to a very distant day; and, as the demolition of Ossoor and Bangalore, leave us no object of intermediate attack; we can have no means of making any formidable impression upon Tippoo Sultaun, but by the siege of his capital itself. This from the circumstance we have already stated, as well as from the experience of the last war, must, inevitably, be a work of time.

Mean while our preparations shall go on, with every precaution to prevent the discovery of their object; yet we cannot be sanguine that a matter of such necessary publicity as the march and equipment of an army, which can have no object but hostility against Tippoo, could escape that prince's vigilance.

If, upon this discovery, he should pursue the line of policy pointed out by his father, (and there is too much reason to expect, from the demolition of Bangalore and Ossoor, that this will be his future system of warfare) we apprehend that an immediate invasion of the Carnatic may be expected; and, as his resources are much more prompt than our own, and as a great part of his army is supposed to have long been in a state of field equipment, we fear that his attack upon us may be expected, before we shall be in a condition to meet him.

Our own army, when equipped, can, from its number, be only defensive, and its operations confined to the Company's territories; while the enemy, from the rapidity of his movements, and the superiority of his cavalry, will carry devastation throughout the Carnatic, until we may be able to fix his attention to his own dominions. Meanwhile the loss of revenue in our central districts and the Baramahal is inevitable; while the ravage of the country, in the neighbourhood of this presidency, with the destruction of the November crop in the Baramahal, will oppose very serious obstacles to the equipment of our troops for the invasion of Mysore.

Having made the most urgent and repeated applications to you, upon the state of our finances, it is unnecessary to recapitulate the subject here, but in the discussion of war, a matter of so much moment as money, cannot be omitted. It is our duty therefore to apprise you, in the most explicit manner, that we must rely, solely and unequivocally, upon your Government, for supplies in specie. The official statements with which you have been already furnished, shew a very considerable defect in our resources compared with our expenses, for the current year; and any diminution of our current revenue, by the depredations of the enemy, must be followed by the utmost inconvenience, the discount upon every species of our paper leaves us to expect no assistance, upon our own credit; and the scarcity of money here, compels us to repeat, in the most unequivocal manner, that our means for equipping, as well as for

personal regard and esteem for you, suggested my answer to your public letter of the 10th July.

I beg you will return my thanks to Captain Malcolm for his very able and satisfactory report respecting the state of Tippoo Sultaun's force and preparations for war.*

I must also request you to express my gratitude to Major Allan for the valuable communications which I have received from him on the subject of the passes into the Carnatic.

Major Beatson has been here for some time, I have received great satisfaction from his knowledge and ability, and I feel very much obliged to you for having afforded me the opportunity of forming so useful and amiable an acquaintance.

I am very sorry that it will not be in my power to spare the *Bombay* frigate for the purpose mentioned to you by Admiral Rainier. That ship will be employed in conveying the troops to Masulipatam, and when that service shall have been accomplished, my intention is to order her to cruize in company with the *Nonsuch* off the Sand heads, for the protection of the trade of Bengal during the north-east monsoon.

I shall give an early consideration to the affairs of Tanjore; I have not yet been able to form my opinion on that subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

paying the army, must depend upon the supplies of treasure which your Lordship in council may be able to send from Bengal.

We shall do ourselves the honour of enclosing, for your information, as soon as it can be prepared, a statement of the monthly expense of our own army in the field, together with a statement of the balance of cash in our treasury.

Though we have thought it our duty to represent the difficulties in which we may be involved, by the immediate execution of your Lordship's orders, we beg leave to repeat our assurances of the most hearty co-operation, in any plan which you may determine to adopt, in the present conjuncture.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord, your Lordship's,

Most obedient, humble servants,

GEORGE HARRIS.

EDWARD SAUNDERS.

E. H. FALLOFIELD.

* See Appendix.

No. LI.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 19th August, 1798.

I have just now received your letter of the 7th of August,* with the extracts inclosed ;† and I am anxious to avail myself

* See page 155.

† The following is the Minute of General Harris, referred to :—

Secret Department, 31st July, 1798.

The President lays before the Board a letter from Bengal, which he recommends may not at present be entered on the records, directing that immediate orders may be issued for assembling, with all practicable despatch, two native regiments of infantry, with field pieces, each battalion completed to the war strength of 1,000 men, and intimating that it is probable this force will shortly be required for the service of the Nizam.

The President delivers in the following Minute :—

If the present order had been given after the receipt of our letter to the Supreme Government of the 10th instant, there would have been no cause to doubt what conduct we ought to pursue, because the Governor General in Council would have issued his directions under a knowledge of the difficulties in which we should be involved by the execution of his first instructions for assembling the coast army, with the ultimate view of marching to Seringapatam.

In that letter we stated our utter inability to undertake any offensive operation; that our whole collected force was barely sufficient to repel any invasion of our own territories; and that, without large and immediate supplies of money, we could not put it in a state of field equipment, it follows, then, that by preparing and detaching so large a part of our army (and which it is probable will shortly be entirely withdrawn from our protection) as 4,000 effective native infantry, with their complement of field artillery, that a very serious reduction is made from our means of defence, and that the very measure which we were before scarcely in a condition to repel is proportionably provoked.

The question, therefore, for our consideration is, whether these consequences shall be risked by the execution of the present order.

If I believed that the stipulated force was required only for the ordinary service of the Nizam, I would not hesitate to recommend that the execution of the order should be suspended until a reply was received to the representation which has been made to the Supreme Government of our difficulties; but, judging from the very pressing private request of the Earl of Mornington, that the detachment may be equipped with the utmost promptitude and caution, that its formation is of great importance to the British interests in India, I should deem myself culpable if I thwarted any general plan which may have been formed by the Supreme Government, by delaying, for a moment, to propose to the Board the mode

of the earliest opportunity to return you my most cordial thanks for the zeal and resolution with which you have carried my suggestions into effect; my letter of the 16th July will have informed you how essential a plan to the very existence of the British empire in India would have been defeated if your honorable firmness had not overcome the suggestions of an opposition, which would have persuaded you to violate the law under the specious pretence of executing the spirit by disobeying the letter of the orders of the Governor-General in Council. This opposition I am resolved to crush; I possess sufficient powers to do so; and I will exert those powers to the extreme point of their extent, rather than suffer the smallest particle of my plans for the public service to be frustrated by such unworthy means. With this view, my earnest request to you is, that you will communicate to me without delay the names of those who have arrogated to themselves the power of governing the empire committed to my charge: the ignorance and weakness of this self-created government have already appeared to you from the papers which I transmitted to you on the 18th July. In addition to that information, I have now the satisfaction to tell you, that the Nizam has agreed unequivocally to cooperate with us in the event of a war with Tippoo, and has also cordially united in all the measures which I have proposed for the relief of the Peishwa. In the meanwhile a revolt in the army of Scindiah has so reduced his power, that there remains no doubt of the complete restoration of the Peishwa, and consequently of the immediate revival of our defensive alliances against Tippoo in (at least)

which I deem most proper for the speedy and effectual accomplishment of the part with which we are charged.

I am aware that difficulties of great magnitude oppose the arrangement I shall propose, but feeling that they ought to yield to the more immediate object in view, it would be superfluous to dwell upon them, and culpable to shrink from the responsibility which may attach to us in meeting them.

The public and private promise of a supply from Bengal in specie lessens my apprehensions on this account; and as I have again, in the most urgent terms, pressed the immediate necessity of its performance, I am confident that his Lordship in Council will be as forward to afford effectual relief to our particular difficulties, as we may be to manifest a cordial cooperation in his plans for the general safety.

(GEO. HARRIS.

their original vigour. The dismissal of the French corps at Hyderabad will take place immediately after the arrival of our increased subsidiary force. I leave it to you to judge whether this state of the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, cemented by my authority and power, is more likely to tempt Tippoo to move into the Carnatic, or to turn his eyes seriously to the danger of his own dominions. It is extremely necessary that you should not divulge this information, until I am enabled to transmit you a more exact state of our negotiations, which I will not fail to do by the first favourable opportunity. The *Virginia* will sail to-morrow or the next day with about 13 or 14 lacs of rupees. The marine battalion will embark in a day or two. You may rely on my employing every exertion to send you a further supply of treasure and of men, if the latter should become necessary.

I am not aware of having omitted any point of importance on which you appear to desire my opinion, excepting that part of your letter which relates to the necessity of the Commander-in-Chief and myself visiting Fort St. George in the event of a war; the Commander-in-Chief long ago expressed to me his intention to take the command on the coast in that event; and I shall not hesitate one moment (if necessity should require such a step) in carrying to the coast such power as shall soon repress the faction, which I perceive is already formed for the purpose of embarrassing my Government. Indeed I will not wait the moment of war (which I trust is distant), if the spirit which has arisen at Madras should appear to gain strength; the activity of that spirit will very soon bring me to Fort St. George.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer.

SIR,

August 19th 1798.

Your letter No. 31, dated the 26th July, reached me yesterday. The present situation of Scindiah, will probably dispose him to consider our interposition rather in the light of a friendly and seasonable assistance, than in that of an authoritative act of compulsion.

Under such circumstances, which I am persuaded you will improve to the utmost possible degree of advantage, I think it might be practicable to enter into details with respect to the precautions, which become every day more necessary for the defence of Scindiah's dominions, against the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah. You are aware, that the injustice and violence of Scindiah have disgusted the Rajahs of Jynagur and Joodipour, and other Chiefs of the Rajahpoot tribe, who would form most useful allies to Scindiah and to the Company, in the event of the Shah's approach. I wish you to endeavour to convince Scindiah of his deep interest in making such early concessions to the Rajahpoots, as may conciliate them towards him; at present I am afraid that his outrages have thrown them into the scale of their natural enemy Zemaun Shah, and have entirely separated them from the Mahratta interest, to which they are attached by every natural tie. I enclose a paper of intelligence respecting Zemaun Shah, which appears more authentic than any which has hitherto reached me. By a copy which I have received of the Persian paper, delivered by Captain Kirkpatrick to Azim ul Omra, I find that Captain Kirkpatrick has departed very widely both from the spirit and letter of my instructions to him. Not having yet received from him any explanation of the motives of his conduct, I cannot yet form my judgment upon it; but it is necessary that you should take the earliest precautions against the effect to be apprehended from two passages in the Persian paper, to which I have adverted. The first relates to Tippoo Sultaun, with whom it would be supposed from the tenor of that paper, that war was in my opinion become not only inevitable, but desirable. The primary object of all my present measures is to prevent war, by convincing Tippoo on the one hand, that we are perfectly prepared to meet him in the field, and on the other, that we are equally ready to accept of a just and moderate satisfaction for his late infraction of treaty.

The second passage in Captain Kirkpatrick's paper, from which I apprehend mischief, is that, which states in such strong terms, my determination to use compulsory measures against Scindiah; my instructions on this head appear to me to be sufficiently intelligible. My wish and expectation always has been, that measures of conciliation might effect all

that I require from Scindiah, with considerable advantage to his own genuine interests; and I have authorized you to resort to compulsion in the last, and I trust improbable, extremity.

You will bear these observations in your mind, in whatever conversations or papers shall pass during the course of this negotiation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P.S. I have just now received Captain Kirkpatrick's account of his motives for varying and extending my propositions. He has judged rightly in extending the exclusion of the French to all Europeans excepting the British. You will advert to this circumstance with reference to the state of Poonah.

No. LIII.

(By Express.)

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Fort William, 20th August, 1798.

I have received your letters of the 31st July, and 2nd of August.

I shall forward to you by the next post, a public letter containing my observations on their contents. But I cannot delay the communication of my anxiety on some points, contained in the Persian paper, delivered by you to Azim ul Omra.

From the tenor of that paper, it would be supposed, that war with Tippoo was in my opinion, become not only inevitable but desirable.

The primary object of all my present measures is to prevent war, by convincing Tippoo, on the one hand, that we are perfectly prepared to meet him in the field; and on the other, that we are equally ready to accept of a just and moderate satisfaction for his late infraction of treaty.

The manner in which that paper states my determination to use compulsory measures against Scindiah, is very different from the spirit of my instructions to Colonel Palmer. My wish and expectation always has been, that measures of conciliation might effect all that I require from Scindiah, with

considerable advantage to his own genuine interests; and I have authorized Colonel Palmer to resort to compulsion in the last, and I trust improbable, extremity. But from your Persian paper it would be inferred, that I expected a contest with Scindiah, and that I was not desirous of conciliating that Chief.

You will bear these observations in mind, and you will endeavour to remove impressions from which I apprehend the most serious mischief.

Without at present adverting to the propriety of your having made any alteration in the propositions, which I directed you to make to Azim ul Omra, I shall confine myself to apprizing you, that I do not feel any material objection to any alterations which you have made in the substance of those propositions, excepting that which respects the permanency of the new subsidiary engagements. Such a proposition appears to me likely to create jealousy in the mind of the Nizam, without securing any possible advantage to us. You will therefore withdraw it, if it should have occasioned any objection.

I do not yet think it prudent to disclose the nature of the demand of satisfaction, which I have it in contemplation to make from Tippoo; and I am therefore anxious, that you should take an early occasion of removing any impression, which may have been made by your suggestions on that subject.

You will not delay your application for the force from Fort St. George, in consequence of any difficulty which may have arisen, respecting the security for the pay of the new subsidiary force; the great object is to effect the dismissal of the French force as speedily as possible.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LIV.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 22 August, 1798.

Having barely had time, under the circumstances of my recent arrival, to read your Lordship's confidential letters of

the 16th ultimo, to General Harris, and of 29th* to myself, I shall not now presume to enter upon the very important

* The following is an extract from the letter referred to :—

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

(Most private and confidential.)

MY LORD,

Fort William, July 29th, 1798.

Although I have not the honour of your Lordship's personal acquaintance, I trust that my public situation and my anxiety to discharge its duties in a satisfactory manner will be a sufficient apology for the liberty which I take in troubling you with this letter.

I learnt the intelligence of your Lordship's appointment to the Government of Fort St. George with very great pleasure, being convinced that the affairs of that Presidency require the vigorous control of a person of your Lordship's rank and character, and that you will have it in your power (as I am persuaded it is your inclination) to render essential service to the interests of the Company, and to confer considerable benefits upon the people committed to your peculiar charge.

For the system of measures which I think it advisable to adopt in the present crisis with regard to the defence of the Carnatic, and to the restoration of our alliances, I refer your Lordship to my private correspondence with General Harris, and to the papers accompanying my last letter to him.

Having frequently considered the state of the Presidency of Fort St. George previously to my departure from Europe, and having had the opportunity of correcting, by personal observation, the opinions which I had formed at home, I think it my duty to lay before your Lordship, without reserve, the final result of my deliberate judgment upon a subject equally interesting to yourself and to me. In pursuing the various topics connected with this subject, I shall communicate my ideas to your Lordship with the same degree of confidential freedom which I should use to my most intimate friend; being satisfied that your Lordship will not suffer communications of so secret a nature to pass beyond your own mind; and being assured that you will receive them as the most unequivocal testimony of my cordial zeal for the prosperity of your administration, and of my disposition to afford you every assistance towards the maintenance of the dignity, authority, and vigour of your Government.

The Civil service of the Presidency of Fort St. George is unfortunately in a condition very far removed from perfection, and inferior in every respect to that of Bengal.

The deficiency of most of the Civil servants at Madras, in the departments of revenue, is to be ascribed in a great measure to the system so long prevalent of administering the revenues through provincial Chiefs and Councils, whose policy it was to confine the means of acquiring a knowledge of the nature of the collections within the most narrow channels, and who were themselves almost universally under the dominion of the Native agents and servants. The whole administration of the Revenue

topics they contain, but content myself for the present, with expressing the grateful sense I entertain of the friendly and

was a scheme of mystery, calculated to embarrass inquiry, and to screen speculation from justice.

The provision of the commercial investment upon the coast of Coromandel has also been managed almost exclusively by Native agents and contractors; and while their management shall continue, it cannot be expected that the servants of the Company will become conversant with the details of the several manufactures, or with the minute circumstances which affect the quality of the different fabrics. This defective mode of administering the revenue and commerce of the Company on the coast rendered the study of the languages, customs and laws of the country a superfluous, if not an useless, labour; since a servant of the Company might reach the most arduous trusts, and might discharge them with as much credit as his predecessors had ever enjoyed, without the previous application necessary for acquiring any of those branches of knowledge. On the other hand, the ignorance of the Company's civil servants necessarily threw them into the hands of the native Dubashes, whose destructive influence soon produced embarrassments, which led to the sacrifice of public trust and duty, and ultimately to the utter subversion of every principle of integrity and honour. To these causes must be added the continual operation of the intrigues of the Durbars of the Nabob of Arcot and of the Rajah of Tanjore. The junior servants I trust, under your Lordship's superintendence, may be encouraged in the study of the native languages; a knowledge of which is indispensably necessary to enable them to discharge any important public trust with advantage to their employers, or with honour to themselves. With this view, I most earnestly recommend it to your Lordship to direct your most vigilant attention to the conduct of the junior writers from the earliest period of their arrival at Madras. Too many of them fall into early habits of extravagance, in which they are encouraged by the native Dubashes; and I declare to your Lordship my deliberate conviction, that this evil cannot be remedied in any other manner than by the personal exertions of the Governor himself.

Lord Cornwallis watched over the conduct and morals of the junior servants of the Company in Bengal with the anxiety and solicitude of a parent; and the beneficial effects of his laudable care are now visible in every department of this Government. To a person of your Lordship's disposition, this duty will not be irksome. Various opinions have been stated to me with respect to the salary of the writers; some persons seem to think its present amount sufficient, and that any increase would lead to extravagance; while others are of opinion, that it does not afford the means of maintaining the writers in a situation of competent affluence. I confess that I was not able, during my continuance at Madras, to form a decided opinion upon this important question. I therefore refer it to your Lordship's judgment, being persuaded that you will concur with me in feeling that the source of many of the defects in the civil service at

unreserved manner, in which you have done me the honour to open your correspondence; and with assuring your Lord-

Madras is to be discovered in the original condition of the writers sent out from Europe, and that from the same source must be derived any permanent system of improvement.

I should have observed to your Lordship, that I believe a proper public building for the reception of the writers upon their first arrival at Madras, would be a very desirable object; the buildings at present used for that purpose are extremely contracted, and, as I was informed, absolutely uninhabitable by any but those of the most vigorous constitution. I would also suggest to your Lordship's consideration, whether it might not be proper to increase the salaries of the present offices of Mahratta and Persian Translator, and to found offices of a similar description for the translation of the various languages, in which the public business is transacted in different parts of the country subject to your Presidency. A measure of this nature would operate as a great encouragement to the study of the native languages upon the coast. Your Lordship will perceive by the directions which I shall speedily forward to you in Council, that it is my wish to introduce, in all those countries subject to your Government, which are now in a state to receive such an improvement, that system of permanent settlement of revenue, connected with a speedy and regular administration of justice, from which such essential benefits have been derived in Bengal. I conversed very fully with all the Members of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George on this most interesting subject, in which the prosperity and happiness of the whole people committed to your particular charge is deeply concerned; and I was convinced by the information I received from those respectable Gentlemen, that the system, to which I have adverted, might immediately be introduced into almost every part of your Lordship's Government with infinite advantage, not only to the Native inhabitants, but to the civil service of the Company. I am aware that, at the first institution of the courts of justice, it may be very difficult, in the present state of the civil service of Fort St. George, to find a sufficient number of persons properly qualified for the several judicial offices; but, on the other hand, the institution of such offices will open new channels for the ambition, industry and talents of your civil servants. The study of the manners, languages, customs, and laws of the natives will then become general, and the beneficial effects of such an additional incitement to the activity of your servants will soon be widely extended, and will gradually produce a supply of persons equal to all the duties of the Company's civil service.

Before I quit the subject of the state of the civil service at Madras, I must beg leave to call your Lordship's attention to the revision of your civil establishments, as directed in my letter in Council of this date, addressed to the President in Council of Fort St. George. Every practicable reduction of your expenses and augmentation of your revenue will be of importance in the present distressed state of the finances of the Company in India. If my information be correct, the proposed establishment of

ship that I am entering upon the important duties of my station, with a mind fully impressed of the great advantage

the courts of justice will not ultimately prove any additional burthen upon your finances.

With respect to the military establishments at Fort St. George, I have the satisfaction to declare to your Lordship, that I do not believe there exists in any part of the world an army more distinguished for its high state of discipline, or for the activity, gallantry, and skill of its officers, than that which will be under your immediate direction.

In the ranks of Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, and those still inferior, you will find many excellent officers.

The defects in your military establishments, which impede the power of putting any considerable portion of your army in motion at a short notice, are considered in my letter to your Presidency of the 20th July, and in my minute, recorded in the Secret Department at Fort William, of the same date, of which I will soon transmit a copy to your Lordship.

I most earnestly entreat your early and serious attention to the very alarming considerations which arise from the view which I have taken of this important subject. Your Lordship will receive a more full detail of my sentiments on this head from General Harris, who will communicate to you all my private correspondence relating to it. I must also take the liberty of requesting that you will allow my brother, Colonel Wellesley, (whose regiment is now under orders for Fort St. George,) to have the honour of stating to your Lordship at large my opinions with respect to the defence of the Carnatic.

Your Lordship will have learnt previously to your departure from Europe, that I was charged by the Court of Directors to attempt, by means of persuasion and advice, to induce his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic to agree to the same modification of the treaty of 1792, which had been proposed to him by Lord Hobart. General Harris, and Mr. Lushington, who acted as my interpreter, will state to your Lordship the means which I employed to endeavour to accomplish the object of my commission; in which I entirely failed: I was equally unsuccessful in my endeavours to prevail upon his Highness to make provision for the liquidation of any part of his debt to the Company; I am persuaded that it will ever be wholly impracticable to induce his Highness the Nabob (by means of conciliation) to surrender the management of any part of his country into the hands of the Company; and I am satisfied that *any other means* would be as foreign to your Lordship's disposition as they are to mine. My fixed rule during my continuance at Madras was, to treat the Nabob with the respect due to his rank, with the kindness due to the ancient friendship between his family and the Company, and with the delicacy demanded by his dependent situation. At the same time I avoided all familiarity with him; and I animadverted very fully upon the defects of his administration, and upon the extreme impropriety of his late conduct with relation to the interests of the Company. I never allowed him to utter any invective against Lord Hobart, notwithstanding his various at-

which must result from mutual confidence and co-operation, and with the intention of shewing the highest deference, and

tempts, both in public and private, to induce me to listen to a vein of abuse, in which his Highness is too apt to indulge himself on that subject. You will find his Highness's disposition to be very far from amiable or respectable; he is insincere, mean, and timid; he is however said to be humane in his temper; although Lord Hobart has recorded instances, which impute to him the guilt of very great cruelty. He is by no means deficient in his understanding; I have met with few men who possess more address; his abilities however were always exhibited to me in the form of low cunning, artifice, and subterfuge. You will find a most virulent party formed against his Highness amongst a certain description of the Company's servants, civil and military, at Madras. The persons concerned in this party preserve no bounds of moderation or of decency in their public language concerning his Highness's conduct and character; and if their opinion were suffered to guide the councils of the Government of Fort St. George, there is no degree of public humiliation or disgrace to which his Highness would not be subjected, and scarcely an excess of compulsion and violence, which would not be attempted, to extort the surrender of his country from him. I must here take the occasion of assuring your Lordship, that the character of those measures is wholly inconsistent with the acknowledged temper and disposition of Lord Hobart, whom I have known with the utmost degree of intimacy for many years. I shall forward to your Lordship shortly copies of the papers which passed between me and the Nabob, together with my observations upon them. In the meanwhile, I offer it as my sincere advice to your Lordship, not to attempt any immediate negotiation with his Highness for the surrender of his country; I found his mind in a state of great irritation and alarm; and although I flatter myself that those emotions were in some degree abated by my intercourse with him, I can hardly expect that he is yet inclined to give favourable attention to any proposition for a modification of the treaty of 1792. For my own part, notwithstanding the anxiety of the Court of Directors upon the subject, I entertain very serious doubts whether the Company would gain considerably by the surrender of the mortgaged districts. This however is a point, upon which I have not yet formed a decided opinion. I must therefore entreat your Lordship to turn your attention to it; and as I am persuaded that you will consider the question without passion or prejudice, and that no virulence of party will be suffered to warp your judgment, I expect to derive considerable advantage from receiving the honour of your opinion.

With regard to the Nabob's debt to the Company, I think the present moment of general voluntary contribution might offer a favourable opportunity for persuading his Highness to pay the whole or part of the new cavalry loan; and I shall speedily forward to your Lordship a letter for his Highness, suggesting the propriety of so seasonable a step in the present moment.

I should here observe, that his Highness expressed great anxiety to be

giving the most cordial support to the measures of the supreme Government. With great consideration and esteem,

My Lord, &c.

CLIVE.

allowed to correspond privately with me, but I declined the proposition ; and your Lordship may be assured, that I will admit of no other mode of communication between his Highness and me than the regular channel of your Government.

It is very necessary that we should be prepared to decide the eventual question of the succession to the Nabobship in the probable event of his Highness's early death. Your Lordship will have the goodness to ascertain, with as much accuracy as possible, the respective pretensions of those who might lay claim to the Musnud in such an event. Upon such information as I shall receive from you, we may be enabled to anticipate the mischiefs of a disputed succession, and to avoid the disgrace of adopting a premature decision, which we might afterwards be compelled to revoke. General Harris will have communicated to you the directions of this Government with respect to the succession to the Musnud of Tanjore ; and you will have learnt the manner in which those directions have been executed. I shall be extremely anxious to receive the report of the commission, which is to be appointed for enquiring into the real state of Tanjore. Untill that report shall be received, it will be impossible to form a permanent system for the improvement of the interests of the Rajah or of the Company in that fertile, but harrassed country. I think it necessary however to apprize your Lordship, that such information, as I have already been enabled to obtain upon this subject, leads me to hope that the most advantageous arrangement for the interests of the Company will prove to be that, which would evidently most redound to their honour, and would place the character of their justice on the most substantial foundations. Your Lordship will have anticipated my idea, that the restoration of the *whole* country to Serfoge under an improved system of management, checked by the superintendence of the Government of Fort St. George, would produce the most beneficial permanent consequences to both parties. It was with this express view that I suggested the policy of endeavouring to persuade Serfoge to make a temporary cession of his Kingdom to our management ; in order that we might provide for him (during our temporary possession,) not only such a permanent system of administration, as should enable him hereafter to govern his people with justice and mildness, but also such funds, as should admit of his making the necessary advances for the cultivation of the country, and of his securing the regular discharge of his subsidy to the Company.

I now proceed to that part of my communication with your Lordship, which, although the most delicate and invidious, is perhaps the most urgently demanded by my public duty, and by the real interest which I take in the success of your Lordship's administration.

With these sentiments, I shall deliver my unreserved opinion of the

characters of such persons as I had an opportunity of knowing at Madras; and I must observe that, although my continuance at Madras was but short, I had very frequent opportunities of seeing all the persons of whom I shall speak to your Lordship.

Mr. Webbe, the Secretary of the Government, appeared to me to be a man of talents and knowledge; his integrity I believe to be unblemished.

Your Lordship will find all the Members of the Board of Revenue worthy of confidence; Mr. Cockburn however deserves particular notice; he bears the highest reputation for integrity, talents, and knowledge of the business of the country; and I found him fully answerable to his general character. I have very seldom met with a more valuable man in any part of the world; and I take the liberty of recommending him most earnestly to your Lordship's attention, as a person upon whom you may rely for the most accurate information, and for the soundest and most honest opinions, entirely exempt from any taint of passion, prejudice, or self-interest.

Mr. White is a very deserving and useful man; I understand that he is not likely to remain at Madras beyond the present season.

Mr. Harrington is a gentleman of the highest character for integrity and diligence. Your Lordship will find him a very valuable public servant. His brother is the ablest officer in the Court of Sudder Dewannee Adaulut in Bengal, and a person who possesses just pretensions to an eminent station in the Judicial Department at this Presidency. Mr. Lushington, Secretary to the Board of Revenue, and Private Secretary to General Harris, although a very young man, ought to be particularly mentioned to your Lordship, as possessing very considerable talents and knowledge, united with an uncommon degree of discretion and prudence, and with a peculiar propriety of manners. He has paid great attention to the study of the Persian language, in which he is a considerable proficient. He is without exception the most promising young man I saw at Madras, and as far as I could judge from continual intercourse with him during my stay there, I believe him to possess the soundest principles of integrity and honour.

Mr. Nathaniel Kindersley's character for integrity, ability, and general knowledge, is universally established. He appeared to me to stand next to Mr. Cockburn in point of consideration at Fort St. George. He has however lately adopted the business of agency and private trade, and therefore has relinquished to a certain degree the service of the Company, and has relaxed that minute attention to the details of business, which you will find to be the peculiar characteristic of Mr. Cockburn.

Colonel Close, the Adjutant-General, is a very able and intelligent man, and is perfectly conversant with the Persian language. He is reputed to be of a vehement and ardent temper, and inclined to promote measures of that character; but I saw no symptom of any such disposition in him. The reputation of his integrity is unblemished.

Captain Malcolm, the Town Major, deserves every degree of countenance and protection. He is an officer of great worth, of extremely good sense, and well acquainted with the country languages; he has turned his attention particularly to the study of the political system of India, and to

the relative situations and interests of the several native powers; on this subject he is capable of furnishing your Lordship with useful information; and you will find him remarkably diligent, active, and zealous in the execution of any service with which you may entrust him. He has also the advantage of very pleasing and amiable manners.

In this place I take the liberty of mentioning to your Lordship the name of Captain Montgomery, who commands your body guard; he is a very worthy and intelligent man.

Major Allan was a particular friend of Lord Hobart, and I believe him to be an intelligent and honourable man.

The administration of the Company's Jaghire, under Mr. Lionel Place, has been a subject of great animosity and party at Fort St. George. Your Lordship's notice will, of course, be immediately directed to it. Mr. Place (whom I did not see at Madras) as I am informed, is a man of considerable talents, and of great diligence and zeal in the public service. He certainly has been engaged in a most invidious and difficult duty, in the execution of which he has encountered with great spirit and perseverance the combined influence of all the Dubashes of Madras, and has succeeded in effecting a considerable augmentation of the produce of the Jaghire. On the other hand, I should apprise your Lordship, that repeated complaints were stated to me of his rigorous treatment of the renters and cultivators of the soil subject to his authority; and doubts were suggested with respect to the justice of his settlement of the land revenue.

I had not sufficient time at Madras to enable me to enter into the investigation of the charges against Mr. Place; and my intention in what I have said upon this subject is merely to draw your Lordship's notice to it. The general impression upon my mind is, that the introduction of the Mocurrery system of land revenue would be more desirable, as well as more speedily practicable in the Jaghire, than in any other part of the Company's territories on the coast. Having troubled your Lordship with so much detail upon the subject of the internal Government of Fort St. George, I shall proceed to state some considerations with regard to the nature of the relation between that Government and the Governor General in Council of Bengal. Your Lordship is, I doubt not, perfectly conversant with the provisions of the law on this point; I shall therefore advert merely to the practical principles resulting from those provisions; and I am anxious to explain my sentiments to your Lordship upon this head in the earliest period of your Government, not only because the greatest inconveniences have resulted to the public service from misunderstandings of the distinct practical duties of the two Governments, but because I know that a faction exists at Madras, whose constant endeavour has been and will be assiduously employed to foment those misunderstandings into a systematic spirit of jealousy and contention.

All measures relating to the general defence and protection of India, to the system of our alliances, and of our negotiations or intercourse with the native powers, to the levying war or making peace, to the general administration of the revenues of all the Presidencies, to the employment of the military force, and finally to every point affecting the general interests whether civil, military, or political of the Company's possessions,

form the exclusive duties arising out of the superintending power of the Governor General in Council. For all measures of this description, he alone is responsible; and therefore the duty of the other Presidencies, with regard to such measures, consists in a cordial cooperation in the execution of that, which it is the peculiar province of the Governor General in Council to determine. The Governor General being in possession of the whole superintendence and control, as well as of the means of comprehending in one view the entire state of the Company's empire and trade, and of all the various considerations and circumstances which may affect either, must frequently issue instructions, the fundamental principles and final scope of which cannot at first sight be fully understood by the other Presidencies: in such cases (as well indeed as in any of those already described), I am persuaded that your Lordship will concur with me in thinking that the duty of the other Presidencies can never be to mix direct or indirect censures with their formal obedience to the legal authority of the Governor-General in Council: Still less can it be their duty, to anticipate his decisions by the premature interposition of their opinions and advice in any quarter, where such interference may counteract the success of his general plans, and may introduce all the mischiefs and confusion of divided councils, and of conflicting authority. The examination of the records of the late Government of Fort St. George, will manifest to your Lordship a constant tendency towards this fatal error; and even since my arrival in Bengal, I have found it necessary to restrain the symptoms of the same disposition in two instances; the one a letter written to Admiral Rainier, without any previous concert with me, suggesting a plan of operations for his Majesty's squadron entirely incompatible with my views for the general protection of our possessions. The other, a letter to me in Council, containing both direct and indirect censures of the orders which I have lately issued for assembling the army on the coast; a measure indispensably necessary, and founded on a variety of reasons, of which the Government of Fort St. George could not at that time comprehend either the nature or extent.

Under your Lordship's administration, I am confident that no such embarrassment can ever occur. With the same freedom which I have used throughout this letter, I will state to you distinctly the mode in which I propose to conduct the intercourse between the two Governments, with a view to secure their cordial cooperation, and to preclude the possibility of distraction. Every endeavour shall be used on my part to communicate to your Lordship the fullest and earliest intelligence of the nature and object of any measure which I may have in contemplation, either with relation to your particular Government, or to the general interests of the whole British Empire in India. These communications will be made to your Lordship through the channel of my private correspondence. On the other hand, I make it my earnest request to your Lordship, that whenever any such communication shall be delayed, you will attribute the delay either to the absolute necessity of the case, or to my views of the public service; and that you will therefore have the

goodness to prevent the Government of Fort St. George from proceeding to take any steps upon matters belonging to my exclusive responsibility, without a full previous communication with me, and without being apprised of my concurrence. In your Lordship's private correspondence, I trust that your Lordship will permit me to hope for the advantage of your unreserved opinion, not only with respect to all matters within your own peculiar charge, but to any point which you may think essential to the general interests of the British Empire in India; and I assure your Lordship most sincerely that I shall always receive your private suggestions as personal favours. In regulating your public correspondence, I request that your Lordship will advert to the suggestions contained in this letter, and that you will exclude from the public records every indication of jealousy and counteraction. On my part you will always find a sincere disposition in every transaction, both public and private, to consider your Lordship's authority as a part of my own, and to repel every attempt to disunite the two Governments.

By these means I flatter myself that I may be enabled to contribute effectual assistance to your Lordship in promoting those important interests, in the prosperity of which you must feel a natural and hereditary concern. It would give me great satisfaction to have the honour of a personal interview with you in the early period of your government; such an event would greatly contribute to forward the public service. Perhaps your Lordship may feel a disposition to visit Plassey during the approaching cold season in Bengal; if you should find yourself at leisure to make such an expedition, I can assure your Lordship that you will be received here by the whole settlement and by myself with the marks of distinction and respect to which you are on every account entitled, and that you will find in the mind of all those entrusted with the administration of these opulent and flourishing provinces, a grateful remembrance of the exertions to which the Company is indebted for this valuable possession.

This letter has been copied from my original draft by my brother,* who is my private secretary. I would not entrust a paper of so confidential and secret a nature to any other hand.

I have the honour to be, with great respect and esteem,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

* Mr. Henry Wellesley.

No. LV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HON. SIRS,

Fort William, 23d August, 1798.

I have the honour to inform you, that I have addressed to Mr. Secretary Ramsey by this despatch, for the use of your Honourable Court, several printed copies of the proceedings of a meeting of the British inhabitants at Calcutta, assembled on the 17th July, for the purpose of expressing, in an humble and dutiful address to his Majesty, their loyalty and attachment to his royal person and government at this important crisis, and also of considering the best mode of promoting voluntary contributions in these provinces and their dependencies, and of remitting the same to Great Britain, in order that the amount thereof may be there applied to the public service, in such manner as Parliament may direct.*

In addition to the meeting which has taken place at Calcutta, I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Honourable Court, that a similar spirit has manifested itself in every part of these provinces, not only amongst his Majesty's troops and every description of your civil and military servants, but amongst all the Europeans residing under the protection of the Company.

Several of the most respectable native inhabitants of Calcutta having signified an earnest desire to take this opportunity of proving their attachment to the interests of the British empire, I did not oppose the public expression of sentiments so honourable to the reputation of your Governments in India. At the same time I think it necessary to assure you that the subscription of the natives originated in their own spontaneous solicitude for the safety of the British

* Among the sums subscribed on this occasion at and above 1,000*l.* Sir R. Chambers, Mr. J. Hare, Mr. W. A. Brooke, Sir J. Craig, Major G. R. Stuart, 1000*l.* each; Sir Charles Cockerell, Mr. P. Speke, Mr. W. Johnson (for W. Cowper), Mr. Stephen Bayard, 1000*l.* annually during the war; Sarkis Johannes, 1,200*l.*; Corps of Engineers, 1,250*l.* annually during the war; Lieut.-General Sir A. Clarke, 2,000*l.* and the Governor General 3,000*l.* annually during the war. Subscriptions from 500*l.* upwards were very numerous from Natives as well as Europeans; the total amount being 130,785*l.* The Presidencies of Madras and Bombay exhibited a similar spirit of noble and patriotic feeling.

empire, and was not suggested by any interference of your servants.

Being persuaded that you would feel great satisfaction in receiving these unequivocal testimonies of the loyalty and public spirit of every class and description of the inhabitants of these provinces, I thought it my duty to avail myself of the earliest opportunity of forwarding an account of the whole transaction in the most convenient form. It is my intention to transmit the original address to His Majesty by the ship, *Eurydice*, which will be despatched in a few days. By that opportunity I propose to submit to your Honourable Court a more detailed report of all the circumstances relating to the subject of this letter.

Your Honourable Court will probably have received from Fort St. George, and from Bombay, accounts of the proceedings relative to a voluntary contribution at those Presidencies, at both of which it has given me great pleasure to observe the prevalence of the same laudable disposition which exists in every part of these Provinces.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LVI.

To the Government of Fort St. George.

Fort William, 29th August, 1798.

We have received your letter of the 3rd instant, in reply to our orders of the 13th ultimo,* for assembling a detachment of four thousand men for the service of the Nizam.

Our Secretary has also laid before us your Secretary's let-

* The following is the order from the Governor-General in Council:—

To the Government of Fort St. George.

Fort William, 13th July, 1798.

We think it proper to acquaint you that we deem it probable that a military force will shortly be required from your establishment for the service of the Nizam, in addition to the Bengal regiment now stationed at Hyderabad.

You will accordingly give immediate orders for assembling, with all practicable despatch, two native regiments of infantry, with field pieces, each battalion completed to the war establishment of 1,000 men.

We must particularly request that an able and experienced officer may be selected for the command of this force.

ter to him of the same date, enclosing a copy of a minute from your President on the subject of that detachment.

The zeal and public spirit which distinguish the sentiments of your President, in expressing his anxiety for the speedy execution of our orders, demand our warmest acknowledgements.

The force should be collected in whatever station in the Company's territories you may deem most eligible for enabling it to reach Hyderabad with all possible expedition.

It is at the same time desirable that the station to be selected for assembling the troops should be such as, consistently with the consideration stated in the preceding paragraph, may be least likely to excite any suspicion of their destination.

We have empowered the Acting Resident at Hyderabad to call for this force whenever he may judge it expedient; and you will instruct the officer who may be appointed to command it, to hold it in constant readiness to march to Hyderabad at the requisition of the Acting Resident signified to the Commanding Officer.

On the arrival of the detachment in his Highness's territories, Lieut.-Colonel Hyndman will place himself under the orders of the Commanding Officer, who will, of course, be a senior officer to Colonel Hyndman.

The Commanding Officer is to be instructed to conform to all such further directions as he may receive from the Acting Resident, as soon as the troops shall have entered his Highness's territories.

It is of the greatest importance that the object of collecting this force should not transpire, you will therefore take such precautions for this purpose as you may judge advisable.

In the event of the two regiments being called for by the Acting Resident, we authorize you to take immediate steps for raising two additional native regiments of infantry at your Presidency. Should you have reason to apprehend any difficulty in furnishing a sufficient force for the performance of the local military duties in the northern Circars during the interval of time which must elapse previously to the completion of the new regiments, you will apprise us of your opinions in this respect, and if you should express a wish for an additional military force, we propose to despatch our marine battalion by sea to the northern Circars: you will inform us at what port, in such case, the corps could most conveniently be landed. It is likewise our intention to embark his Majesty's 33d regiment for your Presidency, and we direct that you take the earliest opportunity after its arrival of sending the men of the 36th regiment to Bengal to be drafted into the 76th. It is our intention to communicate to you, by an early opportunity, the circumstances which have induced us to issue the orders contained in this despatch.

We are, &c.

MORNINGTON.

ALURED CLARKE.

P. SPEKE.

W. COWPER.

It is matter of great satisfaction to us that the result of your deliberations terminated in the necessary steps for assembling the force which we had directed you to detach to the northern Circars, as any delay in the execution of our orders might have occasioned consequences injurious to the British interests in India.

We are, however, concerned to remark the terms in which you have expressed your letter of the 3d instant, and particularly the 5th paragraph.* In our letter of the 10th

* The following is the letter :—

From the Secret Department to the Earl of Mornington, K.P.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 3rd August, 1798.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 13th ult., containing your orders for assembling 4,000 men, in such a situation as we may judge most convenient for their marching to Hyderabad, upon the requisition of the Acting Resident.

If the representation which we have judged it our duty to make, in our letter of the 10th ult., upon the state of our means for military equipment, could have come under your Lordship's consideration, before the issue of the present orders, we should have been relieved from a very considerable degree of embarrassment, which cannot now but attend our compliance with your directions.

By your Lordship's letter of the 20th June, we are directed to assemble the army under this Presidency, with a view to offensive operations against Tippoo Sultaun; in our reply to that letter, we have shewn that the whole force we can assemble is barely equal to defensive operations, in the event of a war with Tippoo; and that we are destitute of means for equipping it, without large supplies from Bengal.

By your Lordship's present orders, we are directed to assemble a body of 4,000 men in the Guntoor Circar, which we have not the means of doing without detaching a very considerable proportion of our defensive army.

On the one hand we have your Lordship's positive orders for assembling an army for defeating the hostile designs of Tippoo, for the execution of which he appears to the Supreme Government to have taken preliminary measures; on the other, we have also your Lordship's positive orders for furnishing a large proportion of our force for the service of his Highness the Nizam. As your Lordship's last orders do not advert to the object of the first, we conclude you look upon them as distinct objects; but, being committed to the first by the designs of the enemy, as well as our own preparations, we are reduced to the necessity either of crippling those preparations, which cannot be done without considerable danger, or of disobeying your positive orders, and thereby defeating perhaps your object in equipping a detachment for Hyderabad.

If we believed that this force was required only for the ordinary service

instant, we have already declared our determination to exclude from the correspondence between the two Governments all

of the Nizam, we should not have hesitated to postpone the execution of your orders until you should have determined upon our representation of the 10th ultimo ; but having reason to believe, from the urgency with which our President informs us, that Lord Mornington has pressed the equipment of this detachment, that the formation of it is of great importance to the British interests in India, and being satisfied, at the same time, upon the opinion of Lieutenant General Harris, that our remaining force is still equal to cope with the army of Tippoo in the field, we have chosen to risk the diminution of that force, rather than disappoint your Lordship's arrangements of the Soubah's Court.

We have accordingly issued the necessary orders for assembling four battalions of native infantry completely equipped for field service, in the neighbourhood of Innacoondah in the Guntoor Circar ; which situation we have selected as most suited to the directions of your Lordship in Council, and as soon as it may be in a condition to move, we shall issue the further orders requisite for the object of its destination.

Having thus complied with the orders of your Lordship in Council, we deem it our duty to apprize you that the arrangements which have in consequence become necessary, have deprived us of three battalions of native infantry which we had destined for field service, in event of war with Tippoo Sultaun ; and which we have not the immediate means of replacing ; we shall hereafter forward an exact return of the troops which are about to assemble at Wallajabad, for the formation of our defensive army, as soon as it can be prepared.

Having repeatedly and unequivocally urged upon your Lordship's consideration our financial embarrassments, we shall not now revive the subject further than by informing you that the whole of our present arrangement has been made upon the confident assurance of a very large supply of specie by his Majesty's ship *La Virginie* in the course of this month ; and that any disappointment of those hopes must put a stop, if not to the military pay of our troops, at least to every exertion for their equipment.

Having detached so considerable a part of our army, we have judged it necessary to the safety of these territories, that the remainder should instantly be put in a state to take the field at a moment's warning, we have therefore issued the orders necessary for providing draft and carriage cattle for the field train, for the provisions, for the stores, and for the camp equipage of the centre army ; and though it is not our immediate intention to encamp them, we shall yet make such a disposition as to admit of their junction without danger or delay.

These several measures have considerably enhanced the expenses of our military establishment ; we have, in consequence, stopped all further advances for the investment, and have ordered the greatest part of our civil revenue and commercial establishments to be discharged by bills on Bengal.

We shall hereafter avail ourselves of the latitude you have left us for

discussions of the nature contained in that paragraph, and we trust that our suggestions on this subject will be observed in your future correspondence with us.

We have now to acquaint you that we have embarked for your Presidency on his Majesty's ships *La Virginie* the sum of thirteen lacs of rupees, and it is our intention to send you a further supply in specie of not less than seven lacs by the *Bombay Frigate*.

His Majesty's 33rd regiment has been embarked in the *Fitzwilliam*, *Busbridge*, *Camden*, and *Henry Dundas*.

Our marine battalion will embark for Masulipatam on the *Bombay Frigate*, the *Peggy* and *Princess Charlotte*, country ships; we have further resolved to send you a detachment of artillery, consisting of one company of Europeans, and two companies of Lascars, with six field pieces. This detachment will be embarked on the *Caledonia*, and will also be landed at Masulipatam.

The ships with the marine battalion and the detachment of artillery will, we trust, be clear of the river by the 1st of next month.

raising two additional regiments on the establishment; meanwhile we have ordered our revenue corps in the northern Circar to be completed to 600 men each; and we beg leave to apprise you that, if it should hereafter be judged advisable to send round your marine battalion, it will be most convenient to us that they should be landed at Masulipatam.

In the present circumstances of our army, we think it our duty to state, in the most explicit manner, that we could not part with his Majesty's 36th regiment without the most positive injury to the public service. His Majesty's 12th and 33d regiments, and 25th dragoons, being new regiments, and unused to the climate, cannot be expected to escape the invariable condition of all new levies upon taking the field; the experience, therefore, of the officers, with the hardiness and discipline of the men, of the 36th regiment, are now become inestimable, and we have no hesitation in saying that, under the appearance of impending hostility, the loss of that gallant and efficient corps cannot be replaced.

Agreeably to the intimation contained in our letter of the 10th July, we have now the honour to enclose a statement of the monthly expense of our centre army, and of the balance of cash this day in our Treasury. Your Lordship will observe, that the expenses of the army at Wallajabad are calculated upon the returns transmitted to you on the 10th ult.

We have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servants,

GEO. HARRIS.

EDWD. SAUNDERS.

We entirely approve of your having determined to put your army in a state to take the field at a moment's warning, and of your making such a disposition of the several corps as will enable them to form a junction without danger or delay.

We also approve of the temporary suspension of your advances for your investment, of the provision which you have made for discharging a part of your civil revenue and commercial establishments by bills on Bengal, and of the orders which you have given for completing your revenue corps in the northern Circars to the establishment of 600 men.

We think it indispensably necessary to desire that the men of the 36th regiment may be sent to Bengal, agreeably to our former directions, by the first opportunity which may offer after the arrival of the 33d at Fort St. George, and that the other directions given respecting the remainder of the 36th, may be complied with.

We are perfectly sensible of the long and gallant services of the 36th regiment, but adverting to the period of the arrival in India of the 12th and the 33d regiments, and to the services on which they have been repeatedly employed in various parts of the world, with credit to themselves and benefit to their country, we are of opinion that those corps cannot justly be considered as new levies unused to the climate of India.

In order, however, to afford you every practicable degree of assistance in the present moment, we authorize you to detain his Majesty's 29th regiment of dragoons on its arrival at Fort St. George, if you should deem its services absolutely necessary. This regiment may be employed on garrison duty, and will enable you to add the greater part of the European regiment now in garrison to your force in the field.

We have the honour to be, &c.

[The letter of the 10th August, with the Enclosures referred to, is as follows:—

No. LVII.

*From the Governor-General in Council to the Hon. Lieut.-General Harris,
Governor in Council, Fort St. George.*

HON. SIR, Fort William, 10th August, 1798.

We have had the honor to receive your letter of the 10th July, in answer to ours of the 20th June.*

We approve the assurances which you have expressed of your disposition to cooperate cordially with us in such measures as we may judge expedient for frustrating the designs of the enemy, and we have no doubt that you will discharge,

* The following is the letter of the 20th June :—

*From the Governor General in Council to the Hon. Lieut -General Harris,
Governor in Council of Fort St. George.*

HON. SIR, Fort William, June 20, 1798,

The Governor General having communicated to us an authenticated copy of a proclamation, published by the Governor of Mauritius during the residence of two Ambassadors from Tippoo Sultaun at that island, we now transmit you a copy of the same.

From this proclamation, combined with every circumstance attending its publication, it appears that Tippoo Sultaun has not only openly avowed a design of commencing offensive war against the British possessions in India, but has actually taken the preliminary steps for putting that design into execution.

The Governor General in Council is at present occupied in deliberating upon the general system of measures which it may be advisable to adopt for the purpose of frustrating the united efforts of Tippoo and of France, the result will be communicated to you by the earliest opportunity.

In the meanwhile, however, it is a requisite precaution to make such seasonable preparations as may enable us to act with effect under any circumstances which may arise.

We therefore direct that the army under the orders of your Government be assembled with the utmost degree of expedition, at such station as you shall judge most eligible for the purpose of proceeding directly to Seringapatam, if such a measure should hereafter be deemed necessary.

You will be careful not to disclose the object of the preparations which we have hereby directed you to make, until you shall receive further instructions from us.

It is our intention to forward a supply in specie to Fort St. George by His Majesty's ship, *La Virginie*, as soon as that ship shall be ready to sail.

We have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

A. CLARKE.

P. SPEKE.

W. COWPER.

with alacrity and zeal, this indispensable part of your public duty.

In our letter of the 20th July,* we have adverted to those causes which impede the movement of your army in a con-

* The following is the Minute and Letter of the 20th July, 1798 :—

Minute of the Earl of Mornington.

Fort William, July 20, 1798.

When the proclamation published by the Governor of Mauritius made its first appearance in Bengal, I thought it my duty to apprise the Governor of Fort St. George, that if that extraordinary publication should prove authentic, it must lead to discussions of a serious nature between this Government, and Tippoo Sultaun; and I suggested the necessity of taking the earliest preparatory steps towards the assembly of the army upon the coast.

When the authenticity of the proclamation became established, I thought it my duty not only to direct the assembly of the army, but to ascertain how soon that force might be enabled to move, either for the purposes of offence or defence.

With this view, I transmitted several questions to the Governor of Fort St. George, upon which I desired to obtain his opinion, as well as that of the principal military authorities upon the coast, and I requested that an officer of experience and ability, might be despatched to this Presidency with the answers to my several questions, and with such further information, as might tend to throw light upon the subject.

The Governor of Fort St. George, without delay, returned the answer to my questions by the *Bombay* frigate, and an officer was directed to accompany the despatch, but he was prevented by an accident, from embarking on that ship.

The substance of the communications received from the Governor of Fort St. George, is of a nature so important, and alarming, that I have felt it my indispensable duty to lay it immediately before the board.

From these communications, it appears to be the opinion of the Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel Close, that the force which could be assembled immediately upon the coast, could not be equal to more than defensive operations, and that the cattle necessary to enable that force to move, even for purposes of defence, could not be collected before the commencement of the ensuing year.

The opinions of the Governor of Fort St. George, and of other respectable authorities at that Presidency, differ materially from that of Colonel Close, in stating, that sufficient cattle might be procured to enable the army to move for defensive purposes, within three months.

Thus it appears, that the shortest period of time within which the army on the coast can be put in motion, even for purposes of defence, is three months, according to some respectable authorities, and six months according to that of the Adjutant General; whose official situation, must render him peculiarly competent to form a judgment on the question.

juncture, when, according to your information, a great part of the army of Tippoo Sultaun has long been in a state of equipment for the field. We expect to receive from you, with

It is impossible for any human foresight to ascertain the precise time, when an attack from Tippoo may be expected.

But it is a matter of public notoriety, that he will attack the Carnatic, whenever circumstances shall appear to favour his design.

If in consequence of his alliance with the French, he had received the aid of one or two regiments, either from the Mauritius, or from France, there is every reason to suppose, that he would immediately have attempted an irruption into the Carnatic, with the whole strength of his regular cavalry, which although diminished, is still considerable.

To this force would probably have been added numerous bodies of irregular troops.

The peculiar character of this force has always been the rapidity of its movements; and it is well known that a large portion of Tippoo's army, is constantly maintained in a state of preparation for the field.

To counteract such an enemy, and to avert the devastation which must attend the first inroad of his army, our protecting force should be so constituted, as to be capable of meeting his attack by movements equally rapid.

The present constitution of our force upon the coast, does not appear to be founded on this principle.

Tippoo's preparations are believed to be such as to enable him to move at any time with facility and celerity, even for the purposes of offence, while the condition of our protecting force, will not admit of its moving even for purposes of defence, within a shorter period of time than three, or according to the Adjutant General, than six months.

Our army upon the coast under such circumstances, must be deemed, notwithstanding its high state of discipline, and the acknowledged gallantry, activity and skill of its officers, nearly disqualified for the primary object of its institution—"The defence of the Carnatic, against a sudden invasion."

It is now evident, that if Tippoo had succeeded in obtaining the object of his late Embassy to the Isle of France, no obstacle could have been opposed to his progress in the Carnatic for many months.

My enquiries have naturally been directed to ascertain the causes which occasion so alarming a difference between the state of our army upon the coast, and of that of Tippoo; with relation to their respective powers of moving at a short notice. The result of the consideration which I have given to this subject, leads me to believe that the radical defects in the constitution of the army on the coast, which must always retard its equipment for the field, are these; the want of a permanent establishment of draft bullocks; the want of a regular system for the speedy collection of carriage bullocks from the country, the want of established stores of grain, and of other supplies necessary for the provision of an army in the field; the want of proper regulations for providing camp

as much despatch as the nature of the subject will admit, such further advices as may enable us, in concert with you, to frame a permanent system for the correction of those defects

equipage; and lastly, the want of a regularly established train of artillery, with all its proper equipments.

The motives which prevented Government from providing the army upon the coast, with the several establishments in which it is now deficient, have certainly proceeded from an anxiety to limit the military charges of the Presidency of Fort St. George.

It cannot be denied that any effectual improvement of these deficient establishments, would necessarily be attended with a very heavy expence. But it is equally certain, that until that expence be incurred, the army on the coast never can possess the power of making a forward movement at a short notice; under these circumstances, it is a most improvident system of economy, to submit to the expence of maintaining so large an army, while we withhold the necessary means of putting a proportion of it in motion upon any sudden emergency.

The policy has been quite different in Bengal, where the part of the force destined for the immediate protection of the country, is always considered as actually in the field, and is equipped for undertaking at the shortest warning any operations either offensive, or defensive; yet Bengal is undoubtedly the part of our possessions in India, the least exposed to any sudden attack.

The nature of our establishment in India, and the rapid changes which arise in the political situations of the Native Powers, have been generally acknowledged to require that we should constantly be in a state of preparation for war; this acknowledged principle has evidently formed the basis of the whole system of our military establishments in India, which it has been our fixed policy to maintain upon a scale in point of numbers, greatly exceeding a peace establishment.

The same principle necessarily demands that a large proportion of our army should be always in readiness for active service; but that principle applies with peculiar force to our army upon the coast, which is destined to oppose the attacks of our most active and implacable (if not our only) enemy, amongst the native powers of India.

These considerations have determined me to encounter the expense which must be incurred in providing a lasting security against the future return of that danger to which the Carnatic is now, and for some time past has been, exposed.

The measures which are now taking for the assembling of the army will contribute to lay the foundation of a permanent system for the correction of the defects in the several departments of the military establishments upon the coast.

Although my opinion is already in a great measure formed with respect to the nature of the obstacles which impede the movement of the army upon the coast, I do not think it advisable to propose any detailed plan

in your military establishments which induce you to apprehend that an attack from Tippoo Sultaun may be expected before you can be in a condition to meet him, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic.

upon that subject untill I shall have received the formal opinion of the Government of Fort St. George.

I therefore propose that the President in Council at Fort St. George be directed to prepare and transmit to me in Council, with all practicable despatch, a plan for enabling a large proportion of the army on the coast to be in constant readiness to move against an enemy on a sudden emergency.

That he be further directed to frame that plan with a view to every degree of economy which shall appear to him consistent with the attainment of the principal objects in contemplation.

In communicating the details of this plan, the Governor of Fort St. George will necessarily enumerate the circumstances which now impede the movement of the army on the coast.

I also propose that the President in Council of Fort St. George be directed to report the actual state of the frontier garrisons and fortresses of the Carnatic, and what improvements or repairs may be necessary to place them in a respectable posture of defence; and lastly, I propose that the President in Council of Fort St. George be directed to report the present condition of the stores, and magazines of grain, and other provisions, as well as of the field and battering train of artillery upon the coast.

MORNINGTON.

The Governor General in Council to Lieutenant General Harris.

HON. SIR,

Fort William, 20th July, 1798.

The Right Honourable the Governor General in Council having brought under our consideration the defective state of certain branches of your military establishments, and the consequent necessity of correcting those defects, by the adoption of such permanent arrangements as will at all times afford you the means of putting your army in motion at a short notice, we request that you will prepare and transmit to us, with all practicable despatch, a plan for enabling a large portion of the army on the coast to be in constant readiness to move against an enemy on a sudden emergency, and that you will frame that plan with a view to every degree of economy which shall appear to you to be consistent with the attainment of the principal object in contemplation.

In communicating the details of this plan you will of course enumerate the circumstances which now impede the movement of your army.

We have also to request that you will report to us the actual state of the frontier garrisons and fortresses of the Carnatic, together with such

You have further considered it to be your duty to suggest the ideas to which the immediate execution of our orders has given rise in your minds.

The course of those ideas has led you to suggest to us the prudence of remaining unarmed, lest any attempt to counteract the avowed hostility and acknowledged preparations of Tippoo Sultaun should draw down his immediate resentment upon our unprotected possessions.

With these views, you have urged a variety of arguments against the policy of those measures of precaution and defence which we have ordered you to pursue for the purpose of enabling your army to meet Tippoo Sultaun in the field, and to act with effect under any circumstances which may arise.

If we thought it proper to enter with you into any discussion of the policy of our late orders, we might refer you to the records of your own Government, which furnish more than one example of the fatal consequences of neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of the enemy's equipments, and of resting the defence of the Carnatic, in such a crisis as the present, on any other security than a state of early and active preparation for war.

But being resolved to exclude all such discussions from the correspondence of the two Governments, we shall only repeat our confidence in your zealous and speedy execution of those parts of the public service which fall within the direct line of your peculiar duty.

The assembling the army upon the coast is a measure indispensably requisite with a view to any system of seasonable precaution against the declared projects of Tippoo Sultaun. Although we directed that the first station of the army should

improvement and repairs as may be necessary to place them in a respectable posture of defence.

We further desire that this report may be accompanied by a statement of the present condition of the stores, and magazines of grain, and other provisions, as well as of your field and battering trains of artillery.

We have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON,
ALURED CLARKE,
PETER SPEKE,
WILLIAM COWPER.

be that which you might judge most eligible for the purpose of proceeding directly to Seringapatam, if such a measure should hereafter be deemed necessary, it does not follow that our determination was to undertake the immediate siege of that city—such an operation, however, was necessarily to be considered among the earliest objects of any war with Mysore.

In our letter of the 20th June, we enjoined you to conceal not the march or equipment, but the destination of your army; the sixth paragraph of that letter does not express any expectation on our part, that the march or equipment of your army could be a matter of secrecy. We trust, however, that the object of your preparations has been concealed, being persuaded that you will have taken every proper precaution for preventing its disclosure.

We now proceed to give you our instructions with regard to the equipment of a battering train sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam.

We are of opinion that it would be advisable at all times to hold in readiness, at some advanced station near the frontier of the Carnatic, the ordnance, ammunition and stores, and all other necessary equipments (excepting the cattle) of a train of artillery sufficient for the above mentioned purpose; and we are further convinced of the necessity of establishing some permanent system for collecting the supply of cattle requisite for putting such a train of artillery in motion at a short notice.

At present we desire that all such preparations should be made at Fort St. George as may be necessary for placing the ordnance in the most perfect state of equipment; timely measures should also be taken for securing a supply of cattle sufficient for moving the battering train to Seringapatam, if such a movement should hereafter form a part of our plan of military operations. But we do not propose that the establishment of cattle for that purpose should be immediately entertained.

In our letter of the 20th June, we informed you of our intention to forward a supply of specie to Fort St. George by his Majesty's ship *La Virginie*, as soon as that ship should be ready to sail; and the state of your finances has occupied a considerable portion of our deliberations since the arrival of the Right Honourable the Governor General, who directed our particular attention to that subject. It was therefore with

great concern and surprize that we found, in your letter of the 10th July, your representations on the subject of your pecuniary distresses expressed in a manner tending to convey an impression of our having overlooked your embarrassments. We are aware that in the event of war your supplies of treasure must be drawn from Bengal, and in that event you may rely on our omitting no effort to furnish you with the necessary means of supporting your increased charges.

With respect to your representations regarding your want of troops, we have already informed you of our determination to send you immediately his Majesty's 33d regiment, as well as our marine battalion, if you should require it; and it is our intention also to assist you, if necessary, with an additional reinforcement of native troops, as soon as the season will permit.

When we shall have received a particular account of the expense of your present equipments, we shall provide for defraying it in such a manner as circumstances may appear to require.

The *La Virginie* will probably sail in the course of ten days, and we expect to be able to embark on that ship, a sum not exceeding fifteen and not less than ten lacs of rupees. The season becoming daily more favourable for the passage to Madras, we trust that the unforeseen and unavoidable delay in the departure of that ship will not ultimately retard her arrival at Fort St. George.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th ultimo, and shall take measures for forwarding the supply of rum, rice, and gunnies, which you have desired, with as large a quantity of salt provisions as it may be possible to procure.

We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servants,

MORNINGTON,

ALURED CLARKE,

PETER SPEKE,

WILLIAM COWPER.

No. LVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency Rear-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, August 29th, 1798.

It affords me great satisfaction to learn that my endeavours to promote his Majesty's naval service have been acceptable to your Excellency, and I trust that I have been able to give material assistance to Captain Cooke in forwarding the repairs of *La Sybille*.

I forward to your Excellency by this despatch the latest accounts which I have received from Europe; and I wish to call your particular attention to the preparations making by the French in the Mediterranean for fitting out a considerable naval force with transports for the embarkation of troops. This force it was supposed would be ready for sea by the end of the month of April last. Various accounts are given of its destination; the strange report of its being destined for the conquest of Egypt, and after the success of that wild adventure, for the more extravagant project of conveying aid by Suez to Tippoo Sultaun, will not produce much impression upon a person of your Excellency's experience. But some of my letters state an opinion, to which I am much inclined to give credit, that at least a part of this force is probably destined for an expedition to India by the ordinary passage round the Cape of Good Hope. A variety of circumstances combine to render it probable that the French may attempt to send a force to India for the joint objects of reducing the Mauritius, and of aiding Tippoo Sultaun. With these sentiments I take the liberty of requesting your Excellency to direct your most serious attention to the coast of Malabar, as soon as you shall deem it expedient to detach any part of your squadron to that quarter.

It would give me great pleasure to assist your Excellency in inducing the subscribers to the voluntary contribution at this Presidency to appropriate their subscriptions to the discharge of the expenses of his Majesty's squadron on this station; but I know that it is the general wish of the subscribers that their contributions should be sent directly to England; and although I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the good of the public service would be equally

promoted by applying the money here to the purposes proposed by you; I fear that any such proposition might be disagreeable to the subscribers, and might check the laudable zeal which has manifested itself at this crisis. But your Excellency may be assured of my most cordial disposition to afford you at all times every aid which the finances of this Government can furnish towards meeting the expenses of the fleet.

I expect every hour authentic information overland with regard to the preparations of the French. In the meanwhile I request your Excellency to take into consideration any mode which might be adopted by me for strengthening your force; and I shall be happy to be furnished with your instructions on that subject as soon as possible, in order that I may be enabled to take early measures for arming vessels or providing stores according to any arrangement which you may think fit to suggest.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P. S. If your Excellency should propose any mode of strengthening your force by aid from the Company's Governments, I request you will have the goodness to communicate it to the Governments of Madras and Bombay, who will receive my orders to attend to your Excellency's suggestions as far as relates to their separate Presidencies.

No. LIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Fort William, August 31st, 1798.

The general tenour of the late advices from Europe convinces me that the rumours of the approach of peace which had reached me in the last month were entirely void of foundation, but my recent intelligence leads me to apprehend that the attention of France is now earnestly directed towards India, and that at least a part of the armament fitted out in the Mediterranean may have been destined for an expedition to India, not as has been professed, through Egypt and the Red Sea, but by the ordinary passage round the Cape of Good Hope. With these opinions, I am extremely anxious

for the immediate conclusion of my proposed engagements with the Nizam, and for the consequent dismissal of M. Piron's corps and the arrest of the officers. If therefore any delays at Poonah should have prevented, until this time, the termination of the negotiation entrusted to you, I desire you will endeavour to conclude it, with all practicable despatch, under the limitations suggested in the 55th paragraph of my detailed instructions of the 8th July.* You will, according to the spirit of that paragraph, take care to stipulate that the Peishwa shall have an option of acceding hereafter to any engagements concluded with the Nizam.

In the case which I have supposed, of the completion of the arrangements at Hyderabad being delayed by the Court of Poonah until this letter shall reach you, it will be necessary to agree to the proposal of Meer Allum, for securing the interposition of the Company in all future differences between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, under the condition that the Nizam shall bind himself to fulfil all his engagements with the Peishwa, and to abide invariably by the award of the Company on every point of dispute which may hereafter arise between his Highness and the Government of Poonah.

My letters from Bombay incline me to doubt whether that Government will be able immediately to furnish the number of troops requisite for the service of the Peishwa. Whenever therefore the Peishwa shall have acceded to my propositions, and whenever the disbanding of the French force at Hyderabad shall have been accomplished, I desire that you will endeavour to prevail upon the Nizam to permit one of the British regiments to march directly to Poonah; and I authorize you to direct the march of a regiment accordingly. The regiment sent to Poonah will be replaced as soon as possible.

The *Bombay* frigate is to touch at Masulipatam, where she is to land our marine battalion, about the middle of September; from thence she will proceed to Madras, and will return to Masulipatam about the end of September, where Captain Sutherland will be directed to remain until he shall receive your orders, or shall be driven away by the monsoon. My wish is, that all such French officers and privates as may

* See p. 94.

be delivered up to you at Hyderabad, shall be embarked on board the *Bombay* frigate for this Presidency, where they can be more securely guarded, and from whence they will find a readier passage to Europe than at Fort St. George. You will consign the French party to the charge of the commanding officer at Masulipatam in the first instance, and you will take care to provide a sufficient escort for their safe conduct to Masulipatam.

You will direct Captain Sutherland to treat such French officers and privates as may be committed to his charge, with a due consideration of their respective ranks, and with all the attention and kindness consistent with the security of their persons; and you will not fail to use all your influence at Hyderabad, for the purpose of securing the property of such officers or privates as may be delivered to you from the rapacity of the Ministers, and of preserving it for the use of the just proprietors.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LX.

Lord Clive to the Right. Hon. Henry Dundas.

DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 8th September, 1798.

My arrival here is too recent for me to hazard opinions upon the state of this country, but I think it my duty to bring before you a few facts which I judge of the utmost importance for you to have the earliest knowledge of the prospect of our being engaged in a war with the Sultaun. You have, no doubt, been apprized by Lord Mornington of the inadequacy of the means which the Carnatic possesses of carrying on an immediate war with effect; it is necessary you should know, in its fullest extent, our main army consists of not more than 8,000 fighting men (now in cantonments in the vicinity of Walajabad), and cannot be materially strengthened without weakening the necessary garrisons, or drawing troops from Ceylon. A sufficient reinforcement from Bengal cannot be expected before the end of February, a period too late for marching to the attack of Seringapatam next spring, the time for besieging that place being limited from the middle of January to the middle of May. The conclusion drawn

from these, I believe, justly assumed facts is, that Seringapatam is not to be marched against with reasonable grounds of success before January 1800.

The finances of this settlement are in a far more distressing situation than you or I had any conception of when I had the honour of being with you last March. The debt amounts to 54 lacs, the interest to above 4 lacs. The last money taken up has been by bills upon Bengal at 410 A. Rs. the 100 pagodas. Twelve per cent. bonds are at 5 per cent. discount; 8 and 6 per cent. bonds at from 15 to 25 per cent. discount; the revenue falling short by at least from 5 to 6 lacs, a deficit of 13 lacs, an investment of 12 lacs to be provided, our credit nearly gone, and an empty Treasury. In this state of things we must evidently depend upon supplies from Bengal and from Europe in the event of war, and I doubt not but every effort will be made to assist us with specie from Leadenhall Street. The facts I have stated are certain, the opinions are those of the best informed in this place. In the event of war my utmost endeavours will be uniformly and cordially employed in cooperation with the views of the Supreme Government. More I shall not presume to offer, were I to say less I do not conceive that I should have done my duty.

I have the honour to be, with respect,

Your faithful and obedient Servant,

CLIVE.

No. LXI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-Col. W. Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, September 9, 1798.

I have received your several letters of the dates and numbers annexed.*

On a reference to my instructions of the 8th of July,† together with my first private letter to you, you will find that the restoration of Nana to power was never considered by me to be essential to the attainment of any of the objects which I had in view, although I felt that great advantages might be

* August 7. No. 34; Aug. 11, No. 35; Aug. 15, No. 36.

† See p. 113.

derived from the abilities and experience of Nana, if his interests could be connected with the success of the proposed arrangement, and if his return to power could be rendered acceptable to Bajee-Row.

The communications in your letters, numbered 34, 35 and 36, leave no doubt on my mind that the abrupt manner in which the Peishwa rejected the assistance and mediation, which he had before so repeatedly and earnestly solicited, is to be ascribed entirely to the jealousy occasioned by the measures in which you had engaged for obtaining the release of Nana.

Your negotiation with Nana having preceded your first interview with the Peishwa, and having been made a preliminary step to the introduction of my propositions to the Court of Poonah, was certainly calculated to excite in the Peishwa a suspicion that it was my primary object to restore Nana to his former power, and by supporting that minister, to exercise an undue influence in the affairs of the Mahratta empire.

With this impression, and considering the enmity which Bajee-Row and his brothers must bear to Nana, added to Emrut Row's well known jealousy of that minister, it is not at all surprising that the Peishwa should have been readily induced to risk the issue of his present contest with Scindiah, rather than agree to an arrangement which promised to deprive him at once of all authority, and to throw him again into the power of his implacable enemy supported by the influence of the Company's Government, and by the presence of a large British force.

I think it necessary, therefore, to desire that you will lose no time in endeavouring to remove the jealousy which appears to exist on this subject in the Peishwa's mind. For this purpose you will state to him expressly that in becoming security for Nana's payment of the money to Scindiah, you were actuated solely by your personal respect for that minister. That you had received no instructions whatever from me which could authorise such an interference in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's Government; and that although I certainly should view the restoration of Nana (if effected with the full concurrence and cordial consent of the Peishwa), as a measure which would tend to secure the effectual re-establish-

ment of the Peishwa's authority and power, I had never considered the interests of Nana to be necessarily connected with the propositions which I had directed you to make to the Peishwa. Under this explanation, I am persuaded the Peishwa will be sensible that my views are directed to the security of the general interests and public engagements of both states, and not to the support of any particular party, or minister at the Court of Poonah.

The distressed state of the Peishwa's affairs appears to me to offer the strongest reason to induce me to urge, and him to accept, in the present moment the propositions contained in my instructions of the 8th of July, I therefore desire that you will not suspend the negociation, under an idea of my indifference to its successful conclusion in the actual exigency of the Peishwa's condition. His acceptance of my arbitration, and of a subsidiary British force would lead to the success of all the objects which I deem most important to the interests of the Company in the present conjuncture.

Notwithstanding that the Peishwa had offered to communicate to you his ideas of the nature of the demand to be made on Tippoo by the allies, I was much surprised to find that you had thought it expedient to urge him for his draft of a joint letter to Tippoo, or that you could expect any advantage from allowing the Peishwa to take the lead in framing the application to be made to that Prince. The aggression of Tippoo having been directed more particularly against the Company, it is properly their right in the first instance to suggest the nature of the satisfaction to be required.

The Company has indeed hitherto always taken the lead in every case which has called for the co-operation of the several branches of the triple alliance. Great embarrassment must result from permitting the Peishwa to anticipate my views on this most delicate and important part of our present situation. It is therefore my wish that instead of endeavouring to draw from the Peishwa an early declaration of his notions in that respect, you will as far as possible discourage any such communication.

I take this early opportunity of forwarding to you my sentiments on such points as appear to me to be of the most pressing importance in the present state of the negociation,

intending hereafter to review all the circumstances which have attended its progress at the Court of Poonah.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXII.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, September 11, 1798.

I embrace the opportunity which Colonel Kirkpatrick's return to Bengal presents to me of renewing my most sincere thanks to your Lordship, for the open and unreserved communication of your sentiments in your letter of the 29th July,* as well as for the assurance of friendly support in the conduct of my government, which you have had the goodness to give me. Upon my part your Lordship may rely with confidence upon my zealous endeavours to meet the views and cooperate in the measures of the Supreme Government, for the prosperity of the Company. It gives me concern to find your Lordship has had any reason to complain of anything like counteraction, or party spirit in this settlement. I can venture to affirm that any tendency of that kind is foreign to my disposition, and do assure you, that should it ever be my misfortune to differ in opinion with your Lordship, though it may become my duty to express my sentiments with freedom, I shall never lose sight of the relation in which this Government stands to the supreme Government, nor of the respect and obedience which is due to its directions. The point which has chiefly absorbed my attention since my arrival, and which indeed presses with the greatest urgency, is the prospect of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, when contrasted with the means this country possesses of meeting such an event. I cannot view this important object, nor the embarrassment in which the affairs of this country are involved, very far exceeding what there was reason to expect when I left England, without the most extreme solicitude.

The particulars of our situation are so well known to your Lordship, that I shall have occasion to bring them before

* See p. 223.

you in a general point of view, for the purpose of expressing my sentiments upon the subject, and not with the hope of being able to convey information upon what has been so much the object of your Lordship's attention. Our main army consisting of about 8,000 fighting men, being in cantonments in the vicinity of Walajabad, is deemed to be a force totally inadequate to offensive operations, and cannot be strengthened from this presidency without materially weakening the necessary garrisons, or drawing our troops from Ceylon; a sufficient reinforcement of native corps, to enable our army, in co-operation with that of Bombay, to undertake the siege of Seringapatam, can only be drawn from Bengal; and if reliance is to be put upon the judgment of the best informed persons here, such a reinforcement cannot be expected to arrive in the Carnatic before the end of February, or beginning of March, a period too late for the commencement of hostilities with a view to the taking Seringapatam in the course of next year; the time for besieging that place being, as I am also informed, limited nearly to the months February, March and April. It therefore seems to follow that our army cannot be put in condition to act offensively, and with a speedy prospect of accomplishing the main object of a war with Tippoo, the capture of Seringapatam, earlier than January twelvemonth. When to these considerations is added the discouraging state of our finances, that our debt amounts to 54 lacs of pagodas, that an investment is expected to be provided of 12 lacs, that our ordinary expences exceed our ordinary revenue by about 13 lacs, that the revenue of this year is expected to fall short of what it was estimated at by nearly six lacs, that our 12 per cent. bonds are at a discount of 5 or 6 per cent., that our treasury is empty, our credit nearly gone, that the Government, shortly before my arrival, had taken up a lac of pagodas by bills on Bengal at 410 A. Rs. the 100 pagodas, and that I have been under the necessity of resorting to the same expedient,—your Lordship will not be surprised at my viewing the situation of this country with extreme anxiety; nor at my expressing an earnest hope that the calamity of a war, for which we are so ill prepared, may be averted.

Having expressed what my feelings and my duty have urged me to state, I beg to assure your Lordship that in the event

of your being forced into a war with the Sultaun, or in that of your ultimately determining to attack him, of my most cordial cooperation to the extent of the means of this presidency, and of my most zealous and scrupulous attention to the directions of the Supreme Government. In the event of war it is to your Lordship and Bengal that we must look for resources, for I am concerned to say, that I see no prospect of our being able to raise any considerable sum in this settlement, but on the contrary considerable defalcations are to be apprehended from the predatory warfare, which the Sultaun may be expected to wage; little, I fear, is to be expected from his Highness the Nabob.

I have to thank your Lordship for the communication of the papers relating to the negociations of Poonah and Hyderabad. The restoration of the triple alliance to the situation in which it stood when Lord Cornwallis left India, is an object of the first importance, and the measures which your Lordship has pursued with so much energy for its attainment appear to me decisive and highly judicious: that you may succeed and reap the applause due to your exertions, must be the wish of whoever has British glory and British interests at heart. The reinforcement destined for Hyderabad, with the views of overthrowing the French party there, of securing the succession to Secunder Jah, and of establishing a permanent influence in the councils and conduct of the Nizam's Court, has been contemplated by me with peculiar satisfaction. Should this decisive measure be crowned with success, and be properly followed up, it will, without doubt, tend more than any other event to fix the British power in India.

I have the honor to be, with sincere esteem and respect,
My Lord, Your Lordship's most faithful Servant,
CLIVE.

No. LXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut. Col. John Collins, Resident with Dowlut Row Scindiah.

SIR,

Fort William, 15th Sept. 1798.

You will certainly have felt some degree of anxiety to receive the letters, which I had promised to despatch to you

by the earliest opportunity, and I should have forwarded them some time ago, if I had not waited in hourly expectation of being able to communicate to you the intelligence of Scindiah's departure from Poonah, and retreat towards his own dominions. But the actual state of affairs at Poonah, still leaves the motions of Scindiah, in the greatest degree of uncertainty; although the necessity of his return to Hindostan for the preservation of his own existence seems to encrease every day, and the means of effecting that retrograde movement without either disgrace or danger, are now placed within his reach by the liberation of Nana, by my offer of mediation between Scindiah, the Peishwa, and the Nizam, as well as by my proposal for the conclusion of a treaty of general defensive alliance against Zemaun Shah.

My conversation with you, at Barrackpore, apprized you of my ideas with regard to the objects of your mission.

The question which will demand your immediate attention will be, the best mode of securing the strongest barriers against Zemaun Shah, not only with a view to the present moment, but to all future contingencies.

No policy could be so weak, even if the Shah had not condescended to explain his intentions, as to suppose that he could enter Hindostan, without the design of plundering the most opulent part of it. His ultimate objects must be Lucknow and our provinces.

But he has spared me the pains of any argument on this subject, having plainly apprised the Nabob Vizier and me, that his object is to restore Shah Aulum, and to drive the Mahrattas out of India, and having called for our joint services in a tone of command for the prosecution of his project. He has added, that our answer will determine, whether he is to consider us to be his friends or his enemies. As it would be utterly inconsistent with every principle of policy and faith to assist the Shah in the prosecution of his declared purposes, it follows, that we must expect to be ranked in the number of his enemies, and our possessions will be treated accordingly. It is, therefore, necessary to provide every defence, which can obstruct the Shah's approach to our boundary.

The principal powers, whose resistance might offer a serious obstacle to the advance of the Shah's army, are the Seiks,

the Rajpoots, particularly the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Judpoor, and the Mahrattas inhabiting the dominions of Scindiah.

The return of Scindiah to that quarter, attended as such an event must be by the restoration of his power to a considerable degree of efficiency, appears to me to be the best possible means of checking the motions of the Shah; especially as it must ever be the interest of Scindiah (within his own dominions) to cultivate our friendship, and to cooperate with us in opposing any invader, and above all a Mahomedan plunderer. Scindiah, therefore, has been the object of my unremitting attention. If he should return to Hindostan, you will immediately apply yourself to the commencement of negociation with him, for the purpose of framing a defensive treaty against the Shah.

The precaution to be observed in framing such a treaty is principally to avoid any engagement, which might draw our army too far from the boundary of the Vizier's dominions.

On the other hand, it cannot be expected, that other powers will engage with us for the common defence, if we insist absolutely upon limiting the operations of our force, to the exclusive protection of the provinces of Oude, or of our own possessions.

The point therefore to be ascertained is this; the utmost limit to which our force can be advanced for the common purposes of a general defensive alliance without danger to Oude, or to our own provinces, or to the force so advanced. In proportion to the number of our allies, the difficulty of fixing this point in a manner satisfactory to them would necessarily be augmented; it will, however, be desirable to unite as large a body as can be brought to cooperate against the Shah; and with this view, I wish you to endeavour to conciliate the interests of such of the Seik Chiefs and Rajpoots, as may be disposed to resist the Shah, with those of Scindiah. I am aware of the obstacles which you will find to such an union in the impetuosity and violence of Scindiah's character, on the one hand, and in the recent memory of his oppression and injustice on the other. The Rajahs of Jyenagur and Judpoor will not easily forget the injuries which he has committed against them, and this bitter recollection,

may throw them into the scale of their natural enemy Zemaun Shah. It is, however, to be hoped, that the imminent danger which Scindiah has lately escaped, as well as that which still threatens his dominions, may bring his mind to a sober sense of his real interests, and may induce him to afford to the Rajahs, some such effectual protection against future oppression on his part, as shall unite them with him against the Shah. Hitherto I have supposed the case of Scindiah's return to Hindostan; if, however, that event should not take place, a very different scene will open.

The entire destruction of Scindiah's power (in Hindostan at least) must be the inevitable and speedy consequence of his continuance at Poonah.

Whether he will be able to establish any considerable power in the Deccan, on the ruins of the Peishwa's authority, may perhaps admit of some degree of question. The inclination of my opinion is, that his whole power will be dissolved irretrievably unless he shall return to his own dominions without delay. In the event of the dissolution of his power in Hindostan, your attention will be directed to the state of affairs which shall arise out of his destruction. My wish is to abstain from all such interference in any confusion which may follow the annihilation of Scindiah's power, as might involve us either now or hereafter in hostilities. Nor would I engage in any measures, which had a tendency either in the first instance to accelerate the ruin of Scindiah, or finally to exclude the revival of his authority. Consistently with these principles, my endeavours would be directed to frame out of the new order of things, a system of defensive alliance against the approach of the Shah, by entering into engagements, for that purpose, with whatever Chief should have succeeded to the largest portion of Scindiah's power. Ambajee seems to me to be the most likely to stand at the head of any new system in the event of Scindiah's fall.

Your particular attention will be given to the conduct of M. Perron, and of other Europeans now in the service of Scindiah, we must counteract any attempt from them to establish themselves in the form of a state in Hindostan; they would undoubtedly assist Zemaun Shah, and perhaps enter into his service in the event of Scindiah's fall.

I enclose a letter for Sir James Craig, whom I wish you to consult on the important military question, the decision of which must form the governing principle of any defensive treaty against the Shah. Sir James will transmit his sentiments to me, in order that I may consult further with the Commander-in-Chief, and endeavour to fix the limit of the operations of our army, whenever the Shah shall approach Hindostan.

You will be so good as to report to me without delay, any information which you may be able to collect, with relation to the European officers in the service of Scindiah, or of any native power on the North Western frontier of India. I am informed that Somroos Begum, has a considerable corps officered by Frenchmen in her service.

Our intelligence of the motions of Zemaun Shah is very defective. It is always vague as well as tardy. I desire that you will earnestly apply yourself to the speedy correction of this defect, it is of the utmost importance to us to obtain the earliest and most accurate information of the Shah's designs. On this point, you will find it useful to concert some regular and permanent system with the Resident at Lucknow.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Major General Sir James Henry Craig, K.B.

(Enclosed in the foregoing letter to Lieut.-Col. Collins.)

SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 16, 1798.

This letter will be delivered to you by Lieut.-Col. Collins, who having been appointed Resident at the Court of Scindiah, is proceeding to take charge of the interests of the British Government at that Court.

The continual reports of the approach of Zemaun Shah to Hindostan engaged my attention at the earliest period of my arrival in Bengal, and I have already taken every step (which appeared to me justifiable in the great uncertainty of the prevailing rumours) for checking the motions of the Shah, in the event of his advancing towards our frontier.

It could not be supposed that such an expedition, as that meditated by the Shah, would be planned without any view

to the plunder of the most opulent and flourishing parts of Hindostan; I have, therefore, always considered that he must intend to advance to Lucknow, and to our provinces, if circumstances should favour his progress. And with this opinion, I have thought that his march ought to be opposed at the earliest possible period, and his operations checked at the greatest possible distance from our frontier.

But if I had ever entertained any doubt of the tendency of the Shah's operations, it would have been removed by his own distinct declaration to the Vizier and to me. "That he should consider our not joining his royal standard, and our not assisting him in the restoration of Shah Allum, and in the total expulsion of the Mahrattas in the light of an act of disobedience and enmity." As it is utterly impossible for me to aid the Shah in such a project, or to submit the honour and faith of the British Government to such conditions, I must suppose that the Vizier and this Government, will be treated as enemies by him, whenever he shall have an opportunity of bringing his army to act on our frontier. The most useful barrier against this invasion, in the first instance, would be the resistance of the Seiks, of the Rajpoots, especially the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Judpoor, and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

My attention has been directed to a system of measures, the effect of which, (if successful) would have occasioned the immediate return of Scindiah to his dominions in Hindostan, and have given us the benefit of a defensive alliance with him against the Shah. I cannot yet ascertain, what the motions of Scindiah are likely to be, or what may be the ultimate turn of his fate. But at all events, it will be necessary to consider the terms of a defensive league to which, whether Scindiah shall be a party or not, the Rajpoots and Seiks must be invited.

The most difficult question in the formation of such a treaty, will be of a military nature. It may be thus stated. What is the extreme limit beyond the frontier of the Vizier, to which the operations of the British force could be advanced, without danger to that frontier, and to the force so advanced. On the one hand, it would certainly be desirable to restrain the operations of our army, as nearly as possible, to the exclusive protection of the Nabob's and Company's pos-

sessions. But on the other hand, it could not be expected, that any efficient or cordial assistance could be derived from any practicable system of defensive alliance, if our army was to be exclusively exempted from any share in the common defence of the dominions of the contracting powers.

I am aware of the difficulty under these circumstances of fixing such a point for the extreme advance of our army, as shall relieve us from both of the embarrassments which I have stated.

But as I am persuaded, that the question which I have proposed in this letter, must frequently have occurred to you in all its military bearings and consequences, I take the liberty of requesting, that you will have the goodness to favour me with your opinion upon it, in order that I may hereafter be enabled to enter upon the consideration of it more advantageously and accurately, whenever it shall become necessary to discuss it with the Commander-in-Chief.

I shall also esteem it as a favour, if you will state your ideas on this subject to Lieutenant Colonel Collins, who will be employed in the negociation of any defensive engagements which it may be deemed advisable to contract.

If any other suggestions, with regard to the defence of our North Western frontier, should appear to you important to the public service, I should be happy to receive them. One defect has necessarily attracted your notice; the useless, or rather the dangerous condition of the Vizier's own army. This subject is at present under my consideration; and I confess I see but one effectual mode of obtaining a serviceable army in the Vizier's pay. The substitution of regular regiments from the Company's service, in place of the Nabob's own troops; or in other words, such an increase of our force in Oude, as would warrant nearly a total reduction of the Nabob's present army. I believe that this measure might be accomplished not only with infinite advantage to the external defence, but also to the internal tranquillity of the Nabob's dominions, to the safety of his person, to the stability of his authority, and to the order of his finances.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. LXV.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Malcolm.

SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 20, 1798.

The office of Resident at Hyderabad having become vacant by the resignation of Colonel Kirkpatrick, I have this day appointed Captain Kirkpatrick to succeed him; and it afforded me great satisfaction at the same to have it in my power to nominate you Assistant at that Court, having learnt from my brother* that, in a letter to him, you had stated that such an appointment would be acceptable to you.

In conferring this appointment upon you, I have been governed by no other motive than my knowledge of the zeal, activity, and diligence with which you have pursued the study of the native languages, and of the political system of India; and I take this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction at your having made choice of a situation in which I am persuaded you will render essential service to the public, and satisfy your honourable desire of distinction.

I wish to see you previously to your proceeding to Hyderabad, and as soon as it may be convenient to you after you shall have received this letter. There are many circumstances relative to the political system of India, which it is proper you should learn from me as early as possible; it will also be advantageous to the public service that you should thoroughly understand my opinion, on various points, with a degree of accuracy which cannot be conveniently stated in writing. I therefore hope that you will contrive to visit Calcutta soon after the receipt of this letter.

I shall by this day's post apprise Lord Clive of your appointment, in order that the necessary steps may be taken for procuring you leave of absence from the establishment of Fort St. George.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON

* The Duke of Wellington, then Lieut.-Col. Wellesley.

No. LXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 20th Sept. 1798.

I have received your Lordship's obliging letter of the 11th of Sept.* this morning, for which I return you my sincere thanks. I shall reserve my answer on most of the important topics to which you have adverted until I have been enabled to give them a more deliberate consideration; but I am anxious to communicate to your Lordship, without delay, my sentiments with respect to the mission of M. Du Buc. Your Lordship is probably apprized that a very large portion of the national troops, which were expelled from the Isle of France a few months ago, was sent to Batavia, where it is said that they are become very sickly. It appears to me probable that Monsieur Du Buc's *dernier destination*, of which he speaks in his despatch to Tippoo of the 25th of August, may be to Batavia, for the purpose of inducing the French troops to take service in the Sultaun's army, and to obtain for him the cooperation of the French frigates also upon that station. Your Lordship appears to me to have taken every precaution for the arrest of Monsieur Du Buc's person, as well as for the interception of his correspondence: I think both of very great importance with a view to the discovery of Tippoo's immediate plans and means of carrying them into effect. I think it would be very advisable also, that the Admiral should station a force off Tranquebar at the period when M. Du Buc may be expected to embark for his ultimate destination; and your Lordship will have the goodness to communicate this suggestion to the Admiral, if you should concur in my opinion.

If M. Du Buc should proceed to levy a force for Tippoo at Tranquebar, with the connivance of the Danish Government; or still more, if that Government should actually assist him, by convoying supplies of money from Mysore (according to the plan stated in the postscript of M. Du Buc's letter of the 7th Sept.) your Lordship will meet with my warmest support, either in any representation which you may think fit

* See p. 246.

to make upon the subject, or in any more active measures for seizing the person and papers of M. Du Buc and his suite. The proclamation of Monsieur Malartic, under which M. Du Buc took service with Tippoo, would clearly justify such a representation. I am in possession of positive evidence upon oath, which proves that M. Du Buc avowed, in the Isle of France, that he had engaged with Tippoo's Ambassadors for the express purpose of immediate war against the Company. Indeed the terms of his despatches to Tippoo furnish sufficient evidence of the hostile tendency of his mission. Your Lordship will judge according to circumstances, whether M. De Buc's designs will be best frustrated by watching his motions, or by interrupting them.

I trust that you will shortly receive the supply of 20 lacs of rupees, in specie, from on board the *Virginia* and *Bombay*, which will prove a seasonable relief to your finances. The subsidy from the Nizam will also operate to alleviate your burthens for the present.

Believe me, with great esteem and respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. LXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, 21st Sept. 1798.

I have received your letter of the 27th August and 1st instant, and approve the measures which have been taken for the support of Nussun Ulla Khan's authority, and for obtaining possession of the family and treasure of Golaum Mahomed Khan. To the general assurance of indulgence and protection which you have given to his family, you may add an engagement that they shall not be delivered into Golam Mahomed Khan's hands, should he hereafter demand them.

With regard to your conduct towards Golam Ahmed Khan, said to be charged with an embassy from Zemaun Shah, if, upon his arrival at Lucknow, he shall appear to be properly accredited from the Shah to the Governor General, you will permit him to proceed to Calcutta, but otherwise you will take no notice of him.

The doubtful character of Golam Ahmed Khan will not justify any acknowledgment of his pretended commission; you will therefore take no notice of him, unless his conduct should appear to lead to a suspicion of his being employed as a spy, in which case he should be required to depart from the Vizier's dominions.

This direction will serve equally to guide the Vizier's conduct towards Golam Ahmed.

It is much to be lamented that the intelligence from Zemaun Shah's country should be of so vague and uncertain a nature, that no dependance can at any time be placed upon it; it appears to me an object of the first importance to establish some regular channel for the transmission of intelligence from that quarter. I request, therefore, that you will immediately turn your particular attention to this point, and omit no effort for obtaining more correct information of Zemaun Shah's motions than we have hitherto been in the habit of receiving.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXVIII.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington. [Extract.]

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 22d Sept. 1798. .

I cannot express to your Lordship the satisfaction I feel in the arrival of Colonel Wellesley. I find him so easy in his manners and friendly in his communications, that I cannot doubt but that the more I have the opportunity of cultivating his intimacy, the more I shall rejoice at the presence of a person so nearly connected with your Lordship, and so entirely possessed of your views and intentions. The information which Colonel Wellesley has communicated to me, of the very moderate terms of satisfaction which it is your Lordship's intention to demand of the Sultaun, has relieved my mind from much of the solicitude which the appearances of an immediate rupture had excited. We have intelligence from Major Doveton of the Sultaun having raised a forced loan, for the purpose of discharging the arrears due to his troops; and of an irruption of banditti into Dindigul, from Mr. Hurdis, which appears to be of a predatory nature. It however ex-

cites attention from the circumstance of all communication between Tippoo's ryots and those of the Company having been lately prohibited.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

CLIVE.

No. LXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 24th September, 1798.

My last advices from Hyderabad afford every reason to hope that the dismissal of the French party will be accomplished without difficulty or danger.

The accounts from Poonah are much more favourable than any I have received from thence. The Resident has corrected his error, and is now proceeding in a right course. It appears highly probable, that Nana will be restored to power under a reconciliation with Emrut Rao, negotiated through Colonel Palmer. The effect of this will be the success of my propositions to the Peishwa. Scindiah has received my letter with great good will, and now seriously turns his thoughts towards his own dominions, where his presence is required to compose the revolt of his tributary chiefs, as well as to prepare a defence against the eventual approach of Zemaun Shah. The rumours are still various with regard to the state of the Shah's kingdom; if his army should not be at Peshawur early in October, he cannot attempt his projected expedition this year. The return of Scindiah to Hindostan would be a very advantageous circumstance for us in the event of the Shah's approach.

I cannot express to your Lordship more warmly than I feel it, my earnest anxiety that the preparations for war should be carried on with unremitting alacrity and despatch. We have no other security against the designs of Tippoo; my object and my expectation is peace, and I think nothing can frustrate my hopes and wishes but the arrival of a French force in India, or the relaxation of our preparations for war.

I feel the greatest satisfaction in your cordial concurrence in the measures which I have pursued at Poonah and Hyderabad; and I accept with much gratitude your Lordship's

suggestion respecting the addition of a body of cavalry to the subsidiary force in the pay of the Nizam.* No measure could be more wise nor better calculated to give additional effect to the principles on which my whole system is founded. Such a body of British cavalry (I mean commanded by British officers) would for ever secure the facility of our convoys of provisions in the event of a rupture with Tippoo. I shall instruct the Resident at Hyderabad to avail himself of the first favourable moment for this improvement of our force at Hyderabad.

But your Lordship is aware that the proposition must be managed with caution, and, if possible, rather encouraged from the Nizam, than directly offered by us.

For it cannot be denied that what we have already gained in point of influence was rather to be desired than expected; and if the moment had not been peculiarly favourable, we could not safely have ventured even so far as the limits of my instructions of the 8th of July.

To propose any further augmentation of our force at this juncture might perhaps create alarm in the wavering and irresolute mind of Azim ul Omra, who even now is almost afraid of what he has done, and who still doubts whether he has enslaved himself or established his power on permanent foundations. But, although I feel the necessity of management, and perhaps of delay, in the introduction of any additional force at Hyderabad, I have little doubt that such a measure will ultimately succeed, and I trust that your Lordship and I shall witness its success long before we return to Europe.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXX.

Majoor General Sir J. H. Craig to the Governor General.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 26th September, 1798.

A good deal of leisure time, and a solicitude upon the subject, that will not appear unnatural, have given rise to some

* This was a suggestion of Lord Clive's, in a former letter, for the raising a regiment of cavalry, to be paid by the Nizam.

reflections upon the very probable event of the invasion of Hindostan by Zemaun Shah, which I have committed to paper, and I do myself the honour of transmitting them enclosed to your Lordship;* I have not a doubt that the subject has met with every attention that it requires, and that the necessary steps to be taken will have been determined by higher experience and better judgment than I can lay claim to. It is not, therefore, in any view of dictating,—when I am conscious that my part is to concur, to the best of my abilities, in executing, that I take the liberty of offering these observations. I request that they may be only considered as a private communication, of the value of which nobody can have a lesser idea; but from which, if one serviceable hint can be drawn, none will feel a higher gratification—than him who has the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble Servant,
J. H. CRAIG.

LXXI.

From the Nizam to the Earl of Mornington.

(Received 27th September, 1798.)

What your Lordship has written respecting the affair in agitation is from first to last strictly true. For it is a fact known to all the world, that since the conclusion of the peace, and the execution of the treaty between the allied powers and Tippoo, every possible degree of regard has been invariably shewn by the three States to the principles of good faith and the obligations of friendship, actuated by a purity of design and a wish to preserve the general tranquillity. The three States have constantly pursued the enlightened path of truth and sincerity, and strictly adhered to the laws of amity and concord. But as Tippoo has now at once thrown off the mask, and, according to the contents of the proclamation issued by the Governor of the Mauritius (of which a translation has, word for word, been submitted by Captain Kirkpatrick to me) has publicly deputed Embassadors to that island, solicited an offensive and defensive alli-

* See Memoir of Sir James Craig in the Appendix.

ance with the French against the English Company (which is, in fact, a declaration of enmity against the three States) received a body of French, furnished by his own desire and fixed the monthly pay of that force; each of these acts is specifically and individually a flagrant instance and an incontrovertible proof of his violation of treaty and of his hostile intentions, it therefore becomes absolutely necessary to take measures to meet the occasion, and oppose a barrier to the turbulence and restlessness of his disposition; and as it is possible that when called upon, he may have recourse to his usual subterfuge, disavowal, his voluntary consent to that which may afford ample security to the three States against his inimical designs for the future, cannot be expected. But as your Lordship, actuated by the best intentions, and by a solicitude to preserve the general tranquillity, has deemed it advisable in the first instance to call upon him for the above purpose merely that he may have an opportunity of restraining the violence of his designs before he involves himself in the calamities of war, there is no objection; and, accordingly, the draft of a demand to that effect has been delivered to Captain Kirkpatrick, by whom your Lordship will be informed of the contents should it be thought proper; a letter to Tippoo, conformable to the terms of the draft, may be prepared and delivered to Captain Kirkpatrick so as to accompany those from your Lordship and the Peishwa, and in the event of his failing to return a satisfactory answer, that is to say, should he refuse to concede that which may afford ample security to the three allied powers against his inimical designs for the future, what doubt is there but that my forces will be ready to cooperate agreeably to the stipulations of the existing treaty?

With respect to what your Lordship writes, that "whilst subjects of difference subsist between me and the Peishwa and Dowlat Row Scindiah, it will be altogether impossible to make the necessary exertions upon this occasion, and therefore Captain Kirkpatrick had your Lordship's instructions to communicate several propositions on this important subject." Captain Kirkpatrick, for the better consideration and comprehension of those important propositions, committed your Lordship's instructions, fully and particularly, to writing, and submitted them to me. By that writing your Lordship's

sentiments have been fully developed, while it evinced your Lordship's extreme interest in the welfare of my Government, as well as your anxious desire to establish the tranquillity of India on so firm a basis as to preclude the danger of its being disturbed by those who hope to establish their own power on the ruin of all the States of the Deccan and Hindostan. These sentiments I conceive to spring from the most honourable intentions, the deepest penetration, the soundest wisdom and understanding in your Lordship—in particular; to know that since your arrival in India, your Lordship has felt the deepest regret that, from various detrimental causes, such powerful States should, in a short space of time, have lost their former splendour and greatness, and have been brought to their present situation; but that it was some satisfaction to your Lordship to reflect that an important medium may now arise by which all these injuries may be repaired, in such a manner as to give increase to the weight and importance which those States formerly possessed—that in promoting the interest and welfare of such a powerful State, the world will have the most evident testimony of that love of justice, public faith, goodness of intention, and disinterestedness which are among the characteristics of the English, and which are equally enjoined by the orders of the Company and the principles of the British Government in Europe. These just sentiments (I say) shew your Lordship to be endowed with the truest sense of honour, and the highest degree of understanding and magnanimity. I entertain the fullest conviction that your Lordship has, in the highest degree at heart, the prosperity, splendour, and due arrangement of the affairs of my Government, and what your Lordship and I thus make the mutual object of our views, through the grace of Providence, will be satisfactorily and fully accomplished. Accordingly in the spirit of great foresight, a treaty, consisting of various articles, for the increase of the detachment, has been entered into and authenticated under my hand and seal and that of the Nabob Aristo Yah (Azim ul Omra) and delivered to Captain Kirkpatrick, and a counterpart under his hand and seal, as plenipotentiary on the part of your Lordship, has been delivered to me. It being my first wish and object to cement the bonds of union and attachment between my Government and that of the Company in the most public

manner, and to shew that no division of interest subsists between them; and it being likewise my full intent and resolution to avoid all aggression and encroachment upon those with whom I am connected by treaties and engagements, far from seeking to protract the execution of the treaty in question, I have deemed it most advisable to hasten its conclusion. I am confident that from the knowledge your Lordship will acquire of my sentiments so fully laid open by the report of Captain Kirkpatrick and the execution of the treaty, your mind will be completely satisfied that far from having any wish or design to aggress or trespass upon the engagements subsisting with any of my friends and allies, I have no other view than to adhere to the dictates of good faith and equity. In pursuance of these sentiments I have signified to Captain Kirkpatrick my desire for the immediate assemblage of the proposed detachment upon the frontier, the adjustment of many concerns depending upon its arrival at the Presence, and it will, no doubt, very shortly be collected there accordingly, and proceed without delay to the capital, so that the most effectual means may be at hand, both for cooperation in the possible event of a war, and for removing the impediments that may present themselves (to that cooperation). Particulars will be fully made known to your Lordship by Aristo Yah and Meer Allum, and Captain Kirkpatrick will also write to your Lordship very fully.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. LXXII.

From Tippoo Sultaun, dated 2d September, 1798.

[Received 28th September, 1798.]

I have had the pleasure to receive your Lordship's friendly letter,* purporting that you had received the final opinion of the Malabar Commissioners upon the subject of Wynaad; after a full examination of every circumstance that your Lordship was now convinced that Wynaad belongs to me—that therefore you had directed the Commissioners to make a formal acknowledgment of my claim to that Taalook; but that

* See p. 154.

some doubts yet remained with respect to the pass (*vide* letter written 7th August 1798), Tambercherry, which is below the Ghauts, by the Treaty of Peace came into the Company's possession; above the Ghauts is Wynaad, which consisted of a few habitations, and has for a long time been desolate. The Ghauts are situated between, and also belong to me; it (Wynaad) consists of nothing but forests and heaps of stones. Accordingly, long ago this fact came repeatedly under peculiar inspection, at the time when measures were taken for the settlement of the Malabar districts; and whatever doubts there may be upon this head, will be solved by a reference thereto. In like manner the right to the Taalooks of Ameera and Saulea, which appertain to Cauriaul (Mangalore) is proved by the records of a century, in which are inserted the names of the collectors and defrayers of the land tax; nay, a copy of the parts of those records shall be sent, when by referring thereto, the circumstances respecting Ameera and Saulea, Eeserawaraseenny, &c. will be ascertained and laid open. Mischief-makers, by starting empty disputes and altercations, hope to accomplish their own purposes, but by the favour of God, the fountains of union and harmony between the two states possess too much purity and clearness to be sullied by the devices of self-interest persons. Continue constantly to gratify me by letters denoting your Lordship's welfare.

P. S. Sewaraseemy* also belongs to me. The Taalooks which were ceded to the Company are particularly enumerated in the Treaty of Peace. I beg you will refer thereto for information.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. LXXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Chairman of the East India Company.

SIR,

Fort William, October, 1798.

You will perceive that I have been called upon very early to make a vigorous exertion; if I have failed to deserve your approbation, my failure cannot be imputed to negligence or to want of zeal in your service.

* This stands for Eeserawaraseenny.

Lord Clive's appointment will, I trust, prove advantageous to the public service. I have entered into the most unreserved private correspondence with him, and I have found him cordially disposed to cooperate with me. His letters are very creditable to his understanding and disposition: he will have great difficulties to encounter at Fort St. George, where much reform is required, and where the management of the Nabob and Rajah of Tanjore (even under the newly established Government), will demand a considerable degree of skill.

I trust that Tippoo will not venture to move without having obtained a more effectual succour from the French than they have yet afforded to him; and I am equally confident that the vigilance of our Government at home, and of our fleets, will oppose every possible obstacle to the approach of the French towards this quarter of the globe. But I still feel the necessity of active and early preparation for war, as being the only security against all contingencies. Such preparations must occasion expense: this is a severe disappointment to me, but my duty demands that I should encounter it with firmness. I trust that the Court of Directors will feel a correspondent disposition, and that they will be ready to sacrifice with cheerfulness something of present commercial profit to the Company for the preservation of the main sources of our wealth and strength.

I have the honor to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXIV.

The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee.

Fort William, 1st October, 1798.

In our letter of the 4th of July, despatched overland, we had the honour to inform you that the Right Hon. the Governor General had failed in his endeavours to induce his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic to accede to the modification of the treaty of 1792, formerly proposed to his Highness by Lord Hobart.

The Governor General was equally unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade his Highness to agree to any plan for the liquidation of his debt to the Company.

During his continuance at Madras, his Lordship employed,

for the accomplishment of both objects, every exertion compatible with the extent of the powers entrusted to him by the Honourable the Court of Directors, in their orders of the 18th October, 1797.

Both the spirit and letter of those orders required that his Lordship should manifest to the Nabob every possible mark of respect and kindness, and should endeavour to gain his Highness's confidence by every conciliatory measure.

The tenor of the accompanying papers will afford to your Honourable Committee the means of framing a judgment of the effect produced upon the Nabob's mind, by his intercourse with the Governor General.

From these papers it appears that, although the Nabob professed satisfaction in the manner in which the Governor General had executed the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, his Highness continued to oppose a determined resistance to the proposed modification of the treaty of 1792.

The Governor General is convinced that, in the actual state of the Nabob's temper, and of the influence of those who surround him, no hope can be entertained of persuading his Highness, in the present moment, to conclude any arrangement of the nature proposed to him by Lord Hobart.

His Lordship is further of opinion that, under all the circumstances of the Nabob's affairs, the most prudent course would be to suspend for the present all negotiation with his Highness for the cession of any part of his territory to the management of the Honourable Company's servants.

It is however to be hoped, that the discussions which have taken place between the Governor General and the Nabob may hereafter furnish the foundation of a more beneficial arrangement of the Honourable Company's interests in the Carnatic; and the attention of the Governor General will be constantly directed to that desirable object.

The Governor General thought it advisable to conduct the negociation principally by the means of personal intercourse, with a view of avoiding a controversial correspondence, which would have been managed on the part of the Nabob by the European adventurers who still find access to his Highness's durbar.

His Lordship therefore addressed no other proposition in

writing to the Nabob than the note of the 8th of May,* containing a summary statement of the propositions made to the Nabob, with relation to the modification of the treaty of 1792.

Your Honourable Committee will observe, that his Highness has distinctly acknowledged that he is in the practice of raising money annually, by assessments of the revenues of those districts, which form the security for the payment of the Honourable Company's subsidy.

This practice is unquestionably contrary to the letter and subversive of the spirit of the treaty of 1792; and it is for the serious consideration of the Honourable Court of Directors what operation this voluntary acknowledgment on the part of his Highness, shall be allowed to have in any future negotiation with him.

With respect to the liquidation of the sums due to the Company from the Nabob, his Highness appeared disposed to dispute every branch of the debt, excepting the new cavalry loan, for the liquidation of which he seemed to think he had already given sufficient security, by having charged it upon the funds now appropriated for the payment of the consolidated debt.

The Governor General has, however, endeavoured to persuade his Highness of the propriety of his advancing, at least a considerable portion of the new cavalry debt, for the aid of the public service, in the present exigency of the Honourable Company's affairs.

His Highness has not yet returned any answer to the letter addressed to him on this subject by his Lordship.

The Government of Fort St. George, under their instruction from us, will have informed your Honourable Committee of the deposition of Ameer Sing, and of the establishment of Serfojee upon the musnud of Tanjore.

We propose by the next despatch to submit to your consideration our sentiments at large with regard to the arrangements which appear to us most advisable for the final security of the interests of the Honourable Company in Tanjore.

We have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON and COUNCIL.

* See p. 39.

No. LXXV.

Major General Sir James H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 6th October, 1798.

I am sure your Lordship will believe that it is not without giving it every attention in my power, that I sit down to lay before your Lordship the various considerations which have presented themselves to my mind, on the subject of the question upon which your Lordship has honoured me with your commands that I should give you my opinion.

In the consequence which your Lordship is pleased to attach to any opinion of mine, your Lordship has certainly manifested that confidence in my judgment which I should have felt to have rested upon a better merited claim had it been applied solely to my ambition of being useful to the service of my country; but whatever may be the sense that I entertain of my capacity to do it fully, I feel at the same time the force of the demand on me which your Lordship has established, that I should make the best return that is in my power to the confidence that your Lordship places in me; and it appears to me that I should ill discharge that obligation were I to confine myself to the considering the question as a mere abstract proposition, and did not enter into it more fully as connected with the probable circumstances of our situation, in the event from whence alone can arise the necessity of your Lordship's decision upon it.

I have already had the honour, on another occasion, to explain to your Lordship my idea upon the nature of our frontier, which I shall request that your Lordship will have the goodness to carry in your mind in what I may now have occasion to offer to your Lordship. It is singularly unfortunate, and surely much to be regretted, that in the thirty odd years that we may be said to have been in possession of this country, it has, I should suppose, never been considered in a military point of view as being within the possibility of attack; hence it arises, that except Allahabad, which hardly yet deserves the name, there is not a single fortress or place of strength in the whole country. It is not necessary to enter into the various inconveniences, and indeed essential circumstances of danger, which may arise from this deficiency. It is here alluded to principally as connected with and certainly very materially affecting the object in question.

However such as is the natural barrier which limits our frontier, and with every inconvenience which we might experience from the deficiency to which I have adverted, I have not a doubt but that if the army in the field is carried to 20,000 men, the position that I have pointed out in the memoir which is already in your Lordship's hands, and the other measures of precaution that are there recommended to be adopted, would be equal to our security, although I have laid it down as an axiom, that it can be endangered only under circumstances of previous advantage to the enemy, by which his numbers will be increased to almost any extent to which he may wish to carry them; but were we to confine ourselves thus solely to our own defence, however successful we might at present be in that object, I for my own part have scarcely a doubt, that a new and formidable power would establish itself in our nearest neighbourhood, a power which would upset the whole political state of Hindostan, would require an unremitting vigilance and constant state of preparation on our part, attended with an enormous expense, and that at last we should have to contend for our existence, under circumstances of infinitely greater difficulty and embarrassment than those which will now attend our opposition to its first establishment. I ought to apologize to your Lordship for thus obtruding an opinion which has not been called for, but I have been led to it by the view of acceding, most fully, to the wisdom of the measure of a junction with the Mahrattas, and as pointing out the grounds on which I may allude to the expediency of doing it with cordiality and effect.

It appears to me to be impossible to point out any precise bounds at which danger commences to the army that quits a frontier, and to the frontier which is left by it. Its communication, indeed, becomes more and more precarious in proportion as it abandons the country with which it is to be preserved, but in all situation, with respect to action, it is equally liable to the fate of war; and with respect to the frontier, it is impossible, except under local circumstances of peculiar advantage, very rarely to be met with, that it can be covered by any army that is advanced before it. The true question, however, that I think arises is, how far the object in view will justify the possible danger that may attend the movement, and the principal circumstance of consideration

should be, to adopt the best measures that human wisdom can devise, to lessen or to meet the danger, with the best means within our command.

The expediency of a defensive alliance with the Mahrattas being admitted, it follows of course that as the object must be their defence as well as ours, the operations of the armies employed must be directed by what appears to be the best means of accomplishing that end. It is not to be supposed that the Mahrattas would sacrifice a part of their country in order to contract the line of defence to what may lessen the danger to ours. Their object will be to meet the enemy on their frontier; and it will scarcely be practicable to make them comprehend that they can receive any advantage from an alliance with us, unless we join them there. Fortunately every step we take to defend their dominions is equally applied to the protection of our own; their frontier becomes, in fact, ours, which is truly and effectually covered by it; and having once quitted the precise line which would be obviously marked out by our confining ourselves solely to our own defence, it matters, I think, very little whether we are 50 miles farther from or nearer to that line.

At the same time that I hazard this idea, for it will, I am persuaded, meet many opponents, I beg your Lordship to be assured that I by no means overlook the consequences that may attend its being adopted in its fullest extent. I am well aware of the difficulty of communication, I am fully sensible of those that may be experienced with respect to subsistence, and I feel all the dangers and hazards that would attend us in the unfortunate event of a defeat, when, unquestionably, every mile we should have advanced would increase the peril of retreat. I am even inclined to give additional weight to these circumstances, because it is my decided and fixed opinion, that our enemies are as numerous as the inhabitants of the country; and I have not a doubt but that a reverse of fortune would exhibit them starting from every tope and from behind every bank. But all these inconveniences and dangers commence, to a certain degree, the moment our army quits the banks of the Ganges. It is to the greater or less extent to which they may be carried that my reasoning applies; and it is under the conviction, that the benefits to be derived from a junction with the Mahrattas will be found to justify and to

overbalance them all, that I observe that their being more or less increased by a greater or less distance from our frontier is of no weight when put in competition with the expediency of acting with the strictest cordiality, and in the closest union with those people. It is not to be imagined that they will give up Delhi without a contest: their first position will certainly be beyond it. Their frontier extends to Carnaul, which is 60 coss, perhaps something better than 100 miles from Delhi. I should have no hesitation to recommend that there should be no restriction to our advancing so far in co-operation with them. The only condition that I would annex to the permission would be, that they should put into our hands some place of strength between Anopsheer and the army, to serve as a depôt and magazine. The question, in short, appears to me to be reducible to this: Whether we shall meet the enemy and oppose him, though at a distance, under every advantage of the assistance to be derived from a numerous and powerful body of friends, equally interested in the cause with ourselves, and masters of the intermediate country between our own frontier and the scene of our operations, by which the danger, which might otherwise arise from that distance, will be very considerably lessened; or whether we shall wait to be attacked at home, when we shall be deprived of that assistance, and when our enemy will himself have acquired all the advantage to be derived from increased resources, augmented numbers, and established authority, exerted with the ardour and enthusiasm usual in a career of victory and conquest, and with our own native troops, perhaps, labouring under all the effects of a contrary impression?

But in viewing the subject of the danger attending our advancing, it is necessary that we should advert to the numbers of which the army will consist that may be applied to the defence of our north-western frontier. I have ventured to suppose that that number may be carried to 20,000 men, but as I am entirely ignorant of the services for which, independent of the internal security of our provinces and the necessary attention to Fort William, the remainder of our army may be required, I may err very considerably in my calculation on this subject. One circumstance is, however, clear to me, and that is, that if we cannot command

that number at least, independent of the garrison of Allahabad, our means of defence will be scarcely proportionate to the magnitude of the danger with which we are threatened.

After determining the actual strength of the army that can be collected for the whole of the service required, it will then remain to proportion its several parts into the different branches into which that service will divide itself. For if it is judged expedient that the principal corps should be carried beyond the frontier to any distance, that a cordial cooperation with our allies may require, I believe there is no one will doubt the necessity of leaving no very inconsiderable force in these provinces, as well to assist in guarding the passes on the river as to insure to us that command and influence, and those services, that may be indispensable to our safety. Your Lordship judges most rightly that, in its present shape, no sort of service can be expected from the Nabob's army, and I am confident that without a total change in the policy of the Court and the manners of the people, there exists no possible means by which it can ever be rendered such as can merit that the smallest degree of confidence should be placed in it. The money now expended on them is thrown away, and can only be rendered subservient to the object of general defence, by being appropriated to the increase of the Company's army. But I much fear that it is too late to adopt such a measure, with the hope that any troops that would be raised with this view can be of service if the Shah's invasion take place this season. This consideration should, however, only act as a spur to us to begin the attempt as early as possible; and it may perhaps be much facilitated by the possibility of taking into our service some of his battalions entire. They are all, to a certain degree, disciplined, and under the charge of a proper selection of officers, might soon become serviceable. There seems to be little doubt of their willingness to engage.

With respect to the number of which the corps that is to act with our allies should consist, there appears to me to be no medium. It should either be a simple detachment of two or three battalions, such as was that which, under Captain Little from Bombay, accompanied a body of the same people during the Mysore war, and that which was on the same

occasion attached to the Nizam's army, or it should consist of the utmost strength that can be collected, with a due regard to other services. I hold it for certain that in all situations in which we are to act with any of the country powers, the whole brunt of the operations will rest with us; nor will our particular safety ever be considered by them as an object that can be put in competition with any danger that a regard to it might entail upon themselves. Our force should, therefore, be such that any misfortune that might befall it could have no sensible influence upon the general state of our affairs; or it should be such as is sufficient for its own defence,—as can, if necessary, act upon the means which it possesses within itself, and as can give us that influence, and entitle us to that pre-eminence, which it is so essential for us on all occasions to preserve. A medium force would only expose us to insult from our arrogant and selfish friends, and to defeat and ruin from our more open enemies, whilst the deficiency which might be occasioned in our general means of defence, by a loss which as such would be considerable, might very materially cripple, perhaps render vain, our further efforts. Could, by any means whatever, the acting army be carried to any thing near the strength I have proposed, and could a corps of five or six thousand men be formed at the same time in these provinces, and provided decisive measures for the tranquillity of Rohilcund be adopted, I should certainly imagine that we might hope to give the Shah such cause to repent his incursion as would secure the future tranquillity of Hindostan, at least from foreign invasion, for some time.

I feel, my Lord, that in what I have hitherto had the honour of offering to your Lordship, I have in some shape departed from the datum upon which your Lordship's questions seems in some degree to be founded. Your Lordship observes, that it will be necessary to consider the terms of a defensive league, to which, whether Scindiah shall be a party or not, the Rajpoots and Seiks must be invited, whereas I have confined myself entirely to the supposition of an alliance and hearty cooperation with the Mahrattas; that is, I presume, with Scindiah, without once adverting to either the Rajpoots or the Seiks.

The truth is, my Lord, that, with all deference to better

information, and still greater to better judgment, it does not appear to me that it can be practicable for us to enter into any alliance with either of the Powers mentioned, but through the Mahrattas, if I may use the expression. I mean by it that it is utterly impossible that we can join or cooperate with the former but by the concurrence and in concert with the latter, for we cannot even communicate but through the dominions of Scindiah. Exclusive of the geographical difficulty, there would, I apprehend, be found a much greater in the inveterate hatred that exists between the two people. Any communication between us and the Seiks, without the participation of Scindiah, would excite a jealousy that would, I fear, be fatal to our friendship with the latter. The same circumstances exist with respect to the most powerful of the Rajpoots, the Rajahs on the western frontier of Scindiah's territory. It appears, therefore, to me, that if we cannot form an alliance with Scindiah, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to form any other. If, indeed, we can convince him of his true interests, I believe it will be an easy matter to engage the Rajah of Jynajur, and others whose territories are adjacent to his, for it is impossible that they can be desirous that the Shah should establish himself in these parts. With respect to the Seiks, the task may be more difficult. What advantages can we hold out to induce them to act in co-operation with us? They will naturally ask if we expect that they should abandon their country and possessions to join us, and of what use we can be to them while posted on the frontiers of the Mahratta dominions? The answers to these questions seem difficult.

Another consideration arises, however, upon this subject. Suppose the Seiks were found to be cordially disposed to join in the league, and should the Mahrattas on their part be equally willing, would it be expedient that we should carry our operations to the length of advancing into the country of the former, upon which terms alone it would be possible to bring into action the united forces of the three Powers? I do not, indeed, think the case is likely to occur, in which a decision may be necessary on this question, at least beyond a certain degree. If the Shah carries his intentions into effect, he is probably at this moment on his march, and the fate of the Seik frontier, most likely of Lahore itself, will be decided

long before we can possibly be at hand to take a part in the contest. Our movement, therefore, to that extent, cannot in any case be necessary; but the Rajah of Patiala is represented to be a powerful prince, commanding at all times a force of 10,000 horse, and as many footmen, and capable of raising many more in case of necessity. His territories border on those of the Mahrattas: and should the Seiks have remained disunited and separate, or should he by any means have escaped the effects of any defeat which his countrymen may have suffered on the frontier, so that his force may remain entire, and probably increased by the junction of such as may have escaped the Shah's army;—I think such an addition of strength would be an object, and would justify a further advance; but certainly not unless our force were such as would command the respect of both parties, and place us in the light of umpires, capable of enforcing our wishes on either.

I have no doubt of the Mahrattas readily acceding to any alliance your Lordship may propose; and Scindiah's return seems more probable now than it did when your Lordship's letter was written, but even should that event not take place, though it will be a circumstance much to be regretted, as crippling the energy with which his strength might be exerted under his own direction, yet it would appear that the approach of so manifest a danger must unite all parties to avert it, which they would be perhaps more inclined to do under our controlling influence than if they were left to themselves.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and

Most humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. LXXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan

SIR,

Fort William, 8th October, 1798.

I concur with you in thinking that the services of the native agent whom you have appointed to reside at Bushire may be usefully employed for the purpose mentioned in that letter; and as the probability of the invasion of Hindostan by Zemaun Shah seems to increase,* I am of opinion that Mehdy Ali Khan cannot too soon commence his operations at the Court of Baba Khan, or of whatever person may be in the exercise of the sovereignty of Persia. It would certainly be a very desirable object to excite such an alarm in that quarter as may either induce the Shah to relinquish his projected expedition, or may recal him should he have actually embarked in it.

I am not possessed of sufficient information respecting the state of Persia, or the views of the ruling power in that country, to enable me at present to furnish Mehdy Ali Khan with any specific instructions or powers for the attainment of the object in contemplation. Until, therefore, his future communications shall have opened a more distinct view of the subject, we can only be authorized to offer to the Persian Government, in return for any efficient measure which it shall take for the purpose of diverting Zemaun Shah from his designs against Hindostan, such supplies of arms and military stores as may be required, and as you may be able to furnish.

If the credentials already provided for Mehdy Ali Khan by your Government should appear insufficient to procure him due attention from the ruling power in Persia, on the more important points now proposed to be committed to his management, it will be proper to furnish him with such additional letters and powers as may be suitable to this object. These instruments may at present proceed from your Government; hereafter it may be necessary that they should issue from myself.

It has been suggested to me, and I understand it was the opinion of Sir Charles Malet, that a further diversion of the Shah's force might be created by our affording certain encouragement to the nations occupying the Delta and lower

* See letters of Zemaun Shah in the Appendix.

parts of the Indus, who have been stated to be much disaffected to the Government of the Shah ; I wish you to give this point the fullest and most serious consideration ; to state to me your ideas upon it ; and in the mean while to take any immediate steps which shall appear proper and practicable to you.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Admiral Rainier has, at my recommendation, resolved to proceed with the principal part of his squadron to the Malabar coast, as soon as possible after the change of the monsoon. This arrangement will, I trust, relieve you from the apprehension of any material inconvenience under the unavoidable detention of the *Bombay* frigate in this quarter.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, October 10, 1798.

I shall be glad to receive your promised suggestions respecting the means of obtaining early and correct intelligence from Zemaun Shah's country, but I desire you will not delay the execution of any practicable plan for this purpose, to so late a period, as the time when you could receive my approbation of your ideas. Some time since I instructed the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to take an early opportunity of concerting measures with you and Sir James Craig, with a view to the attainment of this desirable object.

It has occurred to me that it may be possible for an agent established at Cabul to open with Surat and Bombay, by the route of Bikher and the Indus, a communication which would be more secure, and, perhaps, more expeditious, than any at present in use. A trial of this route might at least be made, by transmitting through it duplicate despatches only in the first instance. I shall request Mr. Duncan to consider this suggestion, and I desire you will also examine how far it may be likely to lead to a practicable and beneficial plan.

I approve of the measures which have been adopted for the purpose of reinforcing the troops in Rohilcund, and when the whole shall have been assembled under Major General Stuart,

I direct that every proper and necessary step to be taken in order effectually and speedily to crush every remaining seed of commotion in that country.

To this end it is, no doubt, a measure of primary necessity that all the sons of Fyzoolah Khan, now at Rampoor, should be removed without delay to Lucknow. I shall be glad to learn that they have acquiesced without difficulty in the Vizier's requisition to this effect. But if they should manifest a disposition to resist his authority, they must be compelled to yield to it.

It is, for the same reason, highly expedient that the Rissalhdars Omar Khan, Ghulam Hussain Khan, Sunnoo Khan, and Mahommed Syde Khan, should not only be divested of their commands, but removed out of the country: and I accordingly desire you will take the necessary measures for securing as soon as possible the persons of these officers, who must in the first instance be sent to Benares, whence they may afterwards, if requisite, be ordered to Calcutta. I have given this direction under the supposition that you are possessed of sufficient proofs to warrant a belief that the Rissalhdars have entered into engagements inconsistent with their duty towards the Vizier and the Company; under this supposition the Rissalhdars are not entitled to the benefit of the obligation signed by Sir Robert Abercromby and Mr. Cherry.

If the course of affairs should again bring the person of Golaum Mahomed Khan into our hands (an event which I anxiously desire) he will have no claim to any future indulgence from this Government, and he must, without any stipulations in his favor, be despatched without delay to Calcutta.

I am, Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, October 11, 1798.

I proceed to submit to you the progress which I have been able to make in my proposed measures for frustrating the designs of Tippoo and of France. My objects, as already described to you,* have been to assemble the army on the

* See p. 80.

coasts of Coromandel and Malabar; to revive our defensive alliances against Tippoo, and to check the growth of the French influence in the Deccan; to secure the presence of the fleet on the coast of Malabar at the earliest possible period; and to lay the foundations of a permanent improvement of the military establishments of Fort St. George, and of the defences of the Carnatic.

From my private correspondence with General Harris, and from the letter of the Government of Fort St. George addressed to me in Council, under the date of the 10th of July, you will learn the counteraction which I have met in my endeavours to place our possessions upon the coast of Coromandel in a respectable posture of defence.

From the whole tenor of my correspondence, public and private, as well as from every document contained in my despatches since my arrival in Bengal, you will perceive that so far from imagining that I can ever be called upon to justify my orders for assembling our armies in the Peninsula of India, my only doubt has been, whether I ought not to have attempted a bolder effort, with a view of anticipating the meditated attack of Tippoo, and of his French allies. The measures of preparation and defence which I have ordered, are so evidently essential to the preservation of the British Empire in India, that I should have deemed myself absolutely unpardonable if I had either neglected to order them, or had been deterred from carrying them into effect by such arguments as those which you will find in the letter of the 10th July, from the Government of Fort St. George.

The army, however, is assembled on the coast of Coromandel, and although wholly inadequate at present to purposes of offence, it at least affords a better protection to the Carnatic than when dispersed, and when utterly unable to offer any sort of resistance on any part of our frontier.

I shall be able to reinforce the army in the Carnatic by an addition of about 3,000 volunteers from the native regiments on this establishment, as soon as the state of the season will admit of landing them at Madras. The volunteers have offered themselves for embarkation under the proposed bounty with very great alacrity, and I am persuaded, if the number had not been limited by my orders, it would have been much more considerable. The men who have turned

out for service are chiefly those who have already been on the coast and have obtained medals for their services, they are in fact the flower of the army.

At Bombay I have found no obstacles whatever in carrying into effect the assembling of the army, and I have every reason to be satisfied with the zeal and vigilance of Mr. Duncan and General Stuart, and with the excellent abilities of the latter, I trust that the army at Bombay and in Malabar, is now in a forward state of preparation.

The Government of Fort St. George previously to the arrival of Lord Clive (having in their letter of the 10th July* deprecated every measure of precaution for the protection of the Carnatic against the threatened invasion of Tippoo) expressed in their letter of the 3d of August† an equal disinclination to the orders which I had given for assembling a detachment in the Guntoor Circar with a view to the revival of our defensive alliance with the Nizam, and to the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad. The opposition proceeded in both instances from the same quarter, and was met by me with the same determination to pursue the line of my duty to the best of my judgment, to enforce the execution of my orders, and to reprove the factious spirit which had attempted to obstruct them.

In pursuing this course, I have concluded a subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, on the principles stated to you in my private letter, No. 6,‡ in my instructions of the 8th July,§ to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, and in my minute of the 12th August.|| A copy of that minute, and a translation of the treaty for your private use, accompany this letter; you will find some parts of the translation rather awkwardly expressed, but as the substance of the stipulations appeared to me highly favourable to our interests, and as any delay might have hazarded the success of the whole plan, I ratified the treaty without alteration. Being satisfied with the manner in which Captain Kirkpatrick, the Acting Resident at Hyderabad, had executed my instructions, I have appointed him Resident at that Court in the room of his brother Colonel Kirkpatrick who has resigned.

I am indebted to the firmness and spirit of General Harris for having assembled the Guntoor detachment with every

* See p. 214. † See p. 236. ‡ See p. 80. § See p. 113. || See p. 159.

possible degree of expedition. But you will observe by the letters from the Resident at Hyderabad, that whether from neglect or wilful omission in some of the subordinate departments of office at Fort St. George, the troops had not been furnished with money sufficient to enable them to quit the Company's territories. This circumstance must retard their advance to Hyderabad. I still, however, entertain little doubt that I shall soon be enabled to forward to you the intelligence of the complete dismissal of the French party. I look upon that event to be not only highly desirable on general grounds but indispensable to the possibility of maintaining a contest with Tippoo if he should think fit to attack us, especially if he should receive any succour from France. I refer you on this point to my minute of the 12th of August. The transactions at Poonah will show how active Tippoo has been at that Court, and how dangerous an influence he maintains there through the intrigues of Govind Kishen. Although it is difficult yet to form any certain judgment of the issue of the negociation at Poonah, I am disposed to believe that the conclusion of the treaty of Hyderabad, under the circumstances of an opening being left for the accession of the Peishwa, will induce him to enter speedily into our views. He stated no objection when Colonel Palmer first apprised him of our intended arrangements in favour of the Nizam; and he has hitherto declared his intention to fulfil his defensive engagements with us, in the event of hostilities with Mysore. If, however, he should prove unfaithful, the affairs of the Mahratta empire are still so disordered, that the utmost we can now apprehend is the neutrality of the Court of Poonah. Under such circumstances it will certainly be a most important advantage to have secured the cordial cooperation of the Nizam, and to have removed all French influence in the Deccan.

Since I have begun this letter, I have received a despatch from Colonel Palmer, giving an account of his having announced to the Peishwa the conclusion of the treaty of Hyderabad. The Peishwa received the communication without the least symptom of jealousy or alarm, expressed his own wish to enter into similar engagements with the Company, and signified his intention of opening an immediate negotiation with Colonel Palmer for that purpose. Colonel Palmer, however, does not believe that the Peishwa will enter

cordially into our views, unless Nana shall be restored to the administration, an event which is expected to happen within a short period of time.

If the Peishwa shall ultimately accept my propositions, it is my intention to cement the whole of my plan by a new treaty of defensive alliance between the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa; the stipulations of which shall remedy every defect in the subsisting treaties, by defining whatever is vague, and by explaining whatever is obscure, in our present reciprocal engagements. This was an object which Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to accomplish during the last months of his continuance in India. It is unquestionably not only a desirable, but a necessary improvement of our security in the present crisis, the subsisting defensive treaties with the Nizam and the Peishwa being very ambiguous and loose, as well as defective in many essential articles.

The circumstances of the moment will probably enable me to extend our system of defensive alliance to the case of a French invasion in India, whether connected or not with the cause of Tippoo. As our treaties now stand, if a French army were to land in any part of our territory, we could not claim assistance either from the Nizam or from the Peishwa, unless Tippoo had previously avowed a connection with the French, or had manifested the existence of it by some overt act.

Scindiah has received my propositions very favourably, and I have every reason to believe that he will endeavour to return to Hindostan, where the internal commotions in his dominions, and the increasing rumours of the approach of Zemaun Shah, render his presence absolutely necessary to his own preservation. The situation of Scindiah is at present such that we have a good deal to hope and nothing to fear from him. He will be useful to us if he should return to his own dominions, and if he should not, his power must fall to ruin.

In my letter, No. 6,* I informed you that I had actually forwarded a representation to Tippoo, and had called on the allies to concur in it, the fact was that I had drawn a paper for that purpose, and had prepared it for despatch to both the allied Courts; but a more full consideration of the whole political state of India induced me to think that it would be advisable to postpone any remonstrance to Tippoo until our

* See page, 80.

preparations should be further advanced, and until I had been able to ascertain the disposition of our allies, as well as their means of assisting us in the event of a contest with Mysore. It appeared also to me that the presence of a British fleet upon the coast of Malabar might incline the Sul-taun to give a more serious consideration to our representations. A further advantage which recommended this delay was, that it would afford me the opportunity of accommodating the nature and extent of my propositions to my means of enforcing them. My minute of the 12th of August, will furnish you with the outline of the remonstrance which I should hope we may be enabled to make to Tippoo without the hazard of an immediate war, and with the prospect of obtaining from him some degree of security against his future machinations.

The draft of a letter to Tippoo which I have received from the Nizam and the Peishwa, (and which forms a number in the packet of the 3rd October, addressed to the Secret Committee) will serve to prove the sense which our allies entertain of Tippoo's aggression, as well as their concurrence in my principles with regard to the general nature of the satisfaction to be required from him. You will observe, however, that I have still reserved to myself the power of framing the remonstrance to Tippoo according to the circumstances of the conjuncture in which it may be expedient to apply to him. The moment I trust is not far distant when the French party shall have been expelled from the Deccan, when the fleet shall be on the coast of Malabar, and when our military preparations shall be sufficiently advanced to enable me to bring every point of difference with Tippoo to a distinct issue.

By my correspondence with Admiral Rainier, you will perceive that I have induced him to proceed immediately to the coast of Malabar, I trust this disposition of the fleet will prove an efficient check upon Tippoo's intercourse with the French.

My instructions to the Government of Fort St. George on the subject of the defects in their military establishments were despatched on the 20th July.* I have not yet received the report which I desired; and I have reason to apprehend that the necessary preparations for the defence of the Carnatic, are carried on with less zeal and energy than the occasion

* See page, 244.

requires. Even now that Government appears unwilling to push our preparations with the requisite alacrity, lest the forwardness of our defence should invite an attack from Tippoo at an earlier period than he would otherwise be disposed to move. I know that Tippoo will attack us, whenever he shall imagine that he can do so with advantage, but I never can believe that his inclination to make the attack will increase in proportion to the augmentation of our means of repelling it. In the defenceless state in which I found our possessions on the coast of Coromandel, at a time when a large proportion of Tippoo's army was actually in the field, the Carnatic lay completely at his mercy: It was, however, probable at that time, as it is now, that Tippoo would not be disposed to move previously to the arrival of an additional force from France; an event which was not to be expected until after the close of the monsoon on the coast of Malabar. Under these circumstance it was apprehended by the Government of Fort St. George, that any attempt to collect our forces might induce Tippoo to make an immediate attack upon the Carnatic.

I felt at that early period that a moment of hazard must be passed during the necessary interval between the commencement of our preparations, and the time when they would be so far advanced as to secure us against the effects of a sudden blow. The degree of this hazard appeared to me to be inconsiderable, but if it had been greater, I should have incurred it rather than have relied on the other alternative of remaining in a defenceless state, and trusting to the forbearance of Tippoo.

General Harris's private letters will shew the duration of the period of danger according to his opinion.

It will not escape your observation, that the argument of the Government of Fort St. George against the prudence of arming would have been stronger every day in exact proportion to the progress of Tippoo's preparations. The danger, therefore, of taking any steps for our defence would have increased with the probability of the attack; and the moment must ultimately have arrived in which we should have been compelled either to assemble our army under circumstances of augmented danger, or to abandon all hopes of resistance.

My judgment clearly was, and is, that the earliest possible effort to recover our means of repelling the enemy must be at all times the safest step which could be taken. Having

held this opinion even before the commencement of our preparations, I now feel still more strongly the absolute necessity of urging them with every practicable degree of despatch, until we shall be in a state to meet Tippoo in the field either for purposes of offence or of defence.

The engagements which Tippoo has contracted with the French, and the public proofs which he has given of his readiness to receive in Mysore as large a force as they can furnish, are circumstances which form a new feature in our political situation in India. The intercepted correspondence between M. Dubuc and Tippoo contains an additional proof of the nature of Tippoo's connection with the French, as well as of his present views. On their part the French have not only manifested every intention to cooperate with Tippoo, but I am bound to conclude, from all the intelligence which I have been enabled to obtain, that they have actually fitted out considerable armaments with a view of reaching India, either by the Cape of Good Hope, or through the Red Sea, or by a combined attempt through both passages. If they should attempt the passage by the Cape, and should succeed in eluding the vigilance of our fleets (an event at least possible) they might land upon the coast of Malabar a force which would become formidable to us in an unprepared condition. On the other hand, it is hardly to be supposed that with our army in the field, on the coast of Malabar, it would be practicable for the French to convey, by the Cape of Good Hope, without interruption from our fleets, any force so considerable as to be a subject of alarm to us.

I have just now learnt, though from doubtful authority, that the French obtained possession of Alexandria in the month of June, combining this report with the news received from Europe of the sailing of the fleet from Toulon towards the middle of May, the event, however extraordinary, is not improbable. If the French really have taken Alexandria, difficult as the attempt may be, I conclude that they will omit no exertion to assist Tippoo,* and, at least, will use every means to instigate him to war. The terror of their victory in Egypt (where I hear they have made an immense slaugh-

* See Napoleon Buonaparte's letter to Tippoo from Egypt in the Appendix.

ter) will greatly serve their cause in India, and perhaps elate Tippoo so highly as to induce him to commence hostilities.

My information, however, leads me to believe that even without meeting any opposition in Egypt, the French could not reach India from thence in any numbers for a considerable time, and that if a vigilant cruize of three or four ships could be established off the Straits of Babelmandel, it would be nearly impracticable for any vessels which the French could collect in the Red Sea to force a passage through the Straits. But I am not yet apprized whether the Admiral will be able to provide for this object without abandoning the protection of the trade of Bombay and of the coast of Malabar. It appears possible that a part of the armament from Toulon may be destined for India direct, while the remainder shall operate in Egypt; a squadron leaving the Mediterranean with this view before the end of May might have entered the Red Sea before the Admiral can have occupied the Straits of Babelmandel. This is not, I trust, a probable, but it is far from an impossible event, and its consequences would be to remove a main obstacle to the operations of the French against India from Egypt. Whether, therefore, the operations of the French against India be directed through the ordinary passage by the Cape of Good Hope, or through the Red Sea, or through both, it is equally incumbent on us to maintain Bombay and Malabar in a respectable posture of defence. I have already suggested the possibility of Tippoo's mind being so elevated by the first account of the French successes in Egypt as to break out into immediate hostilities. These considerations apply not only to the necessity of keeping the field in Malabar, but to that of continuing the army in the Carnatic in a state of forward preparation.

On the north-western frontier of India a greater probability appears, than has yet existed, of the approach of Zemaun Shah. Gholam Mahommed, the Rohilla Chief, who was the leader of the rebellion in 1794, is returned into Rohilcund with a mission from the Shah, and is endeavouring to excite the Rohilla Chiefs to commotion. This premature step, although a strong indication of the serious intentions of the Shah, will, I trust, enable me to give an immediate check to the spirit of revolt in that quarter, from which he would have derived great assistance in any attempt upon the frontier of

Oude. With this view, I have invested Sir James Craig with the command of the troops in the Vizier's dominions, and I have directed the corps stationed at Futteh Ghur to advance into Rohilcund for the purpose of securing the persons of the leaders of the projected revolt, and of crushing the seeds of commotion before they shall have gained any height. Even after this object shall have been accomplished, it will still be necessary to maintain a large force on the frontier of Oude, as long as any danger of Zemaun Shah's approach shall exist.

The necessity of protecting Ceylon, and also our various acquisitions in the Eastern Seas, has diminished our disposable force at Madras, and in some degree at this Presidency.

If the French should be enabled to reach the coast of Malabar with any considerable force, I am persuaded that one of their first objects would be to seize Goa, as being the strongest place and the best harbour in which they could readily establish themselves in that part of India. From Goa they would have the power, with great advantage, of affording assistance to Tippoo, as well as of receiving, from time to time, whatever succour might be furnished from their newly acquired dominions in Egypt.

Having at a very early period foreseen the importance of Goa, I have already obtained much information on the subject from Mr. Duncan and General Stuart, and I mean to direct them to endeavour to take the most effectual means for protecting it against any attempt of the French. This operation may possibly require a considerable force. If the Peishwa should revert (as I trust he will) to his former wish for the aid of a subsidiary force from the Company, this service will also become an additional call upon our army at Bombay. The combination of all these circumstances, on every side of India, will probably require an increase of our force at all the Presidencies. You will observe, however, that the greater part of the expense of this augmentation at Fort St. George and Bombay will be defrayed by the Nizam and by the Peishwa; and by referring to my letter to the Secret Committee, under date the 3rd October, you will perceive that it is my intention to provide for the expense of the augmentation of our army in the province of Oude by a proportionate reduction of the Vizier's present military establish-

ment, and by charging him with the pay of our increased force.

It is my intention, by the ship which carries this despatch, to represent to Lord Macartney and to Sir Hugh Christian the necessity of their contributing to the defence of the coast of Malabar, provided they shall be satisfied that the efforts of the French are directed solely to India, and that no attack is to be apprehended against the Cape. I should hope that, under such circumstances, we might expect to receive from the Cape the assistance of several ships of war, and, at least, one regiment of European infantry, before the end of the month of February. I also place great reliance on your vigilance and alacrity, being persuaded that my letters from the Cape, M. Malartic's proclamation, and the movements of the French towards India, will have concurred to induce you to reinforce the army and navy in this quarter. My endeavours shall be directed to keep our expenses on the lowest possible scale consistent with the permanent security of our possessions.

Whatever may be the result of this crisis, I trust that your opinion and that of my friends at home will be, that I have not been deficient, either in diligence or zeal, for the public service. My health is now, and has been throughout the whole of the rainy season, much more favourable than I have remembered it for some years past in England; a circumstance remarkably fortunate under so great a pressure of business. I am confident that the ultimate issue of this alarm will be prosperous to our affairs; but I do not apprehend that I shall find myself oppressed by the labour to which any turn of our fortune may subject me; my mind would be perfectly composed, if I could expect to meet a correspondent disposition in those who must be charged with the execution of my orders. I refer you to my secret and confidential letters for an explanation of my apprehensions on this point, the sole object of my anxiety, and the only real peril in the present situation of India.

Believe me, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P. S. I have annexed to this letter two papers drawn up by Captain Malcolm, late Town Major of Fort St. George, one on the state of Tippoo's army and resources, the other a ge-

neral view of our present political situation. The latter is curious as Captain Malcolm had not seen any of my letters or minutes on the same subject, and only knew that a detachment was ordered to Hyderabad. I had no knowledge of Captain Malcolm, nor was he recommended to me before I met him at Fort St. George; he is a very promising young man. I have appointed him Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad.

No. LXXIX.

Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 13th October, 1798.

The letter from my Kurnaul correspondent, to which I have alluded to in my public letter, is principally on the subject of Gholaum Mahommed, whose motions I have directed him to watch. After, however, mentioning the construction of the bridge over the Attock, he adds—

“A constant intercourse is maintained between the Chiefs of the Siek nation and those of the Mahrattas. The former are all at their stations.”

I have written to him for a further explanation, and have directed him to make particular enquiry, as far as may be in his power, as to the probability of the two people entering into an alliance to oppose the Shah; and more especially as to the disposition of the Seiks, and how far they are united among themselves, for that purpose. I have also written in the same terms, on the latter subject, to my friend at Amrut-sir. In the meantime I have forwarded the account to Colonel Collins: as, if these people should really have an intention of entering into a defensive league against the common enemy, it may be much facilitated I think by its being known that your Lordship is willing to be a party in it, whilst that circumstance will undoubtedly have a tendency to inspire them with a little more confidence in the force of any treaty that may take place between them, than is otherwise likely to exist betwixt inveterate enemies, each knowing the other to be capable of every treachery.

Not having the honour to be known to your Lordship, it may now be necessary that I should assure you that I am not

apt to obtrude opinions, or to step out of my sphere in the presumption of offering advice. The only merit to which I lay any claim is that of an ardent zeal in the service of my country, but I wish not that it should be intemperate, and if I assume the liberty, on this occasion, of continuing a *private* correspondence with your Lordship, you owe it to the honour which you did me in your first letter: by the frankness of which I was led to believe that it would be received by your Lordship precisely in the light in which alone I can assure you it is ventured upon.

I have not heard from Colonel Collins since he left this for Futtyghur. In the conversation that I had with him here I endeavoured to impress him with a conviction of the necessity of his losing no time in entering into the negociation with which he is charged, and I am sure he was himself sensible of it; but since we have such good reasons for believing that the Shah has actually begun his march, so far as to be on the banks of the Attock upwards of twenty days ago, I now feel it to be of double importance that he should proceed without an instant's delay. I am concerned to have to say, that from all the information I can get, and I have made every inquiry in my power, I am led most firmly to believe that the Seiks, if left to themselves, will not make any opposition at all to the Shah's approach; or if they do, that it will be very feeble. I believe, indeed, that the power of the Seiks rests very much upon opinion, and that in the day of trial the delusion will appear. I neither believe them to be so numerous, or so hardy, as they have been represented, although sufficiently so to lord it over the real inhabitants of the country, for I make no doubt that your Lordship is aware that the Seiks are not the fortieth part of the inhabitants of the district over which they have established their dominion. The mass of these are a mixture of Mussulmen and Hindoos; the former of which from every motive, and the latter in detestation of the oppressions of their present Lords, will rejoice in the Shah's approach. Nothing I believe can produce any important exertion from the Seiks but a junction with the Mahrattas; and giving even credit to the letter from Kurnaul, whatever appearance it may carry of the probability of such an event, I still imagine it will be with difficulty accomplished, but under your Lordship's auspices; but I much

doubt the ability of the Mahrattas themselves to assemble in time such a force as will give confidence to the others. There is no appearance of it that I can yet hear of; they are quarrelling among themselves at Delhi, without seeming much to think of the danger with which they are threatened. The Attock is but a little better than 400 coss from Delhi, a space that may with the utmost ease be marched in six weeks, and that without adverting at all to the celerity with which the Shah's army is reported to move. If, (and it is no very improbable supposition) despising the Seiks, whose behaviour in 1796 was no ways such as to give him cause to hold them in high estimation, the Shah should adopt a bold step; and, leaving a corps of troops to keep them in awe, he should move on with rapidity, in the view of anticipating the Mahrattas at Delhi, he may be there in a time, that I almost tremble to think of. It is not utterly impossible, my Lord, that he might anticipate our preparations; though it is indeed hardly to be expected that, entertaining the same opinion of the Mahrattas as that which I have supposed him to do of the Seiks, he should venture to leave them behind in order to attack us, especially before the fords of the Ganges are open. However, I wish to shew the expediency of exertion and activity on our part. The extent to which it is meant to carry the army being ascertained, the troops that are to compose it should be immediately assembled, not in the slow progress of the ordinary relief, when battalion relieves battalion, but the utmost expedition should be used in it. The ordnance and stores should be hurried up in some very unusual way, unless it can be furnished from Chunar, as I have suggested to the Commander-in-Chief; and, above all, some steps should be adopted, with respect to further arrangement, that might preclude the necessity of a daily reference to the present seat of Government.

I know not what to say with respect to the Nabob's troops, I would be content that they should be useless, but I dread their being dangerous, unless some step is taken with regard to them. I should be almost as unwilling to leave them behind me as I should be to leave a fortress of the enemy. The Nabob is highly unpopular, and of all his subjects, I believe he would least expect attachment from his army. I fear much that it is too late to reap any benefit from the arrangement which your Lordship proposes with respect to them; and if we

should be called to the frontier I doubt whether it may not be hazardous to attempt to reduce them. We shall have of ourselves too many recruits in our ranks, indeed, a number that will very much weaken the dependence to be placed in our battalions. On this subject I feel that I tread on tender ground ; but I write to your Lordship in the confidence of a private communication. Neither the discipline of the army, or the knowledge of the officers, are such as to admit of our being insensible to other disadvantages. We are to expect a numerous and ferocious enemy, undisciplined and disorderly, but impetuous in their attacks, and rapid in their movements,—abounding in cavalry, and acting in a country the most favourable to that arm, where, if we can secure one flank, it will be a fortunate position. Against them our reliance must be on our artillery, and on the steadiness of our infantry,—where discipline should keep them firm in their ranks, and where confidence in their advantages should teach them not to shrink under the impression of a tumultuous charge of cavalry, the circumstance of all others the most likely to affect the mind of a young soldier, while the knowledge of the officers, and the previous training of the corps, should ensure the ability of moving with the utmost precision and rapidity, and of forming in every direction, to resist a surrounding cavalry. Battalions, with full one-third of recruits, are little equal to this description in its first part, and truth compels me to say that I have not yet seen one that came any where near it in the latter.

Your Lordship will do me justice in believing that I do not mean to hold out discouragement by this description. We must act, and we must make the best of the tools in our hands. My view is, that your Lordship may be aware of the true state of the army, which it is at least possible that you may not become through any other channel ; three-fourths of them with whom your Lordship may converse do not themselves know it, and the other fourth will not confess it. There is a third class of people which your Lordship may meet,—and it is a numerous one, even in my own profession,—who either do, or affect to, hold in contempt the idea of the necessity of its being otherwise. It is a fact, however, past controversy, that within these four years, and owing to these very circumstances of want of discipline and knowledge, the fate of our

Empire in India probably hung by a thread of the slightest texture; since even the impetuosity of the enemy ought naturally to have led to the very advantage which his ignorance would not permit his being sensible of.

Our stores are utterly incompetent to any forward move, such as I have ventured to suggest as justifiable, if cooperation with the Mahrattas can be purchased by it. Our proportion of musquet ammunition is 120 rounds per man, and that for the small arms of the cavalry is 40; with this I most certainly would not venture to stir a step from the Ganges, and how we are to get up more, in the time in which I think it is probable that it may be requisite for us to do so, I know not; I have written in strong terms to the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject. For our artillery we have 300 rounds, but that is, if possible, still less equal to what we ought to have, at least in a *depôt*, to which we could have a much more ready access than we have to Chunar or Allahabad. The latter should be our grand *depôt*, in which should be lodged a quantity of stores of every species, equal to every possible emergency; while a field *depôt* fed continually from it, should move successively from post to post as we advance, and be always at hand to renew our deficiencies. Upon the whole, do not, my Lord, consider it as presumption if I say that I feel a great deal more arrangement to be necessary than appears to me to occur to others as such. It is an easy thing to put the whole upon the issue of one battle, and unfortunately it is the mode which is attended with the least trouble.

I really beg your Lordship's pardon for this long and very free intrusion; but my apology is already offered in the fore part of my letter, and I shall therefore say no more, but that I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. LXXX.

Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 13th October, 1798.

On the 10th inst. I forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief the original of a letter which I received from a correspondent at Amrutsir, which tends to corroborate the information which Colonel Collins received from Delhi, and forwarded to your Lordship by express on the 6th, and yesterday I had another letter from a man who I have stationed at Kurnaul with an establishment of hurcarrahs, who also confirms that account, with the addition that a bridge was constructing over the Attock.

Considering the fact as established, for I can see no reason to doubt it, that the Shah is on the banks of the Attock, I should feel myself extremely happy if I had any instructions by which I could guide myself on the occasion. Your Lordship and the Government have done me the honour to vest me with the general command of the army in the field, but I must request the permission to observe, that it has been without one line of direction by which I can form a judgment of the extent to which I may use my discretion in that command, or of the powers with which it was intended to entrust me in the exercise of it, I feel myself to be so totally incapable of starting difficulties for the purpose of embarrassment, that I am unwilling even to be exposed to the suspicion of it. I therefore most solemnly assure your Lordship that in making this observation, my sole view is, to point out the expediency of guarding against the possibility of my counteracting the views of Government, through ignorance, or possibly from over zeal, at the same time feeling every moment to be of the utmost importance, in the present crisis, I should regret exceedingly to find that I had neglected a measure from not knowing that it was intended to vest me with the power of adopting it. I am far, my Lord, from shrinking from responsibility, but I wish not to be charged with it, at so great a hazard as must be incurred, under the total ignorance of what is expected from me.

I have just written to the Commander-in-Chief to acquaint him, that if I got any intelligence upon which I can rely, that

the Shah has actually marched from the Attock towards Lahore, before I am honoured with any instructions from him or from your Lordship, I shall immediately march with everything I can collect, except General Stuart's corps, to Anopsheer. As I take for granted that the Commander-in-Chief will communicate that letter to your Lordship, it is scarcely necessary that I should enter into any detail of the reasons upon which I have judged it expedient to adopt this resolution.

I have already written several letters to the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject of the deficiencies under which we should labour in the event of our taking the field. All those that regard cattle and camels, I believe, I could supply here, but I have felt myself restrained by the Commander-in-Chief, having observed in one of his letters that measures were taking on that subject at the Presidency. I have also applied to Mr. Lumsden to ask the assistance of the Nabob in the article of elephants, and though I have not yet received any official answer, yet I have had great satisfaction, in a private letter, in which he tells me he thinks he can prevail upon him to give it us to some extent. Other deficiencies of ammunition and stores, particularly musquet cartridges, must come from below, and I very much fear can scarcely arrive in time to be of any use.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and

Most humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. LXXXI.

From the Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, 18th October, 1798.

In consequence of information I have received of a considerable deficiency in the carriage-cattle of the army in the field upon the frontiers of his Excellency the Nabob Vizier's dominions, I have deemed it expedient to apply to his Excellency for his assistance in this respect, and have accordingly addressed a letter to him for that purpose, which will be forwarded to you by the Persian translator. You will lose no time in ascertaining the number and description of deficient

carriage-cattle from the Commander-in-Chief in the field, and apply to his Excellency the Nabob for them accordingly.

I understand that the deficiency is principally in elephants.

No arguments can be supposed necessary to obtain this aid from his Excellency, in promoting an arrangement of which the immediate object is the protection of his country. You will, however, assure him, that the same or an equal number of elephants and bullocks shall be restored to him when no longer required for the present service.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXXII.

From the Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, 24th October, 1798.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 25th September, and although the measures which you adopted in consequence of your late advices from Suez, and the Gulph of Persia, have already obtained my public approbation, yet it is with great pleasure that I embrace the present opportunity of repeating the high sense which I entertain of the activity and judgment which have marked your proceedings, not only in this instance but on occasion of the preparations which had been previously rendered necessary by the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun.

Although I hope we may still be able to avoid a war with that Prince, yet I continue to be of opinion that we must persevere in our preparations, and take all our measures as if that calamity were inevitable. With these sentiments I have determined not to relax my endeavours for reinforcing the army of the Carnatic from Bengal as speedily and to as great an extent as possible; and the Commander-in-Chief is now employed in framing a plan of eventual operations against the Sultaun, of which the immediate attack of Seringapatam must constitute the main object. This plan will be communicated to you as soon as it shall be formed; in the meanwhile I request that, having consulted General Stuart on the subject, you will as soon as possible let me know to what extent of force, at what period, and from what points it will be in your power to cooperate with the army in the Carnatic in such an attack on the capital of Mysore.

Adverting to the dispersed state of his Majesty's squadron in India, to the indispensable necessity of vigilantly guarding the Malabar coast during the present monsoon, and to the possibility of our experiencing some disappointment with respect to the arrival of the naval reinforcement promised from home; I consider it to be our urgent duty to make every practical effort for the purpose of increasing the Admiral's means of frustrating effectually the designs of the enemy in the Red Sea. I shall accordingly endeavour to equip and despatch immediately some armed ships from this port, which I shall place at his disposal; and I desire that you will apply yourself to the same object without delay: I should hope that the port of Bombay, with proper exertion, might contribute materially to the augmentation of the Admiral's force. It has occurred to me that gun-boats might be usefully employed against any small craft which the enemy may have collected in the Red Sea; and if the Admiral (whom you will consult on this point) should be of the same opinion, I should hope you would not have much difficulty in supplying him. I also wish you to consider, in concert with him, whether it would not be advisable, with a view to the more effectual security of the Straits of Babel Mandel, to possess and fortify the small island of Pereim, which I understand to be uninhabited.

I approve of your proposed mission of Captain Wilson, but not having yet seen your instructions to that gentleman, I shall only observe that, in the event of his destroying any of the shipping or craft in the Red Sea, it will be necessary to satisfy the proprietors of our determination to indemnify them faithfully for all losses so incurred.

Our latest accounts of Zemaun Shah scarcely leave a doubt of his having actually marched towards Hindostan. It is my intention to suggest to his Majesty's minister at Constantinople the expediency of his endeavouring to engage the Porte to concur with us in exciting the ruling power of Persia to such measures as may alarm Zemaun Shah for the safety of his hereditary dominions, and may recall him from the prosecution of his designs against the tranquillity of India. In the meanwhile it is my wish that you should take the earliest opportunity of suggesting the same considerations and objects to the English minister with the Porte, or through any other

more expeditious channel. If I am rightly informed, a brother of Zemaun Shah is now at the Court of Persia : this Prince took refuge there not long since, and he might possibly be found an useful instrument in forwarding a plan of the nature in question.

Should you be of opinion that any advantage can be derived from the local knowledge or qualifications of Mr. Manesty, the Company's Resident at Bussorah, you have my permission to employ him in the negotiations in Persia, either separately or in conjunction with Mehdy Ali Khan, as you may judge most advisable.

In order that this business may be impeded as little as possible by the delays necessarily arising from reference to me, I authorize you to furnish Baba Khan, or whoever may be the reigning sovereign of Persia, with any number of field-pieces, as well as any quantity of military stores, which you can safely spare, whenever the communications of Mehdy Ali Khan, or of Mr. Manesty, shall afford you reason to believe that the Government of Persia is sincerely disposed to make a serious diversion in our favour, by menacing the dominions of Zemaun Shah.

With a view to the same object, I must repeat my desire that you will immediately employ all practicable means of exciting the people of Sinde, and any other tribes occupying the countries which border on Moulton and Candahar, to alarm Zemaun Shah for the safety of his possessions in those quarters. These people have been stated to be generally ripe for revolt against the authority of the Shah ; and possibly they might be induced, by a liberal supply of arms and ammunition, and by the countenance of this Government, to take advantage of his absence in Hindostan. I understand that such supplies might be conveyed to them through Kutch and up the river Indus, but you will, of course, be in possession of the best information on this head.

You will easily judge how anxious I must be in the present crisis to obtain the fullest and earliest advices from Europe, as well as from your side of India. I hope, therefore, that you will have the goodness to forward to me, as speedily as possible, whatever newspapers or other accounts may reach you ; and I request that you will always send, not extracts, but the whole of the despatches and letters on public affairs

from the several ministers, agents of the Company, or other officers with whom you correspond.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXXIII.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.

(Private.)

MY LORD,

Fort St George, 24th October, 1798.

It being the wish of this Government, in making the revision of its establishments, according to your Lordship's orders of the 6th August, to follow as nearly as circumstances will permit, the mode of proceeding fixed upon in Bengal for effecting the same object; and doubts having arisen in the Council with respect to the powers intended to be given to the Committee appointed by your Lordship, I have been desired to request you will have the goodness to acquaint me whether it was your Lordship's design to confine the Committee, of which you are the President, in its report to the rise, progress, and present actual state of establishments and resources, or whether it was your intention that the Committee should, in addition to this labour, report its opinion upon such reduction of expense in the present existing establishments, as may be thought salutary and advisable, or upon such increase of revenue and resource as may be deemed practicable; and farther, whether, under any apparent circumstances of advantage to the service, or of able and laborious exertion, it is understood the Committee may recommend any increase of salary or expense. In consequence of the settled state of the weather, and of the disappearance of all signs of the breaking of the monsoon, General Harris, yesterday, gave it as his opinion in Council, that the battering train might be ordered to set out for Vellore. Directions have been accordingly given, and I have been assured by some of the gentlemen of the military board, who I met this morning at the arsenal, that the first division of six eighteen pounders, with a quantity of ammunition, will be ready to move on Friday evening or Saturday morning, and a second division in about three days afterwards. His Highness the Nabob lends four elephants, which may prove of great use in case there should be a heavy

fall of rain before the guns reach their destination. The important and glorious news of Sir Horatio Nelson having, with thirteen sail of the line, totally defeated the Toulon fleet of the same number of ships of the line under Admiral de Brueys, in the Bay of Beguier, near Rosetta, taking nine, two having blown up, and two only with two frigates, having effected their escape, has filled this settlement with joy. With cordial congratulations, and with the greatest respect and esteem,

I have the honor to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful Servant,

CLIVE.

No. LXXXIV.

From Tippoo Sultaun to the Right Hon. the Governor General.

[Received 24th October, 1798.]

The Talooks of Ameera and Soula, in which Cauntmungle and Coloorbachee are situated, have belonged to Couryal (Mangalore) from the year Rajah 1070 Mohummuddee to the end of the year Shadab 1226, a term of 156 years. Thirty-six years ago a body of 2,000 Coorga peons were employed in service of the State, and some villages in the Talooks above mentioned, yielding 3,423 pagodas, continued for a short time to be assigned for their pay, but since six and thirty years that even has ceased. This trivial affair can only be ascribed to the turbulent disposition of interested men, who by nature are ever seeking opportunities of sowing the seeds of dissension. Of this I am confident your Lordship must be well convinced the person who is now in Coorga is not of the posterity of the Coorga Rajahs but of a different stock.

Constantly gratify me with friendly letters.

P. S. Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, has written to me, that two persons of integrity and ability, from among the civil officers (Talookdars) on the coast of Malabar, have been deputed to inquire into the claims of the above-mentioned Talook, and will shortly arrive. Orders have been issued from my Sircar also, nominating Shaikh Shahaubuddien and Meer Mohammed Ally, persons of integrity and honour, to negotiate with the deputies above-mentioned, and ascertain, from records and facts, the dependency of the above-mentioned Talooks on Couryal.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Persian Translator to Govt.

No. LXXXV.

*The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-Colonel John Collins, Resident with
Dowlut Row Scindiah.*

SIR,

Fort William, October 26, 1798.

I have received your letters of the dates referred to in the margin.*

If circumstances admitted of our forming a defensive alliance with Dowlut Row Scindiah against Zemaun Shah, it would not be difficult to convince Scindiah of the expediency of inducing the Rajepoots and Seiks to join in the league; and it might not be impossible to persuade him to offer to them advantages of some importance, either in the form of a remission of tribute or of an extension of territory. Some concession of this kind on the part of Scindiah, joined to a promise of our employing our friendly offices to compose any differences which might hereafter arise between him and the Rajepoots or Seiks, would constitute as great a benefit as these powers could reasonably expect from a political connection with the Company, the immediate object of which is no other than to repel a common danger, or rather a danger much more formidable to their interests than to ours.

Unfortunately, however, the circumstances of the moment afford but a faint prospect of our being able to effect such an arrangement. The probability of Scindiah's early return to Hindostan is increased, but it is still uncertain whether his arrival within his own dominions will be early enough for our purpose; and (notwithstanding my expectations expressed in a former letter, I am now inclined to think that) it is still more doubtful whether, at the moment of his return, the state of his authority and resources will be such as to warrant any great hope of advantage to the Company from a formal defensive alliance with him against Zemaun Shah.

Under these circumstances, the utility of formal defensive engagements, even with Scindiah himself, cannot be determined without a full knowledge of the actual state of his authority at the time of his return from the Deccan. The alternative which I had considered in my former despatches was, that either of the total ruin or of the effectual restoration

* 5th, 7th, 11th and 15th October.

of Scindiah's power. But the existing case is of a nature different from either of those which I had foreseen, and, in the present crisis, the uncertainty of Scindiah's affairs suspends the situation of every Mahratta chief now remaining in his dominions. Although Ambajee appears to possess a considerable degree of present weight and power, and of the confidence of his master; he is still no more than the chief of one division of Scindiah's army engaged in open war with another, which he, Ambajee, must reduce completely under his authority before he can be in a condition to cooperate with us against the common enemy, with such a force as would justify us in forming separate defensive engagements with him.

By the latest accounts from the Resident at Poonah, it seems probable that Dowlut Row Scindiah will find it expedient to reinstate Baloo Tantia in the chief management of his affairs; in such an event, the authority at present exercised by Ambajee would be superseded by a new commission, which would probably be granted to his most active opponents, the partizans of Baloo Tantia. Such a resolution must occasion fresh dissensions among the officers of Scindiah in Hindostan, and the invasion of the country by Zemaun Shah would not tend to favour the arrangement of such a scene of confusion.

In this state of things, I see no ground to hope for any advantage from defensive engagements with Ambajee, even concluded under the approbation of Dowlut Row, who, however, has never notified (to my knowledge) the delegation of his authority in Hindostan to Ambajee. For the present, therefore, in the event of the Shah's approach to the frontier of our ally the Vizier, we must confine our military operations to a system of defence, and we must in no case pass beyond the limits of his Excellency's dominions, unless such a forward movement should be deemed, by the Commanding Officer of our army, necessary for the protection of the frontier, either of Oude or of our own provinces.

I do not mean by this determination to preclude myself, in the event of Scindiah's return to Hindostan, from entering into such defensive engagements with him against the Shah as may consist with the principles on which my overture to him at Poonah was founded, and with the actual state of his

authority and resources at the time of his return; on the contrary, whenever I shall learn that Scindiah has moved towards his own dominions, I shall instruct you how to proceed with him according to the state of his affairs at the moment. In the meanwhile I desire that, in communicating with Ambajee or with any other person exercising the powers of Dowlut Row in the absence of the latter, you will not proceed farther than to encourage and advise him to oppose the most effectual resistance in his power to the threatened invasion, acquainting him with the determination of this Government, to omit no effort or precaution necessary to the defence of the Vizier's dominions. I think it proper also, that you should for the present confine yourself in your correspondence with the Seiks and Rajepoots to the same general principles. To satisfy them that the Shah will meet with the most steady opposition from us in the prosecution of his ambitious projects may produce the effect of stimulating them to an equally vigorous resistance.

I cannot believe that M. Perron would be likely to give a cordial support to any cause which we might favour. We must never forget that he is a Frenchman, and that many of the officers in command under him are of the same nation. In the event of our negotiating hereafter any defensive engagements with Dowlut Row, leading to a cooperation or junction of our forces, the necessity which I should feel for providing against any treachery on the part of the French in his service, would constitute a principal embarrassment in the conduct of the treaty, and would form an object of the first consideration.

I approve of your having declined to comply with the wish of Shah Allum, and I wish you to avoid all intercourse with his Majesty during the absence of Scindiah from Hindostan.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXXVI.

(Private.)

The Earl of Mornington to Sir J. H. Craig, K.B.

SIR,

Fort William, October 27, 1798.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 26th September, and 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 13th instant, and also of a memoir containing much valuable information, and many judicious and forcible remarks. The whole tenor and spirit of your private communications, manifest a zeal and anxiety for the public interests, which demands my unqualified applause, and which cannot fail to prove highly beneficial to any service on which you may be employed. As you must be aware of the great extent and variety of my numerous public duties, I am persuaded, that you will accept my cordial thanks for your suggestions as a sufficient testimony of my real sense of their importance and value; and that you will not suppose me either indifferent to their merit, or unprepared to avail myself of their utility, because I am not at liberty to enter into a detailed review of the facts which you have collected, or of the able conclusions which you have drawn from them. I am particularly anxious to assure you, that nothing can be more acceptable to me, than the continuance of a free communication of your opinions with the same unreserved confidence, which appears in your private correspondence with me.

The uncertainty of Scindiah's return to Hindostan, as well as of the condition of his authority and power whenever that event shall take place, renders it impossible at present to contract any formal engagements with any of the powers on the north western frontier of India. Unless we could secure the efficient cooperation of Scindiah's army, we should not be warranted to conclude engagements with him tending to draw our troops beyond the limits of the position required for our own exclusive defence. The same principle applies with additional force to the precarious state of the Mahratta Chiefs now exercising the Government, or contending for it, during the absence of Scindiah.

The suggestions stated in my former letter, with regard to

the Seiks and Rajpoots, were not intended to refer to the possibility of any regular treaty with them, unconnected with Scindiah; but merely to such general encouragement as (in the absence of Scindiah) might be offered to those powers by our advice and amicable communication, and by the appearance of our army in the field; until the ruin or the restoration of Scindiah shall have been finally decided, our intercourse with these powers must be confined to such communications as I have described.

The progress of the French arms in Egypt, our actual situation with Tippoo, and the doubtful posture of affairs at Poonah, must contract our means of reinforcing the army under your command. We must therefore be satisfied, in the event of Zemaun Shah's approach, with a system of operations strictly defensive. I have, however, no reason to doubt, that your army will very soon be augmented to the number of nearly 20,000 men. With this force, (which I will encrease if other calls should permit) I rely on your ability to afford a complete protection to the dominions of the Vizier, as well from internal commotion, as from foreign invasion. If any circumstances should hereafter arise favorable to the extension of our system of defence, you will receive timely notice of the change (most earnestly desired by me) either from the Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Lumsden, or Colonel Collins. The present state of affairs does not require me to trouble you with any more particular instructions; you are the best judge of the position most eligible for the defence of the Vizier's frontier; I will not embarrass your judgement by any further limitation of your discretion, than must result from a strict adherence to the defence of the Vizier's frontier, leaving it to you to decide, whether that object will be best attained by remaining within the Vizier's boundary, or by a more advanced position.

The Commander-in-Chief has apprized you to what extent I have been enabled to authorize him to adopt a part of the very useful suggestions contained in your memoir.

With your private communication of the 13th, I had the honour of receiving from you a letter of the same date,* which,

* See page, 304.

although not addressed to me in council, I understand to be intended by you to form a public document.

It is difficult to express the concern and surprize with which I read that letter.

My confidence in your talents, activity, and public spirit, as well as my knowledge of your readiness to take the general command of the army in the field, induced me to entrust that charge to you. This trust was accompanied by a discretionary power of suspending the general relief of the army, according to the exigency of the case ; and you had been apprized, that the defence of the country in which you commanded, was to supersede every other consideration. Under these circumstances, I was not aware, that you could feel any difficulty in determining what would be expected from you ; nothing more could be expected, than a defence of the frontier of Oude, compatible with the extent and condition of the force under your command. Less could not be expected from such an officer ; and I had hoped that the anxiety which I have manifested to facilitate the exertion of your talents, might have satisfied you, that I was neither disposed to expect from you any effort beyond the means which you possessed, nor to charge you with any responsibility beyond the limits of your military duty. No special instructions therefore were given to you ; because none were requisite to enable you to act in the event of Zemaun Shah's approach. The only case in which special instructions to you could become necessary, was that of our having formed defensive engagements with the bordering powers. This case has not yet occurred, and my private correspondence as well as the communications of Colonel Collins, enabled you to ascertain the state of that question with an accuracy, which could not have been derived through any other channel. With regard to that part of the letter in question, which refers to the deficiencies of bullocks, camels, elephants, and ammunition, I know that the Commander-in-Chief, had actually taken the earliest possible steps for your speedy supply, and I had written to the Vizier for the express purpose of urging him to furnish you with whatever aid his establishment can afford. With this view of the subject, I trust, that the letter to which I refer was not the result of your deliberate consideration ; and I have therefore considered it as a private letter ; I have not recorded it ; and I have entered into a free discussion of

its contents with the facility of a confidential communication. If, however, I should have mistaken your intentions, you will correct my error; and I shall then be reduced to the necessity of entering the letter on the records, with the observations which my public duty will, in that case, demand.

A variety of concurrent accounts leads me to believe, that the French fleet off Alexandria, has suffered a severe blow from our squadron; and that the army has been checked in Egypt by a Turkish and Arab force. My last despatches overland, dated the 22nd of June, promise a very considerable naval and military reinforcement in India; the arrival of this force may be expected very soon. It does not appear probable, that in the advanced state of our preparations on the coast, and in the present condition of our alliances, Tippoo will venture to move without the actual cooperation of a French force. If the French should even surmount their difficulties in Egypt, the navigation of the Red Sea and of the Indian ocean at this season is so tedious, that it appears highly improbable that they should anticipate the vigilance of our squadrons. If I should learn the news of the defeat of the French in any authentic form, I will despatch it to you by express.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXXVII.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 29 October, 1798.

Mr. Petrie having communicated to me the contents of a letter of the 22nd instant, by the desire of Captain Kirkpatrick, from that gentleman to him, which brings the information of Monsieur Perron's corps being disarmed, and the French officers who lately commanded it being in the power of Colonel Roberts, I do not wait for an official confirmation to offer to your Lordship my hearty congratulations upon events so fortunate for the British interest, and so honourable to your Lordship's administration. The happy issue of this decisive measure will have relieved your mind, as it has mine from a very considerable degree of anxiety, and will enable me to

turn my attention without embarrassment to the execution of your Lordship's orders for urging on our warlike preparations with the utmost zeal and alacrity.

I have the honour to be with sincere respect and esteem,

My Lord, your Lordship's,

Most faithful servant,

CLIVE.

No. LXXXVIII.

General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Madras, 29th October, 1798.

Your kind favour of the 18th ultimo, would have been acknowledged the moment it was received, if I had only attended to the grateful feelings it occasioned, but convinced as I am how precious every moment of your Lordship's time is to the public, I should not even now have interrupted you if the great and important news from Hyderabad did not compel me to congratulate you on it. Never was any event more completely the work of an individual, than that has been your Lordship's, and much am I flattered, that you should think the part you consigned to me was performed with zeal and alacrity, which it certainly was, and will ever continue to be, while executing orders so pleasantly and clearly detailed.

It is a grand stroke, and I think will ensure all the rest of your excellent plan in the same bloodless style. We are going on with even encreased vigour for this fillip. The second ten battery guns sets off this day for Vellore, and as the Monsoon still holds off, I am in hopes they will get there without being stopped by it. Lord Clive is very zealous, and only wants to know your Lordship's wishes to have them executed. With my warmest congratulations once more and those of my whole family added, on the complete success of your Lordship's policy,

I am with great sincerity, my dear Lord,

Your faithful and obliged servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. LXXXIX.

The Hon. Frederic North to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Colombo, October 29, 1798.

I have already had the honour of referring you for information concerning Ceylon to my friend Lieut.-Colonel Agnew, late Adjutant General on this Island, and member of the Committee of Revenue. He has lately been recalled to his duty on the coast, to my very great sorrow; for he was really my greatest comfort and assistance in this place. His talents have been long distinguished in his own profession, and they are universal as they are eminent—indeed it will be difficult to find any one who possesses abilities, civil, military, financial, commercial and diplomatic, in the degree which he does, and though I shall always most sincerely regret his loss, it is a great satisfaction to me that he is recalled to the coast at a time when your Lordship is at Madras, that his merit may be directly under your eye.

Adieu, my dear Lord,

Believe me, with the greatest respect and regard,

Your most obedient and faithful Servant,

FREDERIC NORTH.

No. XC.

The Earl of Mornington to Robert Brooke, Esq. St. Helena.

SIR,

Fort William, 30th October, 1798.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 4th of April, and 10th of June, and I return you many thanks for the care you have taken of my several despatches and private letters by the *Albion*.

Your representations respecting the Lascars serving on board ship are perfectly proper, and are now under my consideration.

I am much obliged to you for your suggestions with regard to the Scpoy Regiments.

I perfectly concur with you in opinion as to the advantages which might be derived from the possession of Monte Vidco. But besides the difficulty of transporting a large body of native troops to such a distance, the present state of affairs in this quarter renders the detachment of any part of our force wholly impracticable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XCI.

The Hon. Jonathan Duncan to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Bombay, October 31, 1798.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 8th instant, and beg to assure your Lordship that I shall strictly observe the line therein indicated in respect to Mehndi Alli Khan's intended negotiations with the ruling power of Persia; and endeavour, also, to discover the means of exciting the natives occupying the Delta and the lower parts of the Indus towards a further diversion of Zemaun Shoah force, in the view of counteracting his intentions respecting India.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,

JONATHAN DUNCAN.

No. XCII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR

Fort William, November 2nd, 1798.

I consider it as an object of the utmost importance, that every practicable precaution should be taken to prevent any jealousy from being conceived by the Court of Hyderabad, in consequence of the great increase of our subsidiary force.

For this purpose it is extremely desirable, that the conduct of our troops in their intercourse with the natives of the country, and particularly with the officers of his Highnesses Government should be of the most conciliatory nature, and should be so regulated as to form the strongest contrast with the arrogant and contumacious spirit of the French corps. You will, therefore, apprise Lieut.-Colonels Roberts and Hyndman of my particular anxiety on this subject; and you will signify to them my expectations, that they will take effectual measures to prevent any such irregularities or misconduct in the officers or men under their respective commands, as might tend to create distrust and jealousy. My

wish is that the Company's army in his Highnesses service, should conduct itself with the utmost degree of mildness towards his subjects, and of respect towards himself and his Ministers; and that it should manifest the most prompt obedience to his orders, according to the tenor of the late subsidiary treaty.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

XCIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort William, 4th November, 1798.

You have doubtless received information of another excess of that unjustifiable ambition and insatiable rapacity, which have so long marked the conduct of the French nation. They have invaded Egypt, a country, from which they were in no danger of molestation, and from whose Government, they could not even pretend to have received the slightest provocation. They have committed this act of violence in contempt of the treaties subsisting between France and the Porte, and without any regard to the acknowledged authority of the Grand Seignor, so long established in Egypt. Nothing can more clearly expose their total disregard of every principle of public faith and honour, than this unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression; and it will no doubt afford satisfaction to every friend to justice and good faith, and particularly to every friend of the British nation, to hear, that by the success of his Majesty's arms, the French have already suffered for their injustice and temerity. Certain intelligence has just been received, that 13 sail of the line, which had been employed in the expedition against Egypt, mounting 1024 guns, and carrying about 10,000 men, being at anchor in the port of Bekir, near Rosetta, at the mouth of the Nile, were attacked by an equal number of his Britannic Majesty's fleet; an engagement took place, which terminated in the capture of nine ships of the French line; two more were blown up, one of them of 118 guns, the French Admiral's, and only two made their escape from the valour and skill of the British Admiral. All communication being thus cut off

between Egypt and Europe, the troops who have landed in Egypt must in all probability perish, either by famine or by the sword. This very signal victory is to be ascribed to the justice of the British cause, and to the aid of divine providence, favouring the gallantry of our forces, and punishing the injustice and impiety of our adversary. On the same assistance I rely with confidence for a continuation of similar successes, and for the final triumph of his Majesty's arms over a nation which has shewn itself to be the general enemy of mankind. Confident from the union and attachment subsisting between us, that this intelligence will afford you sincere satisfaction, I could not deny myself the pleasure of communicating it.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

I am, &c.
MORNINGTON.

No. XCIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 5th November, 1798.

The events of the last three weeks have afforded matter first of great alarm, and ultimately of satisfaction and probable security. Your Lordship found the report of my Moulavi upon his return from the prophet's tomb, confirmed by the intelligence from Bombay. My subsequent enquiries leave no room to doubt, that if the French could have reached Suez early in August, they might have found craft in the Red Sea for the conveyance of a large body of troops, and the passage from Suez to Mocha, and from thence to the coast of Malabar, would not have been difficult at that season. The brilliant victory of the 1st of August, (a good day for such a deed) probably checked their career, and saved Tippoo from the perilous consequences of their active support. But I do not yet think it impossible that the desperate and enterprising spirit of Buonaparte, exasperated by the new and increasing difficulties which surround him, may attempt to push forward a force to Malabar; nor is the success of such an attempt impossible, if it be not frustrated by the vigilance and power of our fleet. Under this impression, I am now fitting out the *Earl Howe*, and *Princess Charlotte*,

and a large country ship, to act as armed ships under the orders of the Admiral, and I intend to despatch them, as soon as they shall be compleatly equipped, together with the *Bombay* frigate, to Malabar. I have ordered the *Bombay* Government to fit out such ships as they may be able to collect for the same purpose. To your Lordship I have sent no public communication on this subject, apprehending that at this season, you possess no means of contributing any assistance. If, however, I should have been mistaken, you will have the goodness to arm whatever vessels you can furnish, and send them to the coast of Malabar, to be there placed under the orders of the Admiral.

The secret despatch from England* must have afforded your Lordship great satisfaction, in as much as it tended to shew the indispensable necessity of the measures, in the execution of which you have borne so cordial and ready a part. To me it is a matter of no disagreeable reflection to retrace all my late orders, and to find that I had not only anticipated every point of the commands of my friends at home, before their despatch had left England, but that my reasoning, and all the variations and shades of my opinion, which have followed the changes of circumstances in this quarter, have corresponded in the most minute manner with their sentiments and views. In addition to this source of satisfaction, I now have the pleasure to know, that I have removed one of those great obstacles to the vigorous prosecution of war against Mysore, of which the Secret Committee express a just apprehension; I mean the French army at Hyderabad. The treaty of Hyderabad, and the first secret article were carried into full effect on the 22nd of October. This is a most fortunate event, and will produce an encreased effect coming so close upon the steps of the recent victory at Bekir. The last despatch from Colonel Palmer, opens a favourable prospect of the probable issue of affairs at Poonah. On the other hand, my last advices from the northwestern frontier of Hindostan, encourage an expectation that the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, will not take place this year; even if it should, we are well prepared to meet it.

Your Lordship will perceive, that my object is to circumvent Tippoo on all sides; by our alliances at Hyderabad and

* See page, 61.

Poonah; by our fleet on the coast of Malabar; and by our armies on that coast, and on the frontier of the Carnatic, carrying the strength of both to the greatest practicable extent. Every effort has been and will be employed by me to augment those armies, so as to enable them to undertake the siege of Seringapatam, within the course of the approaching season, and to convince Tippoo of their ability to accomplish that important operation. By these means, I trust to bring him to reason; all others are hopeless; and if we should not be disappointed in our reinforcement from home, and if the fleet should not fail in vigilance, I think we may hope to surmount all our difficulties without the hazard of war, and with the certainty of a considerable ultimate improvement of our security.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XCV.

Spencer Smith Esq. to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Constantinople, 7th November, 1798.

In my past negotiations here, you have ere this some proof in your hands, that I have not been inattentive to the interests of your Lordship's Government; and you may be assured of my constant vigilance to keep the different presidencies in India informed of all that passes hereabouts, which it may be interesting for them to know. As such, I now enclose to your Lordship the best account we have of the position of Buonaparte and of our fleet. The former in the form of his own despatches intercepted on the coast of Syria, the latter by Captain Hood's despatch to myself, to which I have thought it worth while to add some of my latest English news-papers.

I am negotiating a treaty of defensive alliance with this court, upon the basis of that concluded with Russia, according to a counter project sent out to me in answer to the overtures of the Porte, made to me on the 28th July, and then sent home. My brother Sir Sidney Smith, is named to succeed Admiral Nelson in the Levant; and is moreover joined with me in the full power to sign the treaty if he arrives in time, as it is probable he may, being to communicate verbally

with the Porte, before he attacks the French in Egypt, which he will do in the most vigorous and comprehensive way.

The French Chargé d'affaires here, *Ruffin*, is with all his legation in the Seven Towers. The different consuls, including *Jambon St. André*, from Smyrna, with about 40 of the most dangerous demagogues and *apostles*, have been dispersed in the several fortresses of Amasia, Sinope, Samsoon, Trebisond, and Anapa, on the Black Sea. The Turkish and Russian fleets combined have reduced Cerigo, accepted the submission of Zante, and garrisoned Cephalonia; while Ali Pasha, governor of Yanina has purged the slip of Ex-Venetian territory, on the coast of Albania, by the well timed and successful attack with 10,000 men of all the French ports, such as Prevesa, Parga, &c., including the capture of the active emissary General Rosa, one of Bonaparte's *aid-de-camps* in Italy, and commandant at Prevesa, with several other officers, and about 250 men saved from the slaughter. I shall say nothing of English news, referring your Lordship for that to the enclosed. Our spirits are raised high by Nelson's incomparable victory, and our resources are great. If the powers of the Continent can but be roused from their stupid supineness, we may yet overthrow the monster that has threatened us with general destruction. Naples professes itself to be ready, and even impatient to renew hostilities. The Court of Vienna begins to acknowledge the necessity of a new war. The Russian auxiliaries are ordered to *march*. From Prussia I fear little good is to be expected. We may be even satisfied if no mischief be experienced. From the Germanic body no vigor is to be hoped for, such is their pusillanimity, that they submit without a remonstrance to the repeated insults, and threats of France, whose contempt for them is manifested by every new note *in crescendo*.

I hope your Lordship approves my idea of the grand Signor's and Vizier's amicable exhortation to Tippoo, anything of this kind that I can render more to the purpose, I should rejoice to accomplish according to your ideas.

I have the honour to be, with perfect truth and regard,

My Lord, your Lordship's,

Very obedient humble servant,

SPENCER SMITH.

No. XCVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort William, 8th November, 1798.

It affords me sincere satisfaction to learn that you have nominated two persons of integrity and honour to meet and confer with the Deputies appointed, under my orders, by Mr. Duncan (the Governor of Bombay), for the purposes of investigating the question regarding the Talooks of Ameera and Soulea. It is only by means of regular enquiry, and amicable discussion, that such questions can be adjusted among independent powers. My determination, in the case of Wynaad, was dictated by those principles of justice and moderation, which always direct the Company's Government, nor shall my scrupulous adherence to the same principles be less manifest in my decision on your claim to the districts at present in question, the possession of which shall not be withheld from you for an instant if, after full investigation, I shall be satisfied of the justice of your title to them.

It is a well known truth, that they are always the most ready to respect the just rights of others who are the most vigilant and resolute to maintain their own.

I have understood your sentiments concerning the "turbulent disposition of interested men, who, by nature, are ever seeking opportunities of sowing the seeds of dissension." For the happiness of mankind it is to be lamented that these authors of confusion are too numerous, assiduous and successful, in all parts of the world. In no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue cultivated with such success as they are at present by the French nation. I sincerely wish that no impression had been produced on your discerning mind by that dangerous people; but my situation enables me to know that they have reached your presence, and have endeavoured to pervert the wisdom of your councils, and to instigate you to war against those who have given you no provocation.

It is impossible that you should suppose me to be ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British na-

tion. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear necessary or proper that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connection, which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects, and to destroy the religion which you revere.

Immediately after my arrival at Bengal, I read your correspondence with the late Governor-General, Sir John Shore, and with the Acting Governor General Sir Alured Clarke; and I perceived with great satisfaction, that in all your letters you constantly professed a disposition to strengthen the bonds of sincere attachment, and the foundations of harmony and concord established between you and the Honourable Company. I received particular pleasure from reading your last letter to Sir John Shore,* in which you signified your amicable desire that he should impress me with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so long subsisting between the two States. Your subsequent letters to me have abounded with professions of the same friendly nature.

Combining these professions of amity on your part with the proofs which the Company's Government have constantly given of their sincere disposition to maintain the relations of friendship and peace with you; and advertng, at the same time, to your reputation for wisdom and discernment, it was natural for me to be extremely slow to believe the various accounts transmitted to me of your negotiations with the French, and of your military preparations; but whatever my reluctance to credit such reports might be, prudence required both of me and of the Company's allies, that we should adopt certain measures of precaution and self defence, and these have accordingly been taken, as you will no doubt have observed. The British Government and the allies, wishing nevertheless to live in peace and friendship with all their neighbours, entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the least incompatible with their respective engage-

* See Introduction.

ments, and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, will always be ready, as they now are, to afford you every demonstration of their pacific disposition.

The Peishwah, and his Highness the Nizam, concur with me in the observations which I have offered to you in this letter; and which, in the name of the Company, and of the Allies, I recommend to your most earnest consideration; but as I am also desirous of communicating to you, on the behalf of the Company, and their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties; I propose to depute to you, for this purpose, Major Doveton, who is well known to you, and who will explain to you more fully and particularly the sole means which appear to myself, and to the allies of the Company, to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations.

You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient to you to receive Major Doveton; and as soon as your friendly letter shall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your presence.

I shall expect your answer to this letter, with an earnest hope that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies; and that you may be convinced that you cannot in any manner better consult your true interests than by meeting, with cordiality, the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points on which any doubt or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. XCVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort William, 9th Nov. 1798.

I am happy to express my entire approbation of the judgment, firmness and discretion, which you have manifested during the important transactions which have passed since the ratification of the new subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, and

which have terminated so satisfactorily in the compleat execution of the secret and separate articles of that engagement.

Your conduct in the negociation of the treaty has already received my approbation.

I desire you will signify to Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, and to the officers and men under his command, the high sense which I entertain of the important service which they have rendered to the British interests, and to the Honourable the East India Company, by the prompt execution of your instructions.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts the greatest degree of public gratitude and applause is due for his skilful and judicious disposition of the troops under his command, and for the temper and humanity of his conduct towards the French officers in his custody.

You will also express my approbation of the service rendered by Captain Scohy, in obedience to the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts.

The entire reduction of the large French force lately in the service of the Nizam, and the complete subversion of the dangerous influence of that nation at the Court of Hyderabad, place his Highness at length in a position which will enable him, in the event of a war between Tippoo Sultaun and the allies, to cooperate in the vigorous prosecution of it with considerable efficacy; but though neither the ability nor the disposition of the Court of Hyderabad to contribute materially to the support of the common cause can any longer be doubted, yet it must be obvious that without a full and precise knowledge of the extent and nature of the assistance which we may confidently rely on receiving from the Nizam, it will be impossible for us to concert with his Highness any plan of general operations, or even to decide satisfactorily on the practicability of attacking Seringapatam in due season should the refusal of Tippoo to comply with the demands which may be made by the allies, render that measure expedient.

For this reason it is of the utmost importance to ascertain without delay, and with every possible degree of correctness and certainty, the following points:—

1. The greatest amount of the force in cavalry, infantry, and field ordnance, which the Nizam will positively furnish;

not as an army to act separately, or in the way of diversion, but to join ours, and to proceed with it directly against the capital of the enemy.

2. The earliest period at which the force to be so furnished can move from Hyderabad.

3. The place where the Nizam may desire that this force should effect a junction with our army.

4. The route by which the Nizam would wish this force to march, for the purpose of effecting such junction with the greatest facility and despatch.

5. The speediest period at which we may safely expect the junction to take place.

6. The person to whom the command of his Highness's forces is to be entrusted.

7. The means or resources applicable by the Nizam to the due and regular supply of provisions, whether for the consumption of his own forces, or for the use of the united armies.

These are the principal heads of enquiry to which it is necessary to direct your immediate attention.

Upon these points I am anxious to obtain the earliest and most accurate information.

From these leading points arise several questions of a more minute description, to which it will also be proper to give due consideration. I proceed to state the most important of these in the order in which they result from the preceding propositions.

As the reduction of Seringapatam, in the event of a war, must constitute the sole object of the allies, it is impossible not to feel a desire that the whole of our subsidiary troops should be comprehended in the contingent to be furnished by his Highness for the purpose of acting with our army. These, with the addition of 6,000 of Mr. Finglass's corps, and a suitable train of field ordnance, and joined by a body of from 8,000 to 10,000 of his Highness's best cavalry, under the command of Rissalahdars, of approved zeal and fidelity, would form as large a force as it would, perhaps, be necessary to require from him. But if any of the Company's subsidiary troops are to be withholden, although their place will be ill supplied by any others in his Highness's service, the number of the latter must be proportionably augmented.

When you are informed, however, that the army before Seringapatam in February, 1792, amounted to 30,000 fighting men (exclusive of five native battalions in different parts of the enemy's country, and four battalions with the Nizam and the Mahrattas), that an equal force is now deemed requisite for the siege of this place; and that even with the aid of the whole of the subsidiary troops now at Hyderabad, we should with difficulty draw together so considerable an army, you will perceive the necessity of urging the Nizam by every argument in your power, to acquiesce in the arrangement here suggested.

In the last war with Tippoo the whole of the subsidiary British force was absent from Hyderabad. No reason occurs to me which should induce his Highness on this occasion to retain any part of it about his own person: nor am I aware of any other ground of objection to the employment of the whole of it against the common enemy, which must not equally have existed in the last war. I therefore entertain a sanguine expectation of his Highness's ready consent to the proposed measure.

I must not dismiss this article without instructing you to be particularly careful, as far as may be in your power, to obtain the exclusion from every sort of command or trust in the Nizam's contingent force of all those Sirdars whose conduct during the last war furnished a just suspicion of traitorous correspondence with the enemy. If necessary you must formally protest against the employment of those individuals on the present occasion.

With regard to the second object of enquiry, or, the period at which the Nizam's contingent can move, I need only observe that, as it will have a considerable distance to proceed before it can effect a junction with the army of the Carnatic (whatever place of junction may be appointed), it is absolutely necessary that it should commence its march as soon after your receipt of this as possible, observing, however, the caution that it shall not any where in its progress pass into the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun without further notice from me. The interval, I trust, will not be long; since no doubt his Highness's preparations for enforcing the demand of satisfaction and security, which it was agreed by the allies to make

upon Tippoo Sultaun, have kept pace with those of the Company's Government.

As to the third point which relates to the place of the junction, although it is necessary to consult the pleasure of the Nizam upon the subject, yet I am willing to believe you will have no difficulty in proving to him the expediency of leaving this article to be ultimately adjusted between the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's army and the commanders of his Highness's contingent force, including the commanding officer of the subsidiary troops.

With respect to the route to be taken by the Nizam's troops, although this cannot be completely ascertained until the place of junction with our army be determined, and therefore must be left in a great measure to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, exercised in concert with the officers commanding his Highness's division, yet there appears to be no difficulty in fixing some general direction during the earlier stages of the march. Thus, whether the place of junction should hereafter be appointed in the vicinity of Amboor, Ryacottah, or Coveriporum, it will be equally convenient that his Highness's troops should proceed by Kurpah. To this point, therefore, it cannot move too soon: and before it can arrive there, the Commander-in-Chief will be able to determine on the best direction for its further progress.

It is of peculiar importance to ascertain the fifth point, or the speediest period at which the junction can be effected, with the utmost accuracy possible.

It being understood that unless the united armies could arrive at Seringapatam by the middle of February, the siege and capture of that place before the setting in of the monsoon, would hardly be practicable: to guard against such a disappointment it is absolutely requisite that the army, with its battering train, should not be later in moving from Amboor than the end of January; of course the Nizam's force ought to reach that place (supposing it to be the appointed rendezvous) not later than the middle of that month. For this purpose it is stated to me that his Highness's troops should be in motion by the 5th of December: but as, in order to render the junction as secure as possible, a circuitous route from Kurpah to Amboor (probably by Dalmacherry and Chittoor)

may be deemed advisable, it is evident that they cannot commence their march too soon.

It is certainly extremely desirable that Azim ul Omra should put himself at the head of the Nizam's forces; and if no substantial objection should arise to his leaving the person of his Highness, I wish you to urge Azim ul Omra, by every possible argument, to proceed with the army. It is not, perhaps, of much consequence whether he is accompanied by one of the princes or not: but in this arrangement I see no necessity for your interference. If any solid reason should arise for the minister's remaining with the Nizam, or if he cannot be prevailed on to proceed with the troops, care must be taken to select for the command a person whose zeal for the common cause shall be accompanied by a due share of personal weight and authority. These qualities in the commander of the Nizam's forces are to be sought in preference to military knowledge and experience, which, perhaps, it would be difficult to find in any considerable degree among the Omras of the Court at Hyderabad.

In the case of Azim ul Omra's proceeding with the Nizam's force, I should think it advisable for you to accompany him; leaving your assistant to attend on his Highness. But in the event of the minister's remaining behind, it will be proper that you should continue at your station; and that Captain Malcolm should accompany the troops, according to the same arrangement under which Lieutenant Stewart was employed in the last war, when assistant to Sir John Kenneway.

Although I fear that the declining state of the Nizam's health, joined to his increasing years, is but too likely to obstruct the measure, yet I cannot help expressing a wish that his Highness may be able, if not immediately, yet early in January, to advance in person to the banks of the Kishna, where his position during the last war, if it no otherwise contributed to the success of the general operations, tended to inculcate the belief of his serious disposition to second them.

With regard to the point remaining to be considered, namely, the regular supply of provisions, it appears to me that no time should be lost in storing as large quantities of grain as possible in Ganjecottah, Sedhout, and all the other forts on the southern frontier of his Highness's dominions in which such supplies may be safely deposited. It is also ex-

tremely desirable that the minister should give the most effectual encouragement to the Brinjaries to accompany and follow the army; and I should think you could not better inculcate the great advantages of a liberal arrangement with those people, than by referring him to the result of Lord Cornwallis's proceedings on this subject, of which he was himself an eye witness. I likewise authorize you to cooperate with Azim ul Omra in the useful measure of engaging the cordial services of the Brinjaries, by making such advances of cash on behalf of the Company as you may judge advisable or necessary for this purpose; not exceeding, however, the sum of 50,000 rupees, and taking sufficient security from them for the repayment of the same within a reasonable time.

As in the event of Tippoo Suldaun's compelling the allies to attack him, by refusing the security proposed to be demanded of him, the immediate siege of his capital will constitute the sole object of their operations; the consequence of this plan must be, that all the supplies for the army to be drawn from the Nizam's country, must, for greater security, pass from Kurpah through the Carnatic, by the way of Damalcherry, Chittoor, Amboor, &c.; or such other routes as may best suit with the circumstances of the moment. It will not be necessary, however, to communicate this arrangement to the Brinjaries who, when they perceive that it is not our intention to occupy any posts in Tippoo's country, on the direct line between Kurpah and Seringapatam, will naturally follow the army by the route just mentioned, as the only one affording them equal security.

The actual state of the Company's troops serving in the Nizam's country, with regard to field equipment of every description, is a subject which demands immediate attention. Whatever deficiencies may exist, no time should be lost in supplying them. You will, therefore, ascertain these immediately, and as soon as possible, privately advise Lord Clive of them, who will have my instructions to issue the necessary orders for forwarding in due time, to the place of rendezvous of the allied army, whatever articles shall be wanting to complete the equipment of the subsidiary troops for actual service.

Having in a former part of this letter supposed Mr. Finglass's corps to form part of the Nizam's contingent, and not

having hitherto in any of my letters to you touched on the subject of that party, I will now give you my sentiments and instructions respecting it.

On general principles of policy I am sensible of the danger of admitting the establishment of corps of this description among the country powers, even under the command of British subjects; but the numerous military establishments of French adventurers in the service of the different States of India suggested the necessity of opposing some counterpoise to their dangerous influence and growing power. Hence arose the introduction of Mr. Finglass into the service of the Nizam, and the subsequent augmentation of his corps. This however was a very inadequate security against the danger which existed at Hyderabad, and which could never have been averted by any other means than the complete subversion of the French army in the service of the Nizam.

This object having been happily accomplished, it becomes a question how far it is advisable for this Government to permit or countenance the continuance of Mr. Finglass's corps. Our right under the treaty lately concluded between the Company, to require the dismissal of all the Europeans in his Highness's service is unquestionable: but would it be prudent or politic, or even just, to exercise it in this instance.

It would perhaps be unjust, because the dismissal of M. Piron's corps, and the articles of the new treaty under which the restrictions of the former subsidiary troops still remain in force, joined to those stipulations which limit the use of the Company's troops to cases of important service, have absolutely deprived the Nizam of all means of executing a variety of military duties of an indispensable nature; unless his Highness be allowed to retain Mr. Finglass's corps in his service.

It would be impolitic, first, because it would naturally excite great dissatisfaction in the mind of the Nizam; and secondly, because it would deprive the common cause, at a very critical period, of a body of troops, which, though not to be compared with the Company's, may be capable of rendering considerable service in the event of war.

On the whole, therefore, my opinion is, that it is expedient to encourage and support this corps (Mr. Finglass's) to such an extent as may place it in a condition to act with effect in conjunction with our own troops.

For this purpose I mean to permit Mr. Finglass (on the usual application from the Nizam) to purchase from time to time, at Fort St. George, any quantity of ordnance, ordnance stores, and muskets, which shall appear to you necessary to the efficient equipment of his corps for actual service. But as the opportunities of procuring such articles are precarious, I am also willing that any moderate supply of them which may be required for the use of any division of the corps, actually proceeding as part of the Nizam's contingent to join our army, should be issued at your requisition from the Company's Arsenal at Fort St. George; and I shall instruct the Government of that Presidency accordingly. The Government of Fort St. George will, however, be empowered to exercise its discretion with regard to the quantity of the several articles above mentioned, which can at any time be spared with safety from the demands of their own military service; I think it probable, however, that the magazines belonging to the late French corps may be found sufficient to the supply of most of the articles in which Mr. Finglass's corps is now deficient.

But while I consent to extend to this corps the degree of encouragement which I have described, I must particularly enjoin you to use the utmost vigilance for the purpose of preventing the admission of any others than British subjects, not only into commands, but into any rank or station in the corps. You will also take care that such British subjects retain their attachment to their native country, and to its laws and constitution; and that they shall not, under the shelter of their British origin, protect the growth of French influence at the Court of the Nizam.

The sixth article of the late treaty furnishes you with ample means of obtaining the dismissal from this corps of any individual whose conduct or principles may render him a just object of suspicion. I conceive, however, that the commanding officer of this party is not likely in any such case to reduce you to the necessity of asserting the right of the Company under the treaty.

It is proper you should be particularly careful so to regulate your occasional intercourse with the corps of Mr. Finglass, as to prevent its exciting any jealousy or dissatisfaction in the mind of the Nizam or his ministers. On this principle

it is peculiarly necessary that, except when your opinion or interference shall be expressly desired by his Highness or by Azim ul Omra, you should avoid taking part in any discussions which may arise between that corps and the Durbar, whether relating to the pay of the party, to the nature of the duties and services required of them, or to any other point whatever.

I must except, however, from this general instruction, the case of any division of Mr. Finglass's corps which shall happen to compose part of the Nizam's contingent, acting with the Company's army: for it will at all times be incumbent on us to see that due measures are taken by his Highness's ministers for securing the regular payment of whatever troops may form that contingent, whether they shall be those of the Nizam, or the Company's subsidized force; I accordingly desire that you will exert yourself to effect a satisfactory arrangement for this purpose with Azim ul Omra.

My anxious desire that Azim ul Omra, in person, should accompany the Nizam's contingent, is founded on my opinion that, from his presence a greater degree of security would be derived, not only for the punctual payment of the troops, but for the prompt obedience, and efficient cooperation of their commanders.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XCVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, 10th Nov. 1798.

I have viewed with particular concern the encreasing embarrassments of Doulut Rao Scindiah, and the slow progress made by the Peishwa in the final arrangement of his government. The former by obstructing the return of Scindiah to Hindostan, and by tending to weaken his authority, and diminish his resources, threatens to deprive us of the assistance of a power, whose cooperation under other circumstances, might have been of the greatest advantage, in the event of an invasion from Zemaun Shah. The latter by disclosing the weakness and irresolution of the Peishwa's mind, and by leaving me in doubt, whether his councils will ultimately be

guided by an influence friendly or hostile to his connection with the Company, makes it impossible for me to judge with any confidence, what his conduct is likely to be in the event of a rupture between the Company and Tippoo Sultaun.

But, whatever may be the ultimate determination of the Peishwa, the period is arrived, when it is become necessary to call upon him in the most explicit manner, for the faithful performance of the engagements contracted by his predecessor and recognized by himself.

I enclose you the copy and translation of a letter, which I have thought proper to address to Tippoo Sultaun.* You will without delay communicate this letter to the Peishwa, who will no doubt perceive that the terms of it are in exact conformity to the spirit of his own declarations, and to his proposed draft of a letter on the same subject. You will at the same time point out to him the necessity of moving his forces immediately towards the frontier of Tippoo, as well for the purpose of giving weight to the negociations of the allies, should Tippoo consent to treat; as in order to be in a proper state of forwardness for cooperating with the armies of the Company and of the Nizam, in the event of the allies being reduced to the necessity of enforcing their just demands.

I shall be satisfied if the Peishwa's contingent shall amount to 20,000 horse; provided this body of cavalry shall be of the best description belonging to the state, and shall be commanded by Sirdars, and by a principal Chief, well affected to the cause, my confidence on this last subject would be considerable, were Emrut Row to be selected for this important charge; but I should feel very differently were either Gobind Kishen himself, or any other person closely connected with him in politics or otherwise, to be appointed to it. You will, therefore, be particularly careful to prevent by every means in your power, any nomination of this dangerous nature; since such a disposition of the Peishwa's contingent would make it questionable, whether its presence at Seringapatam, in the event of hostilities, might not be of more detriment than benefit to the general interests.

It is proper to mention in this place, that the Peishwa's contingent must not pass the frontier of Tippoo Sultaun, until

* See page, 326.

duly advised (in the manner to be hereafter specified) of the failure of the negotiations, or until required to move either by the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's army in the Carnatic, or by the officer in Command of our forces on the coast of Malabar.

The requisition for the advance of the Mahratta contingent into the enemy's country, will be accompanied by a communication of the route which it may be deemed advisable for it to pursue, for the purpose of effecting a junction, either with the army of Malabar, or with that of the Carnatic.

You will advise Mr. Duncan confidentially, from time to time, of the progress of your negotiations with respect to the Mahratta contingent; the better to enable him, and General Stuart, eventually to establish every degree of practicable concert between the movements of our army in Malabar, and those of the Mahratta forces.

If the Peishwa after having read my letter to Tippoo Sul-taun, and in consequence of the proposed military movements, should require to know the nature and extent of the security which I propose hereafter to demand from Tippoo, you will answer, that this is a point on which I shall not be able entirely to make up my mind, until I see what impression is produced on Tippoo by the letter which I have sent him on behalf of the allies. In the mean while the Peishwa may rest assured, that I feel no desire to exact any concessions from Tippoo, beyond the objects avowed in my letter to him, or inconsistent with the Peishwa's own sentiments, as expressed to yourself, and in his proposed draft of a letter to Tippoo, and that no settlement of any kind shall ever be made by me with Tippoo, in which the Peishwa and the Nizam shall not participate equally in all respects with the Company.

I am, &c.,

MORNINGTON.

No. XCIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 12th Nov. 1798.

My last private letter to you was closed on the 11th of October.* On the 18th, I received the despatch of the secret

* See p. 288.

committee dated the 18th of June,* and forwarded overland, and on the same day, a confirmation of the reports of the progress of the French arms in Egypt.

It is difficult to express the satisfaction which I derived, from finding that the measures which I had taken, in consequence of the alliance formed between Tippoo and the French, corresponded so happily with your principles and views on the same occasion. You will observe by a reference to my several despatches, that I had not only anticipated all your orders before the overland despatch had left England, but that the whole course of the ideas which passed through my mind during the late critical conjuncture of our affairs in this quarter, coincided entirely with the tenor of your opinions.

On the only point which you have thought too delicate to decide at home, I am happy to be able to remove your apprehension.

My former letters will have apprized you of the signature of the treaty of Hyderabad, and of the approach of the British detachment towards that city. The detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, arrived at Hyderabad on the 10th of October, and on the 22nd of October, the British troops under the orders of the Nizam, and with the cooperation of a body of 2000 of his cavalry, surrounded the camp of the French army, disarmed all the Sepoys, and secured the persons of all the French officers then in camp. This operation was happily effected without bloodshed, and without contest. A mutiny having broken out in the French camp on the preceding day, and the Sepoys having imprisoned their officers, the Resident at Hyderabad, and Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, with the consent of the Nizam, judiciously availed themselves of this favorable opportunity to execute this important measure, without difficulty or danger.

The French officers by my particular orders, were treated with every practicable degree of attention and humanity; at the period of their arrest by our troops, their persons were in confinement, and their lives in danger from the mutiny prevailing in their camp; and the greatest difficulty which Colonel Roberts encountered, was that of rescuing the im-

* See page, 61.

prisoned officers from the violence of their own Sepoys. Particular care was taken to save the property of the officers for their use, as well as to obtain for them such arrears of pay and allowances, as were due to them from his Highness; Captain Kirkpatrick informs me, that he has been completely successful in effecting both these desirable objects. The French officers are now on their passage to this Presidency on board the *Bombay* frigate, which I had previously stationed at Masulipatam for their accommodation. On their arrival at Calcutta, it is my intention to receive them with the consideration due to their respective ranks, and to allow them every indulgence compatible with the security of their persons. I propose to send them to Europe by the earliest opportunity, using the precaution of dispersing them in different ships. On their arrival in England, I have engaged that they shall not be treated as prisoners of war, but shall be immediately transported to France, without suffering any detention for an exchange of prisoners.

I am persuaded, that you will consider this event as a circumstance of peculiar good fortune in the present moment. The effects of it must be to secure to us, whatever benefits can be derived from the cordial cooperation of the Nizam, in the event of a war with Tippoo, and, in the meanwhile, so considerable a reduction of the French influence in India must be viewed as an important benefit, at a moment when the adventurous and enterprizing spirit of that nation is directed to the object of erecting an Empire in India, on the ruin of ours.

With respect to the Court of Poonah, our affairs in that quarter also have taken a very favourable turn. Nana Furnavese has been restored to the Ministry, and has publicly taken charge of the affairs of the Government. I have already informed you, that the Peishwa had concurred without hesitation in all my arrangements at Hyderabad, and had uniformly professed his determination to abide by his defensive engagements with us, in the event of hostilities with Tippoo. The restoration of Nana, secures the Peishwa's faithful execution of those engagements, and affords a strong ground of expectation of further improvements in the nature of our connection with that state. Neither Tippoo nor the French will ever acquire any influence at Poonah, while Nana shall hold

the reins of power. Nana has too much wisdom to involve the Mahratta Empire in such desperate connections.

On the 31st of October, we learnt the satisfactory intelligence of the glorious victory at Bekir, which I immediately announced by a circular letter to all the Princes of India, not omitting Tippoo Sultaun. Being still uncertain of the fate of the French army, I have not relaxed any part of our military or naval preparations, for the nature of which I refer you to my letters to the secret committee. But I have deemed this a favorable opportunity for opening a negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun, which you will observe the state of affairs at Hydrabad and Poonah, now admit of my commencing in conformity to my original view of the subject. A copy of my letter to Tippoo, forms a number of the secret packet.*

I wish it were in my power to express my satisfaction in the alacrity with which the Government of Fort St. George, have executed my orders for the defence of the Carnatic. But I am concerned to state, that notwithstanding the cordial disposition of Lord Clive to second my exertions in the public service, unnecessary and unwarrantable delays have prevailed in the military equipments in that quarter, and the movement of the battering train towards the frontier, (a measure absolutely necessary for the purpose of giving effect to our negotiations with Tippoo), has been delayed several weeks, until at length no alternative was left, but that of deferring the movement altogether until after the monsoon, or of attempting it during the monsoon at the hazard of interruption from the bad weather. The latter alternative after much hesitation was adopted.

You will perceive by the secret despatches, that I have taken measures for embodying the Calcutta European militia. I expect that their number will not fall short of 1500 men. This useful institution had grown obsolete; as I conceive that great advantage might be derived from it in any case of sudden emergency, I have availed myself of this opportunity to revive it, intending to place it on a permanent foundation.

Our accounts of Zemaun Shah, are still extremely vague and contradictory. I have, however, thought it prudent to continue our preparation on the north western frontier, where

* See p. 326.

I trust our defences are perfectly secure. My letters to the Secret Committee contain so full a detail of all the circumstances of our present situation, and of the steps which I have taken for the purpose of meeting the exigencies of the moment, as they have arisen, that I do not feel it necessary to trouble you with any further particulars in this letter.

I have received the military regulations, and I have already given the necessary orders for carrying into execution, that part of them which relates to the promotion by regimental rank; with respect to the reduction of the allowances, it is a question which I have not yet decided, whether it might not be advisable to postpone, for a time, a measure which would necessarily tend to slacken the zeal of the officers who may be called into the field in the present crisis; but this is a consideration merely of time, and of prudence; for the temper of the army is such, and I trust my authority so firmly established, that I have no expectation of meeting with any difficulty or danger in carrying the orders of the Court into effect; I may hereafter suggest some observations on some parts of those orders.

The despatches to the Secret Committee, and to the Court of Directors, will shew you the amount of the voluntary contributions within these provinces, when you will recollect, that the greater part of it is furnished from the annual income of the subscribers, I think it will appear a sufficient testimony of their zeal and public spirit. The same spirit has appeared on the occasion of the calling out the militia; all descriptions of the European and Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta having manifested the utmost degree of alacrity in offering their personal services.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. C.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 14th November, 1798

I am most happy to learn that your battering train is in such forwardness, and if the same spirit of alacrity and despatch can (through your Lordship's means) be infused into all the departments of your Government, you will hereafter have the satisfaction to reflect, that you have contributed most effectually to the preservation of that Empire, which was acquired by the strength of our arms, and must be maintained by the same means. For my own part I declare to your Lordship, that I deem myself bound by every principle of duty and character to suspend every other consideration as secondary to the indispensable object of providing a large force in the field, and an efficient system of alliance; and so entirely devoted am I to the exigencies of this duty, that my estimate of characters, and my sentiments of respect, and even of affection in this country, are regulated absolutely by the degrees of zeal and alacrity which I find in those who are to assist me in this great struggle. Nor can I conceive a more firm foundation, or a more honourable bond of friendship than a common share in the labours, difficulties, and honour of defending and saving so valuable a part of the British Empire. This is the nature of the connection which I seek with your Lordship, and these are the sentiments which render me so averse to those men who appear negligent, or reluctant, or irresolute in a conjuncture which ought to extinguish all partialities, all private resentments and affections, and to unite and animate all talents and exertions in one common cause. In this effort your Lordship and I have the satisfaction to know that we have the most strenuous support of the whole Government at home, and that we must have that of every man acquainted with the real interests of India and attached to those of Great Britain. In such a cause, and with such support, we may safely tread with a firm step, and proceed steadily in a forward course; and I trust the moment is not distant when we may look back with mutual satisfaction and approbation to every step of the course we have pursued, and may claim

with justice and with success the gratitude of our country, and the best rewards of honest ambition. I am extremely happy to learn that your Lordship continues to approve the conduct of my brother,* it does not become me to say with how much safety you may repose implicit confidence in his honour and discretion. You will, I hope, have understood from him my cordial wish to conduct my intercourse with your Lordship upon a footing of the most unreserved freedom, without a sensation of jealousy, or with any other object than that of a sincere union for the purpose of first preserving, and finally of improving, the interests committed to our joint charge.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CI.

Major General Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 15th November, 1798.

I cannot refrain from taking the liberty of congratulating your Lordship, which I do with very great satisfaction, upon the successful issue of your Lordship's measures to extirpate the French influence at the Court at Hyderabad. Nothing struck me more forcibly, upon my arrival in this country, than the extent of the mischief which might be created by that baneful and inimical ascendancy. It was reserved for your Lordship's firmness and political wisdom to remove an evil of so dangerous a tendency. I very sincerely hope that the decision and energy, which have so eminently characterized this the first step of your Lordship's administration, will produce the effect of restoring our national character for vigour and spirit, upon which points I fear it has suffered much of late years in the opinion of the natives.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

* The Duke of Wellington, then Lt. Col. Wellesley, who had been sent by the Governor General to Madras with his regiment, the 33d infantry.

No. CII.

Major General Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 15th November, 1798.

Our intelligence continues unvaried in confirmation of the Shah's determination to attempt the invasion of Hindostan, and of his being on the point of crossing the Attock for the purpose. I have no doubt that Col. Collins will have transmitted to your Lordship the report of his cassids, the account of which I received from him yesterday evening, and which was at the same time confirmed, in all its material parts, by a letter that I received from one of my own people, a copy of which I sent to the Commander-in-Chief last night; this letter, which by the bye, ought to have reached me at least three days sooner than it did, contained the report of two of my hircarrahs, who returned direct from the Attock. The part of it which I saw with the greatest regret has been the confirmation, as far as such can be deduced from public report, of the opinion I have for some time past held, that little or no resistance would be made by the Seiks, and I fear as little is to be expected on the part of the Mahrattas. Seeing no reason to doubt the Shah's advancing soon, it would at any rate now be my wish to assemble the army at Anopsheer as soon as circumstances will admit. I feel however an additional inducement to the doing it, in the hope that it may give encouragement to the latter to attempt something at least. In their present divided and distracted state, I fear the offering any direct opposition to the Shah's approach to Delhi is more than can be expected from them; but if they should assemble any body of troops with a view of protecting their nearer frontier from his incursions, and could be prevailed upon to act with a little vigour on his flank and in his rear, which will be open to them, if he advances towards the boundaries of the Vizier's dominions, it might be useful; and I shall be glad to be honoured with your Lordship's instructions how far I may proceed, in concert with Colonel Collins, in suggesting the idea to them, or in listening to any overtures that they might make for a junction of forces, under circumstances that would not carry us far from our own frontier, or create any disadvantage as to

the local situation of an action. A reference to the map will point out to your Lordship that if the Shah should advance from Delhi, on this side the Jumna, it may equally be in the intention of pursuing his conquests over the Mahrattas, or of turning his arms against us. We should, therefore, be equally concerned in opposing his progress; and though, unable to accomplish this of themselves, yet such of the Mahratta chiefs, as remain united and attached to Scindiah, might be willing to join and assist us in an attempt, in which there is not a doubt but they must consider themselves as interested, even in the great stake of their existence as a nation in these parts. The distance from Anopsheer to the nearest part of the Jumna does not exceed forty miles, and if the aid of any tolerable body of the Mahrattas can be procured at the risk of advancing a part of that distance, instead of waiting for the enemy something nearer our own frontier, I should presume that your Lordship will think it advisable to adopt the measure. At the same time it appears to me that it must depend upon a knowledge of the extent of the assistance that is to be expected from them; and if your Lordship should think it preferable, it might, if expedient in other respects, be brought about as a sort of military agreement between the leaders of the respective armies without the intervention of Government in a formal treaty. I have confidence in assuring your Lordship that you may rely on my prudence in the exercise of any discretionary latitude, with which your Lordship may think proper to entrust me in this respect.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient

and most faithful humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. CIII.

Tippoo Sultan to the Governor General.

20th November, 1798. (Received 15th December, 1798).

It has lately come to my ears from report, that in consequence of the talk of interested persons military preparations

are on foot. Report is equally subject to the likelihood of being true or false. I have the fullest confidence that the present is without foundation. By the favour of God, the conditions (or obligations) of peace established (between us) have obtained the utmost degree of strength and firmness; under the circumstances of their having been firmly observed and adhered to, of the daily increasing union and friendship, and of the constant intercourse of correspondence, it (the report) cannot possibly be entitled to credit; but the promulgation of such reports excites my surprize. My friendly pen writes this; I hope your Lordship will be pleased to gratify me by writing of it. From a desire to maintain the obligations of treaty and engagement, I have no other intention (or thought) than to give increase to friendship, and my friendly heart is to the last degree bent on endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of harmony and union.

Let your Lordship always continue to gratify me by gladdening letters, notifying your welfare.

A true Translation, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. CIV.

The Right. Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

Wimbledon, 16th June, 1798.

MY DEAR LORD,

(Received 20th November, 1798).

Having been unwell for a considerable part of this spring, and particularly distressed with a weakness in my eyes, I have been obliged chiefly to make use of a Secretary's hand. Perhaps you may tell me that this does not require much apology.

The subject of this letter arises from recent despatches from the Cape of Good Hope, and the state of affairs in the Mediterranean, in consequence of a French fleet and a great armament being fitted out from Toulon, and having actually sailed upon some secret expedition under the conduct of their favourite General, Buonaparte. The intelligence we have received from the Cape must have reached you either from the Mauritius itself, or from the Cape of Good Hope, long be-

fore you can receive this. I think it however right to send the copy of a proclamation said to be issued by the Governor of the Mauritius, and if it speak true, we are probably at this time at war with Tippoo Sultaun. If we are not, it must have arisen either from his name being introduced into the proclamation without his authority, or from his having in consequence of proper representations from our Government in India, disclaimed and disavowed the whole in such a manner as to set your mind at ease upon the subject. When I speak of disclaiming what is imputed to him, I mean that his conduct should be such as to evince the sincerity of his professions, for if he contents himself with a mere denial, and is at the same time, by preparations and hostile movements, demonstrating his real intention of breach of treaty with this country, your Lordship's wisdom and vigilance will not be lulled asleep or trifled with, but will, when you think it the proper moment for doing so, bring him to an explanation in the only way such conduct merits, and I am persuaded that it will be your peculiar care so to act with regard to other allies, as to induce them to cooperate with us in chastizing so notorious a breach of faith, not only to us, but to all those who were united together in that war which led to the peace concluded under the auspices of Marquis Cornwallis.

I likewise send to your Lordship the most recent intelligence we have received relative to the expedition fitted out in the Mediterranean.

For a long time it was rumoured that Buonaparte was intended to lead the threatened invasion against Great Britain and Ireland, but whether it has proceeded from the irresistible superiority of our fleet, or from the great preparations which the zeal and loyalty of his Majesty's subjects has enabled him to make throughout the Kingdom, I cannot pretend with certainty to know, but it does appear that of late they have been more reserved in their menaces, and less forward in their preparations in the ports opposite to our coasts; and the great exertions of the Republic appear to have been made to fit out the present armament from the ports of the Mediterranean. The destination of this expedition has been matter of various conjecture. It was for some time supposed to be destined against Naples, or Portugal, or, under cover of the latter,

to lay the foundation of revolutionizing the Spanish monarchy. By the latest intelligence transmitted to me by Lord Grenville, the copies of which are herewith inclosed, it would appear that Egypt and India are the ultimate object of this great preparation. We have intelligence of the armament having actually sailed upon the 19th day of May, and we entertain sanguine hopes that, whatever the destination of it may be, the design of the enemy will be frustrated, and the armament itself destroyed by a powerful squadron acting in the Mediterranean, under the command of Sir Horatio Nelson, the object of which is to watch and to pursue it, wherever its course may be directed. If it actually is destined for Egypt, it appears to me to be a great and a masterly stroke; and if successful, would be attended with very pernicious consequences to the interests of this country. In order to avoid entering into a long detail at present upon that view of the subject, I shall content myself with sending your Lordship a copy of a letter written to Lord Grenville* two days ago, in consequence of the intelligence communicated to me by his Lordship. We expect soon to receive certain advice both of the object of the expedition from Toulon, and of the success of the force which has been detached to counteract it; but with the intelligence before us to which I have referred in this letter, His Majesty's servants would be culpable in delaying a moment to inform you of what is at present known to them, and of the measures which they have in consequence resolved upon.

It is intended, with as little delay as possible, to send a very respectable reinforcement of European force for the service of India. First, a body of about 1,500 troops from the Cape of Good Hope: that settlement to be strengthened by other force as soon as circumstances will allow of it. Secondly, it is proposed to send 1,500 newly recruited troops to the garrison of Gibraltar, and to forward from thence to India an equal number of troops which have been seasoned there; and lastly, there are above 1,500 European troops now serving in Portugal, which it is likewise intended to order for India. These different detachments, from the flower of the British army, will tend to put his Majesty's European forces in India upon a respectable footing. By the arrange-

* Vide Appendix.

ment with the East India Company, his Majesty's European regiments of infantry are to be 1,200 strong. His Royal Highness the Duke of York will accordingly issue his orders to the Commanders-in-Chief at the different settlements, to draft the regiments into each other in such a manner as not to increase the expense agreed upon in the arrangement with the Company.

My dear Lord,

With sincere regard, and with every wish for the success of your Administration, your's very faithfully,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors.

HON. SIRS,

Fort William, 21st Nov. 1798.

By my letter despatched overland from Fort St. George, I had the honour to inform you of my arrival at that Presidency on the 26th April.

I lost no time in endeavouring to execute your commands with respect to the propositions, which you had directed me to make, to his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic.

I am concerned to inform you that the conciliatory measures, which, in conformity to the spirit and letter of your instructions, I employed, in the hope of persuading his Highness to agree to a modification of the treaty of 1792, produced no more favourable effect upon his Highness's mind than to draw from him repeated acknowledgments of your moderation and justice.

I was equally unsuccessful in my endeavours to persuade his Highness to enter into any adjustment of his debt to the Company.

By my letter of the 23rd of June, despatched overland, I had the honour to inform you of my arrival at Calcutta on the 17th May, on the 18th of which month I took charge of the Government General of your possessions in India. Soon after my arrival I despatched to the Government of Fort St. George my final directions for carrying into effect the orders of your Secret Committee with regard to the deposition of Amer Sing, the late Rajah of Tanjore, and to the establishment of Serfojee upon the throne of that kingdom.*

* See p. 41.

It was a great satisfaction to me to learn from the Government of Fort St. George that this signal act of justice took place without occasioning any disturbance at Tanjore.

The state of your finances at this Presidency demanded my earliest attention.

The enquiry which I proposed to institute* into the various branches of expenditure and revenue, as well at this Presidency as at your other settlements, is commenced in Bengal, at Madras, and at Bombay.

At this Presidency I have no doubt that the result of the enquiry will lead to a reduction of expense, and to an augmentation of your resources.

The detail of my proceedings on this subject shall be forwarded to you as soon as the enquiry shall have been completed, but in the interval I shall not delay the adoption of such measures as shall appear to promise any substantial and speedy benefit to your affairs.

The state of your public buildings, and of the allowances to your servants, under the head of house and office rent, has formed one branch of my investigations, and I hope to be able to effect a considerable permanent reduction in the charges on that head, accompanied by an improvement of your estate at Calcutta, as well as by an addition to the accommodation of your servants, and by other arrangements tending to facilitate the despatch of public business in all the principal departments of your civil service.

While I was engaged in considering the means of improving the internal order and management of your finances, I received intelligence which led me to apprehend the approach of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, aided by a French force. Your Secret Committee is in possession of this intelligence, of which the result on my mind was, a firm conviction that the safety of your possessions in the peninsula of India demanded that your armies should be placed in an active and early state of preparation for war. Accordingly having apprized the Governor of Fort St. George as early as the 9th June,† of my apprehensions of the designs of the enemy, and having directed his attention to the probability of our being involved in hostilities; on the 20th June‡ I issued my final orders to

* See Minute of 12th June, 1798, p. 54.

† See p. 54.

‡ See p. 240.

the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay for calling your armies into the field on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. These orders have been executed; and I trust that the subsequent disclosure of the projects entertained by France against the British empire in India, and the adventurous and daring spirit with which those projects have been prosecuted, will sufficiently justify to your Honourable Court the measures of precaution which I deemed it my duty to adopt for the defence of your territories; although the immediate effect of those measures has necessarily occasioned a large increase of your expenses, a diminution of your commercial investment, and a suspension of the improvements which I had hoped to have accomplished in the state of your pecuniary affairs.

It would have been a most improvident and mistaken economy to have hazarded the permanent safety of the British empire in India, and to have abandoned the sources of your commercial prosperity without defence to the attack of the enemy, for the purpose of preserving a specious and delusive appearance of security in a conjuncture of real danger.

I am persuaded that the wisdom and justice of your Honourable Court will readily approve the policy of sacrificing a degree of temporary advantage to the important object of providing an effectual protection for the foundations of your trade and revenue, and for the lasting tranquillity of your possessions in India.

Under the expectation of an approaching war with Tippoo Sultaun, aided by the French, the state of our alliances with the country powers became an anxious object of my consideration.

I have submitted a full detail of my opinions and proceedings upon this subject to your Secret Committee, but it is my duty in this place to request the attention of your Honourable Court to the condition in which I found our alliance with his Highness the Nizam, and to the happy improvement which circumstances have enabled me to effect in the nature of our connection with that prince.

The corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam, which, during the last war with Mysore, amounted to no more than 1,500 men, and was at that period of time so defective in point of discipline as to be rather an object of

contempt than of jealousy to your Governments in India, had gradually augmented its numbers and improved its discipline under the command of the late Monsieur Raymond, until at the period of my arrival in India it had nearly reached the number of 14,000 men, and had attained a degree of discipline superior in every respect to that of any native infantry in India, excepting the sepoys entertained in your service.

This corps formed the largest and most efficient branch of the military establishment of his Highness, and the French officers had acquired a considerable ascendancy in his dominions, and had manifested, on several occasions, the symptoms of a disposition so arrogant, overbearing, and adventurous, as to excite alarm in the minds of his Highness and of his ministers. Although his Highness had entered into no engagement or obligation which in any degree bound him to retain this party in his service, and although their sudden dismissal would at any moment have been warranted by every principle of justice, and their continuance at Hyderabad threatened the independence, if not the existence of his Highness's throne, yet the Nizam and his ministers confessed their inability to check the growth of a power, of which they acknowledged the dangerous influence and dreaded the destructive effect.

The principles of the French officers commanding this army were avowedly the same with those of the persons who for some time past have exercised the powers of Government in France, and their enmity to the British interests was declared on all occasions. While this army, commanded by Frenchmen of such principles and views, and of such uncontrolled power, remained in the service of the Nizam, his Highness's alliance must have proved a source rather of danger than of advantage to the Company, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun; and that danger would have been greatly aggravated by any cooperation which might have been afforded to Tippoo from France. Various other considerations will occur to the wisdom and experience of your Honourable Court, to prove the direct and collateral effects which the existence of a numerous armed French party in the centre of the Decan must have produced, whether in time of war or of peace, upon the whole frame of your political interests in India. Under these circumstances, the expulsion of the French party

from the Court of Hyderabad appeared to me to be a necessary part of that system of precaution and defence by which I hoped to be enabled either to encounter the pressure of war, or to secure the advantages of peace.

With these views on the 8th July, I instructed the Acting Resident at Hyderabad to open a negociation with his Highness the Nizam, proposing an addition to the British detachment serving at Hyderabad, and stipulating for the dismissal of the corps commanded by French officers in his Highness's service.

A new subsidiary treaty, founded on this basis, and embracing other collateral arrangements (particularly such conditions as appeared necessary for the removal of all causes of jealousy, and for the restoration of union and concord between our two allies, the Peishwa and the Nizam), was signed by his Highness at Hyderabad on the 1st of September, and ratified by me in Council on the 18th of the same month.

By this treaty an increase is made in the British subsidiary force serving with his Highness of 4,400 men, and an increase in the annual subsidy paid by his Highness, of about nineteen lacs of rupees. The former subsidy having been 53,713 Arcot rupees per mensem, and the subsidy under the new treaty being 2,01,425 Arcot rupees per mensem, or 24,17,100 Arcot rupees per annum.

The substance of this treaty was communicated to the Peishwa both previously and subsequently to its conclusion, and at both periods he expressed his entire approbation of the nature and tendency of the new engagements, as well in their operation upon the interests of the Mahratta empire, as upon those of the Nizam.

On the 13th July* I ordered the Government of Fort St. George to assemble such a force in the Guntoor Circar as might enable me to fulfil the subsidiary engagements of the Company, under the new treaty, at the earliest possible period subsequent to its conclusion. This measure was executed with the utmost degree of promptitude and alacrity by Lieutenant General Harris (at that time uniting in his person the offices of Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander-in-

Chief on the coast of Coromandel,) to whose zeal, public spirit, and prompt obedience on all occasions wherein I have entrusted him with the execution of my orders, I am happy to be able to bear this public testimony.

The British detachment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, reached Hyderabad on the 10th October, and, on the 22nd October, under the orders of his Highness the Nizam, and with the cooperation of a body of his cavalry, surrounded the camp of the French army, disarmed all the sepoys, and secured the persons of all the French officers then in the camp. This operation was happily effected without bloodshed and without contest. A mutiny having broken out in the French camp on the preceding day, and the sepoys having imprisoned their officers, the Resident at Hyderabad and Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, with the consent of the Nizam, judiciously availed themselves of this favourable opportunity to execute this important measure without difficulty or danger.

The amount of the French force disarmed on this occasion was about 11,000 men, from which circumstance your Honourable Court will observe that a part of the corps was absent, on detachment. Measures have been taken for the arrest of those who commanded the detached force. The French officers, by my particular orders, were treated with every practicable degree of attention and humanity; at the period of their arrest by our troops their persons were in confinement, and their lives in danger from the mutiny prevailing in their camp; and the greatest difficulty which Colonel Roberts encountered was, that of rescuing the imprisoned officers from the violence of their own sepoys. Particular care was taken to save the property of the officers for their use, as well as to obtain for them such arrears of pay and allowances as were due to them from his Highness; Captain Kirkpatrick informs me, that he has been completely successful in effecting both these desirable objects. The French officers are now on their passage to this Presidency on board the *Bombay* frigate, which I had previously stationed at Masulipatam for their accommodation. On their arrival at Calcutta it is my intention to receive them with the consideration due to their respective ranks, and to allow them every indulgence compatible with the security of their persons. I propose to

send them to Europe by the earliest opportunity, using the precaution of dispersing them in different ships.

On their arrival in England I have engaged that they shall not be treated as prisoners of war, but shall be immediately transported to France, without suffering any detention for an exchange of prisoners.

The treaty under which this measure was executed has been already forwarded overland to your Secret Committee, and it now forms a number of the secret despatch by the *Eurydice*.

The effect of the measure will, I trust, be highly favourable to your political interests in the peninsula of India. The British subsidiary force now stationed in the dominions of his Highness the Nizam, while it must tend to cement the connexion between the Company and that Prince, and to render him a more useful and efficient ally in the event of war, will operate at all times as an effectual protection to your possessions in the Northern Circars; and the total subversion of the French influence in the Deccan, under all the circumstances of the present moment, is an event from which I expect to derive additional security, not only for your territories, but for the general tranquillity of India.

Among your servants who have been concerned in the execution of my orders, on this occasion, I have already recommended Lieutenant General Harris to your favourable notice. To his name it is my duty to add those of Captain Kirkpatrick and of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts. I found the former in the situation of Acting Resident at Hyderabad, and to his zeal, address, discretion, and firmness, I attribute the early success of the negotiation entrusted to his management.

Upon the resignation of Colonel Kirkpatrick, I took occasion to manifest my sense of Captain Kirkpatrick's merits, by appointing him Resident at the Court of the Nizam.

To the ability and temper of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, acting under the judicious instructions of the Resident, I attribute the complete and satisfactory execution of the articles of the treaty relating to the dismissal of the French army; and his conciliatory and humane conduct towards the officers deserves the highest commendation.

The rumours which have prevailed of the intended approach of Zemaun Shah to the frontier of Hindostan, although

of a vague and contradictory nature, appeared to me not wholly undeserving of attention; and I have the satisfaction to inform you that every possible precaution has been taken for the effectual defence of the frontier of Oude.

I am happy to be able to inform you that, although I found the subsidy of the Nabob Vizier considerably in arrear, I have succeeded in persuading his Excellency to discharge a large part of it; and in justice to his Excellency, I am bound to declare, that I have found him sincerely disposed to fulfil his engagements under the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth, and to manifest on every occasion a cordial attachment to the interests of the Company. The situation of affairs on the coast of Coromandel, and the necessity of providing against the possible event of a war with Tippoo Sul-taun, have hitherto prevented me from visiting the upper provinces. But I have not been unmindful of the affairs of Oude, and I trust that I shall soon be able to turn my undivided attention to the improvement of the civil and military establishments of the Nabob Vizier.

Although I have deemed it my duty to call your armies into the field in every part of India, my views and expectations are all directed to the preservation of peace, which in the present crisis cannot otherwise be secured than by a state of forward preparation for war. In the mean while you may rely on my unremitting efforts to confine your expenses within the most narrow limits, and to raise your commercial investment to the highest scale compatible with the indispensable necessity of providing for the security of your possessions.

In the execution of my orders for the protection of your territories on the coast of Malabar, I am much indebted to the zeal and diligence of Mr. Duncan and General Stuart, and the vigilance and firmness manifested by the Government of Bombay on the first intelligence of the progress of the French arms in Egypt, have obtained my public and cordial approbation. It is also a peculiar satisfaction to me to inform your Honourable Court that I have received from Lord Clive the most ready and honourable support in the preparations for the defence of the Carnatic, and that reposing the most implicit confidence in his Lordship's anxious solicitude for the prosperity of the general administration of your affairs en-

trusted to my hands, as well as in his assiduous attention to the peculiar duties of his own station, I expect to derive considerable benefit to your service from a sincere union with him in the important task of preserving and improving the interests committed to our joint charge.

Notwithstanding the great strength of the military force now in India, I have deemed it my duty, for the further security of this Presidency to embody the Militia, composed of the European and Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta; and my orders for this purpose have been obeyed with an alacrity and zeal which strongly indicate the resolution of your civil servants, and of all the European and Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta, to devote their personal services to the defence of the seat of your Supreme Government in any exigency which may arise. My intention is to establish this useful corps upon a permanent foundation, as an institution from which great advantage may hereafter be derived.

I trust in the course of a few months to be enabled to lay before your Honourable Court my observations in detail on the great branches of your service, and on the conduct and character of your servants acting under my orders. For the present I must content myself with submitting to your Honourable Court a general assurance that I have every reason to approve (with few exceptions, the particulars of which will appear upon the proceedings), the conduct of your servants, in all the departments of the Government.

I have had the honour to receive your commands of the 6th of June, with respect to the regulation of your military establishments at this Presidency, and I have already directed that your orders with respect to the system of promotion by regimental rise should be carried into immediate effect. In the mean while I have the satisfaction to assure you that the general disposition of your army at this Presidency is such as to merit your approbation and confidence; and I entertain no apprehension of meeting any difficulty in the establishment of the regulations, which you have forwarded to me, or of any other, which the wisdom of your Honourable Court may deem it advisable to enforce.

By the regular ships of this season, I propose to submit to the consideration of your Honourable Court my proceedings with respect to the several other parts of your commands.

In my letter of the 23d of August,* I had the honour to inform you of the proceedings of the British inhabitants at Calcutta on the 17th of July, of their having presented to me a dutiful and loyal address for transmission to his Majesty, and of their having subscribed to a voluntary contribution for the public service of Great Britain in the present exigency. The details of this transaction will appear in the printed papers of which several copies are forwarded by this despatch for the use of your Honourable Court. The amount of the voluntary contribution remitted to Great Britain by the ship *Eurydice* is £95,843 7s. 11d.

I trust that your Honourable Court will sanction the approbation which I deemed it my duty to declare of the spirit of loyalty and attachment towards his Majesty's person, family and government, and of the affectionate solicitude for the safety of the British Empire in Europe, which dictated the expressions of the address, and the measure of the voluntary contribution.

It was my intention to have despatched the *Eurydice* as early as the month of September, but the various important events which have successively arisen, and my desire to transmit to England the most ample details with respect to the state of your affairs in India, have induced me to detain her until this time.

The original address to his Majesty, with the signatures, is forwarded to your Honourable Court by the ship *Eurydice*. I take the liberty of submitting to your Honourable Court my request that the address may be presented to his Majesty by your Chairman, attended by the whole Court in the most public manner.

It was a great pleasure to me to receive the honour of your approbation of the measures which I took at the Cape for the detention of the *Mildred*, and for the despatch of your several packets by his Majesty's ship *Crescent*. The approbation of your Honourable Court will always form a primary object of my ambition.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
with the greatest respect,
your most obedient and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

* See p. 233.

No. CVI.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 29th Nov. 1798.

I have the honour to transmit for your perusal a paper of intelligence, on the correctness of which, as far as it goes, I believe you may with confidence rely. It comes through the channel of a friend of the family of the former King of Mysore, who had communication and engagements with Lord Pigot, Lord Macartney, and Sir William Meadows I believe, and whose information during the periods of their governments was found to be of importance, and invariably to be depended upon. This person, Tremal Row, keeps up a connection with the old Queen of Mysore, who is confined by Tippoo, and whose only hopes of the restoration of her family arise from the prospect of a war. Upon this unfortunate Lady's views and wishes, I expect very soon to be able to send your Lordship a paper, which in that event may become a subject of your consideration. Tremal Row is also connected with some persons immediately employed in the Sultan's Government, which though it affords him superior means of information, places him under considerable alarm for the safety of those persons. He has however engaged, upon receiving assurances of the strictest secrecy, to furnish me with the best information, and that object will be completely secured to him by his communicating with me through Mr. Webbe, whose knowledge of the Mahratta language enables him to converse in it without the intervention of dubash or interpreter.

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect and esteem,

My Lord, your Lordship's,

Most faithful servant,

CLIVE.

No. CVII.

Memorandum in Lord Clive's Letter.

28th Nov. 1798.

[Intelligence by a person who left Seringapatam, 18 days since.]

Tippoo is extremely uneasy on account of the information relative to the defeat of the French fleet at Alexandria, and

the little prospect he now has of being soon succoured by the reinforcements promised him by the French.

He has positive information of the great military preparations going on in the Carnatic, and is assured in his own mind, that the English intend to attack him without delay. His own designs not being matured, he is desirous at present to avoid war, and on this account he means to put himself in a state of preparation only, and wait the motions of the English—with a view to this plan, he has taken measures to augment his infantry by 8000 men, and to recruit his cavalry to the number of 30,000, besides which from the habits of friendship, which subsist between him and Rastiah, he expects by means of this person to receive the assistance of 20,000 Mahratta horse. He is also levying 20,000 Peons to be used in plundering, and having sent for three principal Lumbardies, who frequent the Mysore country, presented them each with an elephant, took engagements from them, by which they are bound to supply him with 50,000 bullocks.

For some time past he has been employed in repairing the works of Seringapatam, and in consequence the fort is in an unfinished state, and conceiving it might fall, if attacked by the English, he has prepared Chittledroog and Pajoonda for the reception of his family and treasure, thus meaning to keep the field in person should his capital be besieged. Of his family and treasure, however, no part is yet removed from Seringapatam. Of late he has with the greatest secrecy, issued to the Mint Master at Seringapatam, to be coined, bullion gold and silver, sufficient for 30 lacs of sultaney pagodas, and 20 lacs of sultaney rupees. A Killadar with 200 men is again established at Bangalore, and appearances indicate that the place will be re-fortified. In order that his troops may be ready to act in the event of the English commencing hostilities, he has stationed in different places in the Coimbatore about 3000 horse, and a few infantry, and a body of Peons with orders to enter the southern provinces, and ravage them from Trichinopoly to Tinnevely—5000 horse are also distributed in the districts of Malwagh, and that neighbourhood with similar orders for the purpose of plundering the Carnatic. Muddoo Chan and Ghazu Chan's son, who command the Beid horse, are particularly cautioned to have their corps in readiness for predatory service.

No. CVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort William, Dec. 10th, 1798.

I had the honour of addressing a friendly letter to your Highness, on the 8th of November* last, in which I stated a variety of important points, to which your Highness would no doubt perceive the propriety and necessity of giving your earliest and most serious consideration. I particularly hope, that your Highness will have been sensible of the advantages likely to result to all parties, from the conciliatory measure of my deputing Major Doveton to you, which I proposed in that letter.

I expect to have the pleasure of finding your answer to that letter on my arrival at Madras, for which place I am on the point of setting out from Calcutta. I hope to arrive at Madras about the same time that this letter reaches you, and should any circumstances hitherto have prevented your answering my last letter of the 8th November, I assure myself that you will immediately, on your receipt of this, despatch a satisfactory reply to it, addressed to me at Madras.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 10th Dec. 1798.

I despatch this letter by an express vessel to inform your Lordship, that a consideration of the delays which must arise from the necessity of a reference to me in the event of Tippoo Sultaun's acceding to my proposition for an amicable negotiation, has determined me to proceed to Fort St. George, on board the *Sybilie*; and that I hope to be able to embark on Monday next.

The Shah has crossed the Attock, and is certainly at Lahore with a large army. The Seiks will give every op-

* See p. 326.

position within their power to his progress, but their internal distractions preclude the possibility of their meeting his army in the field. The Mahratta power on the north western frontier of Hindostan, is nearly in the same state and temper as the Seiks, and Scindiah's return, (the object of my early and unremitted endeavours) appears as distant and uncertain as ever. In this state of affairs (of which I have received the account just now) I have determined that Sir Alured Clarke, shall remain here in charge of the Government and of the army instead of proceeding to the coast; while I shall endeavour with your Lordship's assistance, to bring matters in your quarter to a distinct issue.

Under these circumstances the command of the army destined eventually against Mysore, will remain in the hands of General Harris, who will now consider himself at liberty to form his plan of general operations, and to direct the movement of the army according to his judgment. My wish is that the battering train should be advanced as near the frontier as possible without delay. But I am aware, that until it can be determined through which pass the army is to proceed into Mysore, it may be difficult to fix any forward point at which the train should be stationed; and it is impossible to determine the route of our army, until we shall have ascertained the time when we may expect the junction of the Nizam's force. Adverting to these difficulties, I must leave it to your Lordship and General Harris to make such arrangements as may appear most advisable; apprizing you that my wish is to advance the train as near as possible to the frontier. It is equally an object of my anxiety, that your whole army should be advanced in the same manner as speedily as may be practicable, consistently with the observations which I have applied to the station of the battering train, and which are equally applicable to that of the army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CX.

Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp at Futtý Ghur, Dec. 13, 1798.

Since I had the honor of addressing your Lordship on the 29th ultimo, nothing has occurred, upon which I could deem it necessary to intrude upon your Lordship's time.

The Commander-in-Chief will have reported to your Lordship the march of the last of the troops under my command, with which I joined the division under Colonel Clarke, at this place yesterday, and shall proceed the day after tomorrow towards Anopsheer, where I shall direct General Stuart to join me. I hope the whole will be collected by the 26th.

Your Lordship will be aware, that having left four battalions under the command of Colonel Russell, to act as may be expedient, with a view to the internal security of the Vizier's dominions, we shall have in the field ten native battalions, and two of Europeans, with four regiments of cavalry, besides the independent regiment under Colonel Bruce. From the great length of time which it has required to prepare the artillery and stores directed to be sent from Chunar, and which so far exceeded what I could suppose to be necessary, that I could not think of suffering any further delay on their account we are something deficient in these respects; I have however made arrangements for sending part after us, and having appropriated a considerable portion to the service of Colonel Russell's corps, in the confidence that he could not have any occasion for them for some time; I hope that in every event we cannot suffer much inconvenience on that head. In the article of cattle and carriage of every sort, our supply is ample; indeed I do not believe that any army in India was ever in a state more compleat as to the means of movement.

Being extremely anxious for the junction of the 7th regiment, which is now on the Lucknow duty, I wrote on the 8th to Mr. Lumsden to press the Nabob to come to an immediate determination relative to his joining the army, and to fix a short day for his departure, in case he should continue in the resolution of accompanying us. The result of a long conference which he had with the Nabob on the subject was, that he would remain at Lucknow, but he was extremely

pressing to have some of the Company's troops left for his protection, indeed he made it almost a condition. As he would embarrass us a good deal by his presence, I have consented that a battalion of Colonel Russell's corps shall remain with him, and I had the less difficulty in doing so, from considering that in case of any movement on the part of the Rohillas, capable of exciting alarm, timely notice will always be had, and the fears of the Nabob himself will readily suggest the expediency of this battalion joining the remainder of Colonel Russell's corps, destined chiefly for the express purpose of opposing these people.

Although I have made arrangements upon a very large scale, and at a very considerable expence, for procuring intelligence immediately from the Shah's camp, a sufficient time has not yet elapsed, to receive any benefit from them, and at present I depend entirely upon the communications made to me by Colonel Collins and Mr. Lumsden, which are of course regularly transmitted to your Lordship; from the latest it would seem, as if the Shah was in the intention of establishing himself in the Pungab, before he prosecutes his further objects, and Colonel Collins informs me, that he has grounds for thinking, that with this view, he is using his endeavours to conciliate the Seik Chiefs. If this should really be the case, it will necessarily occasion his remaining at Lahore some time. It appears indeed, that it would be an act of extreme temerity in him to advance, until he has secured these people, either by conquest or conciliation, but at the same time must it be confessed, that their resistance both on this and on the last occasion, has been so inconsiderable—the opportunity offered by the divisions in the Mahratta Government is so favorable, and the Shah's wants with respect to money, seem to be so pressing, that it is far from improbable, that he might determine to encounter all the hazards of the step, to reach Delhi, where alone he can look for any possible supply, though perhaps he may be sensible, that he must proceed further to render it any wise efficient.

Were the Seiks united as a nation, I should think it scarcely possible that they would ever enter into the Shah's interests, they must know that their existence is incompatible with them, and they must feel that by forwarding that Prince's views, they would only render him the more perfect

master of their fate; but in their present distracted and dis-united state, where no union or concert is to be expected, where no prospect appears of successful opposition, where mutual jealousy and distrust must magnify the danger and aggravate their fears,—is it not highly probable, that distant considerations will be sacrificed to the interests of the moment,—is it not likely, that viewing it as the only possible means of securing their personal safety, they may be anxious to anticipate each other in meeting the Shah's advances. Should this surmise be realised, though the requisite arrangements may probably delay him some little time at Lahore, he will be enabled to advance shortly without the risk of leaving an enemy behind him, but on the contrary, with increased strength by the accession of that very enemy.

The Mahrattas are likewise, it appears, in the determination of assembling at Delhi, but of themselves I am convinced they will do as little as the Seiks. I am led to believe that the appearance of our army assembling on the frontier, has been their only inducement for this apparent vigour, which, unless supported, will terminate in appearance only.

These are considerations which, though I assume the liberty of mentioning them as they suggest themselves to my mind, I have not a doubt that they have already met with every necessary attention from your Lordship, where they will have their due weight in the decision of the question, whether to confine our force to the precise defence of the Vizier's dominions, or by advancing to give support to the Mahrattas, and encouragement to the Seiks.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

P.S. Since writing the above, Colonel Collins has communicated some intelligence which he has just received from Delhi, by which it would appear that the Seiks are actually assembled in some numbers at Amrutsir, that skirmishes have taken place between them and the Shah's troops, but there is nothing yet that can lead me to alter my opinion as to what is to be expected from these people. Without support, I am convinced they will do little that is effectual.

No. CXI.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency Rear-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, 13th Dec. 1798.

It gives me great satisfaction to find that I have anticipated your Excellency's wishes with respect to arming such Indian men and other vessels as appeared fit for the purpose. The ships *Earl Howe* and *Princess Charlotte*, having been armed and manned as completely as the circumstances of this port will admit, were despatched, on the 12th December, under the instructions already forwarded to you. I take this occasion to recommend to your favourable notice Captain Burrowes of the *Earl Howe*, and Captain Prescott of the *Princess Charlotte*; they manifested the utmost zeal and alacrity in preparing for a service which does not afford the prospect of any other reward than the approbation of your Excellency and of the public.

I return your Excellency many thanks for your obliging attention in permitting me to exercise my discretion on the important question of detaining the *Sybil* on this station. I will state to you, without reserve, the considerations on which my opinion has been formed, and on which it now rests.

The great object of all our efforts, in the present crisis, is to prevent the success of the joint designs of Tippoo Sultaun and of the French. On the one hand, we must endeavour to intercept all communication by sea between Tippoo and the French; on the other hand, it is an equally urgent duty, with the same view, to strengthen our army in the Carnatic to the utmost possible degree, in order to provide against all contingencies. To your Excellency, in this confidential communication, I will state considerations of a more secret nature, which affect my judgment on this question.

The period of the season, the state of the French army in Egypt, and every accompanying circumstance, leave little apprehension of the approach of any considerable French force to the coast of Malabar before the month of March or April. In the meanwhile the happy revival of our alliances with the native powers, the destruction of the French party in the Deccan, the advanced state of our preparations for war on the coasts of Coromandel and of Malabar, and the expected

arrival of large reinforcements from the Cape and from Europe, place us in a commanding situation in the peninsula of India. Being convinced of the hostile nature of Tippoo's views, I am resolved to avail myself of the present favourable moment to reduce his powers of offence, either by the terror or by the actual employment of our arms; for it is evident that, if we suffer him to continue his preparations for war without molestation, the same pressure of danger under which we have lately suffered, will come upon us in the next season with redoubled force. A blow struck now may save crores of rupees and thousands of lives, by rendering Tippoo unable to avail himself of the future assistance of France whenever she may be able to renew her attempts against India.

With these views, I have ordered a considerable force to be embarked for Fort St. George; and large convoys of artillery, stores, and provisions, will be constantly passing from this port to the coast during the next monsoon. The failure of the crops on the coast will render it still more necessary to send constant and ample supplies of rice to that quarter.

My intention is to try the effect of negotiation with the Sultaun in the first instance; if that should fail, war will become inevitable.

Under these circumstances, it is absolutely necessary to secure a free intercourse between this port and the coast of Coromandel, and this object is intimately connected with the views which the Lords of the Admiralty and your Excellency entertain of frustrating the combined projects of Tippoo and of France, and of affording defence to the British empire in India.

If one or two of the enemy's large frigates from Batavia were to enter the bay of Bengal during the present monsoon, they would be superior to any opposition which I could provide by arming Indiamen, or such other vessels as this river affords.

The *Sybilie*, therefore, is the only force on which I can rely at present for securing an intercourse with the coast of Coromandel, and I consider her continuance in the Bay of Bengal to be indispensably necessary to the public service, either with a view to the possibility of an irruption from Tippoo into the Carnatic, or to the great object of anticipating his hostilities by our alacrity and firmness.

Your Excellency will, I trust, concur in acknowledging the strength of the reasons which have induced me to avail myself of the discretion which you have allowed me, to detain the *Sybillie* on this station, until Captain Cooke shall receive your further orders. I also trust that the armed Indiamen will arrive under your command before you could have expected them, and that their presence will prove useful.

The embarkation of troops to the coast will take place in the course of this week, and having consulted with the Marine Board and with Captain Cooke, I have judged it advisable to recommend, for the purpose of despatch, that the *Sybillie* should cruize for a short time off the Armegon sand, while the *Nonsuch* shall be stationed at the mouth of the Hooghly, and that the transports shall run down to Madras separately, as they shall happen to be ready for sea, without waiting to sail in one convoy. This arrangement will also enable Captain Cooke to receive your Excellency's final orders at Madras much sooner than he could have expected, if the *Sybillie* had cruized off the Sand heads.

The situation of affairs rendering it necessary for me to proceed to Madras, I have requested Captain Cooke to allow me a passage on board the *Sybillie*, and as soon as she can be ready for sea, I propose to embark with Captain Cooke accordingly. He gives me reason to expect that the *Sybillie* will drop down the river to-morrow, and be ready for sea on Wednesday next.

The Presidency of Fort St. George will become the seat of the Supreme Government during my residence there; my hope is, that I shall not be under the necessity of remaining on the coast more than two months. Your Excellency will have the goodness to address your commands to me at Fort St. George, until further advice. The *Cornwallis* will convey part of my establishment to Fort St. George, and will from thence be despatched to join your Excellency, touching at Pointe de Galle and Anjengo for your orders. The *Bombay* frigate being employed on the important service of conveying the French officers and privates (lately dismissed from the service of the Nizam under the stipulations of the new treaty) to Fort William, is not yet arrived in the Hooghly; as soon as she arrives, I shall despatch her to your Excellency, under the same instructions as those of the *Cornwallis*.

If your Excellency should still deem it necessary to call the *Sybilie* to the coast of Malabar, I must, in that case, request that the armed Indiamen and the *Cornwallis* may be ordered to return to this station with all practicable expedition. I am aware that the return of these ships cannot be effected for a considerable time, and I have despatched them to the coast of Malabar in the confident hope that the reasons which I have urged for the detention of the *Sybilie* will make the same impression on your Excellency's judgment which they have produced on mine.

I entirely concur with your Excellency in opinion that the defence of the Company's possessions on the coast of Malabar, and the blockade of Tippoo's ports, demand your first attention. I confess that I do not now see the least prospect of any attempt of the French through the Persian gulf; and I conclude that you will exercise your discretion (justified by the actual state of circumstances) in the execution of such parts of the orders of the Lord's Commissioners of the Admiralty as relate to the establishment of a cruize in that quarter.

I shall detain whatever large ships shall arrive from China until I shall receive your further commands; but I shall not arm them before I know that you require their assistance. On this subject I shall expect your orders at Madras.

I return your Excellency many thanks for your obliging congratulations on the late happy result of my measures at the Court of the Nizam.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXII.

Minute in the Secret Department.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Fort William, 14th Dec. 1798.

The military regulations contained in the separate letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors, of the 6th of June, 1798, having been carried into effect, as far as they related to the alterations in the establishments, and to the arrangement of regimental rank, I now proceed to explain the motives which have determined me to suspend the exe-

cution of the orders of the Court, with relation to certain allowances granted by this Government in June, 1796.

If the present temper of the army at this Presidency afforded any ground to suspect that the execution of the reductions ordered by the Court would produce either disrespectful remonstrance or intemperate opposition on the part of the officers, no crisis, however extreme, would have induced me to modify the orders of the Court. In such a case, the power and authority of the Government and the discipline of the army would have been at stake; and every other consideration must have been superseded by the indispensable necessity of subduing every remnant of the spirit of insubordination, and of preserving the main spring of our military strength. But I am happy to declare my conviction that the army is now in a temper to receive, with dutiful submission, whatever regulations the Government may chuse to enforce. The question of discipline (which must have precluded all exercise of my discretion) now no longer exists.

On the other hand, I should not have deemed myself at liberty to exercise any discretion in the execution of the Court's orders, if the circumstances of the present conjuncture had not been of a nature not only extraordinary, but unknown to the Court at the time of despatching the letter of the 6th of June.

On any occasion of a different description, my duty would have been that of implicit obedience, whatever might have been my opinion of the policy of the regulations which I had been ordered to carry into effect.

The Court of Directors could not be aware, in the month of June, of the dangers which now threaten every part of the British possessions in India.

On every point of our frontier we are threatened by the designs of powerful enemies; and the disclosure of those designs has already compelled us to call a large part of our armies into the field, where we have every reason to apprehend that active and arduous operations may soon become necessary. As far as we can form any conjecture on the course of future events, it is probable that the actual service of the whole of our army may be required, at no distant period, to contend against the most formidable combination, by which the British empire in India was ever menaced. Even in such

a conjuncture I never would have submitted to make any compromise with a disobedient army. I should have considered the restoration of discipline and order in the army to be the most necessary of all preparations for war.

Although submission to a mutinous army is a weak policy in any conjuncture of affairs, a crisis, which demands every military exertion, is not the season in which any incentive to zeal and alacrity can be withdrawn from the army without a considerable aggravation of the existing danger; the continuance of a scale of allowance which the officers have enjoyed, and which they deem necessary to enable them to meet the losses and expenses incidental to actual service in the field, must operate as a considerable incitement to the cordial and willing discharge of duty under the pressure of accumulated labour and increased charges; while the reduction of such allowances, on the eve of a general war, might be expected to throw a damp upon the spirit of the whole service, and to send our officers into the field in a temper of less energy, promptitude and ardour, than might correspond with the exigency of the public service.

It became my duty to enquire whether the immediate execution of the orders of the Court of Directors was likely to produce this fatal effect, and, in examining this important question, I adverted to the several articles of reduction which have been ordered, and I considered the allowances of the several officers on the reduced scale, with a view to ascertain the proportion which their several incomes would bear to their respective ranks and duties, and to their expenses in the field.

The first article of reduction is the batta of brevet rank to the officers of his Majesty's regiments serving in India, and to the officers of the Company's army.

In his Majesty's army in Europe, officers having rank by brevet, when serving in the field with mixed corps, and consequently doing duty according to their rank in the army, receive certain allowances under the denomination of bat and forage, correspondent to the rank which they hold by brevet, and the reason of this practice appears to be just. The officers by brevet partake of the same duties with those holding the same ranks regimentally, and, in many cases, command those of the same regimental rank; the officers by

brevet, therefore, necessarily have occasion for similar conveniences and for similar means of meeting the expense incidental to similar duty.

Batta in India can only be considered as a different denomination for the allowance of bat and forage granted in the manner described to his Majesty's officers in Europe; and the reasons for granting batta to the brevet officers in India appears to stand on grounds of equal necessity.

Although the instances of brevet rank in Bengal previously to the arrival of the late military regulations were rare, his Majesty's officers, serving in other parts of India, have long been in the enjoyment of the batta of their brevet rank.

If the various advantages gained under the late regulations by the Company's officers ought to be considered as sufficient to counterbalance the reduction now ordered as far as it applies to their case, it is manifest that his Majesty's officers have not participated in those advantages; the proposed reduction will, therefore, fall with aggravated force on his Majesty's officers.

During the war in Mysore, Lord Cornwallis, with a just consideration of the expenses of officers incident to their respective situations, procured for lieutenant colonels, commanding wings of the army, the batta of colonel, and a certain allowance to officers commanding brigades; Lord Cornwallis also permitted the captains performing the duties of field officers of the day to receive the batta and prize money of majors, though not possessing that rank by brevet, and certainly it appears necessary that the income of officers should be proportioned to the duty which they are to discharge, and the rank which they are obliged to maintain.

On these grounds it appeared to me, that the officers by brevet would suffer a real hardship when called into service in the field, if not allowed to receive the batta of their brevet rank.

The second reduction is table allowances of one thousand rupees per month to colonels on duty in India, not being generals on the staff.

In order to ascertain the propriety of this allowance, it is necessary to state the monthly receipts of a colonel, which are 1050 Sonaut rupees; to which is to be added the supplies of the off-reckoning, not amounting to more than 550 rupees per

month, making in the aggregate a monthly income of 1600 Sonaut rupees. Even in time of peace, with the advantage of quarters, this income is not more than sufficient to maintain an officer in a manner suitable to the precedence which is assigned to the rank of colonel in civil society in India, or to enable him occasionally to entertain the officers of his regiment; and although it must be admitted, that the colonel commandant of artillery (to whom, and to the colonel commandant of cavalry and chief engineer, the table allowance of one thousand rupees per month is continued by the orders of the Court) has the superintendence of a more extensive corps; yet it can rarely happen that so large a proportion of officers can be present with him as is attached to an European or a native regiment. It must also be observed, that upon whatever service the colonel is employed, however expensive and laborious, (excepting in the Vizier's dominions) his income admits of no increase. Nor is it less material to remark that, although the original regulations were understood to confer upon the colonel his regiment for life, even during his residence in England, (subject of course to be recalled to India whenever his services should be required), it has been subsequently explained, that it is the intention of the Honourable Court to subject the colonel of a regiment to the rules of retiring from the service in common with other officers. By the late orders, the officers of the rank of colonel on actual service would suffer a diminution of more than a third of their present income, and would also be ultimately deprived of an indulgence which is considered in his Majesty's army as the reward of past services.

The third article is the superior batta to any officer under the rank of colonel in command of a regiment or battalion.

This increase (in some instances only occasional and temporary) is not positively disallowed by the recent orders, excepting in some cases, where the colonel shall be present with the regiment or battalion. The Honourable Court appears to doubt the necessity of extending this indulgence to both the officers respectively in command of the two battalions of a native regiment.

The conclusion must be, that the allowance may be continued to the senior officer of a regiment when the colonel shall be absent; because the senior officer in that case will be exposed to

an additional expense. For the same reason, the allowance ought to be continued to both the officers commanding the two battalions of a native regiment, when separated, and when the colonel shall not be present with either battalion; when the colonel shall be present with one of the battalions, the superior batta ought to be continued to the officer commanding the other battalion. As this separation of battalions must frequently happen, it may perhaps not exceed the Court's intention (which is not on this occasion peremptorily expressed) if the superior batta be allowed to the officers commanding both battalions of a native regiment whenever the colonel shall not be present with either battalion.

The fourth article relates to the additional pay of one rupee per day to captain lieutenants, the continuance of which is left optional with the Government of India.

The pay of a captain lieutenant being the same as that of a lieutenant, and his batta, when on half batta, only one rupee per day more, if the additional allowance of one rupee per day be reduced, he will in point of income be placed in the same situation with a lieutenant, excepting the difference in the gratuity, which is twelve rupees per month. I have, therefore, no hesitation in declaring, that "the additional allowance is absolutely necessary to support the rank of captain lieutenant."

Fifth. The batta of captain to brevet captains (promoted in consequence of their having been of fifteen years standing) is ordered to be discontinued, and one rupee per day to be established in lieu thereof.

The Court of Directors declare it to be impossible for them to concur in the measure of giving captain's batta to the captains by brevet, who are the subject of this article; but in order to render the pecuniary situations of officers of this description adequate to their rank, the Court does not object to an allowance of one rupee per day to brevet captains, in addition to their usual pay and allowances of lieutenant.

The difference between the half batta of a captain and that of a lieutenant is one rupee per day, consequently the brevet captains will sustain no loss in garrison and in cantonments; but in the field, on full batta, they will suffer a diminution of one rupee per day, and on the Vizier's allowances of three rupees per day.

The situation of these officers has a peculiar claim to attention. The Honourable Court of Directors, in consideration of their long service, granted superior rank to them, thereby advancing them out of the subaltern line, and raising them to an honorary distinction.

This description of officers forms the bulk of the most laborious and effective part of the officers of the army; and the reduction will fall upon them on their taking the field, in a situation of increased fatigue and expense.

Since the abolition of the double batta on foreign service, the alacrity to engage in that service is considerably diminished; nor ought this to be a matter of astonishment when the fact is ascertained, that the present income of brevet captains will hardly bear the additional expenses which duty in the field necessarily occasions by the enhanced rate of servants' wages, by the increased price of provisions, by the wear and tear of camp equipage, and by the loss of cattle, always incident to such service.

It may be urged, that the additional rupee per day granted by the Honourable Court of Directors, by raising the income of brevet captains above that of lieutenants, preserves the due proportion, but we must also look to the proportion which the income of brevet captains will bear to that of captain, the title and the rank which they really hold. It will be found on calculation that the income of the brevet captains, with the additional rupee per day, will be 72 rupees per month less than that of captain; and 42 rupees per month less, even with the continuance of the captains batta. Under this last head, therefore, the reduction would fall heavily on the most efficient class of the officers of the army at the moment when their services would be most necessary to the state.

The result of a deliberate examination of the operation of the proposed reductions convinced me that they would produce so considerable a diminution of the income of every class of officers, as well in His Majesty's as in the Honourable Company's service, as must be severely felt throughout the whole army; that they would press with peculiar weight upon the most laborious and effective class of officers, the brevet captains of fifteen years standing; and that the pressure would be most severe upon the officers employed in the field, on whose zeal and exertions must depend our means of

defence against the impending attack of the enemy. Under these circumstances, I thought it my duty to suspend the execution of such parts of the orders of the Honourable Court as appeared to me likely to cast any degree of damp upon the spirits of their officers: at the same time, however, I took occasion to modify the Vizier's allowances, and to introduce a regulation for the purpose of precluding all future claims to arrears of batta accruing under promotions by brevet.

In examining the policy of reducing the military allowances at this critical period, I was led to consider the extent of the saving which would be effected at this Presidency by that reduction, and to compare it with the charges as they will stand under the modification of the Court's orders, which I have thought it advisable to adopt.

The account No. 1 will show the effect which would have resulted from the complete execution of the Court's orders at this Presidency; and the paper No. 2 will show the comparative effect of the modification of those orders, accompanied by the regulation which confines the Vizier's allowance of regimental rank in correspondence with pay, instead of continuing it, as originally ordered, in correspondence with batta.

Upon the result of the two accounts it appears, that the monthly difference of charge at this Presidency will amount to Sonat Rupees 12,480.

It must be observed that the heaviest part of this charge consists of the batta to brevet officers, and is not of a permanent nature, but must progressively decrease.

If, however, the difference between the two accounts were to be considered as a charge of a permanent nature, I do not conceive that it would be deemed an object of sufficient magnitude to justify me in hazarding the consequences to be apprehended from any abatement of the spirit of the army in the present crisis.

I have already declared that if the actual state of affairs in India had either been of a less pressing nature, or had been known to the Honorable Court of Directors in the month of June, 1798, I should not have presumed either to have suspended the execution of their orders, or to have submitted any remarks upon the justice or policy of the proposed reductions. But the peculiar exigency of this conjuncture

having rendered the interposition of my discretion a matter of indispensable duty on my part, a considerable interval of time must necessarily elapse before the final judgment of the Court on this interesting question can reach their servants in India. During this interval it has appeared to me to be a part of my duty to lay before the Court such considerations as have occurred to me, not only with respect to the present expediency, but also to the fundamental justice and policy of the proposed reductions as applicable to the pecuniary situation of the King's and Company's officers serving in India.

It will rest with the wisdom of the Honorable Court, after a due examination of the foregoing remarks, to determine whether the allowances in question shall ultimately be continued or abolished.

If it should be the final pleasure of the Court to abolish them, it will be my duty to enforce that order, whenever a change in the condition of political affairs in India shall appear to the Honorable Court to admit of such a measure. The step which I have taken has not been dictated by any remonstrance, or claim of right, on the part of the officers, but by the spontaneous operation of my own free and unbiassed judgment, actuated by a deliberate sense of public duty. No principle of discipline has been sacrificed, or even brought into question on the present occasion; and if I should ultimately be ordered by the Court to carry the proposed reductions into effect, I am satisfied that I shall be able to obey their commands without any difficulty arising from the temper of their army.

I have thought fit to record my sentiments on this occasion in the Secret Department from a sense of the evils which have been produced on former occasions by the public discussion of the interests and claims of the officers of the army, and with a full confidence that the Secret Committee will submit this Minute to the Honorable Court of Directors in such a manner as shall be best calculated to secure the object of my remarks.

No. CXIII.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 17th Dec. 1798.

From all the combined information received of Seringapatam, it is reasonable to conclude that the works going on there are in a very unfinished state, and that if the place can be attacked this season it will easily fall. I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that it is Colonel Close's opinion, which I believe to be the best that can be had in this country, that with exertion the army may reach Seringapatam by the middle of March, and that six weeks is ample time for its reduction. There is reason to believe that the Sultaun's army is at present in a very indifferent state, but that with the assistance of some French officers, whom he has lately engaged in his service, it may become formidable in another year. Under these circumstances, I am induced to give it to your Lordship as my sincere opinion, that your coming to this country would be attended with the most beneficial consequences to the public cause. Your presence would preclude the delays of reference to Bengal, and your union with Sir A. Clark, who I am happy to hear we are so soon to expect, would give such weight and efficacy to your negotiations, or offensive operations, should you be obliged to have recourse to them, as would in all human probability insure success to your measures; and permit me to say that in case your Lordship shall determine to visit the coast, I shall have much more satisfaction in obeying your commands when present, than at the distance you now are.

I cannot conclude this letter without testifying to your Lordship how much I feel the sentiments of friendship and regard expressed towards me, nor without assuring you with what pleasure I entertain the offer of that connection, which you have the goodness to say you seek with me, upon grounds so honorable as those of mutually devoting our labours to, and sharing the difficulties, and honour of defending and saving so valua-

luable a part of the British Empire, as our possession in India.*

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect and esteem,
My Lord, your Lordship's,
Most faithful and humble servant
CLIVE.

No. CXIV.

Tippoo Sultaun to the Earl of Mornington.

18th Dec. 1798.

(Received at Fort St. George, 25th Dec. 1798.)

I have been made happy by the receipt of your Lordship's two friendly letters, the contents of which I clearly comprehend, (vide those written 4th and 8th November.)* The particulars which your Lordship has communicated to me, relative to the victory obtained by the English fleet over that of the French near the shores of Egypt, nine of their ships having been captured and two burnt, on one of which of the latter was their Admiral, have given me more pleasure than can possibly be conveyed by writing. Indeed I possess the firmest hope that the leaders of the English and the Company Bahauder, who ever adhere to the paths of sincerity, friendship, and good faith, and are the well wishers of mankind, will at all times be successful and victorious; and that the French, who are of a crooked disposition, faithless, and the enemies of mankind, may be ever depressed and ruined. Your Lordship has written to me with the pen of friendship, "that in no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue ever cultivated with such success as they are at present by the French nation. Would to God that no impression had been produced on my mind by that dangerous people; but that your Lordship's situation enables you to know that they have reached my presence, and have endeavoured to pervert the wisdom of my councils, and to instigate

* It may be necessary to remark, that at this period the Governor General had never had any personal acquaintance with Lord Clive.

* See pages 321 and 326.

me to war against those who have given me no provocation. That it is impossible that I should suppose your Lordship ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between me and the French, who I know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British, and that I cannot imagine your Lordship indifferent to the transactions which have passed between me and the enemies of the English."

In this Sircar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe, who employ themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents purchased a two masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to the Mauritius, from when forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment. Such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar (the gift of God); and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports with the view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars.

It is the wish of my heart, and my constant endeavour, to observe and maintain the articles of the agreement of peace, and to perpetuate and strengthen the basis of friendship and union with the Sircar of the Company Bahauder, and with the Sircars of the Maha Rajah Saheb, Sree Munt Peishwa Bahauder, and his Highness the Nabob Asuph Jah Bahauder. And I am resident at home, at times taking the air, and at others amusing myself with hunting at a spot which is used as a pleasure ground. In this case, the allusion to war in your friendly letter, and the following passage, namely "that prudence required that both the Company and their allies should adopt certain measures of precaution and self defence," have given me the greatest surprize.

It was further written by your friendly pen, that as your Lordship is desirous of communicating to me, on the behalf of the Company and their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties; your Lordship proposes to depute to me for this purpose Major Doveton, who formerly waited upon me, and who will explain to me more fully and particularly the sole means which appear

to your Lordship and the allies to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations; and that therefore your Lordship trusts I will let you know at what time and place it will be convenient to me to receive Major Doveton. It has been understood, by the blessing of the Almighty, at the conclusion of the peace, the treaties and engagements entered into among the four Sircars were so firmly established and confirmed as ever to remain fixed and durable; and be an example to the rulers of the age; nor are they nor will they ever be liable to interruption. I cannot imagine that means more effectual than these can be adopted, for giving stability to the foundations of friendship and harmony, promoting the security of states, or the welfare and advantage of all parties.

In the view of those who inspect narrowly into the nature of friendship, peace and amity are the first of all objects, as indeed your Lordship has yourself written to me that the allied Sircars look to no other object than the security and tranquillity of their own dominions, and the ease and comfort of their subjects. Praise be to God, that the sum of my views and the wish of my heart are limited to these same points. On such grounds then a just and permanent observance of existing treaties is necessary; and these, under the favours of God, daily acquire new strength and improvement by means of amicable correspondence. Your Lordship is a great Sirdar, a firm friend, and the rectifier of all things, and you possess an enlightened judgement. I have the strongest hope that the minds of the wise and intelligent, but particularly of the four states, will not be sullied by doubts and jealousies, but will consider me from my heart desirous of harmony and friendship.

Continue to allow me the pleasure of your correspondence, making me happy by accounts of your health. What more shall be written.

Dated the 9th of Rujub, 1213, of the Hegirah, (answering to the 18th December.)

A true Translation, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. CXV.

(Secret Department.)

The Governor General's Minute.

Fort William, 22nd Dec. 1798.

The recent advices from the north western frontier of Hindostan, as well as from Fort St. George, have induced me to suggest to the Commander-in-Chief the necessity of an alteration in the arrangement under which I had proposed to him to embark for Fort St. George.

The reports of Zemaun Shah's progress, which hitherto have been vague and contradictory, have now become more uniform and consistent. Zemaun Shah is now advanced to Lahore and appears determined to prosecute his design of proceeding at least as far as Delhi.

On the other hand the check which the French have received in Egypt, the destruction of their influence in the Decan, the revival of our defensive alliance with the Nizam and the Peishwa, and the appearance of the fleet off the coast of Malabar, together with the advanced state of military preparations on that coast and on the coast of Coromandel, appear, by late intelligence from Fort St. George, to have excited in the mind of Tippoo Sultaun an apprehension of our power to enforce our just demands of satisfaction, for his late infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam.

The probability of military operations on the frontier of Oude is therefore increased, while a prospect opens of our being able to induce Tippoo Sultaun to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation without resorting to arms.

Under these circumstances, it appears to me, that the public service will derive material benefit from the presence of the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal, and that it is my duty to proceed to Fort St. George.

In the present conjuncture, it would not be advisable that both the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief should be absent from Bengal at the same moment; and the frequent references which must be made to me, in the event of a negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun, render it necessary that I should be as near as possible to his dominions. A

single reference from Seringapatam to Fort William, would consume a large part of the season which ought to be employed in military operations, if war should unfortunately become inevitable; Tippoo Sultaun would certainly avail himself of this advantage to protract, and probably to frustrate the issue of the negociation.

It is, therefore, my intention to embark for Fort St. George, as soon as his Majesty's ship *La Sybille* shall be ready to receive me.

During my absence, I request that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will act as Vice President and Deputy Governor of Fort William.

Under the act of the 33rd of the King, cap. 52., the ample powers and authorities exercised by the Governor General in Council at Fort William, will be transferred to Fort St. George, during the period of my residence at the latter Presidency; and I shall also be invested, during the same period, with the powers and authorities of the Governor in Council at Fort St. George.

The Government of this Presidency will, therefore, be exercised during my residence at Fort St. George, in the same manner, and under the same limitations as the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay are now exercised by their respective Governors in Council, subject however, to the several restrictions contained in the act of the 33rd of the King, cap. 52.

But feeling the propriety and necessity of apprizing the Council at Fort William of the general state of the British interests in India during my absence, I have directed copies of all such public documents, as relate more particularly to the Government General, to be regularly transmitted to this Presidency for the information of the members of the board; the original records of all such documents shall be brought to Fort William, whenever I shall be able to return from the coast of Coromandel.

I rely on the Commander-in-Chief and on the members of the Council, for such an administration of the Government of Bengal during my absence, as shall correspond with the pressing exigencies of the present difficult crisis, and shall promote those important objects of the public service, which form the common scope of our united views.

The Board has been already apprized by verbal communication of the progress, which, with the assistance of the Committee, appointed on 20th June, I have been enabled to make in the revision of several branches of the civil establishments of this Presidency; the great pressure of other business has not yet admitted of my drawing the details of my plan into a connected form; but the materials which I have already laid before the Board, and which I now leave in the hands of Sir Alured Clarke, will I trust be sufficient to enable the Board to issue the necessary orders for putting the proposed reductions in train; and upon my return to this Presidency, I propose to submit the whole arrangement to the Honorable the Court of Directors, together with a full statement of the principles on which the arrangement is founded, and of the means by which it is to be carried into effect.

I am, &c.,

MORNINGTON.

No. CXVI.

(Private.)

The Earl of Mornington to J. Lumsden, Esq.

SIR,

Fort William, 23rd Dec. 1798.

The extraordinary pressure of public business in a conjuncture which demanded the most unremitting exertion, almost from the moment of my arrival in Bengal, must plead my excuse for having so long delayed to acknowledge your private letter, I now request you to believe that I entertain a very high sense of your talents and integrity, as well as of your diligence, and that I am perfectly satisfied with your conduct in your office as far as it has come under my observation. The necessity of providing for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the early revival of our alliances in the Peninsula, as well as for the seasonable reduction of the growing influence of France in India, has not admitted either of my visiting Oude, or of my turning my undivided attention to the reform of the Vizier's affairs. There are, however, two or three leading considerations in the state of Oude, to which I wish to direct your particular notice, intending at an early

period to enter fully into the arrangement in which they must terminate. Whenever the death of Almas shall happen, an opportunity will offer of securing the benefits of Lord Teignmouth's treaty by provisions, which seem necessary for the purpose of realizing the subsidy under all contingencies. The Company ought to succeed to the power of Almas, and the management, if not the sovereignty of that part of the Doab which he now rents, ought to be placed in our hands, a proportionate reduction being made from the subsidy. The effect of such an arrangement would be confined to the improvement of our security for the subsidy. The strength of our north western frontier, would also be greatly increased. On the other hand, in the event of Almas's death we shall have to apprehend either the dangerous power of a successor equal to him in talents and activity, or the weakness of one inferior in both, or the division of the country among a variety of renters. In the first case we should risk internal commotion, in the two latter, the frontier of Oude, would be considerably weakened against the attacks either of the Abdalli or of any other invader. The only remedy for these evils will be the possession of the Doab fixed in the hands of our Government. The state of the Vizier's own troops is another most pressing evil. To you I need not enlarge on their inefficiency and insubordination. My intention is to persuade his Excellency at a proper season to disband the whole of his own army, with the exception of such part of it, as may be necessary for the purposes of state, or of the collection of revenue. Some expedient must be devised for providing a maintenance for such leaders and officers, as from their birth or habits, cannot easily be divested of their military pretensions, (I do not say military *character*, for I do not believe that any such description of men exist at Lucknow.) In the place of the armed rabble which now alarms the Vizier and invites his enemies, I propose to substitute an increased number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry, to be relieved from time to time, and to be paid by his Excellency; I have already increased our establishment to the extent of 17 regiments of infantry, with the view of transferring three regiments to the service of his Excellency, I imagine that under this plan, his force might be rendered much more efficient at a reduced expense; objects, which

would probably meet the two prominent features of his character, timidity, and parsimony; I have not yet fixed the amount of the force which it might be deemed necessary for his Excellency to maintain with a view to the two objects of increased security, and diminished expence; but I request you to take these suggestions into your consideration, and to state your opinion to me in a private letter, you will also point out the time when you think this reform of the Vizier's army might be attempted with the best prospect of success, and in the mean while you will constantly encourage all such partial reductions of the present military establishment, as may facilitate the final and total reduction of this useless charge.

With respect to the Vizier's civil establishments, and to his abusive systems for the extortion of revenue, and for the violation of every principle of justice, little can be done before I can be enabled to visit Lucknow. I am now under the necessity of proceeding to Fort St. George, whence, I trust I shall be at liberty to return to Fort William, in the month of March; and I propose to set out for Lucknow at the conclusion of the month of June. I must call your attention to another important subject. The number of Europeans, particularly of British subjects established in Oude, is a mischief which requires no comment. My resolution is fixed to dislodge every European excepting the Company's servants from Oude. It is my intention to allow to those Europeans now established in Oude, a reasonable time for the settlement of their affairs, limiting the period to twelve or eighteen months at furthest; you will transmit to me privately, a list of all the Europeans now in Oude, as complete as you can make it, with a state of their several occupations, and of the period which might reasonably be required by each for settling their affairs. My wish is to occasion as little private distress as possible, but the public service must take its course; and it is not to be expected, that some cases of hardship will not be found in the extent of so great a measure. In the mean while, I have refused permission to every European who has applied for leave to visit Oude, with the exception of a single case now under my consideration, that of Mr. Prendergast, to whom I think it is possible, on a revision of his claims, that I may extend the indulgence of visiting Oude, (but not Luck-

now) for the arrangement of his affairs. If I should permit this gentleman to return to Oude, he must not continue there beyond the period assigned for the general recall of all Europeans. You will understand it to be a fixed determination in my mind, never to lend the assistance of Government to any European residing in Oude, for the recovery of any private claims, either upon the Nabob or any of the natives.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

I wish that the Nabob could see, that it would be a more dignified course to pay his subsidy without giving me the trouble of importuning him, he regularly falls into arrear, and as regularly pays up the arrear, whenever he learns from me that it has attracted my notice, would it not be more for his honour and for my ease, if he would not wait for my application, but pay punctually as the subsidy become due.

No. CXVII.

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 31st Dec. 1798.

Hoping that your Lordship has had a prosperous and favourable passage, and that you are in perfect health, I have the honour to offer my most cordial congratulations upon your arrival in these roads; your presence in the present crisis will, I am convinced, be followed by consequences the most beneficial to the public welfare. It will, I trust, produce a unity of action and a combined exertion, similar to that which prevailed during the war, conducted by Lord Cornwallis, and enable your Lordship to accomplish the great and important object you have in view, of placing the British interests in India upon a secure and permanent foundation. Adverting to the friendly tenour of your letters, and to the unreserved and confidential communication with which you propose to honour me, and reflecting upon the advantage I may expect to derive from the assistance of your direction and advice, I have looked to your Lordship's arrival as a source of comfort and satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect
and esteem, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful and humble Servant,
CLIVE.

No. CXVIII.

Proclamation by the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

Whereas in and by an Act of Parliament made and passed in Great Britain, in the 33rd year of the reign of his present Majesty King George the third, and entitled, an act for continuing in the East India Company, for a further term the possession of the British territories in India, together with their exclusive trade, under certain limitations for establishing further regulations for the Government of the said territories, and the better administration of justice within the same, for appropriating to certain uses the revenues and profits of the said Company; and for making provision for the good order and Government of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay; it is enacted, that when the Governor General of Fort William in Bengal, for the time being, shall find it expedient to visit the Presidency of Fort St. George, or the Presidency of Bombay, or any province, or place in India, the powers and authorities of the Governor or other chief officer or officers of such presidency, province, or place, shall from the time of the proclamation of the arrival of the said Governor General therein, be suspended, (except with regard to judicial proceedings), and shall so continue to be suspended, until other proclamation be made to the contrary, by the order of the said Governor General, or otherwise until the said Governor General shall depart therefrom, and no longer, and that during that interval the powers and authorities of the said Governor, or other chief officer, shall be vested in the said Governor General with liberty, nevertheless for such Governor to sit and act as a Member of the Council of such Presidency, and that the said Governor General in Council at either of the said Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, shall be invested with the powers and authorities of the Governor in Council of the same Presidency or settlement respectively, and also with the same ample powers and authorities, as can, or may be exercised by the Governor General in Council at Fort William, by force and virtue of this act; and whereas the Right Hon. Richard Earl of Mornington, Viscount Wellesley, of Dangan Castle, and Baron Mornington, of Mornington in the Kingdom of

Ireland, Baron Wellesley, of Wellesley in the county of Somerset in the Kingdom of Great Britain, one of his Majesty's most honorable Privy Council in the Kingdoms of Great Britain and of Ireland, Custos Rotulorum of the county of Meath, and Knight Companion of the illustrious Order of St. Patrick, and now being Governor General of Fort William in Bengal aforesaid, has found it expedient to visit this Presidency of Fort St. George, and is actually arrived at the same, with intent to exercise, and for the purpose of exercising the powers so vested, and intended to be vested in the Governor General in Council at this Presidency of Fort St. George aforesaid, under and by the virtue of the said act; and whereas such the arrival of the said Richard Earl of Mornington, &c. &c. &c., Governor General of Fort William aforesaid, has been duly notified to the Right Hon. Edward Lord Clive, Baron Clive, of Walcot in the county of Salop, and Plassy, of the Kingdom of Ireland, Governor General in Council of Fort St. George, and the said Edward Lord Clive Governor in Council aforesaid, has in consequence thereof, ordered, and directed such the arrival of the said Richard Earl of Mornington, &c. &c. &c., Governor General aforesaid, to be publicly proclaimed, pursuant to the said act. Now proclamation is hereby made accordingly of such the arrival of the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor General of Fort William aforesaid, and all persons are hereby strictly enjoined and required to take notice thereof.

By order of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George aforesaid, the second day of January in the year of our Lord 1799.

J. WEBBE.

No. CXIX.

Minute by the Governor General.

Fort St. George, 2nd Jan. 1799.

The critical state of our actual situation with Tippoo Sul-taun, must necessarily require frequent references to the authority of the Governor General in Council on a variety of important points, which will demand a prompt and immediate decision; my continuance in Bengal during such a crisis,

might have been attended with great inconvenience to the public service, and the season for active operation might have been consumed, before my opinion could have been obtained on the several emergencies which may be expected to arise; the consideration of this inconvenience is the principal motive which has induced me to proceed to this Presidency, and I am happy to take this opportunity of declaring, that I should not have felt my presence to have been at all requisite in this place, for the purpose of adding energy or vigour to such branches of the public service, as fall within the particular duty of this Government. I am perfectly satisfied with the conduct of this Government in the respectable hands to which it has been committed, and I am persuaded that I should always have found the same cordial, manly, and honorable support from your Lordship in Council, which has already obtained the public testimony of my unqualified approbation. My object, therefore, in taking my seat at this Board, is no other than to deprive our enemies of the advantages which they might derive under the present circumstances, from the remote situation of the power entrusted to me, from the probable scene of action. The provisions of the law, require that the authority of the Governor in Council at Fort St. George, should be vested in my hands during my residence at this Presidency, the public acts and proceedings of this Government, must accordingly pass in my name. But I am anxious as well from motives of personal respect, as from considerations connected with the public service, that my residence at this Presidency, should in no degree impair the present or future dignity and influence of Lord Clive. I, therefore, am desirous of abstaining from all unnecessary interference in the details of this Government, nor do I wish to disturb the system established under his Lordship's immediate direction, by the interposition of my power of superintendence on the spot, beyond the limits of the ordinary exercise of that power at the seat of the supreme Government in Bengal. I therefore, request that Lord Clive and the Members of this Council, will take the trouble of conducting the details of this Government, especially those which relate to the patronage of the Governor in Council, according to the principles which have been observed by his Lordship since his arrival in India, and I am satisfied, that I shall de-

rive the utmost degree of advantage from the united zeal, talents, experience, and assiduity of those whom I have the honor to address, while my principal attention must be devoted to the superintendence of the general interests of all the Company's possessions, and of the security and defence of the British Empire in India, against the various dangers by which it has recently been menaced.

2nd Jan. 1799.

MORNINGTON.

The Board express their satisfaction, that their endeavours to meet the wishes of the Governor General, have received his Lordship's approbation, as well as their sense of the confidence which his Lordship is pleased to repose in them, and at the same time beg leave to assure him of their most cordial cooperation, and assistance in the arduous labours, in which his Lordship is at present engaged.

No. CXX.

From Tippoo Sultan.

Dated 2nd January, 1799.

[Received 11th January, 1799.]

The agreeable arrival of your Lordship's two* letters, denoting your welfare, rejoiced and gratified me. A khreeeta, in reply to your Lordship's former friendly letter, has been written and despatched. It will no doubt, by this time, have been received, and the sincerity of my friendship and regard, together with proofs of my solicitude for tranquillity and peace (my friendly heart being bent upon their increase) will have been made apparent. Continue to rejoice me with happy letters.

A true Translation, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

* Original and duplicate of that written 10th December, 1798, see page 363.

No. CXXI.

From the Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort St. George, 9th January, 1799.

My letter to your Highness, of the 8th of November,* will have explained to your Highness the object of the military preparations, which have been advancing in every part of the dominions of the allies ever since the beginning of the month of July.

On my arrival at Madras, I had the honour to receive your letter of the 18th of December,† in answer to my two letters addressed to your Highness on the 4th and 8th of November.‡

I am happy to find that, in this letter, your Highness has been pleased to admit, “that the English nation and the Honourable Company ever adhere to the paths of sincerity, friendship, and good faith; and that they are the well-wishers of mankind.” This declaration is peculiarly satisfactory to me in the present moment, because I am persuaded that a Prince of your Highness’s discernment, would not express such sentiments without full deliberation. I, therefore, accept with pleasure this declaration, as affording not only an unequivocal testimony, on the part of your Highness, to the justice of that cause in which the English nation and the Company are engaged, but an unqualified admission, that you have no ground of complaint against the English Government.

In answer to that part of my letter, of the 8th of November, in which I lamented the unhappy connection which you had formed with the French nation, your Highness is pleased to mention, “that, in the Sirkar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe who employ themselves in trading by sea and land: that their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with the view to traffic; that it happened that she went to the Mauritius, from whence forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came to your country in search of employment: that such as chose to take service were entertained; and the remainder departed beyond the confines of that Sirkar (the

* See p. 326.

† See p. 381.

‡ See p. 321, 326.

gift of God): and that the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship, to put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both Sirkars."

I had no knowledge of the transaction which your Highness has thus described, until I had the honour to receive your Highness's letter. Nor was it to this transaction I adverted, when I expressed my concern at the intercourse which your Highness had established with the French. The facts to which I referred, were of a nature entirely different from those which your Highness has related. If the transactions, of which I complained, had not indisputably proved the existence of a connection between your Highness and the French, entirely incompatible with your engagements to the Honourable Company and to its allies, neither the allies, nor I, would have resorted to those measures of precaution and defence, which have attracted your Highness's attention.

I will now fully and explicitly state to your Highness the circumstances, to which I referred in my letter of the 8th of November, wherein I remonstrated against the tendency of your intercourse with the French.

Although I had been, for some time past, apprized, that your Highness had engaged with several powers of Asia in various negotiations, of the most hostile tendency, towards the interests of the Company, and of its allies; and, although your continued military preparations corresponded with the spirit of your negotiations, I still hoped that a sense of your own interests, and a regard to the acknowledged maxims of prudence and good faith, would have induced you to relinquish projects of aggression, so inconsistent with your own professions, with your real interests, and with the character of your wisdom and discretion. But I had scarcely formed that decision on your Highness's claim to Wynaad (by which I had afforded an unquestionable testimony of my disposition to render impartial and ample justice to your rights, and to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace with your Highness,) when I received from the Isle of France an authentic copy of the proclamation, a Persian translation of which accompanies this letter.

In addition to this proclamation, I possess full and accurate information of all the proceedings of your Highness's ambas-

sadors during their residence in the Isle of France; of the whole of their conduct in exercising the powers delegated to them by your Highness; and of your Highness's conduct, since the return of your ambassadors.

From the whole evidence in my possession, the following facts are incontestibly proved.

Your Highness despatched two ambassadors from your presence, who embarked at Mangalore, for the Isle of France, and arrived there at the close of the month of January, 1798. The ship on which your ambassadors were embarked, hoisted your Highness's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord Ouest, in the Isle of France; your ambassadors were received publicly and formally by the French Government under a salute of cannon, and every circumstance of distinction and respect; and they were entertained, during their continuance on the island by the French Government, at the public expense.

Previously to the arrival of your ambassadors on the island, no idea or rumour existed there of any aid to be furnished to your Highness by the French; or of any prospect of a war between your Highness and the Company. But within two days after the arrival of your ambassadors, the proclamation, of which I now forward to you a translation, was fixed up, in the most public places, and circulated through the town of Port Nord Ouest.

Your ambassadors, far from protesting against the matter or style of the proclamation, held without reserve in the most public manner the same language, which it contains, with respect to the offensive war to be commenced by your Highness against the British possessions in India: and they even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distributed at their own houses.

In consequence of these circumstances, an universal belief prevailed in the island, that your Highness would make an immediate attack upon the British possessions in India.

Your ambassadors were present in the island when the French Government proceeded to act under the proclamation in question; and your ambassadors aided and assisted the execution of the proclamation by making promises, in the name of your Highness, for the purpose of inducing recruits to enlist in your service. Your ambassadors proposed to levy

men to any practicable extent, stating their powers to be unlimited, with respect to the numbers of the forces to be raised in your Highness's name, for the purpose of making war on the Company.

The ambassadors entered into certain stipulations and engagements, in the name of your Highness, according to the tenor of the proclamation,* with several Frenchmen, and others who entered into your service, particularly with Monsieur Du Buc, whom the ambassadors engaged in your Highness's name, for the express purpose of assisting in the war to be commenced by your Highness against the English in India.

The proclamation, therefore, is proved to have been the act of your ambassadors. It originated in their arrival at the Isle of France; it was distributed by their agents; it was avowed in every part by their own public declarations; and finally, it was executed, according to its tenor, by their personal assistance and cooperation.

On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassadors embarked at Port Nord Ouest, on board the French frigate *La Preneuse*, together with the force thus raised in your Highness's name.

This French frigate, with your ambassadors, and with the troops raised in the enemy's country for your service, arrived at Mangalore on or about the 26th of April, 1798. Your Highness permitted this force to land in your dominions, and far from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of the conduct of your ambassadors in any part of this transaction, you formally received them, and the French officers, and principal persons who accompanied them, with public marks of honour and distinction, and you now entertain in your service a large part of the force thus raised for the purpose of making war upon the Honourable Company.

From these several facts the following conclusions result:—

First. That the ambassadors, despatched by your Highness to the Isle of France, did propose and actually did con-

* Nous pouvons assurer tous les Citoyens, qui se feront inscrire, que Tippoo leur fera des traitements avantageuses qui seront fixés avec ses Ambassadeurs, qui s'engageront en outre au nom de leur Souverain, a ce que les Francois qui auront pris parti dans ses Armées, ne puissent jamais y' etre retenus quand ils voudront rentrer dans leur Patrie.

clude an offensive alliance with the French, for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company, and consequently against the allies, the Peishwa and the Nizam.

Secondly. That your Highness's ambassadors demanded military succours from the French, for the purpose of prosecuting the said war; and declared that your Highness had already completed your hostile preparations against the Company, (and consequently against the allies), and that you only waited the arrival of effectual aid from the French to break out into open hostilities.

Thirdly. That your Highness's ambassadors levied a military force in the Isle of France, under the conditions of the proclamation, and for the avowed purpose of carrying into effect the offensive alliance, contracted in the name of your Highness, with the enemy of the Company, and of the allies.

Fourthly. That your Highness approved the conduct of your ambassadors; suffered the French force, raised for the purpose of making war upon the Company and the allies, to be landed in your country; and finally, admitted the said force into your army.

Fifthly. That your Highness, by these several personal and unequivocal acts, has ratified the engagements contained in the proclamation published in the Isle of France, and has taken the preliminary steps for fulfilling those engagements, according to the tenor of that proclamation; and that you have thereby precluded whatever hope might otherwise have been entertained, that the proceedings of your Highness's ambassadors were unauthorized by your orders.

Sixthly. That your Highness has, for some time past, been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hostile spirit of your engagements, contracted with the enemy of the Company and of the allies.

Seventhly. That your Highness was prepared to make an unprovoked attack upon the Company's possessions, if you had obtained from the French the effectual succour which you had solicited, through your Ambassadors.

Eighthly. That your Highness, by these several acts, has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between your Highness and the allies.

Such are the grounds on which I founded my complaint in

my letter of the 8th of November, and such are the motives which now compel the allies to seek relief from that ambiguous and anxious state, in which they have been placed for some years past by the conduct of your Highness. The allies complain, that your frequent preparations for war, together with your hostile negotiations, and offensive alliances with the enemy, continually expose them during a period of supposed peace, to all the solicitude and hazard, and much of the expence of war.

Even under all these circumstances of provocation, the allies entertain the most earnest desire to establish with your Highness, a real and substantial peace, accompanied by the intercourse and good offices, usual among friendly and contiguous states. We are, therefore, ready to renew and confirm the bonds of amity with your highness, on such conditions, as shall preclude the continuance of those jealousies, which must subsist so long as a final and satisfactory adjustment of all causes of suspicion shall be delayed.

Your Highness is pleased to say, "that you cannot imagine how means more effectual, than the existing treaties, can be adopted for giving stability to the foundations of friendship and harmony, or for promoting the security of the states, and the welfare and advantages of all parties."

In this sentiment I entirely concur with your Highness; and if your Highness's wisdom had not been perverted by evil councils, from a due observance of your engagements with the allies, no new or more effectual means would now be necessary, "for giving stability to the foundations of friendship and harmony, or for promoting the security of the states, and the welfare and advantage of all parties." But a new arrangement is become indispensable, in consequence of your Highness's new engagements with the common enemy of the allies; and I again entreat your Highness to meet, with cordiality, the friendly and moderate advance of the allies, towards an amicable settlement of every ground of jealousy and danger.

Had your Highness received Major Doveton, that gentleman would have explained to your Highness, on the part of the Company and of the allies, how this advantageous arrangement is to be obtained.

The allies being always anxious to enter into this friendly

explanation with your Highness, I once more call upon your Highness, in the most serious and solemn manner, to assent to the admission of Major Doveton, as a measure, which I am confident, would be productive of the most lasting advantages to all parties.

I trust that your Highness will favour me with a friendly letter in reply to this; and I most earnestly request that your reply may not be deferred for more than one day after this letter shall reach your presence; dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

I am, &c.
MORNINGTON.

No. CXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 11 January, 1799.

No disposition appearing at present in the Court of Poonah to accept of my propositions of the 8th of July, I now direct you to abstain from any further solicitation on that subject. If the negotiation should be renewed by the Peishwa or by his ministers, you will receive their advances with cordiality; but you will signify, "that although my anxiety to promote the welfare of the Peishwa and of the Mahratta State has suffered no diminution, you are apprehensive that I may not possess the means of imparting to his Highness the full and immediate benefit of that arrangement which he had thought fit to decline. Under the present circumstances, therefore, you can only declare the continuance of my disposition to execute the whole plan as originally stated in my instructions of the 8th of July, whenever the state of affairs will admit of a renewal of my propositions."

Although any negotiation on the basis of my original propositions is become inexpedient in the present moment, I am extremely desirous of accepting the suggestion of Moonshee Gopal Row, that a detachment of the Company's troops, of equal strength with that which served during the last war, with Captain Little, in conjunction with Purseram Bow, should join and act with the Peishwa's present contingent, in the

same manner and on the same conditions on which the services of that detachment were granted to the Mahrattas by Lord Cornwallis.

I have accordingly directed the Government of Bombay to prepare the force necessary for this purpose with all possible expedition; and to inform you without delay at what period it will be in readiness to march from Bombay and to join the Peishwa's contingent, at such place as shall be appointed for the junction.

You will not announce the arrangement to the Peishwa and to Nana Furnavese, until you shall have received an intimation to this effect from the government of Bombay; and if the measure shall be approved by his Highness and by his minister, you will immediately proceed to arrange with them, and with the government of Bombay, all the details of the business.

It is extremely desirable that the junction of the detachment from Bombay, with the Peishwa's contingent should be effected, as was the case last war, at an advanced point towards the frontier of Mysore; and you will, therefore, be careful to preserve this object in view. But if the march of the Company's troops to Poonah should be anxiously desired by the Peishwa, you are to comply with his wishes. It is probable that the suggestion of Gopal Row, originated in the motive which you suspect; but in the present conjuncture, it is an important object to conciliate the Peishwa, and to maintain both the reality and the appearance of harmony and good understanding between his Highness and the Company. If, therefore, the result of my present orders shall be, that our detachment shall be detained at Poonah for his Highness's private purposes, so long as to preclude the hope of its services in the field, I shall still look with satisfaction to the extensive political advantages which must be derived from the presence of a British force at Poonah in the present crisis.

In the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, which now appears highly probable, it will certainly be of the utmost importance that an early and powerful diversion should be made in the country of Bednore. You will therefore urge the Peishwa to station a large force in a forward position, for

this purpose, without delay, and without waiting for the junction of the Company's forces.

You will communicate to the Peishwa the correspondence between me and Tippoo Sultaun, (a copy of which will be forwarded to you by the Persian translator), and you will apprise his Highness, that although I shall leave the channels of pacific negotiation open to the Sultaun to the latest possible moment, I shall not, on that account, relax or retard the movement of our army, being satisfied that no adequate satisfaction can be expected from the Sultaun until he shall find himself deprived of all hope of foreign aid, and of every resource of subterfuge or procrastination.

You will not fail to call the attention of the Peishwa to the prevarication and duplicity of the Sultaun's statement of the nature of his intercourse with the French, and you will particularly observe the artifice by which he has evaded the amicable advance of the allies, by eluding the reception of Major Doveton.

In the present state of affairs, I must insist on the immediate dismissal of Tippoo's Vakeels from Poonah; and I direct you to remonstrate in the strongest terms against their continuance at the Court of the Peishwa, as being wholly incompatible with the relation subsisting between his Highness and the Company. You will assure his Highness that I shall constantly submit to him the state of any negotiation which Tippoo may open with me on behalf of the allies; but the residence at Poonah of an embassy from Tippoo, in the actual crisis, must tend to encourage the hopes of the Sultaun, and to countenance rumours of disunion and jealousy between the allies.

I am aware that under the existing establishment of the Company's armies in India, the expense of the detachment, proposed to act with the Peishwa's contingent, will exceed that of the detachment which was commanded by Captain Little during the last war with Tippoo Sultaun: but I consider it so essential an object, in the event of hostilities with the Sultaun, that a British force should act in conjunction with the Mahrattas, that I direct you to waive the consideration in arranging the amount of the subsidy with the Court of Poonah.

You will send your assistant with the detachment of the Company's troops, proposed to act with the Peishwa's contingent, for the purpose of conducting, in the first instance, the intercourse between the commanding officer of the former and the Mahratta commander, and eventually of serving as the channel of communication between the latter and the commanders of the Company's forces on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXIII.

Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp at Anopsheer, 12th January, 1799.

The army under my command assembled here on the 27th, as I make no doubt that you will have been informed from Calcutta. We are encamped close to the city and fort, and the more intimate knowledge which I have been able to obtain of the country has only served to convince me, that we could not have chosen a position better adapted to every circumstance that may occur in the execution of your Lordship's instructions in the defence of the Vizier's dominions. Almas has joined me here with four battalions of sepoys and one of nujeebs, twelve very well provided guns and some horse. I have not yet been able to get from him any exact statement of his numbers; but from having seen his battalions under arms, I compute the amount of the five not to exceed 2500 men. As to the Nabob's troops, it is impossible for me to convey to your Lordship a more decided opinion as to their nullity, than I have already had the honor of communicating to your Lordship. With the view, however, of drawing from them the only service which it seemed possible to hope for, I pressed strongly for the appointment of General Martine to the command of those stationed in Rohilcund, which the Nabob has acceded to, and the General is now on the duty of examining the fords of the river from Hurdwar to this place. It is however extremely difficult to combat the obstacles which arise from the extreme pusillanimity and sordid avarice of the Nabob. I have written in strong terms, and I

am sure Mr. Lumsden is indefatigable in his representations, for it is a duty, that I owe to that gentleman, to assure your Lordship that nothing can exceed the cordiality and zeal with which he has seconded every view that has occurred to me on this occasion. I am well assured that the Nabob's troops are neither armed nor clothed, nor is there a gun in the district, which is put under General Martine's command, that can be made use of. In consequence of our representations he has promised to send some guns; but he declares that he has neither arms nor clothing beyond what he must furnish to the battalions that he keeps near his person. He has indeed given directions for their regular payment, which Mr. Lumsden thinks will be sufficient to ensure it. I own I have great doubts of it.

I do not know in what terms Colonel Collins has communicated to Rajah Ambajee your Lordship's determination upon the proposal which he had made. It is however certain that he has industriously disseminated in the country the report that the Mahratta forces are to be joined by this army; and it is generally considered that our advance for that purpose is only delayed till the arrival of the boats in which our stores are supposed to be. The Mahrattas have in the mean time made some movements towards Delphi, but I do not find that they have it in their power to assemble any force of a magnitude to promise any considerable effect.

Zemaun Shah was still in Lahore so late as the 31st of December. We had a report in all our intelligence that he had quitted it on his return to his own dominions the 27th. I confess I considered it as probable, though the report did not appear to me to be sufficiently authenticated to merit entire confidence, and accordingly it has since turned out to have been false. It would seem from all the intelligence we get, that he has been employed in repairing both the works and the dwelling part of the fort at Lahore, whilst he has restrained his army from the usual exercise of the right they claim of plundering the country, and has been anxious to conciliate the people to his government. This carries with it the appearance of an intention to establish himself there, but his unvaried declarations have always been, that he would soon advance to Delhi. On the other hand the Seiks are assembled in considerable numbers at Amrutsir, some skir-

mishes have taken place, but nothing that can have any influence on the real state of the contest. They, however, impede the supplies to the Shah's army much, and there is no doubt that he has been very much distressed in that respect. Notwithstanding the state of hostility with a common enemy, the chiefs of these people appear to be as much disunited, and to entertain as strong a jealousy of each other as ever; and there is no doubt that they are all negotiating with the Shah. He sent a Vakeel to them in common, who is returned with general answers and nuzzirs from them all; but besides this, each has sent a separate Vakeel with him to negotiate for himself. It is, I think, impossible to form an idea how this is likely to terminate, but to give your Lordship a notion of the opinion which generally prevails on the subject, I do myself the honor to enclose a copy of a translation of part of a paper of intelligence from my own people, which relates to it. I cannot conceive that confidence or cordiality can ever exist between them, and if they ever do come to an agreement, I should rather suppose that they will pay the Shah a sum of money under the denomination of tribute, with which he will return. If, however, my conjecture should prove wrong, and they should actually submit, and join him with their forces, there cannot exist a further obstacle to his progress to Delhi, where he will collect a very formidable force. Every thing remains perfectly quiet in Rohilcund, nor is there any account of Gholaum Mahommed having joined the Shah. I believe he is still at or near Nadoun.

We have an account from Delhi, that it has been mentioned at the King's durbar by Monsieur Peron Duvan, that *he had heard* that the French had penetrated through some islands, and had approached Herat and the Holy Mushed. This appears to be utterly impracticable, as they could not have reached any place from whence they could alarm those cities, in the time that has elapsed since we know them to have been in Egypt, even supposing them to have encountered no obstacle in their march; but if the report is not totally destitute of foundation, it must proceed from some part of Buonaparte's army having made their escape from the immediate ruin with which they were threatened in Egypt; and yet I cannot conceive any route by which they can have done it,

that must not have fallen under the cognizance of Mr. Manesty at Bussorah, who would, of course, have conveyed the information to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient

humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. CXXIV.

To the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St George, 13th January, 1799.

The Government at Fort William will have communicated to you, through the Secret Department, a detail of the affairs of that Presidency, from the date of my last despatches by the extra ship *Eurydice*, to the period of my embarkation for the coast of Coromandel.

I shall now lay before you the motives which induced me to adopt the measure of proceeding to Fort St. George.

I had made an arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief in India, under which I had proposed to his Excellency to proceed to Fort St. George, for the purpose of taking upon himself the command of the army on the coast of Coromandel; but my subsequent advices from the north-western frontier of Hindostan, as well as from this quarter, led me to suggest the necessity of an alteration in that arrangement.

From these advices, it appeared that the reports of Zemaun Shah's progress, which had until that period been vague and contradictory, were become more uniform and consistent; and that the Shah had actually advanced as far as Lahore, and appeared determined to prosecute his design of proceeding at least as far as Delhi. On the other hand the check which the French had received in Egypt, the destruction of their influence in the Deccan, the revival of our defensive alliance with the Nizam and the Peishwa, and the appearance of our fleet off the coast of Malabar, together with the advanced

state of our military preparations on that coast, and on the coast of Coromandel, appeared by my latest intelligence from Fort St. George, to have excited in the mind of Tippoo Sultaun an apprehension of our power to enforce our just demands of satisfaction for his late infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam.

The probability of military operations on the frontier of Oude was, therefore, increased, whilst a prospect was opened of our being able to induce Tippoo Sultaun to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation, without resorting to arms.

Under these circumstances it appeared to me that the public service would derive material benefit from the presence of Sir Alured Clarke in Bengal, and that it became my duty to proceed to Fort St. George.

In such a conjuncture, it was not advisable that both the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief should be absent from Bengal at the same moment; and the frequent references which must be made to me, in the event of a negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun, rendered it necessary that I should be as near as possible to his dominions. A single reference from Seringapatam to Fort William would have consumed a large part of the season which ought to be employed in military operations, if war should unfortunately become inevitable; Tippoo Sultaun would certainly have availed himself of this advantage to protract, and probably to frustrate, the issue of the negotiation.

I, therefore, resolved to embark for Fort St. George on board his Majesty's ship *La Sybille*, which was then in the river preparing for sea.

I requested that during my absence his Excellency, Sir Alured Clarke, would act as Vice President and Deputy Governor of Fort William.

The Government at Fort William had been apprized, by verbal communication, before my departure, of the progress which, with the assistance of the Committee appointed on the 20th of June, I had been enabled to make in the revision of the several branches of the civil establishments of that Presidency. The great pressure of other business has not yet admitted of my drawing the details of my plan into a connected form: but the materials which I have already laid before the Council at Fort William, and those which I have left

in the hands of Sir Alured Clarke, will, I trust, be sufficient to enable him to issue the necessary orders for putting the proposed economical reductions in train; and, on my return to Fort William, I propose to submit the whole arrangement to the Honourable Court of Directors, together with a full statement of the principles on which that arrangement is founded, and of the means by which it is to be carried into effect.

On the 25th Dec. 1798, I embarked for Fort St. George, and having reached the *Sybilie* on the 27th, I arrived at this Presidency on the 31st.

The public despatch of this date from me in Council to the Honourable Court of Directors will state the powers and authorities which it is my intention to exercise during my residence at this Presidency, and the circumstances which attended my taking my seat in Council at Fort St. George on the 2nd Jan. 1799.*

On my arrival I received an answer from Tippoo Sultaun to my letter of the 8th of November.†

Your Honourable Committee will observe the prevarication and duplicity of the Sultaun's statement of his late intercourse with the French; and you will remark the evasion, by which he eludes the moderate and amicable proposition of the allies for opening a negotiation with him, through the mission of Major Doveton.

To this letter from the Sultaun I returned the answer dated 9th January, 1799, in which I have renewed the proposition of opening a pacific negotiation.

Subsequently to the despatch of my letter dated 9th Jan. 1799, I received from the Sultaun the letter dated 2nd Jan. in reply to a letter dated 10th Dec. 1798, which I had forwarded from Fort William, apprizing him of my intention to proceed to Fort St. George, and again urging the admission of Major Doveton. The Sultaun's letter, dated 2nd Jan., is entirely silent on the latter point, and furnishes an additional proof of his disposition to evade the pacific advances of the allies.

In the mean while I have the satisfaction to inform you that the military preparations in the Carnatic are in the most for-

* The despatch adverted to is a mere reference to the minute and proclamation at pages 390 and 391.

† See p. 381.

ward state, having been advanced during the last two months with a degree of alacrity and vigour which reflects the highest credit on this Government.

The volunteers from Bengal had arrived at this Presidency a few days before me.

His Highness the Nizam's Contingent, which is to consist of the whole of the Company's subsidiary troops, of 6,000 of the Nizam's infantry, and of 10,000 cavalry, under the command of Meer Allum, marched from the vicinity of Hyderabad on the 26th of December, and was expected to cross the Kistna on the 6th of this month; it will join a detachment of the army of this Presidency under the command of Colonel Wellesley at Tripetty.

His Majesty's 84th regiment, with a part of the Scotch brigade, and of the 28th regiment of light dragoons, from the Cape of Good Hope, arrived here in perfectly good condition on the 7th of this month.

The last advices from Poonah afford every reason to expect the cooperation of a considerable Mahratta force in the event of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun.

The Government of Bombay have employed every effort to forward the military preparations on the coast of Malabar, from whence a respectable assistance will be afforded if the occasion should require it.

The coast of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions in Malabar is at present guarded by his Majesty's ships *Suffolk* and *Victorious*, and by the Company's ships *Earl Howe* and *Princess Charlotte*, armed under my orders at Calcutta.

By accounts received from the Cape, it appears that Commodore Blanket was met at sea by the ship *Mildred*, in a position which leaves no doubt of his having reached his station, although no official accounts have yet been received of that event.

Under all these circumstances, I trust that I shall possess the means of effectually precluding Tippoo Sultaun from the advantages which he expected to derive under his late offensive alliance with the French.

The fate of the French army in Egypt is still unknown to me; but the forward state of our armies and alliances induces me to entertain a confident expectation, that I shall be enabled to attain effectual security against the hostile designs

of Tippoo Sultaun, before the season will admit of any assistance reaching him from Egypt, even if any part of the French army shall have surmounted the innumerable difficulties of their situation; and if the vigilance of his Majesty's squadrons shall have been frustrated on the Red Sea, and on the coast of Malabar.

The intelligence which I have received this day from Lucknow, and from the resident with Scindiah, induces me to believe that the Shah will not venture to advance beyond Lahore during the present season.

The Seiks have collected their forces at Amrutsir, as well as on other points of his proposed march, and have obtained some partial advantages over detachments of his army. And although they do not appear to possess a force sufficient to cope with his whole army in the field, he seems to dread the effects which might be produced by the embarrassments which they might bring upon the line of his march, if he should attempt to advance towards Delhi.

Both the Mahrattas and Seiks on the north-western frontier of Hindostan have manifested the most anxious desire to cooperate with our forces in opposing the progress of the Shah, I trust that this disposition may hereafter become the source of encreased security to the Company's possessions on that side of India.

In the meanwhile I have the satisfaction to assure you, that the army under the command of Sir James Craig is in the highest condition in point of discipline and equipment, and that the zeal, alacrity and talents of that able officer, as well as of those who command under his orders, leave no doubt that any attack, which the Shah's imprudence might hazard, must terminate to the honour of the British arms.

The family and treasure of Golam Mahomed, the Rohilla Chief, have been conveyed under my orders to a place of security at Benares.

Syed Khan, an active agent in the service of Golam Mahomed, is now imprisoned in the fortress of Chunar; and the remaining sons of Fyzoollah Khan, from whose movements disturbance was apprehended in Rohilcund, are at present detained at Lucknow.

Although the general appearance of affairs promises an augmentation to the security of the British Empire in India,

the expense of the necessary means of accomplishing that important object must be very heavy, and the exigency of the pecuniary demands of this Presidency is peculiarly urgent in the present moment.

Even previously to the apprehension of hostilities in India I submitted to your Honourable Committee, and to the Honourable Court of Directors, my deliberate opinion, that the state of your affairs in India absolutely required an immediate and large supply of treasure from Europe. My duty now demands still more urgently that I should recommend to your serious consideration, in the most earnest manner, the indispensable necessity of aiding, by a seasonable remittance of supply, the efforts of your servants in India to rescue these valuable possessions from the accumulated danger which has lately menaced their tranquillity.

With an anxious zeal for your service, and with a firm resolution to encounter, by every practicable effort, whatever difficulties may arise in the course of your affairs, the servants of the Company in India cannot be expected to surmount all the exigencies of the present conjuncture without some extraordinary aid from home. I, therefore, trust that you will take the earliest opportunity of affording effectual relief to the resources of the Government of Bengal, on the credit of which the whole system of your finances in India must depend.

I am happy to take this opportunity of repeating the assurance of my entire confidence in the cordial and honourable cooperation of Lord Clive; and it is a peculiar satisfaction to me to be able to add, that since my arrival here I have found in all your civil and military servants, and in all the European and Armenian inhabitants of this settlement an unanimous disposition to assist me in the despatch of the public service.

I must refer your Honourable Committee to a minute recorded by me in the secret department of the government at Fort William,* which will be transmitted to you by the first ships of this season, for the motives which induced me to modify the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors with respect to the allowances to the officers of the army. The regulation respecting regimental rank had been carried into execution in Bengal sometime previous to my departure.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* See page 381.

No. CXXV.

From the Earl of Mornington to Major Bannerman.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 16th January, 1799.

Judging it necessary in the present conjuncture to employ a person to reside with the Rajah of Travancore, I have been induced by the favourable report which I have received of your zeal, activity and ability, to select you for this service.

The following are the objects to which you are to direct your attention:—

1. You are to stimulate the Rajah, and his minister, to the necessary exertions for placing without delay the whole of the military force of Travancore in a forward state of preparation, for the purpose of effectual cooperation with the Company's armies in the event of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun.

2. You will urge the Rajah's immediate compliance with the requisitions contained in my letter to him.*

3. You will call upon him, in my name, to give every possible encouragement to the brinjarries and bazar dealers of his country to repair, with supplies, to the army on the coast of Malabar, by such routes, and at such periods, as you shall recommend.

4. As the army under General Stuart will eventually be in great want of coolies for the purpose of assisting in the transportation of provisions and stores up the Ghauts, you will endeavour to prevail on the Rajah to send as many of this useful class of people to the army as you may judge requisite.

5. You will correspond constantly with Lieutenant General Harris and with Lieutenant General Stuart, and you will endeavour to comply with such requisitions as they shall severally make to you for supplies.

6. In the event of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun, you will exert yourself to engage the Rajah to employ his military force in the manner, which shall appear to you best calculated to promote the common cause, or according to such directions as you shall receive, either from Lieutenant General Harris or from Lieutenant General Stuart.

* The letter referred to contains requisitions for the Rajah to furnish supplies of bullocks and coolies for the use of the Madras army.

7. You will carefully endeavour to prevent the Rajah from committing any aggression against the state of Mysore until hostilities shall have actually commenced between the Company and Tippoo Sultaun.

8. I understand that the Rajah entertains in his service several French and other European natives, or subjects of countries at war with Great Britain. You will, therefore, represent to the Rajah, and his ministers, in the most forcible terms, the great danger to his own government from the mischievous principles of the French, and the impropriety of his extending favour and protection to the inveterate enemies of the British nation. You will pursue this representation by an assurance, in my name, that the Rajah cannot better consult his own true interests, or my satisfaction, than by immediately dismissing from his service, and sending out of his country, all Europeans of the character described. Should he wish to replace the foreigners employed in his military service by British subjects, I shall be prepared to receive an application from him to that effect.

9. You will transmit to me, as soon as possible, an account of the military forces and equipments of the Rajah, including a report of all the Europeans in his service; and you will regularly advise me of all material transactions in the Rajah's dominions, and in the adjacent countries.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort St George, 16th January, 1799.

Your Highness has already been furnished by Lord Clive with a translation of the declaration of war issued by the Sublime Porte against the French, in consequence of their having violated the sacred obligation of treaty with the Grand Signior, and of their having invaded Egypt in contempt of every principle of good faith, and of the law of nations. You have also received from me a translation of the manifesto published by the Porte on the same occasion; exposing, in just colours, the overbearing and arrogant spirit, as well as the treachery

and falsehood, which the French have disclosed in their conduct towards all mankind, and especially towards the Sublime Porte.

The Porte, justly outraged by an aggression so atrocious and unprecedented as the invasion of Egypt, has now united in a common cause with the British nation, for the purpose of curbing the intemperance of the French ; and the Grand Signior having learnt the unfortunate alliance which your Highness has contracted with his enemies the French against his friends and allies the British nation, his Highness resolved, from motives of friendship towards you, as well as towards the British nation, to warn you, in an amicable letter, of the dangers of this fatal connection ; and to exhort you to manifest your zeal for the Mussulman faith, by renouncing all intercourse with the common enemy of every religion, and the aggressor of the head of the Mahomedan Church.*

* The following is a copy of the letter :—

Letter from Sultaun Selim to the Indian Sovereign, Tippoo Sultaun, dated Constantinople, 20th September, 1798 ; delivered to Mr. Spencer Smith, his Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, &c.

We take this opportunity to acquaint your Majesty, when the French Republic was engaged in a war with most of the powers of Europe within this latter period, our Sublime Porte not only took no part against them, but regardful of the ancient amity existing with that nation, adopted a system of the strictest neutrality, and shewed them even such acts of countenance as have given rise to complaints on the part of other Courts.

Thus friendly disposed towards them, and reposing a confidence in those sentiments of friendship which they appeared to profess for us, we gave no ear to many propositions and advantageous offers which had been made to us to side with the belligerent powers, but pursuant to our maxims of moderation and justice, we abstained from breaking with them without direct motive, and firmly observed the line of neutrality ; all which is notorious to the world.

In this posture of things, when, the French having witnessed the greatest marks of attention from our Sublime Porte, a perfect reciprocity was naturally expected on their side, when no cause existed to interrupt the continuance of the peace betwixt the two nations, they all of a sudden have exhibited the unprovoked and treacherous proceedings, of which the following is a sketch.

They began to prepare a fleet in one of their harbours, called Toulon, with most extraordinary mystery, and when completely fitted out and ready for sea, embarked a large body of troops, and they put also on board several people versed in the Arabic language, and who had been in

Accordingly this letter (the testimony of friendship, and the fruit of wisdom, piety and zeal) was delivered by the minister resident at Constantinople, by whom it was transmitted to the

Egypt before; they gave the command of that armament to one of their generals, named Buonaparte, who first went to the Island of Malta, of which he took possession, and thence proceeded direct for Alexandria, where being arrived the 17th Muharein, all of a sudden landed his troops, and entered the town by open force, publishing soon after manifestoes in Arabic among the different tribes, stating, in substance, that the object of their enterprize was not to declare war against the Ottoman Porte, but to attack the Beys of Egypt, for insults and injuries they had committed against the French merchants in time past; that peace with the Ottoman empire was permanent, that those of the Arabs who should join, would meet with the best treatment; but such as shewed opposition, would suffer death: with this further insinuation, made in different quarters, but more particularly to certain Courts at amity with us, that the expedition against the Beys was with the privity and consent of our Sublime Porte; which is a horrible falsity. After this they also took possession of Rosetta, not hesitating to engage in a pitched battle with the Ottoman troops, who had been detached from Cairo to assist the invaded.

It is a standing law amongst all nations, not to encroach upon each others' territories, whilst they are supposed to be at peace. When any such events take place as lead to a rupture, the motives, so tending, are previously made known between the parties; nor are any open aggressions attempted against their respective dominions until a formal declaration of war takes place.

Whilst, therefore, no interruption of the peace, nor the smallest symptom of misunderstanding appeared between our Sublime Porte and the French Republic, a conduct so audacious, so unprovoked, and so deceitfully sudden on their part, is an undeniable trait of the most extreme insult and treachery.

The province of Egypt is considered as a region of general veneration, from the immediate proximity of the noble city of Mecca, the Kebleh of the Mussulmen, (the point of the compass to which all Turks turn their face in performing their prayers) and the sacred town of Medina, where the tomb of our blessed prophet is fixed; the inhabitants of both these sacred cities deriving from thence their subsistence.

Independent of this, it has been actually discovered from several letters which have been intercepted, that the further project of the French is to divide Arabia into various republics; to attack the whole Mahomedan sect, in its religion and country; and by a gradual progression, to extirpate all Mussulmen from the face of the earth.

It is for these cogent motives and considerations, that we have determined to repel this enemy, and to adopt every vigorous measure against these persecutors of the faith; we placing all confidence in the Omnipotent God, the source of all succour, and in the intercession of him who is the glory of prophets.

Honourable Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, who has forwarded it to Lord Clive; the day before yesterday this letter reached Madras, and a translation accompanied it, by which

Now it being certain that, in addition to the general ties of religion, the bonds of amity and good understanding have ever been firm and permanent with your Majesty, so justly famed for your zeal and attachment to our faith; and that more than once such public acts of friendly attention have been practised between us, as to have cemented the connection subsisting between the two countries, we therefore sincerely hope, from your Majesty's dignified disposition, that you will not refuse entering into concert with us, and giving our Sublime Porte every possible assistance, by such an exertion of zeal, as your firmness and natural attachment to such a cause cannot fail to excite.

We understand that, in consequence of certain secret intrigues carried on by the French in India, (after their accustomed system) in order to destroy the settlements, and to sow dissensions in the provinces of the English there, a strict connection is expected to take effect between them and your Majesty, for whose service they are to send over a corps of troops by the way of Egypt.

We are persuaded, that the tendency of the French plans cannot, in the present days, escape your Majesty's penetration and notice, and that no manner of regard will be given to their deceitful insinuations on your side: and whereas the Court of Great Britain is actually at war with them, and our Sublime Porte engaged on the other hand in repelling their aggressions, consequently the French are enemies to both; and such a reciprocity of interests must exist between those Courts, as ought to make both parties eager to afford every mutual succour which a common cause requires.

It is notorious, that the French, bent upon the overthrow of all sects and religions, have invented a new doctrine, under the name of Liberty; they themselves professing no other belief but that of Debrees; (Epicureans, or Pythagoreans) that they have not even spared the territories of the Pope of Rome, a country, since time immemorial, held in great reverence by all the European nations; that they have wrested and shared, with others, the whole Venetian State, notwithstanding that fellow republic had not only abstained from taking part against them, but had rendered them service during the course of the war, thus effacing the name of the republic of Venice from the annals of history.

There is no doubt that their present attempt against the Ottomans, as well as their ulterior designs (dictated by their avaricious view towards oriental riches) tend to make a general conquest of that country, (which may God never suffer to take effect!) and to expel every Mussulman from it, under pretence of annoying the English. Their end is to be once admitted in India, and then to develop what really lies in their hearts, just as they have done in every place where they have been able to acquire a footing.

In a word, they are a nation whose deceitful intrigues and perfidious

I learnt the valuable lessons of prudence and truth which it contains. I now forward it to your Highness; you will read and consider it with the respectful attention which it demands; there you will find the same friendly admonitions respecting the dangerous views of the French nation, which I have already submitted to your consideration.

When your discerning mind shall have duly examined this respected letter, you will no doubt draw the following conclusions from it:—

First. That all the maxims of public law, honour and religion, are despised and profaned by the French nation; who consider all the thrones of the world, and every system of civil order and religious faith, as the sport and prey of their boundless ambition, insatiable rapine, and indiscriminate sacrilege.

pursuits know no bounds. They are intent on nothing, but on depriving people of their lives and properties, and on persecuting religion, wherever their arms can reach.

Upon all this, therefore, coming to your Majesty's knowledge, it is sincerely hoped, that you will not refuse every needful exertion towards assisting your brethren Mussulmen, according to the obligations of religion, and towards defending Hindostan itself, against the effect of French machinations. Should it be true, as we hear, that an intimate connection has taken place between your Court and that nation, we hope that, by weighing present circumstances, as well as every future inconvenience, which would result from such a measure, your Majesty will beware against it, and in the event of your having harboured any idea of joining with them, or of moving against Great Britain, you will lay such resolution aside. We make it our especial request, that your Majesty will please to refrain from entering into any measures against the English, or lending any compliant ear to the French. Should there exist any subject of complaint with the former, please to communicate it, certain as you may be of the employment of every good office on our side, to compromise the same; we wish to see the connection above alluded to, exchanged in favour of Great Britain.

We confidently expect that, upon consideration of all that is stated in this communication, and of the necessity of assisting your brethren Mussulmen in this general cause of religion, as well as of cooperating towards the above precious province, being delivered from the hands of the enemy, your Majesty will employ every means, which your natural zeal will point out, to assist the common cause, and to corroborate, by that means, the ancient good understanding so happily existing between our empires.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian translator to Govt.

Secondly. That the French have insulted and assaulted the acknowledged head of the Mahomedan Church; and that they have wantonly raised an unprovoked and cruel war in the heart of that country, which is revered by every Mussulman as the repository of the most sacred monuments of the Mahomedan faith.

Thirdly. That a firm, honourable, and intimate alliance and friendship, now subsists between the Grand Signior and the British nation, for the express purpose of opposing a barrier to the excesses of the French.

Fourthly. That the Grand Signior is fully apprized of the intercourse and connection unhappily established between your Highness and the French, for purposes hostile to the British nation; that he offers to your Highness the salutary fruit of that experience, which he has already acquired, of the ruinous effects of French intrigue, treachery and deceit; and that he admonishes you not to flatter yourself with the vain hope of friendly aid from those, who (even if they had escaped from the valour and skill of the British forces) could never have reached you until they had profaned the tomb of your Prophet, and overthrown the foundation of your religion.

May the admonition of the head of your Faith dispose your mind to the pacific propositions which I have repeatedly, but in vain, submitted to your wisdom. And may you at length receive the ambassador, who will be empowered to conclude the definite arrangement of all differences between you and the allies, and to secure the tranquillity of India against the disturbers of the world!

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 21st Jan. 1799.

I have received a letter from Captain White, in which he informs me that 6000 of the Nizam's infantry had halted on the banks of the Kistna and refused to proceed; and that Meer Allum was doubtful of being able to prevail on them to follow the army.

The deficiency, which may be expected to take place in his Highness's contingent in consequence of this event, does not appear to menace evils of so serious a nature, as those which may be apprehended from the continuance of a body of disaffected troops in his Highness's dominions, during the absence of our military force.

These troops lately constituted a part of M. Peron's army, and although deprived of their European officers, their discipline is still superior to that of any other corps in the Nizam's service; they are well armed, and have a train of field artillery attached to them. Under all these circumstances, the greatest mischiefs are to be apprehended from their disposition and power. They may either desert in a body to Tippoo Sultaun, who might immediately replace their late officers by others of the same nation; or they may raise the standard of revolt in the heart of his Highness's country. The Nizam and Azim ul Omra must, without delay, take every practicable measure for preventing either of these dangers.

My decided opinion is, that these troops ought immediately to be disarmed and disbanded. At the same time I am aware, that his Highness may not possess the means, in the absence of the Company's troops, to effect this desirable object. In this case it will be necessary to temporise with the revolted troops, and to endeavour to break them into small parties. They must be withdrawn without loss of time, from their present station, and on no account be employed to the southward. Their guns should be separated from them as speedily as it may be practicable to attempt the measure with a prospect of success.

You must call upon the Nizam to supply the existing deficiency in his contingent, arising from the desertion of these troops, by a reinforcement of at least 4000 cavalry who must be ordered to join Meer Allum, by the route of Budwail and Dornal pass immediately.

I am, &c.,

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to His Excellency Rear Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 21st Jan. 1799.

I trust that the ships *Earl Howe* and *Princess Charlotte*, are arrived on the coast of Malabar, and that their respective Captains will conduct themselves in such a manner as to merit your Excellency's approbation. But feeling with your Excellency the necessity of investing you with a power of superseding the commanders of the Honorable Company's armed ships, during the period of their serving under your orders; I hereby authorize your Excellency accordingly, to supersede the commanders of any ships armed by the Company and now serving, or which may hereafter be placed, under your Excellency's authority. Although your Excellency has expressed your readiness to accept any such restrictions of this general power as I may deem expedient, I think the public service will be best promoted, by leaving to your Excellency the free and unlimited exercise of your discretion, with respect to such supercessions or appointments, as you may think fit to make.

I rely entirely on your Excellency's prudence, experience and zeal for the public service, that you will use the power which I have vested in your hands in such a manner, as shall most effectually promote the interests of the Company, and of the Nation.

I have signified to the Government of Bombay, the powers with which I have invested your Excellency, and I have directed that Government to notify my orders on this subject to the commanders of the Company's ships serving under your Excellency's authority.

I found Fort St. George crowded with French prisoners, and I was informed that a considerable number of the same description remain in Pondicherry. In the event of a forward movement of the army, great danger is to be apprehended from the turbulent disposition of these prisoners, and the only security against this danger would be to divert a considerable portion of our European force from our operations in the field, for the express purpose of guarding the French

prisoners in Fort St. George, and at Pondicherry. Even this security might become precarious, in the course of certain events, which I need not suggest to your Excellency's experience.

I, therefore, deemed the immediate removal of the French prisoners to be an object essentially necessary towards enabling me to prosecute the war against Mysore with confidence and vigour. I have accordingly taken up tonnage for the purpose of transporting the French prisoners to Europe without delay; being aware that your Excellency under the present circumstances could not be expected to afford any assistance in conveying the prisoners to Europe, I have thought it advisable to employ the *Cornwallis* to accompany them as far as the Cape of Good Hope; from thence, I trust, that the Admiral on that station will be able to guard them to Europe, if he should not, I shall direct the Captain of the *Cornwallis* to proceed thither from the Cape.

The last intelligence from Europe received overland leads me to apprehend, that the French will at length make an effort (which I have long expected) to send a squadron into these seas. Although I have little doubt that the vigilance of his Majesty's Ministers, will take an early opportunity of reinforcing the fleet under your Excellency's Command, I feel it to be the duty of those on the spot to provide with every practicable degree of precaution, against the possibility of the French becoming superior to the British fleet in India. I, therefore, take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency the detention of the *Sceptre*, after she shall have been repaired at Bombay; and as Sir Hugh Christian has directed Captain Edwards to attend to any suggestions which he may receive from the Government of India, I propose to convey my decided opinion to Captain Edwards, that he cannot better promote the safety of the British possessions in India, than by placing himself under your Excellency's orders, until further naval reinforcements shall arrive from Europe, or until all apprehension of the appearance of a French fleet in these seas shall have ceased.

The *Osterley* will soon depart from this port, with a supply of coals for the use of your Excellency's squadron. I shall direct the Government of Bombay to arm her with all ex-

petition, if your Excellency should deem such a measure advisable.

I shall also transmit my orders to Fort William, for the equipment of any large ships which may arrive in the river Hooghly.

I am extremely happy that my suggestions, with respect to the station of the *Sybilie*, have met with your Excellency's approbation.

My endeavours are still directed to obtain a suitable adjustment of our differences with Tippoo Sultaun, through the channel of negotiation, accompanying, however, my pacific propositions with such a disposition of our forces as may tend to give full effect to my representations.

I rely with the most implicit confidence on your Excellency's assurances of cordial cooperation, in the event of war with Tippoo Sultaun, being satisfied that I shall derive every degree of practicable assistance, from the squadron under your command, in my efforts to defeat the projects of the common enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 22nd Jan. 1799.

It is of the utmost importance to ascertain the causes which impeded the operations of his Highness's cavalry during the last war, and to consider how those causes can now be removed.

I am informed that for the most part his Highness's cavalry were sufficiently well mounted and armed ; and I have never heard that they manifested any peculiar deficiency in point of personal courage. Their unwillingness to engage the enemy during the last war must, therefore, have arisen from other causes.

During the first campaign of Lord Cornwallis, the commander of the Nizam's cavalry was not zealous in the cause

of the allies, and some of the rissallahdars were strongly suspected of having been corrupted by the enemy. These circumstances may reasonably be supposed to have contributed, in a great degree, towards their disgraceful inactivity. At present his Highness's contingent is commanded by a person of a very different disposition from Rajah Taiz Wunt; none of the suspected rissallahdars are now employed with it; and no reason exists to justify a suspicion of the faith of any of those now attached to it.

Notwithstanding these advantages, certain radical defects remain in the system of his Highness's cavalry which require correction.

The principal of these defects consists in the want of due encouragement to the sillahdar, or hired cavalry (of which description the Nizam's contingent of cavalry is, I believe, almost entirely composed), to expose their horses in action. For the horses being the property of individuals, and sometimes constituting the whole fortune of the horsemen, no risk will be incurred unless a previous indemnity be provided against the accidents of the field. Engagements to this effect are sometimes formed with sillahdar horse by the native powers, but these engagements are frequently violated.

Another defect in the constitution of the sillahdar cavalry is, that although a horseman should be disabled for life in action, no provision is made for him; he, therefore, is unwilling to expose his person.

The remedies for these defects are sufficiently obvious. The Nizam ought to engage to pay the proprietor for every horse killed or disabled in action, according to its rated value; and his Highness ought also to make a suitable provision, during life, for such horsemen as shall be disabled in actual service.

You will, therefore, take an early opportunity of stating to the Nizam, and to Azim ul Omra, the great advantages which would result to his Highness's service from the adoption of regulations of the nature here suggested; and you will endeavour, by every argument in your power, to induce the Minister to pursue the true interests of his Sovereign on this occasion.

I am aware that his Highness will not readily adopt the

proposed improvements to any useful extent; but if he will only signify his approbation of the plan, and will promise to adopt it, I am disposed (on the strength of such general assurances), to authorize Captain Malcolm, in concert with Meer Allum, to pledge the Company's government for the faithful performance, by his Highness, of whatever promises might be made to the horsemen in his name.

Without the guaranty of the Company, it is not to be supposed that any vague assurances from his Highness would produce the desired effect. That guaranty would of course be given with every degree of respect and consideration for his Highness.

It is possible that the whole expense resulting from the proposed measures might ultimately fall on the Company. But the advantages of the arrangement to the Company, as well as to the Nizam, would probably be very considerable, and might be of the most decisive nature in the approaching war.

I am, &c.,
MORNINGTON.

. No. CXXX.

(General Orders.)

By the Right Hon. the Governor General in Council.

Fort St. George, 2nd Feb. 1799.

Whereas the despatch of the public service requires that the requisitions and orders of the Commander-in-Chief in the field should be carried into effect with every practicable degree of promptitude and expedition, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council hereby orders and directs all civil servants subject to the authority of the Presidencies of Fort St. George, or of Bombay, and all military officers serving under the authority of either Presidency, respectively to pay an immediate and prompt obedience to all such requisitions or orders as they shall receive from the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of His Majesty, and of the Honorable the East India Company, on the coasts of Coromandel and of

Malabar ; and all civil servants and military officers are hereby informed, that any requisition or order under the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the said Forces, shall be considered as a full and sufficient voucher for any advance or disbursement of money which such requisition or order shall authorize.

The Right Honourable the Governor General in Council further directs, that any civil servant or military officer receiving any such requisition or order from the Commander-in-Chief, shall report the same by the earliest opportunity through the regular official channels to his Lordship in Council, but the execution of the said requisition or order shall not therefore be suspended or delayed ; and all civil servants and military officers are hereby informed that this order is to remain in full force until further notice from the Governor General in Council.

No. CXXXI.

General Harris to the Governor-General in Council.

MY LORD,

Camp near Vellore, Feb. 2, 1799.

Having had leisure since my arrival here to inspect the division of the army which has been since its formation under the orders of the Honorable Colonel Wellesley, I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that the very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops do honour to themselves and to him, while the judicious and masterly arrangements in respect to supplies, which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence into dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Colonel Wellesley than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle him to my thanks and approbation.

The other divisions of the army are under orders to take up their respective stations in the line, and as soon as they join, and when the officers at the head of the several departments of ordnance and stores and of supplies, have been fully provided with their cattle and carriage, I shall be able to state, for your Lordship's information, the probable period of

our being ready to move towards the frontiers of Tippoo Sultaun.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,
GEORGE HARRIS.

No. CXXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-Gen. Harris, Commander-in-Chief.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 3d Feb. 1799.

You have already been furnished with copies of the correspondence which has taken place between me and Tippoo Sultaun since the 24th of October last.

I have directed copies of this correspondence to be transmitted to the Commissioners in Malabar, whom I have instructed to communicate the same to his Excellency Admiral Rainier, and to Lieutenant-General Stuart, or the officer commanding the Company's troops on the Malabar coast.

Having received no answer from Tippoo Sultaun to the letter which I despatched to him on the 9th ultimo, and in which I repeated for the third time, with increased earnestness, my proposal respecting the admission of Major Doveton, it is reasonable to conclude that the object of the Sultaun's silence is to delay the commencement of decisive military operations until the season shall be so far advanced as to render the siege of his capital impracticable during the present year.

To defeat these views it is become necessary to suspend all negotiation with the Sultaun until the united force of the arms of the Company and their allies shall have made such an impression on his territories as may give full effect to the just representations of the allied powers.

I, therefore, direct that you enter the territory of Mysore with the army now assembled under your command, with as little delay as possible, and that you proceed to the siege of Seringapatam.

With respect to the division of the Company's army on the Malabar coast, its operations, and, consequently, those of the troops of the Rajahs of Coorga and Travancore (who are to

be carefully prevented from making any premature movements), will be regulated by the orders which you shall transmit for that purpose to Lieutenant-General Stuart, or to the officer commanding in Malabar.

I have instructed the Resident at Poonah to express to the Peishwa and to his Minister, Nana Furnaveese, my hope that the Mahratta empire will instantly pursue the necessary measures for the vigorous prosecution of hostilities against the common enemy, and the assurances which I have already received from that Court, lead me to expect that the north-western territory of the enemy will soon be invaded by a considerable Mahratta force under Purseram Bhow.

My latest accounts from the Resident at Poonah induce me to believe, that he must have applied before this time to the government of Bombay for the assistance of a detachment of the Company's troops to act with the Peishwa's contingent. In the event of the government of Bombay having been able to furnish such a detachment (of which I have no doubt), they will apprise the commission in Malabar, and Lieutenant-General Stuart, or the officer commanding the troops of the Presidency of Bombay in that quarter.

The government of Bombay will also instruct the officer in the command of the detachment serving with the Mahrattas, to maintain as constant and regular a correspondence with you, and with Lieutenant-General Stuart, as possible, and to exert all his influence with the commander of the Peishwa's contingent, to engage him to regulate the progress and operations of the Mahratta forces by your advice and directions, or by those of Lieutenant-General Stuart.

Entertaining no views of aggrandizement, my objects in the war will be limited to the attainment of a just indemnity for the great expence to which the aggression of Tippoo Sultaun has subjected the allies, and of a reasonable security against the future violence and treachery of that Prince; but no negociation with a view to either object can be opened without danger to the common cause, until the Sultaun shall have been compelled to entertain serious apprehensions for the safety of Seringapatam, and it is accordingly my resolution to listen to no overtures from him, until we shall have attained such a position as shall sufficiently secure us against the effects of his insincerity.

I shall hereafter inform you of the manner in which I wish you to receive such overtures as may be made to you by any of the inhabitants of Tippoo's dominions desirous of throwing off the authority of that Prince. I shall also, in due time, send you such further instructions as may appear to me to be necessary for your direction, previously to your entrance into the territory of Mysore.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, Feb. 5, 1799.

I return you many thanks for your exertions to procure intelligence respecting Zemaun Shah ; although your success has not yet been complete, I trust you will ultimately be able to establish a channel of information which may hereafter be useful. Zemaun Shah commenced his retreat from Lahore on the 4th of January ; the principal cause assigned for his retreat is the appearance of Mahmoud, the Shah's brother, in Balkh. From a comparison of dates, I think the movement of this Prince may possibly be the work of your agent, Mehedy Ali ; which, if it should be proved, will establish his utility. If you should be satisfied of Mehedy Ali's real efficiency, I think 2 lacs 10,000 rupees a sum not greater than the value of the service ; and I authorize you to use your discretion on the subject accordingly. The plan of subsidizing the whole army of Persia is more extended and expensive than circumstances require. But I should hope that, by the judicious application of moderate sums of money, from time to time, not only the brothers of Zemaun Shah might be maintained in such a state as to occupy the Shah's attention at home ; but the Court of Persia might be induced to keep him in perpetual check without any decided act of hostility. This system, well executed, would save us a large portion of the expense of drawing our armies to the frontier of Oude, whenever the Shah chooses to cross the Attock. I, therefore, recommend the subject to your constant attention, and I shall willingly provide for a small annual expense in

Persia, which promises to save enormous contingent charges in Oude.

I am much pleased with your attention to the affairs of Goa, and I should most anxiously wish to throw a garrison into that place, if we could at present spare troops for the purpose. At present I can only request you not to lose sight of this important object.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and esteem, Sir,
your most faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. CXXXIV.

*The Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors of the Honourable
East India Company.*

HON. SIRs,

Fort St. George, 12th Feb. 1799.

I have deemed it to be my duty to transmit to your Honourable Court, by the speediest conveyance, the advices which I have received from Bengal with respect to the inhuman murder of Mr. Cherry and of several British subjects, perpetrated by Vizier Alli and his adherents, in the city of Benares, on the 14th of January, 1799.

Your Honourable Court is already apprized of the circumstances which induced Lord Teignmouth to establish Saadut Alli on the Musnud of Oude, and to depose Vizier Alli, who had been raised to that situation in the confusion which ensued upon the death of Asoph ud Dowlah. You are also in possession of the evidence by which the spurious birth of Vizier Alli was incontrovertibly proved, and you have been informed that his Lordship had fixed the residence of Vizier Alli in the city of Benares; where he enjoyed an ample allowance from the Nabob Vizier, and was treated with the utmost degree of indulgence and kindness by Mr. Cherry, agent to the Governor General, and chief judge of the Provincial Court of Circuit and Appeal for that district.

Within the short period of four months, during which Vizier Alli occupied the Musnud of Oude; he had betrayed symptoms of a ferocious, sanguinary, and treacherous disposition, accompanied by an extraordinary degree of boldness

and activity; Lord Teignmouth, from a knowledge of his character, recorded an opinion, that it might be advisable to take an opportunity of changing the place of Vizier Alli's residence to a situation more remote from the scene of his elevation and fall, and more convenient to the immediate superintendence of the Governor General in Council.

Since my arrival in India, various events have happened to convince me, that the removal of Vizier Alli to the vicinity of Calcutta was a measure essentially necessary to secure the tranquillity of the province of Oude.

The numerous retinue entertained by Vizier Alli had more than once disturbed the peace of the city of Benares; and the ordinary military force stationed in the district could not be deemed sufficient to preclude all danger, either of commotion, or of the escape of Vizier Alli. Information had reached me, through different channels, which left no doubt on my mind, that Vizier Alli had despatched a vakeel with presents to Zemaun Shah; a circumstance which sufficiently indicated the disposition of Vizier Alli to attempt any enterprize of which the success might be favoured by the approach of the Shah, and by the consequent diminution of the British force in the interior parts of the province of Oude.

When the Shah had actually advanced to Lahore, and the army under Sir J. Craig had been ordered to proceed to Anopsheer, the Nabob Vizier Saadut Alli applied, in the most pressing manner, for the removal of Vizier Alli to some position less favourable to the exercise of his adventurous and daring spirit.

Under all these circumstances, it appeared to me to be my duty to effect an arrangement, which had been deemed advisable, on general grounds, by the experience and prudence of Lord Teignmouth, and which the actual conjuncture of affairs had rendered highly expedient. I, therefore, directed Mr. Cherry (some time previous to my departure from Fort William) to signify to Vizier Alli my wish that he should reside in the vicinity of Calcutta, and at the same time to assure him, that no diminution of his allowances or appointments would be attempted, and that he would neither be subject to any additional restraint, nor denied any indulgence at the Presidency which he had been suffered to enjoy at Benares.

Being however aware of the difficulty of reconciling Vizier

Alli, by any accompanying measures of lenity, to a change which must preclude his hopes of joining Zemaun Shah, or of disturbing the Government of the Nabob Vizier, I particularly enjoined Mr. Cherry to use the necessary precautions for securing the effectual execution of my orders in any contingency which might arise.

The arrival of the Shah at Lahore, with the declared purpose of advancing to Delhi, and the defenceless state of the intervening possessions of the Seiks and of the Mahrattas induced me to assemble the main body of the army of Bengal on the frontier of Oude, and to station a large force within a few miles of Benares, for the protection of that opulent city.

The presence of this force seemed to have placed the tranquil accomplishment of the removal of Vizier Alli beyond all doubt, and I left Bengal without any apprehension of the possibility of the dreadful events which have ensued.

When my orders were signified to Vizier Alli, he at first expressed, according to my expectation, considerable reluctance to leave his actual situation, but in a short time he appeared to be entirely reconciled to the change of his residence, and to be perfectly satisfied with the assurances which he had received of a continuance of the protection and indulgence of the Honourable Company. The conduct of Mr. Cherry towards Vizier Alli, on every occasion, had been an uninterrupted course of every office of kindness, delicacy, and conciliation, calculated to excite sentiments of affection and gratitude in any mind capable of such impressions. Vizier Alli had uniformly professed to entertain these sentiments towards Mr. Cherry in their utmost force; but his professions proved to be the artifice of the deepest dissimulation, designed to mask the unalterable purpose of a secret and implacable hatred. For it appears that the active exertion of Mr. Cherry's eminent talents in the negociation of the late treaty with Saadut Alli, and in facilitating the sudden departure of that prince from Benares to Lucknow at the period of the deposition of Vizier Alli, had fixed in the mind of the latter a spirit of personal revenge which no kindness could mitigate, and which no difficulty or danger could controul. The evidence in my possession leaves no doubt that this spirit would have broken forth on the first favourable occasion, if Vizier Alli had been suffered to remain at Benares;

but it does not yet appear whether the immediate cause of the murder of Mr. Cherry was any augmentation of Vizier Alli's inveterate resentment, exasperated by the supposition that Mr. Cherry had suggested my late orders; or whether the motive of Vizier Alli was merely to seize that opportunity of accomplishing a purpose which he had long determined, and which might have become impracticable after the seat of his residence had been changed.

My concern for the fate of Mr. Cherry is much aggravated by the reflection, that he might have avoided all danger, if the humanity of his disposition had not been deceived by the artful dissimulation of his assassin; notwithstanding that Mr. Cherry had been repeatedly warned of his danger, the character of mildness and submission which Vizier Alli had assumed, had unfortunately induced that gentleman to omit those necessary precautions which were recommended by every principle of prudence, and particularly enjoined by my positive orders.

I am happy to be able to assure you, that no serious interruption of the tranquillity, either of the province of Benares or of Oude, is likely to be the immediate result of this outrage. But it will require much consideration to devise such a system of measures as shall afford permanent security to your possessions against the ultimate consequences of an event of such evil impression and dangerous example.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs, with the greatest respect,
your most obedient and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. CXXXV.

From the Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 13th February, 1799.

My letter of the 5th instant* will have furnished you with sufficient authority to continue every encouragement to Mehedy Ali on the limited scale of from two to three lacs of

rupees. I cannot express to you my satisfaction at the able manner in which you have executed my ideas with respect to the recal of Zemaun Shah. A comparison of dates, combined with the whole tenor of my intelligence from Lucknow and Anopsheer, leaves little doubt on my mind that the Shah's sudden retreat was occasioned by the news of his brother's appearance at Balkh, and that the latter event was the fruit of your agent's activity. I beg you will provide, or order Mahedy Ali to provide, all the khelaats and presents which he desires, and let them be presented in my name. You shall be furnished with the letters required in a few days.

I am desirous of extending and improving our relations with Persia to the utmost practicable degree; and I wish to receive your opinion with respect to such commercial or political objects as appear to you desirable and attainable under any treaty with the Court of Persia. The great political objects appear to me to be, the exclusion of the French, especially if they should make any attempt to penetrate through Persia to Hindostan; and the establishment of such a continual source of anxiety and apprehension to Zemaun Shah on the borders of his own dominions, as shall effectually preclude his future projects of advancing towards Hindostan.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

your most faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXXVI.

From Tippoo Sultaun to the Right Hon. the Governor General.

Received* 13th February, 1799.

I have been much gratified by the agreeable receipt of your Lordship's two friendly letters, the first brought by a camel-man, the last by hircurrahs, and understood their contents. The letter of the Prince, in station like Jumsheid; with angels as his guards; with troops numerous as the stars; the sun illumining the world of the heaven of empire and dominion; the luminary giving splendour to the universe of the firmament of

* On the 7th of February, Dubuc, the agent of Tippoo Sultaun embarked at Tranquebar to proceed on his Embassy to France.

glory and power; the Sultaun of the sea and the land; the King of Rome (i. e. the Grand Signior); be his empire and his power perpetual! addressed to me, which reached you through the British Envoy, and which you transmitted, has arrived. Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to despatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) slightly attended (or unattended).

Always continue to gratify me by friendly letters, notifying your welfare.

A true Translation, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

No. CXXXVII.

From the Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 13th February, 1799

In my last letter to your Honourable Committee, under date the 13th* of January, I informed you, that I had addressed a letter to Tippoo Sultaun, on the 9th of January, and I enclosed a copy of that letter, as well as the whole of my correspondence, with that Prince.

Soon after the 13th of January, I received from his Majesty's Minister at Constantinople a letter from the Grand Signior, addressed to Tippoo Sultaun, which I despatched to Seringapatam on the 16th ultimo, together with a letter from myself, renewing with encreased earnestness my proposition for the admission of an ambassador, with a view to the commencement of a pacific negotiation.

To this hour I have received no answer from Tippoo Sultaun to either of those letters.

It appeared to me, that the object of the Sultaun's silence could be no other than to delay the commencement of decisive military operations until the season should be so far advanced as to render the siege of his capital impracticable during the present year.

In the mean while, the advices from Bussorah, Bagdad,

* See p. 406.

Constantinople, and Bombay, were of so uncertain a nature, asⁿ to leave me still in doubt of the French army in Egypt; the only safe conclusion which could be drawn from these advices being, that the French still maintained the possession of that country.

Reports had also reached me through various channels, stating, that a French squadron, under M. Richany, destined to the Arabian Gulf, and superior in force to that of Commodore Blanket, had left Europe so early in the season that it might easily have pre-occupied the intended station of the Commodore, and as no intelligence has been received directly from the Red Sea since the date of the advices by the *Intrepid*, the state of our naval force, or of that of the enemy in that quarter, is not yet ascertained.

In addition to these circumstances, I was apprized by the most unquestionable authority, that while Tippoo Sultaun had declined to answer my several letters, three vakeels, from Seringapatam, accompanied by M. Dubuc (one of the leaders of the French force raised in the Isle of France, under M. Malartic's proclamation) were upon the point of embarking at Tranquebar, with an avowed mission from the Sultaun to the Executive Directory of France.

In order, therefore, to defeat the object of Tippoo Sultaun's silence, and to avail myself of the actual superiority of our force, and of the advantages of the present season, before the French can effect any junction with him, I determined to commence hostilities without delay; and I am resolved to suspend all negotiation with the Sultaun until the united force of the arms of the Company, and of their allies, shall have made such an impression on his territories as may give full effect to the just representations of the allied powers.

With these views, on the 3rd instant, I directed Lieutenant General Harris to enter the territory of Mysore with the army assembled under his command, and to proceed to the siege of Seringapatam with as little delay as possible.

With respect to the division of the Company's army on the Malabar coast, its operations, and consequently those of the troops of the Rajahs of Coorg and Travancore (who will be carefully prevented from making any premature movements), will be regulated by the orders which Lieutenant General

Harris shall transmit for that purpose to Lieutenant General Stuart, or to the officer commanding in Malabar.

I have instructed the Resident at Poonah to express to the Peishwa, and to his Minister, Nana Furnavese, my hope that the Mahratta Empire will instantly pursue the necessary measures for the vigorous prosecution of hostilities against the common enemy; and the assurances which I have already received from that Court, lead me to expect that the northwestern territory of the enemy will soon be invaded by a considerable Mahratta force under Purseram Bhow.

My latest intelligence from the Resident at Poonah induced me to believe that he must have applied before this time to the Government of Bombay for the assistance of a detachment of the Company's troops (which I know that Government to be prepared to furnish), for the purpose of acting with the Peishwa's contingent. In that event the Governor of Bombay will instruct the officer in the command of the detachment serving with the Mahrattas to maintain as constant and regular a correspondence with Lieutenant General Harris, and with Lieutenant General Stuart, as possible, and to exert all his influence with the commander of the Peishwa's contingent to engage him to regulate the progress and operations of the Mahratta forces by the advice and directions of Lieutenant General Harris, or by those of Lieutenant General Stuart.

I have authorized the Commissioners in Malabar to receive and encourage from any of the chiefs or public officers of Tippoo Sultaun on the coast of Malabar, any advances which shall appear to them to promise assistance to the Company in the prosecution of the war against that Prince.

I am not at present in possession of information which enables me to judge with sufficient certainty of the general disposition and temper of the inhabitants of Tippoo's remaining dominions on the coast of Malabar. If, however, they should manifest an inclination to revolt against his authority, and the Commissioners should think it expedient to encourage them, I have left it to the discretion of the Commissioners to offer such support and protection to those disposed to abandon the cause of the Sultaun, as the state of the British force on the Malabar coast may admit. I have also autho-

rized the Commissioners to give to all tributaries, and others renouncing their obedience to Tippoo, and acting cordially in our favour, the most positive assurances, in the name of the Company, that I will use my utmost efforts to compel that Prince to relinquish all claims upon their allegiance, and to assent to their becoming the dependants and subjects of the Honourable Company on such terms as shall hereafter be arranged under my orders.

My instructions to Lieutenant General Harris respecting the manner in which he is to receive such overtures as may be made to him by any of the inhabitants of Tippoo's dominions, desirous of throwing off the authority of that Prince, will be framed upon similar principles with my directions on the same subject to the Commissioners in Malabar.

His Excellency, Admiral Rainier, is fully acquainted with the actual state of affairs; and I have informed him that I rely with confidence on his Excellency's zeal for the public service (of which I have already received the most unequivocal proofs), for his cordial cooperation with the Commissioners in Malabar, and with Lieutenant General Stuart, in the vigorous prosecution of the war on the coast of Malabar; and I am persuaded his Excellency will take the most effectual measures for enabling the fleet under his command to keep its present station, on the coast of Malabar to as late a period of the season as possible.

The whole tenor of my intelligence from Mysore induces me to believe, that there is a general aversion in Tippoo's councils and armies to his intimate connection with the French; and I have already received intimations from various parts of his dominions, and from some of his principal ministers and officers, which promise considerable advantage in the prosecution of hostilities against him.

The main body of the army of the Carnatic, under General Harris, marched from Vellore on the 11th instant; I trust that the Barramahal, and the Southern Provinces, will be sufficiently protected by the force assembled under Colonels Reade and Brown.

The Nizam's contingent, accompanied by the whole of the Company's subsidiary troops arrived within a few miles of the main body of General Harris's force previously to their departure from Vellore.

I have the satisfaction to inform your Honourable Committee that Zemaun Shah commenced his retreat on the 4th of January ; by a copy of a letter from Zemaun Shah's Vizier to Shah Allum, it appears that Zemaun Shah has finally relinquished his project of invading Hindostan in the present year, but has engaged to return in the next season. The immediate cause of Zemaun Shah's precipitate retreat is stated in all the papers of intelligence to be the sudden appearance of his brother at the head of a military force in the neighbourhood of Herât.

The documents which I have directed the Governor of Bombay to forward by this despatch, will shew your Honourable Committee that my attention was directed at an early period to the establishment of such an intercourse with the Court of Persia as should withdraw the Shah from the prosecution of his ambitious views of aggression, to the defence of his own dominions.

I flatter myself that you will approve the success of those exertions which (with the aid of Mr. Duncan's ability and zeal for the public service), I have already been enabled to make in Persia, with a view to this desirable object ; it would certainly be a wise policy to apply annually a moderate sum of money to the same object, for the purpose of precluding those annual alarms of invasion which have occasioned so large an increase of your military charges in Bengal. You may rely on my particular attention to the improvement of the intercourse now likely to be established with the Court of Persia, from which I trust to derive many advantages, in addition to those to which I have adverted in this despatch.

The declared views of the French government, the position of the French army in Egypt, the possible cooperation of a French squadron in these seas, added to the recent proceedings of Tippoo Sultaun, render it indispensable to the security of the British empire in India, that the power of that restless and vindictive Prince should be speedily reduced. The delay, even of a few weeks, at this season, might enable him, in the next, to attempt the execution of his avowed projects of vengeance with a formidable accession of strength.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P. S. As I was closing this despatch, I received the en-

closed letter, No. 3,* from Tippoo Sultaun. His design is, evidently, to gain time, until a change of circumstances and of season shall enable him to avail himself of the assistance of France. I shall endeavour to frustrate this design; and although I shall not decline even this tardy and insidious acceptance of my repeated propositions for opening a negotiation, I shall accompany the negotiation by the movement of the army, for the purpose of enforcing such terms of peace as shall give effectual security to the Company's possessions against any hostile consequences of the Sultaun's alliance with the French. I have just now received intelligence that M. Dubuc, with three vakeels from the Sultaun, has actually sailed from Tranquebar, upon an embassy to France, with considerable presents from Tippoo to the Executive Directory.

I had despatched the *Osterley* with a party of the 28th dragoons, for the purpose of intercepting the vessel in which the embassy had embarked; but, unfortunately, the captain of the *Osterley* was not able to accomplish that desirable object.

No. CXXXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 19th Feb. 1799.

Your letter, No. 86, requires the suggestion of some points necessary for your direction.

My intention, in my letter of the 11th January,† was not that the Peishwa should be solicited, as a matter of favour, to receive the Bombay detachment in the manner suggested by Gopal Rao.

On the contrary, my expectation was, that under all the circumstances of the case, the Bombay detachment would be received by the Peishwa as a testimony of my disposition to accord with his Highness's wishes.

I, therefore, desire that you will not attempt to use any persuasion to induce the Peishwa to receive the detachment from Bombay; my experience of the policy of the Court of Poonah has already been sufficient to convince me of its dis-

* See p. 433.

† See p. 400.

position to view with suspicion the most amicable compliance with its own repeated and earnest requests. You will leave it entirely to the discretion of the Peishwa to accept or reject the offer of the detachment, declaring that his Highness's decision is a matter of perfect indifference to me.

You will understand that I am determined never to consent to any augmentation of the subsidiary force now offered to the Peishwa, nor to the continuance of this force in his service after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo, on any other conditions than those proposed in my letter of the 8th of July.*

You will peremptorily insist on the dismissal of Tippoo's vakeels. Under the present circumstances, their detention at Poonah is little short of an insult to the British government. From the several facts which you have stated, I confess that I cannot draw conclusions favorable to the cordial cooperation of the Peishwa, in the present contest with the Sultaun.

The whole conduct of the Peishwa has betrayed a systematic jealousy, suspicion, and even insincerity, in return for the most liberal and unqualified offices of friendship and good will. The time, I trust, is not far remote, when the Court of Poonah may lament the despicable policy which has governed its councils, in its late communications with the British government.

In the mean while, your activity must be exerted to counteract the pride, imbecility and falsehood, of Baagy Rao. My object is to be charged with the sole conduct of the interests of the allies, in any negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun. My proposition respecting the Mahratta vakeel to be sent to Fort St. George, was intended merely to preclude any emotion of the lively jealousy of the Court of Poonah. But, as the Peishwa has not yet made any effort in the common cause, nor is likely to make any, before every question with Tippoo shall be brought to an issue, his Highness might safely trust to me for the management of interests which he has abandoned, and which must ultimately be secured by my exertions. You will, therefore, rather discourage, than endeavour to accelerate, the appointment of a vakeel from the Peishwa, for

* See p. 113.

the purposes proposed. By reference to Hyderabad, you will find, that the Nizam has thrown the conduct of his interests with Tippoo entirely into my hands ; and I know no reason, either of justice, policy, or real dignity, which should restrain the Peishwa from an equal degree of confidence in my friendship and good faith.

I apprise you that I will not accept the Peishwa's mediation between me and Tippoo Sultaun ; nor can I conceive how the Peishwa can undertake the office of mediator in such a cause, without the most flagrant inconsistency. As a member of the triple alliance, he has already declared himself to be a party aggrieved by the Sultaun, and in that view the Sultaun might naturally suspect the sincerity of his mediation : but if he has really brought himself to that temper of impartiality which is the indispensable characteristic of a mediator, he has violated his faith towards the allies, and they cannot accept a mediation founded on a violation of their reciprocal engagements.

Even if this reasoning could be controverted, after having rejected, in the most offensive manner, my proffered mediation between him and another branch of the triple alliance, the Peishwa cannot reasonably expect that either the Nizam or I should admit him to mediate between us and the common enemy.

It may not be useless to suggest to Scindiah, that although Zemaun Shah's retreat has relieved me from all apprehension of any interruption of the tranquillity of the province of Oude, I think it advisable, under the present circumstances, to maintain a large force on the frontier of the Vizier's dominion.

It will not be proper to use any intimidation to Scindiah, but I apprise you, that if he should enter into any connection with Tippoo, of a nature dangerous to the British interests, the security of his dominions in Hindostan will be exposed to hazard.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXXXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency Lieutenant-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, Feb. 22nd, 1799

I have reason to believe that many of the tributaries, principal officers, and other subjects of Tippoo Sultaun, are inclined to throw off the authority of that Prince, and to place themselves under the protection of the Company and of our allies. The war in which we are again involved, by the treachery and violence of the Sultaun, renders it both just and expedient that we should avail ourselves, as much as possible, of the discontents and disaffection of his people. It is, therefore, advisable, to arrange a plan for the regular conduct of all negotiations connected with this object.

Being apprehensive that your more important avocations will not admit of your taking any part in the details of this business, I hereby direct you to constitute a commission for this purpose, to consist of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel Close, Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad; with Captain Macaulay, to act as secretary to the commission.

The commissioners are to act constantly in communication with you, and to obey whatever directions you shall think proper to signify to them.

They are to report their proceedings to me as frequently and as regularly as circumstances shall permit.

They will correspond with the commissioners in Malabar on such points as shall be connected in any respect with the objects of this commission: and for this purpose you will be pleased to furnish them with a copy of the Company's cypher, No. 11.

Their duty is to consist, generally, in receiving and considering all such overtures from the subjects of Tippoo Sultaun (of whatever class), as may either be referred by you to the commissioners, or may be addressed to them through other channels.

In cases which may not admit of reference to me, they will decide, under your authority, on the degree and nature of the encouragement proper to be given to such persons as may

propose to place themselves under the protection of the Company. The following extracts from my instructions to the commissioners in Malabar (which you will be pleased to communicate to the officers named in the present commission), will explain the general principles by which their conduct is to be regulated.

“ I now authorize you to avail yourselves, without reserve, of the overtures made some time since to Mr. Uthoff and to Captain Mahony, by Shehab-ud-Dein Khan, to whatever extent you may judge practicable and useful. You will also receive and encourage from any other of the chiefs, or public officers of Tippoo Sultaun, on the coast of Malabar, any advances which shall appear to you to promise assistance to the Company, in the prosecution of the war against that Prince.

“ I am not at present in possession of any information which enables me to judge with sufficient certainty of the general disposition and temper of the inhabitants of Tippoo's remaining dominions on the coast of Malabar. If, however, they should manifest an inclination to revolt against his authority, and you should think it expedient to encourage them, I leave it to your discretion to offer them such support and protection as the state of the British force on your coast may enable you to afford. I also authorize you to give to all tributaries, or others, renouncing their allegiance to Tippoo, and acting heartily in our favour, the most positive assurances, in the name of the Company, that I will use my utmost efforts to compel that Prince to relinquish all claims upon their allegiance, and to agree to their becoming the dependents and subjects of the Honorable Company, on such terms as shall hereafter be arranged under my orders.”

The enclosure No. 1 contains an account of the overtures from Shehab-ud-Dien Khan, referred to in the foregoing extract.*

It will be obvious, however, that the instructions apply

* This document not only states the overtures made for a junction with the English, by some of Tippoo's chiefs, but declares also the fact, that “ Tippoo had formed a close alliance with the French, to the extent of declaring that the enemies of the one were to be considered as the enemies of the other; and that he (Tippoo) had engaged to grant them (the French) the fort of Honowir (Onore) to facilitate their communication with his dominions.”

more particularly to tributaries, or zemindars, possessing or claiming such districts on the borders of the Company's territory as may be annexed to it, in the favourable event of a further reduction of the Sultaun's power, and of a partition of his present dominions.

The commission will communicate with Meer Allum, with respect to all such proposals as may appear likely to concern the interests of the Nizam. Any overtures which may be made by tributaries, or other subjects of the Sultaun, adjacent to the present frontier of his Highness, will be considered with Meer Allum's assistance ; the necessary encouragement and assurances to such persons being, more properly, to be adjusted by the powers to whom their allegiance may eventually be transferred.

The same principle must be applied to any offers which may proceed from districts bordering on the present Mahratta dominions. Should a Mahratta force hereafter join your army, the commissioners will (in the cases to which I now refer), consult with the commander of that force, as well as with the commanding officer of any British detachment from Bombay which may be acting with the Mahrattas.

But, although in the two last cases, authoritative assurances and encouragement would most properly proceed from our allies respectively, it is not improbable that, on some occasions, the guarantee of the Company may be required to such engagements, and even be made an indispensable preliminary condition by the parties proposing to abandon the cause of Tippoo.

It is desirable to avoid all such engagements of the nature of a guarantee, the commissioners, therefore, will be careful not to guarantee any engagements which the allies may be inclined to form with persons renouncing their allegiance to Tippoo Sultaun, excepting in cases where the proposed advantage shall be important to the common cause, and evidently unattainable without a formal guarantee. In general, therefore, such contracts must be avoided ; but if a case of peculiar exigency should arise, without a possibility of a previous reference to me, the commissioners will regulate their conduct as nearly as possible on the principles which I have already established, for cases more immediately affecting the particular interests of the Company.

The firm foundation on which our connexion with the Court of Hyderabad is now happily placed, disposes me to guarantee, with less hesitation, any engagements which the Nizam, or Meer Allum, on his Highness's behalf, might be willing to form with the tributaries of the enemy on the side of his Highness's frontier than prudence would require in any similar transaction under the Mahratta power.

With respect to overtures proceeding from the more central parts of the enemy's country, and, therefore, from persons whose possessions are not likely, in any event, to be transferred to any of the allies, it is evident that such overtures cannot be received or encouraged in the same manner as those which have been already considered. To offers of this description, the commission must return merely such assurances of aid and support (whether military or pecuniary), as it may be immediately practicable to afford; avoiding, carefully, any engagements which might ultimately embarrass a negotiation for peace. With regard to pecuniary aids, I authorize you to give your sanction to such advances of money as the commissioners may deem essentially necessary to promote the objects of these instructions; apprizing you, however, that these advances of money must be confined within the limits of moderation, and with due attention to economy.

With these instructions you will receive copies, in Persian and English, of a declaration which I propose to publish for the purpose of justifying to the powers of Hindostan the measures which the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun has compelled the Company and their allies to adopt. You will communicate this document to the commissioners, who are to prepare and publish, in your name, such proclamations as shall appear to them to be best adapted to the state of the different parts of the enemy's country through which you may pass, or with which you may open any intercourse, conforming the general tenor of all such proclamations to the principles and spirit of the declaration.

You have already been furnished with copies in Persian and English, of my correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, as well as with translations in Persian, of the Grand Signior's manifesto, and of his Highness's letter to the Sultan; you will communicate these papers to the commissioners. Those pas-

sages of the correspondence, and of the documents received from Constantinople, which expose the character of the French republic, and the outrages committed by the French against the acknowledged head of the Mahommedan church, may, in particular, be employed to produce an useful impression on all the Mussulman inhabitants of Mysore. The commissioners will make any further use of these documents which may appear advisable.

I also enclose (No. 2) copies, in Persian and English, of an agreement which has been lately concluded, under my direction, with certain chiefs of the Ghyre Mehdy sect of Mussulmans. For an account of the banishment of these sectaries from the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun, I refer you to the accompanying extract of a letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, under date the 4th of January last, making the inclosure No. 3. Among these exiles are many persons who formerly held situations of great trust under the government of the late Hyder Ali Khan, as well as under that of Tippoo Sultaun; and it is obvious that all these persons must be intimately acquainted with the country of the enemy. It will be the business of the commissioners, under your orders, to consider how the knowledge and probable connexions of these people, may be best applied to the promotion of the objects of their commission. It appears that the Sudars, whom, together with 400 Sillahdar horse, I have agreed to entertain for the present (principally with a view to the advantages which may be derived from their local knowledge and connexions) possess the means, as well as the inclination, of levying for our service a considerable body of cavalry, consisting of their exiled associates, now dispersed throughout the dominions of the Peishwa and of the Nizam. To employ their whole force in the field would be extremely burthensome, and I trust we shall never be under the necessity of resorting to such assistance beyond the extent of the arrangement already concluded with Jaffier Khan and Syed Yacoob.

The commission will be confidentially informed by Captain Malcolm of the progress which may have been made in a certain secret negotiation which has been opened by Meer Allum, in communication with Captain Malcolm since the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun compelled me to adopt the reso-

lution of attacking his territories. It is impossible for me, in the present stage of this negotiation, to give the commission any precise instructions for the regulation of their proceedings with relation to this very peculiar and important case, and, therefore, I must leave the management of it to their discretion, aided by that of Meer Allum. If, however, they should be able to transmit to me any report on this delicate point before the communication between the army and this Presidency shall become precarious or difficult, it is my desire that they should write to me in cypher, a caution which they must always observe in their correspondence with me, from any position which may render their despatches liable to be intercepted.

The enclosure No. 4, consists of a memorandum of a most secret and delicate nature, relating to the family which governed Mysore previously to the usurpation of Hyder Alli Khan.

It is obvious that no advantageous negotiation can be opened with any of the surviving branches of this family under any other circumstances than a determination, accompanied by undoubted power, to effect the total removal of the ruling dynasty. Such a determination in the present stage of our contest with Tippoo Sultaun would be premature, and incompatible with the principles on which my instructions to you of the 3rd instant were founded. My orders for the march of the army being grounded on the necessity of providing for our own indispensable security and reasonable indemnity, and being strictly limited to those justifiable objects. There is, besides, no reason to suppose that any of the persons mentioned in the accompanying memoir could be rendered useful (in any material degree) in the prosecution of the war.

The commissioners must, therefore, confine their proceedings on this subject to enquiries into the state of parties in Mysore, with a view to the practicability of restoring that family with or without the consent of the principal Mussulman chiefs at present in authority in the country. The commission will readily perceive that these enquiries must be conducted with the utmost caution and prudence; for if their object were to transpire, the discovery might check, if not

prevent, many advances which would otherwise be made from persons attached to the Mussulman Government.

The personal safety of the surviving adherents of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, and even of the Ranee herself, also requires peculiar discretion and secrecy in the conduct of this part of the business of the commission. The most dreadful scene of vengeance and slaughter would be the probable consequence of Tippoo's receiving the slightest intimation of the contents of the accompanying memoir, which, therefore, after being attentively perused by the commissioners, must be destroyed.

You will direct Captain Macleod, of the intelligence department, to communicate, from time to time, to the commission whatever intelligence he may receive of a nature connected with the objects of the commission, with which I authorize you to make him fully acquainted.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXL.

Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, for all the forces and affairs of the British nation in the East Indies, on behalf of the Honourable the East India Company and the allies of the said Company there, his Highness the Nizam and the Peishwa.

Fort St. George, 22d Feb. 1799.

A solemn treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Seringapatam, between the Honourable Company and the Nabob Asoph Jah and the Peishwa on the one part, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun on the other part; and from that day all commotion and hostility ceased. Since that day, the three allied states have invariably manifested a sacred regard for the obligations contracted under that treaty with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun. Of this uniform disposition, abundant proofs have been afforded by each of the allies. Whatever differences have arisen with regard to the limits of the territory of Mysore, have been amicably adjusted without difficulty, and with the most exact attention to the principles of equity, and to the stipulations of treaty. Such has been the solicitude of the allies for the preservation of tranquillity, that they have

viewed with forbearance, for some years past, various embassies and military preparations on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, of a tendency so evidently hostile to the interests of the allies, as would have justified them, not only in the most serious remonstrances, but even in an appeal to arms. On the part of the British Government every endeavour has been employed to conciliate the confidence of the Sultaun, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit, by the most unequivocal acknowledgment and confirmation of his just rights, and by the removal of every cause of jealousy which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace. These pacific sentiments have been most particularly manifested in the Governor General's recent decision on Tippoo Sultaun's claim to the district of Wynaad, and in the negotiation opened by his Lordship with regard to the districts of Amerah and Souleah. In every instance the conduct of the British Government in India towards Tippoo Sultaun, has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith, which the legislature of Great Britain and the Honourable the East India Company have firmly established as the unalterable rule of their intercourse with the native princes and states of India.

The exemplary good faith and the pacific disposition of the allies, since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, has never been disputed even by Tippoo Sultaun. Far from having attempted to alledge even the pretext of a complaint against their conduct, he has constantly acknowledged their justice, sincerity, and good faith; and has professed, in the most cordial terms, his desire to maintain and strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord with them.

In the midst of these amicable professions on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and at the moment when the British Government had issued orders for the confirmation of his claim to Wynaad, it was with astonishment and indignation that the allies discovered the engagements which he had contracted with the French nation, in direct violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own most solemn and recent protestations of friendship towards the allies.

Under the mask of these specious professions, and of a pretended veneration for the obligations of treaty, Tippoo Sultaun despatched ambassadors to the Isle of France, who, in a period of profound peace in India, proposed and con-

cluded, in his name, an offensive alliance with the French, for the avowed purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company, and consequently against the Peishwa and the Nizam, the allies of the Company.

The ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, demanded military succours from the French, and actually levied a military force in the Isle of France, with the declared view of prosecuting the intended war.

When the ambassadors returned, in a French ship of war, from the Isle of France, Tippoo Sultaun suffered the military force, which they had levied for the avowed purpose of making war upon the allies, to land in his country; and finally, he admitted it into his army: by these personal acts ratifying and confirming the proceedings of his ambassadors.

This military force, however, was not sufficiently powerful to enable him immediately to attempt his declared purpose of attacking the Company's possessions, but in the meanwhile he advanced his hostile preparations conformably to his engagements with the French; and he was ready to move his army into the Company's territories whenever he might obtain from France the effectual succours which he had assiduously solicited from that nation.

But the providence of God, and the victorious arms of the British nation, frustrated his vain hopes, and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar.

The British Government, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, had not omitted the necessary precaution of assembling their forces for the joint protection of their respective dominions. The strict principles of self-defence would have justified the allies at that period of time in making an immediate attack upon the territories of Tippoo Sultaun; but even the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet at the mouth of the Nile did not abate the anxious desire of the allies to maintain the relations of amity and peace with Tippoo Sultaun. They attempted, by a moderate representation, to recall him to a sense of his obligations, and of the genuine principles of prudence and policy; and they employed every effort to open the channels of negotiation, and to facilitate the means of amicable accommodation With these salutary

views, the Governor General, on the 8th November, 1798, in the name of the allies, proposed to despatch an ambassador to Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of renewing the bonds of friendship, and of concluding such an arrangement as might afford effectual security against any future interruption of the public tranquillity; and his Lordship repeated the same proposal on the 10th December, 1798. Tippoo Sultaun declined, by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies, and he manifested an evident disposition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by suddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with respect to the districts of Amerah and Souleah, and by interrupting the intercourse between his subjects and those of the Company on their respective frontiers. On the 9th January, 1799, the Governor General being arrived at Fort St. George (notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances in the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun) renewed with increased earnestness, the expression of his Lordship's anxious desire to despatch an ambassador to the Sultaun.

The Governor General expressly solicited the Sultaun to return an answer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no proposition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honour of the Sultaun, or in any degree novel or complicated either in form or substance, it could not require a longer consideration. The Governor General waited with the utmost solicitude for an answer to the reasonable and distinct proposition contained in his letter of the 9th January, 1799, Tippoo Sultaun, however, who must have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained silent, although the Governor General had plainly apprized that prince, that dangerous consequences would result from delay. In the meanwhile the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period, as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the allies. Under these circumstances, on the 3rd of February (eight days having elapsed from the period when an answer might have been received from Seringapatam to the Governor General's letter of the 9th January) his Lordship declared to the allies, that the necessary measures must now be adopted, without delay, for securing such advantages as should place the common safety of the allies

beyond the reach of the insincerity of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the violence of the French. With this view, the Governor General, on the 3rd of February, issued orders to the British armies to march, and signified to the commander of his Majesty's squadron, that the obstinate silence of the Sultaun must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negotiation.

At length, on the 13th of February, a letter from Tippoo Sultaun reached the Governor General, in which the Sultaun signifies to his Lordship, "that being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion;" adding, "that the Governor General would be pleased to despatch Major Doveton to him, unattended or slightly attended."

The allies will not dwell on the peculiar phrases of this letter; but it must be evident to all the states of India, that the answer of the Sultaun has been deferred to this late period of the season, with no other view than to preclude the allies, by insidious delays, from the benefit of those advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to secure. On those advantages alone (under the recent experience of Tippoo Sultaun's violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, and under the peculiar circumstances of that prince's offensive alliance with the French) can the allies now venture to rely for the faithful execution of any treaty of peace concluded with Tippoo Sultaun.

The allies cannot suffer Tippoo Sultaun to profit by his own studied and systematic delay, nor to impede such a disposition of their military and naval force, as shall appear best calculated to give effect to their just views.

Bound by the sacred obligations of public faith, professing the most amicable disposition, and undisturbed in the possession of those dominions secured to him by treaty, Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace, and compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honour.

For a period of three months, he obstinately rejected every pacific overture, in the hourly expectation of receiving that succour which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favourite purposes of ambition and revenge. Disappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, he now

resorts to subterfuge and procrastination; and, by a tardy, reluctant, and insidious acquiescence in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, he endeavours to frustrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation, until some change of circumstances and of season shall revive his expectations of disturbing the tranquillity of India, by favouring the irruption of a French army.

The allies are equally prepared to repel his violence, and to counteract his artifices and delays.

The allies are, therefore, resolved to place their army in such a position as shall afford adequate protection against any artifice or insincerity, and shall preclude the return of that danger which has so lately menaced their possessions. The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tippoo Sultaun, Lieutenant General Harris, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's forces on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, is authorized to receive any embassy which Tippoo Sultaun may despatch to the head quarters of the British army, and to concert a treaty on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary for the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

Dated Fort St. George, 22nd February, 1799, by order of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council,

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator to Govt.

JOS. WEBBE.

No. CXLI.

From the Right Hon. the Governor-General to Tippoo Sultaun.

Fort St. George, 22d Feb. 1799.

I had the honour, on the 13th instant, to receive your letter,* acknowledging your receipt of my two letters of the 9th and 16th January,† informing me of your intention to proceed on a hunting excursion, and desiring me to despatch Major Doveton unattended to you.

* See p. 433.

† See p. 394—413.

I lament most sincerely that the friendly intimation contained in my letter of the 9th January,* regarding the dangers of delay, produced no effect on your discerning mind, and that you deferred your reply to that letter to so late a period in the season. Your long silence on this important and pressing occasion, compelled me to adopt the resolution of ordering the British forces to advance in concert with the armies of the allied powers. You are not ignorant that the period of the season rendered the advance of the army absolutely necessary to the common security of the allies. This movement of the army is to be imputed entirely to your repeated rejection of my amicable proposal of sending an ambassador to your presence.

Under the present circumstances, to send Major Doveton to you, could not be attended with those advantages which would have resulted from his mission at a proper season.

The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with you, Lieutenant General Harris, commander of the British troops, has been empowered to receive any embassy which you shall despatch to him. Lieutenant General Harris will also authorize such persons as he may think proper, to concert, in communication with your ambassadors, a new treaty of friendship with your Highness, founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian translator to Govt.

No. CXLII.

(Secret.)

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 22nd Feb. 1799.

In my letter of the 3rd of February,† I apprised you, that I should in due time inform you of the manner in which I wished you to receive such overtures, as might be made to you by any of the inhabitants of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions

* See p. 394.

† See p. 426.

desirous of throwing off the authority of that Prince; and that I should also send you such further instructions, as might appear to me to be necessary for your direction previously to your entrance into the territory of Mysore.

With regard to the first of those objects, the enclosed instructions of this date,* direct you to form a commission for the special purpose of assisting you in the conduct of such negotiations as may eventually be opened with any description of Tippoo's subjects.

As the intercourse between your army and the Presidency must become liable to interruption after you shall have passed the frontiers of Mysore, I shall now furnish you with such instructions as appear to me to be necessary for your direction, not only previous to your entrance into the dominions of the Sultaun, but during your progres towards his capital, and after you shall have commenced the seige of that city.

The enclosure No. 2,† contains a copy of a letter received by me from Tippoo Sultaun, on the 13th of February; the original of my answer to which, is contained in a sealed packet made up for despatch to the Sultaun, and forming No. 3. No. 4,‡ contains a copy of that answer for your information. No. 5,§ contains copies in English, Persian, and Malabar, of the declaration of the allies, with respect to the causes of their present measures.

When you shall arrive within one day's march of the point by which you propose to enter Mysore, you will transmit the original letter addressed to the Sultaun contained in the sealed packet No. 3, to Major Doveton, with directions to forward it to Tippoo Sultaun.

You will not delay the march of your army one hour after the receipt of this despatch, and you will proceed to enter the territory of Mysore, and to advance towards Seringapatam with the utmost possible degree of expedition.

On passing the frontiers, you will circulate among Tippoo's subjects as many copies as possible of the declaration of the allies; and you will issue a proclamation in your own name promising protection to the persons and properties of all such subjects of the Sultaun as shall, on just and reasonable terms,

Sec page 442.

† See page 433.

‡ See page 453.

§ See page 448.

assist the army in its march by supplies of cattle, grain, forage, and provisions of any description; and further assuring the inhabitants of Mysore in general, that no person shall be molested excepting such as shall appear in arms, or shall impede the march of the army by the removal of those supplies (the produce of the country) which may be useful to its progress or subsistence. The advance of the army is not, however, to be in the least, retarded for the purpose of preparing and issuing these proclamations.

In the course of your advance through Tippoo's territories you will employ, and also engage Meer Allum to employ, every means to conciliate the subjects of the Sultaun, as well by the conduct of the company's and the Nizam's forces, as by publishing from time to time such assurances as shall appear best adapted to the occasion.

You will order Lieutenant Colonel Browne, or the officer in command of the Southern division of the army, to commence his operations at such time, and to direct them to such points of attack on the possessions of the enemy, as you shall judge most advisable.

If Tippoo Sultaun, availing himself of the channel of negotiation still left open by my letter No. 3, either previously to your arrival at Seringapatam, or previously to your having taken a position for the siege of that capital, should signify to you a desire to send an embassy to you, I authorize you to receive any such embassy; exercising your discretion with regard to the particular time and place of receiving it. But at whatever period you may judge proper to comply with the proposal in question, I most earnestly and particularly recommend to you to observe with the utmost care, all those measures of precaution and vigilance, which the artful and treacherous character of the enemy renders peculiarly necessary on such an occasion. It must never be forgotten, that he may possibly despatch ambassadors to you with the sole view of obtaining intelligence of your designs, or of tampering with some of the Sirdars of the allies. Under this constant impression, you will be particularly careful not to halt for an hour nor to relax any operation, necessary with a view to the siege, on account of any overtures which you may receive from the Sultaun in any stage of your progress towards his capital.

You will communicate this letter to the commissioners named in the instruction, and you will consult with them on all points relating to any negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun.

You may possibly think it unadvisable to disclose to Tippoo Sultaun, the nature and full extent of the demands of the allies, before you shall have effected a junction with the army of Bombay, or before you shall have taken your position for the siege of Seringapatam, and shall have been satisfied that all your preparations for that purpose are complete. But after having attained such a position you will without delay (and before you open your batteries, or throw shells into the town) communicate to Tippoo Sultaun, either through the channel of any embassy which you may have admitted from him, or by a flag of truce, the demands of the allies, comprized in the draft of preliminary articles making the inclosure marked A.* The blanks of those preliminary articles you will previously fill up, according to your information and judgement, with the assistance of the commissioners appointed to aid you in all matters relating to negotiation, either with the Sultaun, or with any of his subjects.

You will require the signature of the articles under Tippoo's seal, and the delivery of the hostages specified in the 8th article, within 24 hours from the communication of the articles to the Sultaun, either by his ambassadors, or by the flag of truce. You will at the same time signify to Tippoo Sultaun, that in the event of your being compelled to open your batteries against his capital, you will not afterwards desist for an instant from your operations, on any conditions more favorable to him than those contained in the inclosure marked B; and accordingly after having opened your batteries against the place, you will not admit any ambassadors from Tippoo, unless you shall know them to be charged with his formal assent to the articles contained in the inclosure B, and to bring with them to your camp, both the money required under the draft of preliminary articles B, and the hostages required by the 8th article of both drafts of preliminary articles A and B.

Should Tippoo Sultaun agree, either before or after the commencement of your attack, to the conditions respectively

* See p. 460.

to be proposed in either case; and should he deliver up the required hostages, you will immediately make the necessary dispositions with General Stuart, for taking possession of the ceded territory on the coast of Malabar; you will also direct the Commissioners appointed to assist you in all matters of negotiation, to arrange and conclude with all practicable despatch, in concert with Meer Allum, with any Minister who shall have been empowered by the Peishwa for that purpose, and with the ambassadors of Tippoo Sultaun, a definitive treaty of peace and friendship on the basis, and agreeably to the conditions, of the preliminary articles which shall have been previously signed by the Sultaun.

The only difficulty which can occur in framing the definitive treaty, will consist in the adjustment and specification of the territories to be ceded to the allies respectively, according to the preliminaries, which may have been settled. It is impossible for me to give you any detailed instructions, with regard to the particular countries to be ceded to the Nizam and to the Peishwa, whose respective ministers must make their own selection under your control. The territories to be ceded to the Company under the draft of preliminaries marked A., are enumerated in that draft. The additional cessions which would be demanded for the Company under the draft of preliminaries marked B., must be determined with a view to the improvement of our southern frontier, according to the best opinions and information which you shall be able to obtain from the Commissioners, or from other authorities in your army.

If no Mahratta force shall have joined your army, previously to the conclusion of the preliminary articles, you will still insist on the payment of the whole of the money stipulated to be paid by the 6th article, into the hands of the allied powers on the spot, who will be answerable, in that case, for the due delivery to the Peishwa of his third share of the sum paid into your hands. If at the conclusion of the definitive treaty, no Mahratta vakeels should be present, you are to engage, in concert with Meer Allum, to procure the Peishwa's assent to the treaty, before the expiration of three months; securing and reserving to the Peishwa, the same full and ample power of selecting the districts to be ceded to him conformably to the 4th article of the proposed preliminary

treaty, as he could have exercised if he had been represented during the negotiations by a regularly accredited Minister.

Although you should be in possession of the required hostages, you will not quit your position in the vicinity of Seringapatam, until the army of Bombay shall have reached such a point on its return to the Malabar coast, as may place it beyond the effects of any treachery, which might be attempted against it by Tippoo Sultaun. With a view to this and other advantages, you will reserve to yourself the liberty of remaining in the vicinity of Seringapatam, until the allies shall have been actually put in possession of any three of the fortresses to be ceded to them, which they may respectively select.

I have now furnished you with instructions for your conduct in the two cases of a negotiation, being opened with Tippoo Sultan, either previously, or subsequently to the attack of Seringapatam.

The case of your being compelled to prosecute the siege of Seringapatam to the last extremity, and of your obtaining possession of that city would open so extensive and complicated a change in the political state of India, as to require the most comprehensive system of new arrangements. At present it appears to me to be sufficient to recommend that in this event, you should adopt the necessary measures for effectually securing your position in the city; for supporting those inhabitants of Mysore, who may have placed themselves under the protection of the allies; and for opening a safe and easy communication between your army and both coasts. In such a conjuncture, particular operations must depend on the nature of the political and military situation and strength of the enemy, subsequently to the reduction of his capital; and on a variety of other circumstances which it is impossible to foresee. I rely on your discretion for acting under such circumstances in the manner best calculated to maintain your advantages, until I shall be enabled to transmit specific instructions for your direction.

Whether in the last case supposed, the person of Tippoo Sultaun should fall into your hands or not, you will neither open nor conclude any negotiation involving the final settlement of the country, either with that prince or with any other persons, until you shall have received special authority from me for that purpose.

I have directed a copy to be sent to you of the diary of the proceedings of the deputies, who conducted the negotiations at Seringapatam in 1792, which I desire you will be pleased to deliver in charge to the Commission appointed in my separate instructions of this date. This diary may eventually afford great assistance to the Commissioners in the management of any negotiations which they may be required to conduct with Tippoo Sultaun.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

[The following are the Enclosures referred to in the preceding letter.]

Draft of preliminary Articles.—A.

Preliminary Articles for the re-establishment of the antient friendship, and for the adjustment of existing differences, between the Honourable English Company, the Nawab Asoph Jah, Row Pundit Purdhaun, and Tippoo Sultaun, settled by Lieut.-General George Harris, &c., in virtue of powers delegated to him by the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. P., Governor General; by Meer Allum, Behadur, on the part of the Nawab Asoph Jah; by _____, on the part of the Peishwa; and by _____, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun.

Article 1st. Tippoo Sultaun to receive and honourably entertain an ambassador from each of the allies as often and for as long a period of time as any of the said allies shall require; the allies, on their part, severally consenting to receive and entertain in the same manner, and on the same terms, an ambassador from Tippoo Sultaun.

Article 2nd. Tippoo Sultaun to dismiss without delay from his service, and to remove from his dominions, not only all Frenchmen or natives of the Islands of France and Bourbon, or of any other countries now subject to France; but also all Europeans, natives, or subjects of countries now at war with Great Britain.

Article 3rd. Tippoo Sultaun to renounce all connection with the French nation; and to engage that none of the subjects of that nation shall ever hereafter be entertained in his service, or be allowed to reside within his dominions.

Article 4th. Tippoo Sultaun to cede to the Company in perpetuity the whole of the sea-coast of Malabar below the Ghauts, in his possession at the commencement of the present war: that is to say, all the territory below the Ghauts, situated between the river Cavai (which forms the present boundary of the Company to the northward) and the Portuguese possessions on that coast.* Tippoo is to cede in like manner to the

* And including the district of Belguy on the coast of Malabar, unless Tippoo can clearly prove that this district is above the Ghauts.

Company the district (including the fortress of Sacragerry) which is situated between Paulgacherry and Pilney; and which comprehends Animallie and other Talooks.* He is likewise to cede in perpetuity to their Highnesses, the Nizam and the Peishwa respectively,† a territory adjacent to their present respective boundaries, and agreeably to their selection, equal in net revenue to the districts to be ceded to the Company; and it is hereby determined and agreed, with a view to the prevention of delays, that the several districts to be ceded by Tippoo Sultaun shall be taken at the valuation at which they were respectively rated in the accounts delivered in by his vakeels during the negotiation of the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792.

Article 5th. Tippoo Sultaun to relinquish for ever all claim to the lately disputed districts of Amera and Souleah, and Ersawaraseemy, to any part of the territory possessed by the Rajah of Coorga, at the commencement of the war, to the whole of the Tambacherry Pass, and generally to all places on the present borders of any of the allies which may at this time be in dispute.

Article 6th. One crore and a half of sicca rupees shall be paid by Tippoo Sultaun to the allies, agreeably to the following particulars:—

1st. Seventy-five lacs shall be paid immediately in pagodas, or gold mohrs, or rupees of full weight and standard; or in gold or silver bullion.

2nd. The remaining seventy-five lacs shall be paid within six months from the date of the present treaty.

Article 7th. All prisoners in the hands of the several powers to be fairly and unequivocally released.

Article 8th. Until the due performance of the articles of the present treaty, two of the three eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun shall be delivered as hostages into the hands of Lieut.-General Harris; and as a further security for Tippoo's faithful execution of the same, the fortress or fortresses of ‡ shall also be delivered up to the Company. On the arrival of the said sons of Tippoo Sultaun in camp, and on the pay-

* Memorandum —The object of this cession being to open a free and short communication between Paulgacherry and Dindigul, the Commander-in-Chief is referred to the proper officers for the necessary information with regard to the particular Talooks which are to be demanded for this purpose; and, accordingly, this article will admit of variation, according to the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Commissioners.

† That is to say, to each of the other allies a territory equal to that ceded to the Company, so that the cession to the Company shall constitute one-third part of the total cession to the three allied powers.

‡ This blank to be filled up by the Commander-in-Chief; but it is to be observed, that, it is not to be filled by the word (Seringapatam.)

N. B. The fortress or fortresses here to be specified, are to be exclusive of those within the districts to be ceded (see the conclusion of this article.) Gopaul Droog was in contemplation in this passage.

ment of the first moiety agreed to be paid by the 6th article, a cessation of hostilities shall take place. But the army of the allies shall not quit their position before Seringapatam until the fortress (or fortresses) of

before mentioned, shall be actually in the possession of the Company's troops. And whereas the territory to be ceded to the allies will contain several forts, it is hereby further agreed that of the said forts the allies shall be at liberty to require (if they judge proper) to be put in actual possession of any three of them which they may think fit to select, before Tippoo Sultaun shall be entitled to require the departure of the allied armies from the vicinity of Seringapatam.

Article 9th. When an agreement, containing the articles above written, shall arrive, bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultaun, counter-agreements shall be sent to Tippoo Sultaun from the allies: and after the cessation of hostilities, a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship shall be settled and entered into by the several powers.

Memorandum.

In the event of no Mahratta force having joined the army at the time when preliminary articles shall be concluded, the Commander-in-Chief, or Commissioners appointed to treat with Tippoo Sultaun shall, notwithstanding, insist upon his paying the whole of the money stipulated to be paid by the 6th article, into the hands of the allied powers on the spot, who will be answerable for the due delivery to the Peishwa of his share, namely, one-third of the whole stipulated sum. If on concluding the definitive treaty, no Mahratta vakeels should be present, the other allies are to engage to procure the Peishwa's assent to the treaty in the course of three months. Securing and reserving to the Peishwa the same full and ample power of selecting the districts to be ceded conformably to the 4th article of the preliminary treaty, as he would have exercised if he had authorized a minister on the spot to sign and execute for him.

It is probable that the territory to be ceded to the Nizam and Peishwa, under the 4th article of the preceding treaty, would consist of Gurramconda, Gooty, Anagoondy, Roydroog, and Harponelly (to be divided between them as they may agree;) the forts of which it would be proper, in this case, to require the immediate surrender as additional securities before the army should quit the vicinity of Seringapatam, would, perhaps, be Gooty to the Nizam, Roydroog to the Peishwa, and Shuddasoo (Ghur (on the Malabar coast) to the Company. But as it is proposed that a fortress of Tippoo's, over and above those to be ceded (perhaps Gopauldroog) shall be delivered into the temporary possession of the Company as an additional security for his faithful performance of the treaty, perhaps, instead of Shudashoo Ghur, the immediate delivery of Gurramconda to the Nizam, in addition to Gooty and Roydroog, would operate more effectually as a restraint upon the Sultaun, who would not venture to provoke a renewal of hostilities, after the allies were in possession of the four strong holds which have been specified.

Draft B.

Article 1, 2, and 3, the same as in draft A.

Article 4.—One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultaun was in possession before the war, to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent to their present respective boundaries, and agreeably to their selection. And it is hereby agreed and determined with a view to the prevention of delays, that the several districts to be ceded by Tippoo Sultaun, shall be taken at the valuation at which they were respectively rated in the accounts delivered in by his Vakeels, during the negotiation of the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792.

Article 5, as in draft A.

Article 6, two crores of sicca rupees shall be paid by Tippoo Sultaun to the allies, agreeably to the following particulars :

1st. One crore shall be paid immediately in pagodas, or gold mohrs, or rupees of full weight and standard ; or in gold or silver bullion.

2nd. The remaining crore shall be paid within six months from the date of the present treaty.

Article 7, 8, and 9, as in draft A.

Memorandum with a view to the case of Tippoo's being compelled to cede half of his present dominions to the allies, February 26th, 1799.

Tippoo stated his revenues to amount in 1792, to seventy lacs of kanterai pagodas, or two crores and ten lacs of rupees. The allies, however, having reason to believe this to be an under statement, insisted on adding nine lacs of pagodas to the amount, and, consequently, on dividing 79 lacs, instead of 70 lacs of pagodas. Hence the amount to be ceded, agreeably to the preliminary treaty, was $39\frac{1}{2}$ lacs. Accordingly, the Company received districts to the amount, *according to Tippoo's own valuation of them*, of 13,16,765 $5\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas ; the Nizam 13,16,666 $6\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas ; and the Peishwa 13,16,666 $7\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas ; making together 39,50,047 pagodas.

Consequently Tippoo possesses at present countries yielding, according to his own account, corrected by the allies, $39\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of pagodas.

If, therefore, he should be again compelled to cede half of his dominions to the allies, the latter would each be entitled to districts yielding 6,58,333 $\frac{3}{4}$ pagodas, making together 19,75,000 pagodas.

In this case, the Company's division might be composed as follows :

Canara, or the Malabar territory below the Ghauts, including Bilguy, say 3,20,000 ; Coimbatour 80,000 ; Dennicar Kotal 35,000 ; Darapoor and Chuckergeery 64,000 ; Sattimungul 30,000 ; Chickawir 27,000 ; Chuncherry 27,000 ; Indore 8,000 ; Erroad 20,000 ; Cangum 20,000 ; Caroor 45,000 ; total 6,76,000.

It is to be observed, that Canara is rated above at much more than it would appear to be rated at in Tippoo's own statement of 1792, which is to be the basis of any new partition. However, as the districts of Bednore which compose Canara, cannot at present be accurately distinguish-ed (two or three of the number being doubtful) the revenue has, for the

greater caution, been assumed at 3,20,000 pagodas, although the most that can be made out from Tippoo's list is three lacs.

Possibly, some of the southern districts below the Ghauts may be omitted in the preceding enumeration. On the whole, however, it is sufficiently clear from this abstract, that the cession to the Company of all the countries below the Ghauts on both coasts, would little exceed or fall short of their share of half the Sultaun's remaining possessions. If on strict examination it were found to exceed, an equivalent might be offered, or some adjustments of the difference be made with the allies.

The share of the Nizam might consist of *Anagoondy* 60,101; *Kurnool* tribute 66,666 $\frac{6}{8}$; *Gooty* (as per memorandum at the end of this paper) 2,08,200 $\frac{3}{4}$; *Gurramconda* 2,74,673 $\frac{4}{8}$; *Jungamcottah* 13,000; *Punganoor* 15,000; total 6,37,641 $\frac{4}{8}$; or about 21,000 pagodas short of the Nizam's share. The deficiency might be made up from some of the Cotar districts, or within a small sum, from the overplus of the cessions to the Company according to the preceding article.

The share of the Peishwa might be composed of *Bednore*, above the *Ghauts*, or all the parts of *Bednore* not ceded to the Company, say 3,64,466; *Harponelly* 1,10,030 $\frac{8}{8}$; *Roydroog* 1,15,019 $\frac{3}{8}$; total 5,89,516 $\frac{2}{8}$; or about 69,000 pagodas short, which might be made up from the districts of Chittledroog.

It is probable, however, that *Bednore* above the *Ghauts* may prove, on a stricter examination of Tippoo's statement of 1792, to be rateable at more than 3,64,666 pagodas. For the whole 31 talooks of *Bednore* stand in his account at 6,84,466 pagodas; and, therefore, in proportion as the talooks below the *Ghauts* may fall short in valuation of the 3,20,000 pagodas assumed, those above the *Ghauts* (proposed to be ceded to the Peishwa) will exceed the sum of 3,64,466 pagodas.

There would remain to Tippoo, under the foregoing arrangement, the greatest part (if not the whole) of Chittel Droog, Sara, Bangalore, and other talooks of Seringapatam (enumerated in his list of antient possessions) which the allies are entitled to consider as yielding a revenue of 19,75,000 pagodas. If they should not, in fact, be so valuable, (which, however, there is no reason to suppose) the Sultaun would only suffer by his own deceit. At all events, the allies will be entitled, in justice, (under the treaty now in contemplation) to select their moiety *first*; leaving the remaining half to the Sultaun: and accordingly, this is a principle which ought to be carefully adhered to in the case supposed.

A more moderate arrangement than the preceding one would be, to take the Sultaun's present dominions at 35 lacs of pagodas (instead of 39 $\frac{1}{4}$ lacs) or half of what he himself stated the revenue to be in 1792, and to divide accordingly.

In this case the allies would have to divide among them only 17,50,000 pagodas, instead of 19,75,000 pagodas, and at this rate each would be entitled to a country of no more than 5,83,333 $\frac{3}{8}$ pagodas, instead of (as above) 6,58,333 $\frac{3}{8}$ pagodas.

Upon this principle, it is evident that we should be under the necessity

of leaving Tippoo in possession of a great part of the southern countries below the Ghauts. Our share might, nevertheless, be as follows :

Canara (as before), 3,20,000; *Coimbatore*, 80,000; *Darapoor* and *Chuckergerery*, 64,000; *Erroad*, 20,000; *Cangum*, 20,000; *Carroor*, 45,000; *Dennicour Kotah*, 35,000. Total, 5,84,000.

Or, perhaps, in preference to some of these,

Vencatagheerycotah and *Punganore* above the Ghauts.

The Nizam's share might, in the case now supposed, consist of

Gooty (as before), 2,08,200 3½; *Gurramconda*, 2,74,673 4½; *Anagoon-dy*, 60,101; *Kurnool tribute*, 66,666 6½. Total, 6,09,641 4.

The excess, or 26,308 pagodas, might be made up to Tippoo from *Gurramconda* or *Gooty*, according to the pleasure of the Nizam or of his Minister.

The Peishwa's share, on this principle, might be,

Bednore (as before), 3,64,466; *Harponnelly*, 1,10,030 8½; *Roydroog*, 1,15,019 3½. Total, 5,89,516 2; being an excess only of 6,200 pagodas, to be deducted from some of the proposed cessions.

The foregoing divisions are suggested only as outlines: to be filled up and improved, upon stricter enquiry and better information.

Gooty consisted of nineteen talooks, yielding 2,58,353 4½. Deduct ceded in 1792 to the Nizam, four talooks, 51,782 8½; to the Peishwa, one talook, 10,000; total, 61,782 8½. 1,96,570 6½. Add those parts of *Koorgoor* and *Dummoor* which remained with Tippoo at the peace, 11,629 7½. Remains to be ceded, 2,08,200 3½.

No. CXLIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St George, 23rd Feb. 1799.

If contrary to present appearances and to every reasonable expectation, any untoward event should occur, of a nature to render the reduction of Seringapatam within this season evidently impracticable, I authorize you to recede from the demands contained in the draft A., (inclosed in my letter of the 22nd instant,) in proportion to the improbability of your being able to accomplish the reduction of that place. But whatever may be your own sense of difficulties, it will be of the utmost importance that you should not disclose it, and that you should still endeavour to excite the apprehensions of Tippoo for the safety of his capital. On those apprehensions alone, can you depend for obtaining any concessions whatever from him.

Although I have judged it necessary to authorize you to recede, under certain circumstances, from the demands specified in the draft A. before referred to, you will rather conclude no treaty with Tippoo Sultaun, than one which shall not put the Company in possession of the whole of the coast of Malabar; and secure, besides, some degree of indemnity for the expenses of the war. In framing any treaty under these unfavourable circumstances, you will always be careful to understand that every advantage, either of territory or of money which may be stipulated, is to be equally divided among the allies in such a manner, as they shall hereafter adjust.

In the event of your neither being able to reduce Seringapatam this season, nor to obtain the diminished advantages herein stated, you will dismiss the Bombay army with such reinforcement as you may have the means of sparing, and after having ascertained its safe arrival at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, you will keep the field in the enemy's country with the remainder of your force, in such manner as shall appear most advisable; as well with a view to secure your own subsistence, as to restrain Tippoo from any undertaking against the Carnatic, until a favourable change of circumstances shall enable you to resume the siege of that capital with better hopes of success.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXLIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Peishwa.

Fort St. George, 24th Feb. 1799.

I have regularly communicated to your Highness the progress of my correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, respecting his infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam; and I have had the satisfaction to find your Highness concurring in all the measures which I have deemed it necessary to adopt, for the common security of the Company and their allies. It is a further satisfaction to me to reflect, that no endeavours have been omitted to recall the Sultaun to a sense of the obli-

gations of treaty, and to effect an amicable accommodation of the differences, which his ambition and insatiable revenge have produced between him and the allies.

It is a subject of extreme regret, that these conciliatory and friendly measures have failed to produce a correspondent effect on his mind, and have rendered it absolutely necessary, upon principles of self defence, to resort to arms. After the Sultaun's repeated rejection of the proposition to send an Ambassador to his Court, notwithstanding the warnings he received, his tardy and reluctant acquiescence, (intimated to me in a letter received on the 13th instant, of which a copy will be communicated to your Highness), so far from indicating a spirit of conciliation, can only be considered as an insidious attempt to protract the operations in the field, in the hope of prosecuting his hostile designs against the allies with a better prospect of success. I have, therefore, signified to the Sultaun, in my reply, of which a copy will also be submitted to your Highness by the Resident, that his compliance with the proposal, at this protracted period, cannot produce any change in the determination of the allies to put their respective troops in motion. Deeming it advisable that the grounds of this determination should be publicly made known, I have drawn up a formal declaration on the part of the Honorable Company and their allies, setting forth the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and the nature of the various measures which have been adopted by the allies to effect the accommodation they have so earnestly and so unremittingly sought. I have forwarded a copy of the declaration to the Resident for your Highness's perusal; I am fully convinced that your Highness, sensible of the absolute necessity of the resolution therein expressed, will zealously exert the full extent of your present means to cooperate with the Company and his Highness the Nizam, in the prosecution of the war with the common enemy.

I am persuaded that your Highness will be perfectly satisfied, that no overtures towards accommodation can now be received from Tippoo Sultaun with any degree of consistency; or any beneficial negociation be opened with him excepting at the head of the armies, which are actually entering his country.

For this reason, your Highness will no doubt perceive that

no advantage can possibly arise from the presence of any Vakeels from Tippoo Sultaun at your Court; on the contrary, it must be evident to you that your entertaining any Vakeels from that Prince, under the present circumstances, must prove highly prejudicial to the allied interests, by inspiring Tippoo Sultaun with the hope of dividing the allies, and by disseminating general doubts of the sincerity of your Highness's attachment to the common cause.

I, therefore, earnestly entreat your Highness immediately to dismiss the Vakeels of Tippoo Sultaun now at your Court; and I, with the same earnestness, exhort your Highness not to receive any other mission from that Prince during the war. If he should express any desire to open a negociation, I request your Highness to refer him to the representatives of the allies, accompanying their armies in the field. Any negociation carried on at a distance from the army would prove fruitless and indecisive.

If (which God avert and my friendly confidence will not anticipate) your Highness should neglect my present earnest instances, and should either delay the dismissal of the Vakeels of Tippoo Sultaun now at Poonah, or hereafter receive others from that Prince during the war, I think it the duty of a friend and an ally to apprise your Highness, that I shall be under the necessity of considering such conduct to be a departure from the true spirit of the defensive engagements subsisting between your Highness, his Highness the Nizam, and the Honorable Company. And I know not the extent of the evils which may follow so unexpected a relaxation of the bonds of friendship and alliance.

On the other hand, it is a pleasure to me to believe, that your Highness will discharge the duty of a faithful friend and cordial ally by instantly dismissing the vakeels; by refusing, during hostilities, to receive any others; and by zealously exerting the full extent of your present means to cooperate with the Company and his Highness the Nizam, in the prosecution of the war with the common enemy. Under this expectation, and in a firm confidence that you will remember the ancient connection between the Company and your family, as well as the proof which I have recently afforded of my sincere desire to improve the relations of friendship with you, I assure your Highness that no negotiations shall take place,

or any agreement be concluded with the enemy in which your interests shall not be, in all respects, placed on the same grounds with those of the Company and of the Nizam. In the mean time, I shall be very happy to hear and to consider any particular views which your Highness may entertain in the event of a negociation with the enemy, whether conveyed to me in writing from yourself, or through the channel of Colonel Palmer.

I am, &c.,
MORNINGTON.

No. CXLV.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieutenant General Stuart.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort St. George, 24th Feb. 1799.

I learnt, with great anxiety and uneasiness, the state of your health as well on private as on public grounds; and it was a considerable satisfaction to me to hear that you had arrived on the coast of Malabar so much better, as to be able to undertake the fatigues of the approaching campaign.

It is unnecessary for me to assure you of my entire confidence in your conduct of that part of the present important enterprize committed to your charge. You are already apprized of my sentiments with regard to your merits; I have received great pleasure from the accounts of General Hartley's preparations for your reception, and of the state in which he has delivered over the command to you. An union of the talents and zeal of all departments of the service in India will enable me to avail myself of the advantages of the season, and to render the Sultaun a contemptible ally to the common enemy, long before either party can hope to avail itself of the alliance lately formed against the British power.

There is one point, however, which, although highly improbable, I wish to suggest to your early consideration. If by any accident the French should land a force on the coast of Malabar during the siege of Seringapatam, what would be the best arrangements for checking their progress? This subject deserves serious consideration, and you should com-

municate your opinions on it both to the Admiral and to General Harris, so that you may not be taken by surprize.

Another point requires timely notice. If the whole of the coast of Malabar should come into our possession under a new treaty with the Sultaun, what would be the best distribution of force, with a view to the disappointment of any attempt on the part of the French to assist the Sultaun or to dispossess us.

A third question will be : Peace being concluded with Tippoo, and the coast of Malabar in our possession, can we afford a force to garrison Goa, and will the Portuguese accept a garrison from us? Both of these points, as well as the first, should be considered with General Harris.

I also wish, before you enter Mysore, that you would endeavour to concert with the Admiral any practicable means of employing his powerful squadron on the coast in concert with our remaining forces, or with any disaffected subjects of the Sultaun below the Ghauts.

Recommending these suggestions to your attention, and sincerely wishing that your zeal for the public service, and your ability to promote it, may not in any degree be counteracted by the state of your health, I have the honour to be, with great esteem and respect, Sir, your faithful servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CXLVI.

Lieutenant General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

Caukengena, 7 miles W. of Tripatore, 25th Feb. 1799.

MY DEAR LORD,

Your Lordship's final instructions are received, and their very satisfactory contents perfectly understood.

I shall not attempt an elaborate letter of thanks for them, or for all the noble and liberal confidence and encouragement they contain; but I trust to that Providence on whom I depend, that your Lordship shall be paid by a thorough conviction that every thing to the best of my abilities shall be tried to ensure that success which your Lordship's exertions give so fair a prospect of; and allow me here to relieve your

Lordship's mind from the fear that I shall permit myself to become a *despondie** in the business, by the assurance—that never in my life was I known to have the smallest tendency or turn that way—on the contrary, in some severe trials I have been most cheerful in the support of others, and thank God have always found my spirits to rise in the hour of danger. It is true I am anxious to examine the worst side of things, in order to provide a substitute if possible, but when prevention is no longer in my power, I trust you will hear that I make the best of every thing, and meet with cheerfulness the accidents which must happen in our peregrinations. At present we are in a great way of supplies, and with Read and Macleod's exertions, I have great hopes we shall escape similar distresses to those we experienced last war.

You may depend there is no man in the army wishes the business over more than myself, but no selfishness, or, I trust, persuasion shall induce me to push the cattle beyond their powers, for that would be risking every thing. On them we must depend for getting our noble battering train along, and we will soon make up any time supposed lost in this way when once we begin the siege.

Your Lordship's last communications have been particularly grateful to me, and as you have taken care to secure me by every tie dear to man—by gratitude; by my own honour and conscience being pledged; and even by the Eastern policy of having† my wife and children in your hands, I think you will not be deceived; that you may not is my earnest prayer! and that your Lordship will believe me,

My dear Lord, with great esteem,

Your devoted and faithful Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

* A "*despondie*" is an Hindostanee word, which appears in the Revenue transactions. Lord M. had applied it in a ludicrous sense to those who "*desponded*" of success in the war.

† Mrs. Harris and the General's children were all left at Madras, under the Governor General's care.

No. CXLVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieutenant General Harris

(Secret.)

SIR,

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1799.

The intelligence lately received from Seringapatam renders it probable that Tippoo Sultaun will take the field immediately at the head of the main body of his army.

He may, therefore, attempt either to obstruct your progress towards Seringapatam by force, or to negotiate with you; interposing his army between yours and that city, and endeavouring to protract the negotiation with the same views which he has already manifested, of gaining time, until the supposed season for the siege shall have elapsed.

Although the general principles of my instructions of the 22d instant would furnish a sufficiently distinct rule for your conduct in any of these cases, I think it may be satisfactory to you to receive a more particular explanation of my sentiments.

If the Sultaun should attempt to oppose your progress by force, no instruction can be necessary to induce you to repel it.

No attempt which, at any time, or from any position, he may make towards negotiation, must be suffered to retard your progress towards Seringapatam; and if his army should occupy any position which shall appear suspicious, or embarrassing to your line of march, you will attack him if you should think it advisable; having first dismissed his vakeels, if they should be near your camp.

You are invested with a discretionary power of deciding the time when it may be expedient to admit any vakeel from the Sultaun. In exercising that discretion, the primary considerations must be the security of your army, and the success of the expedition. If either of these considerations should at any time render it necessary to decline any overture from the Sultaun, you will take care to apprise him that, at a proper season, you will be ready to listen to his proposals.

At whatever period of your march you may think fit to admit an embassy from Tippoo Sultaun, you will understand it

to be my intention, applicable to every possible case, that no treaty, either preliminary or definitive, should be concluded with him, until your army shall have effected a junction with that of Bombay, and shall be in a situation to commence the siege of his capital with a reasonable prospect of success.

If Tippoo Sultaun's army should meet yours in the field, and the result shall be, as (under providence) I trust it will, a signal victory to the British arms; you will not consent to negotiate; but you will continue to advance towards Seringapatam. The result of such an action might possibly be the immediate reduction of that city. In this case you will proceed according to my former instructions, applicable to the case of a successful siege. But if the fall of the city should not be the immediate consequence of the supposed victory in the field, you will propose to Tippoo Sultaun, at whatever period of time you may deem most expedient, the preliminary articles marked B, from which you will not depart.

If the person of the Sultaun should fall into your hands after any action with his army, you will not on that account delay your march to his capital.

You will observe, from the whole tenor of my instructions, that it is my decided opinion, that no treaty can be safely concluded with Tippoo Sultaun until your army shall either be in actual possession of his capital, or shall command the effectual means of securing its reduction.

I take this opportunity of suggesting to you the indispensable precaution of never admitting any vakeels from Tippoo Sultaun within the precincts of your camp. If any conferences shall become necessary, they must always be holden at such a distance from your lines as to preclude the possibility of any effect of the treachery of the enemy.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXLVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Earl of Macartney, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 26th Feb. 1799.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letters of the 11th and 18th of September, and of the 18th of October.

The *Sceptre*, conveying the transports from the Cape, arrived here on the 7th of January, with the troops under the command of General Baird. Owing to the heavy sailing of two of the transports, a considerable part of the Scotch brigade did not arrive until some days after the convoy. They reached this place in sufficient time, however, to join the grand army; and they now form a part of General Harris's force in the field. This seasonable reinforcement, the timely arrival of which must be attributed to the alacrity and vigour of your Lordship's Government, has not only placed the safety of these possessions beyond the reach of all immediate danger from the enemy, but will, I trust, enable me to obtain effectual security from him against any advantages which he might have expected to derive hereafter from his alliance with the French.

I have sent the 84th to Bombay to reinforce that garrison.

The reports of the state of the French army in Egypt since the victory of Bekir are so vague and contradictory, that it is difficult to draw any certain conclusion from them. It appears, however, that the French army is not yet destroyed. No authentic advices from the Red Sea have been received by me since the 26th of August, and I am, therefore, ignorant whether Commodore Blankett has yet reached his station, but whatever may be the state of affairs in that quarter, the early measures which I adopted for the defence of India, added to your Lordship's assistance, preclude all apprehension of any mischief.

By this despatch I have transmitted to Mr. Secretary Barnard an abstract of the state of political affairs in India, which will apprise your Lordship of the circumstances of our actual situation with respect to Tippoo Suldaun and the other country powers.

In consequence of your Lordship's recommendation, I have shewn every mark of civility and attention to Captain Michell. Although it was not in my power to comply with your Lordship's wishes, in his favour, by giving him a Company's freight home. I have been enabled to allow him to take in cargo, on private account, under certain regulations lately established in Bengal; this indulgence will, I trust, secure him against any possibility of loss by his voyage from the Cape to this

place. I have, at his particular request, permitted him to touch at the Cape.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXLIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort St. George, March 3d, 1799.

I employ this private mode of communication for the purpose of informing you of a circumstance which has just now come to my knowledge.

An original letter from Ambajee Scindiah's principal commander in Hindostan has been found amongst the papers of Vizier Ali, which were taken at the attack of Mahdoo Doss's Garden, from which it appears that a treaty has been secretly concluded by Ambajee, on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with Vizier Ali.

The agents which have negotiated this treaty, on the part of Vizier Ali, are Hakeem Namdar Khan, and Kamgar Khan, and Iolah Induman.

The treaty itself is not in possession of Government, but from the letter from Ambajee, and from the letters from Kamgar Khan, Namdar Khan, and other papers belonging to Vizier Ali, there can be no doubt that the principal objects of this treaty are of the most hostile nature to the Company, and that they are proposed to be accomplished by placing Vizier Ali on the Musnud of Oude, by means of the assistance of Scindiah, and by the establishment of an union of interests between Scindiah and Vizier Ali.

You will be cautious not to disclose your knowledge of this circumstance to any person whatever, but you will endeavour, consistently with this caution, to obtain every information which may tend to throw light on the motives and objects of this flagrant act of treachery on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and you will keep a vigilant eye on all his proceedings, giving the earliest information of them to me, to the Government of Fort William, and to the Resident at Hyder-

abad. The papers which have reached me from Calcutta do not enable me to ascertain the precise time when the negotiation with Ambajee was reduced to the form of a treaty, but it appears that the negotiation commenced some months previous to Ambajee's arrival at the city of Muttra, for the purpose of arranging the affairs of Scindiah in Hindostan, and that it terminated in a treaty either during the residence of Ambajee at the city of Muttra, or shortly after his departure from thence. The considerable force now under the command of Sir James Craig, will remain assembled on the frontier of Oude, and I should hope that the knowledge of that circumstance would prevent Scindiah or Ambajee from making any movements, of a hostile tendency, to the interests of the Company. There is every reason to suppose, by the last accounts from Oude, that the person of Vizier Ali will soon be apprehended, nor is there the least ground for entertaining any alarm with respect to the number or character of his adherents.

The army, under the command of General Harris, will enter Mysore in the course of a few days, and the general appearance of circumstances in that quarter, affords me every reason to hope that I shall soon be at liberty to take effectual measures for frustrating the designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. It is possible, however, that, in the interval the rashness and violence of his character may impel him to make some attempt either against the Peishwa or the Nizam. You will endeavour to give the earliest intimation of any symptom which you may be able to discover of such a disposition on his part.

On the flight of Vizier Ali from Benares, I addressed letters to all the neighbouring powers of Hindostan, requiring them respectively to deliver up to justice the person of the assassin, in case it should fall into their hands. Amongst others, a letter was despatched to Ambajee, as the principal officer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the spot. I enclose a copy of my letter to Ambajee, which I desire you will communicate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, together with my request, that he will despatch such orders to Ambajee as shall promote the object of my letter to the latter. I do not expect that this communication will lead to any disclosure of Scindiah's real sentiments with respect to Vizier Ali, but it may be useful with a view to the effectual concealment of my knowledge of

Scindiah's treachery, and may tend to quiet his apprehensions, and to prevent his motions, until a favourable moment shall arrive for calling him to account. In communicating the letter in question to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you will express my confident expectation, that Vizier Ali will be apprehended and brought to justice before he can reach the dominions of Scindiah; and you will endeavour to impress Dowlut Rao with a just idea of the insignificance and weakness of Vizier Ali, whose only claims to notice are to be found in the atrocious depravity of his disposition, and in the execrable enormity of his crimes.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CL.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick.

(Private.)

SIR,

Fort St. George, March 3d, 1799.

I enclose for your information a copy of my letter of this date to the Resident at Poonah, and I recommend the important intelligence which it contains to your most serious attention, relying on your discretion for an exact observance of the same secrecy which I have enjoined Colonel Palmer to observe. It does not appear to me advisable, in the present moment, to hazard the disclosure of Scindiah's views, in their full extent, to Azim ul Omra; but I think it would be highly necessary, in my name, to point that minister's particular attention to the probability of some attempt on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah against the Nizam's territories, during the progress of our operations against Seringapatam. With this view, it will be prudent to assemble whatever force can be collected in his Highness's dominions at the station which may be deemed best calculated for resisting any such attack, observing, as far as may be practicable, the necessary caution of concealing the quarter from which danger is apprehended.

You have been already apprized of the embassy which I have despatched to the Rajah of Berar. The moment ap-

pears to approach when the advantage to be derived from the connection with the Court of Nagpore may become highly important in the scale of our political relations. It would be desirable to cement this connection through the means of the Court of Hyderabad; and perhaps, ultimately, to form a defensive alliance, of which Scindiah as well as Tippoo should be the object. To such an alliance (if it were possible to anticipate any vicissitude of the irresolute and capricious policy of Baagy Rao) it might be supposed that he would readily accede; the advantages of it to his power and authority being obvious and considerable; indeed it is difficult to foresee any other issue to the present distractions of the Government of Poonah than the total ruin of the Peishwa's authority and power, or the reduction of Scindiah's influence and force: and it is equally evident, that the Peishwa can never obtain the means of effecting such a reduction without the assistance of the Nizam and of the British force. Until the war with Mysore shall be brought to a conclusion, it will not be prudent to undertake any hostile operations against Scindiah, and it must depend upon the nature of his views, as well as of his means of carrying them into effect at the conclusion of the war with Mysore, whether it may be necessary or expedient to turn our arms against him.

If he should pursue his present perfidious and unprincipled course, every consideration, both of justice and policy, will require us to take the most effectual measures for the reduction of his power, and as no improvement can reasonably be expected in the character of his policy, we must now lay the foundations of such a system as may enable us to defeat his unwarrantable and destructive views. I enclose a letter for Mr. Colebrooke, Resident at Nagpore, which I have left open for your perusal, and of which a copy shall be sent to you by the first opportunity.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLI.

The Earl of Mornington to H. Colebrooke, Esq. Resident with the Rajah of Berar, Nagpore.

[Enclosed in the Governor General's letter to Captain Kirkpatrick of the 3rd March, 1799.]

SIR,

With this letter you will receive copies of my private despatches of this date to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad.

You will understand the injunctions of secrecy contained in those despatches to apply to yourself, as well as to those to whom they are immediately addressed.

My verbal instructions to you on your departure from Fort William, proceeded no further than to direct you to endeavour to ascertain and report to me the character, disposition, views and interests of the Rajah of Berar; the nature and extent of his resources and military force, and the best means of availing ourselves of his alliance, in the event of hostilities, either with Zemaun Shah or Tippoo Sultaun.

The local position of the Rajah's territories appears to render him a peculiarly serviceable ally against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, if the progress of that chief's unjustifiable designs should induce a necessity of reducing his power in Hindostan.

The enclosed letters will afford sufficient proof of the probability of such a contingency, against which early precautions must be taken.

I, therefore, wish you to turn your attention immediately to the consideration of a treaty of defensive alliance, against the detected projects of Scindiah, between the Rajah of Berar, the Nizam, and the Company, with power to the Peishwa to accede to it whenever he shall think fit.

The fundamental principle of the treaty should be a reciprocal guarantee of the respective possessions of the contracting powers, including the rights of their allies.

However evident the hostile designs of Scindiah may be, in the actual state of affairs, it is not prudent to propose to the Rajah of Berar, or even to the Peishwa or to the Nizam, a treaty of defence nominally against Scindiah. Even the

preliminary measures for ascertaining the disposition of the Rajah of Berar on this subject, must be taken with the greatest caution. The object of our apprehension should appear to be Tippoo Sultaun; and although "any other enemy of the contracting powers" may be named in general terms, no suggestion should yet be given by which the name of Scindiah could be brought into question. The Rajah of Berar, as an estate of the Mahratta empire, is a party to our defensive engagements with the Peishwa against Tippoo Sultaun. But these engagements do not preclude a more particular connection, founded on the same basis, and directed to the same general objects.

A treaty might, therefore, be proposed to the Rajah, the immediate and ostensible object of which should be to strengthen and define his defensive engagements against Tippoo Sultaun, but the terms of which should be such as to admit the insertion of Scindiah's name, if such a measure should become necessary previously to the conclusion of the treaty.

With these suggestions in your mind, I wish you to proceed to collect such information as may be safely attainable concerning the degree of assistance which we might expect from the Rajah of Berar in any contest with Scindiah; and I desire you also to commence the negotiation of a treaty grounded on the principles which I have stated. You will take care not to encourage any sentiment in the mind of the Rajah incompatible with the feudatory duties which he owes to the Peishwa. I have no reason to believe that he now entertains any sentiment of this nature, but I warn you against the possible effects of any such disposition.

You will omit no endeavour to facilitate the intercourse between Nagpore and Hyderabad, and you will regularly transmit copies of all your despatches to me to the Resident at the Nizam's Court, with whom it might also be desirable that you should open a private correspondence. You will transmit to the Government at Fort William copies of all your despatches to me.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLII.

(Private.)

Sir Alured Clarke to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 5th, 1799.

Your letter of the 19th last, reached me on the 3rd instant, and relieved my mind extremely by the manner in which you mentioned the progress of the army, and the extent of the provision that the supply of treasure sent from hence afforded it; as I was very apprehensive lest the delay of its arrival at Madras should have been attended with serious inconvenience. *Cooke made a more expeditious voyage from the mouth of the river than we expected, and he seems to have moved with redoubled alacrity in pursuit of the enemy you heard of, and that he afterwards learnt was blocking up this port, and capturing our vessels at the Sand-heads, where he met with the formidable ship *La Forte* on the night of the 28th, and took her after an engagement of one hour and forty minutes. The action was highly honorable to him, and the British navy; and in these points of view must be gratifying to us all; but alas! the melancholy cloud that is thrown over the bright prospect by the severe, if not mortal wound that our truly gallant friend has received; and the loss of that worthy officer, Captain Davis, of your Lordship's family who accompanied him, has cast a cruel gloom on the spirits of every one, and grieved me to a degree that I cannot describe; but which I have reason to think your own feelings will enable you to estimate.

My dear Lord, with great truth and esteem,

Your most obedient,

And most faithful humble servant,

ALURED CLARKE.

* Captain Cooke, of his Majesty's ship the *Sybilie*, who was sent by the Governor General in pursuit of the *La Forte*. He was an officer of the highest merit; he died of the wounds received in this gallant action.

No. CLIII.

(Private.)

Sir Alured Clarke to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, March 8th, 1799.

The vexatious conduct of the Burmahs on our eastern frontier, where we were so slenderly provided with troops, and the check we met with on the attack of one of their posts, has given me some uneasiness. I, therefore, on finding the 76th regiment could be left with us, determined to send part of the 1st european regiment to Chittigong by sea, with a few pieces of heavier ordnance than was there before, in order to force their stockades, which were too strong for light artillery, if that should become necessary; and to put the whole under the command of Major General Deare; and arrangements were making for it, but yesterday we received an account of the Burmahs having evacuated their works with an intention to quit our territories, leaving letters, sealed up in bamboos, attached to poles bearing flags, directed for our Commanding officer; copies of which with the rest of the correspondence shall be sent to you. What their real intentions may be it is difficult to know, but these strange letters manifest a determination to persevere in the recovery of the Mugg refugees, who they say we protect, and withhold from them contrary to right and justice; and that there can be no peace between them and the English, while the *Muggs* and *we are one*. I, therefore, still think it right to send the additional ordnance and stores, with a smaller detachment of Europeans than I at first intended, as they can easily be brought back if not wanted, and General Deare will have orders to examine the country thoroughly, and report his opinions of the best posts, and fittest means to afford it protection against the incursions of these people, by either land or water in future.

I am, with true respect and esteem,

My dear Lord, your most obedient

And most faithful humble servant,

ALURED CLARKE.

No. CLIV.

Lieut.-General Stuart to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seedapore, 8th March, 1799.

I had the honour to address your Lordship on the 20th ultimo, and having marched from Cananore on the following day, agreeably to my intimation of that date, I arrived at the top of Poodiacherrim Ghaut, on the 25th of the same month.

I informed your Lordship, that it was my intention to assume a defensive position close to the frontiers, and there await, in conformity to General Harris's instructions under the 24th of December, his further orders.

In pursuance of this plan I moved the corps successively forward, and placed them in such situations, as might enable me the most promptly, to form the proposed junction with the principal army.

On the 2nd instant, the right brigade consisting of three native battalions under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Montresor, took up their ground at Seedasere, the boundary of the Coorga country, and about seven miles distant from Periapatam.

The main body of the army, with the park and provisions, remained at Seedapore and Ahmootenaar; the first eight miles and the latter twelve, from the advanced position.

It may be necessary to inform your Lordship, that I was in some measure compelled from the nature of the country, which is every where covered by thick jungle, to place the army in several divisions; but I had a further view in occupying the post at Seedasere, in order to preserve a more ready communication with General Harris, as this was the only spot from whence the signals established between the two armies could be observed. Although I had no reason to apprehend any immediate attack, I thought it advisable to adopt the precaution of encamping the corps at such short distances, as would either enable me to move without much loss of time into the enemy's territory, or to support, if occasion should require it, any quarter that might stand in need of assistance.

In the course of the morning of the 5th, an extensive encampment was unexpectedly observed to be forming on this

side of the fort of Periapatam. This circumstance was discovered at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, as the enemy were taking up their ground, by a party of observation on the summit of the high hill of Seedasere, which commands a view of the Mysore almost to the environs of Seringapatam. Before the evening, this encampment assumed a very formidable appearance and covered a great extent of ground.

We were able to count from 3 to 400 tents, amongst the number some of large dimensions were distinguished, and particularly one of a green colour, that seemed to denote the presence of the Sultaun. However much the probability of this circumstance might be strenghtened by the respectable appearance of the encampment, it was contradicted by the evidence of two hurcarrahs, who had recently arrived from Seringapatam. These men generally reported, that Tippoo had marched with all his forces on the 20th ultimo, to oppose the progress of the Madras army, and that the Benky Nabob commanded the only force in the field, that remained in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. This force was represented to be encamped at Caneambaddy and to consist of 5000 Piadas or irregular infantry, who were said to be intended as a covering party to 7000 Brinjaries, and directed to bring as much provisions, as they could collect about Periapatam to the capital.

In this state of uncertainty, I thought it prudent to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Montresor's brigade with an additional battalion of Sepoys, and waited for more correct intelligence, which I expected hourly, to act with the whole of my forces as affairs might render necessary.

On the morning of the 6th, Major General Hartley went forward to reconnoitre, and at break of day from the hill of observation, the whole of the enemy's army was discovered to be in motion; but their movements were so well concealed by the woodiness of the country and the haziness of the atmosphere, that it was impossible to ascertain their object, nor in fact was this discovered, until they had penetrated a considerable way in the jungle, and commenced an attack upon our line, which happened between the hours of 9 and 10.

The enemy pierced through the jungles with such surety and expedition, that they attacked the rear and the front of our line almost at the same instant. This despatch prevented

more than three of our corps being engaged, as the fourth, which was posted two miles and a half in the rear, was unable to form a junction, from the enemy having cut in between them and Seedasere. The communication was effectually obstructed by a column, which, according to the reports of our prisoners, consisted of upwards of 5000 men under the command of Baber Jung.

Fortunately before the enemy had accomplished their purpose, Major General Hartley had time to apprise me of their attack, and remained himself to give any assistance that might be necessary. The best position was assumed for repulsing the enemy, and in this alarming situation the corps defended themselves with so much resolution, that the Sultaun's troops were unable to make any impression. The brigade was on every side completely surrounded, and had to contend against a vast disparity of numbers, besides other discouraging circumstances.

As soon as I received intelligence of the perilous situation of the right brigade, I marched to their assistance with the two flank companies of his Majesty's 75th regiment and the whole of the 77th, I arrived about half past two in sight of the division of the enemy, who had penetrated into the rear, and possessed themselves of the great road leading to Seedasere. The engagement lasted nearly half an hour, when after a smart fire of musketry on both sides, the enemy were completely routed, and fled with precipitation through the jungles to regain their column, which still continued the attack in front. On arriving at Lieut.-Colonel Montresor's post, I found his men exhausted with fatigue, and their ammunition almost expended. At 20 minutes past 3 the enemy retreated in all directions.

For this decisive, and, I hope your Lordship will allow, brilliant success, considering the small number of troops who engaged, under very great disadvantages, probably the flower of Tippoo Sultaun's army, I feel myself peculiarly indebted to the judicious disposition for defence made by General Hartley. He embraced the opportunity of observing the motions of the enemy from the hill, I have above mentioned, and was thus enabled to advise Lieut.-Colonel Montresor of the best method for defeating them. I beg leave also to inform your Lordship, that my best thanks are due to Lieut.-Colonel

Montresor for his very active exertions, and to the officers and men, including the artillery of his brigade, for their gallant and steady behaviour throughout the whole of this arduous affair. Lieut.-Colonel Dunlop and the European division under his command, are likewise entitled to my particular approbation for their spirited conduct, which finally routed the enemy.

Our loss on this occasion is far less than could reasonably have been expected, and I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information a return of this circumstance.

It was impossible to ascertain the exact loss sustained by the enemy; but it must have been heavy, as in the course of so long an action they were often exposed in crowds to the fire of grape shot and volleys of musquetry. Several men of distinction were killed, and some wounded officers have been made prisoners. I have the honour to enclose the information of Mozdin Khan Bhukhshy and the Commander of a Kutchery, the prisoner of greatest rank, who has fallen wounded into our hands; but concurring reports state that Meer Ghofar is amongst the slain.

As the arrival of General Harris at Seringapatam will not happen at so early a period, as he first intended, the immediate possession of the post of Seedasere was no longer an object of such consequence, and to retain it, while Tippoo continued in force at Periapatam, became an affair of serious difficulty. The secrecy and expedition, with which he had planned his late enterprise, and the correct intelligence, that the leaders of his columns appeared to have obtained of the private routes through the Coorga jungles, led to an opinion, that he would not remain satisfied with this abortive attempt, but might endeavour to penetrate by another direction to the southward, still more open than the passage of Seedasere, where he would only be opposed by Coorgs. This consideration derived a greater weight, as if he succeeded in forcing this entrance, it would throw him into our rear and put him in all probability in possession of the great depôt of rice collected by the Coorga Rajah. These motives have induced me to relinquish the post at Seedasere, and to collect the whole of my force at this place. I have accordingly made a disposition, either to defend my position against the Suldaun, if he should again adventure to attack it, or to move in de-

fence of any part of the Coorga Rajah's territories that the enemy may threaten, provided it shall endanger our magazine of provisions; otherwise I shall remain on the defensive, until I receive advice from General Harris.

Since the action of the 6th, the enemy have continued in their camp at Periapatam, nor have I any intelligence either of the Sultaun's designs, or of the motives, that induced him to undertake his present enterprise. It is not likely that he will remain longer in this neighbourhood, than after he receives intelligence of General Harris having entered the Mysore.

As my communication with General Harris is become insecure, I must take the liberty of requesting your Lordship to inform him of such part of these particulars as may appear to you necessary.

I have the honour to subscribe myself most respectfully,

My Lord, your Lordship's

Most obedient humble servant.

J. STUART.

P.S. By some prisoners, who have been just now brought in by the Coorga Rajah's people I am informed, that the loss of the enemy was very great, and that many men of the first distinction fell. They mention Seyed or Meer Ghofâr and the Binky Nabob, who led the center attack among the killed. It is added, however, that the Sultaun is collecting more forces, and is determined to make a second attack.

No. CLV.

(Private and Secret.)

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Sir Alured Clarke.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 8th March, 1799.

1. A letter received to day from Mr. Barlow, enclosing an extract of news from Ambajee's camp, of the 4th and 5th of February, appears to require that I should furnish you with a particular statement of my sentiments, with regard to the distribution and conduct of our military force on the north western frontier of Oude.

2. In every private letter which I have written to you since

the retreat of Zemaun Shah appeared probable, I have uniformly desired that a respectable force should be maintained on that frontier, with a view to check the possible designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

3. I am persuaded, therefore, that notwithstanding the separation of Sir James Craig's army, you have still left a considerable body of troops in the vicinity of those districts, which would probably become the theatre of war in the event of hostilities with Scindiah, or with those who command his army in Hindostan.

4. The papers found in Vizier Ali's house after his flight, leave no doubt that Ambajee has concluded a treaty with Vizier Ali of a tendency evidently hostile to the Nabob Vizier, and to the Company; and Scindiah must be responsible for the acts of Ambajee, who is his avowed Lieutenant, and who refers directly to his authority in the papers relating to the treaty with Vizier Ali.

5. It is unfortunate and unaccountable, that the Magistrate of Benares, should not have forwarded to Calcutta at a much earlier period the papers relating to this treaty; nearly a month has been lost by this strange and censurable delay. Had any success attended Vizier Ali's efforts in Gorruckpore, this delay might have been of fatal consequence. One evil has already arisen from it, which however I trust may soon be remedied, I mean the dispersion of Sir James Craig's army; a measure which would not have been recommended by me nor adopted by you, if we had been in possession of the papers of Vizier Ali.

6. My wish is, that you should without delay reassemble in Oude, such a force as you may deem adequate to the object of checking not only the army now under the Command of Ambajee, but eventually the whole of Scindiah's force, if that Chief should return into Hindostan. You will also keep in view, the probability of early offensive operations against the dominions of Scindiah.

7. The reassembling of the army may possibly alarm Ambajee and Scindiah, and an explanation may be demanded of the motives of such a step. You will ascribe it to the escape of Vizier Ali from Benares, to the probability of his attempting to join Zemaun Shah, and to the consequences which that event might produce.

8. The force being assembled, which you may deem necessary for the accomplishment of the stated objects, you will regulate its operations according to the following suggestions.

9. If Ambajee or Scindiah, or any part of the forces of either, should commence actual hostilities against the Company or the Nabob Vizier, or should make any movement evidently of an hostile nature against the possessions of either, you will of course repel the aggression; and you will further take such steps as may appear most likely to distress the enemy, limiting, however, the operations of the army to the countries situated within the Dooab, with the exception of the City of Agra which you will seize, if it should appear advisable to possess it.

10. If hostilities should commence in the manner supposed in the preceding paragraphs, you will use every endeavour to excite the Rajpoots and other tributaries against Scindiah, and to induce the Rajahs of Jynagur and Jodopore to enter zealously into the war; you will at the same time take the proper steps for supporting and encouraging the exertions of the partizans of the Bhyes and Lukwaje Dada, together with all persons in the family or service of Scindiah, who may be disaffected to his Government.

11. By remaining within the Dooab, (under the exception stated, with respect to the city of Agra,) you will afford more effectual protection to the possessions of the Vizier and of the Company than you could expect to furnish, if your army were to advance further into the hereditary dominions of Scindiah, where, as well as in his possessions between the Chumbul and the Jumna, he will be sufficiently distressed by the operations of the Rajpoots and of other internal, and domestic enemies.

12. Unless the possession of Delhi should be deemed absolutely essential from military considerations, the operations of our army should not be directed against that city. Whatever advantages might be expected in any collateral view from that possession, the political embarrassments which must be the immediate consequence of its falling into our hands are so numerous and inextricable, as to render me peculiarly anxious to avoid the possibility of such an event.

13. The movement of Ambajee into Scindiah's possessions

in the Dooab, would become suspicious in proportion to the magnitude of the force employed in a position so favorable to the invasion of Oude. And if the whole or the greater part of the army of Ambajee should pass the Jumna, with whatever motive, no doubt will arise in my mind, that, with the knowledge which we possess of the engagements existing between Ambajee and Vizier Ali, the justice of our attacking the former under such circumstances would be incontrovertible ; I am equally satisfied of the policy of reducing the power of Scindiah, whenever the opportunity shall appear advantageous. But while Scindiah shall remain in the Deccan, and while our armies shall be engaged in war with Tippoo Sultaun, Scindiah will possess considerable means of embarrassing us in that quarter ; for this reason it is extremely desirable to avoid hostilities with him until either his return to Hindostan, or a peace with Tippoo Sultaun shall place our affairs in a condition, which may enable us to punish the treachery of Scindiah with more effect. I consider the junction of Scindiah's army with that of Ambajee, even if their combined object should evidently be the attack of Oude, as an event much less formidable to us in the present moment, than the consequences to be apprehended from the operations of Scindiah's army alone, either at Poonah, in the dominions of the Nizam, or in Mysore. Notwithstanding, therefore, the just suspicions which would arise from the arrival in the Dooab of the whole or of the greater part of Ambajee's force, hostilities must not be considered as the necessary consequence of such a movement.

14. If, however, that movement should be evidently connected with a design of invading the possessions of the Nabob Vizier, and of the Company, and if the success of such a movement would essentially facilitate the prosecution of that design, self defence must require you to anticipate the projects of the enemy by the seasonable commencement of hostilities.

15. But you will never forget, that every consideration of policy should induce us to abstain from hostilities with Scindiah in the present moment, and you will accordingly give the strongest caution to the officer who shall command the army to be assembled in Oude, not to proceed to extremity unless the safety of our possessions, or of those of the Vizier

should absolutely demand the attack of Ambajee's army. If Vizier Ali should effect his escape and should be received by Ambajee, previously to the arrival of the latter in the Dooab, you will demand the delivery of Vizier Ali's person according to the established practice of all civilized nations, which authorizes the demand of the persons of assassins and robbers flying from justice. The refusal of Ambajee is not in this case, however, to be deemed a sufficient ground of hostility. But if Ambajee shall arrive in the Dooab with the whole or with the greater part of his army, if Vizier Ali in that position should accompany Ambajee's forces, and Ambajee under such circumstances shall refuse to deliver him up to the Company's Government, I authorize you to commence hostilities against Ambajee. In any case in which hostilities shall be commenced you will understand it to be my wish, that they should be prosecuted according to the principles stated in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, of this letter.

16. If Scindiah should return to Hindostan from the Deccan, and on any pretence should enter the Dooab with his whole army, or with a considerable part of it, such a step would be so evident a proof of his design to fulfil his engagements with Vizier Ali, that I have no hesitation in authorizing you in this case to commence hostilities without delay.

I am, &c. &c.,

MORNINGTON.

No. CLVI.

Lieut.-Colonel Read to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp near Ryakota, 12th March, 1799.

I have particular satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that I have just returned from the army, after having delivered over 25,000 loads of different articles of supply in safety, which upon a calculation delivered into General Harris, appears to be a month's provision for 30,000 fighting men and 40,000 followers.

My Lord, your Lordship's,

Most obedient humble servant,

ALEXANDER READ.

No. CLVII.

From the Governor General to Hawjee Khulleel.

Fort St. George, 15th March, 1799.

I have been informed, by the honorable Mr. Duncan, of the zeal you have manifested in promoting the success of the concerns entrusted to Mehedy Ali Khaun, which has afforded me great pleasure and satisfaction. I entertain a high sense of these your laudable endeavours, and, considering you as a sincere friend and well wisher of the English, I look with confidence to experience, still further, the benefits of this good disposition in the continuance of your labours and exertions. May the Almighty daily add to the number and celebrity of your good qualities. I beg you to consider me at all times solicitous for your welfare, and desirous of your attachment. As a testimony of the satisfaction which your conduct has afforded me, I have transmitted a Khelaut for you through Mehedy Ali Khaun. You will no doubt consider it as a mark of my sincere regard, and continue disposed, as hitherto, to promote the service of the British nation. For further particulars I refer you to Mr. Duncan's letters.

No. CLVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Rear Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 16th March, 1799.

While I offer you my most cordial congratulations on an event so honourable to your command, and to the reputation of the British arms in India, as the capture of the French frigate *La Forte* by the *Sybille*, it is with inexpressible sorrow that I condole with you on the probable (I fear almost certain) fate of the gallant and able officer who has so brilliantly distinguished himself on this occasion. My particular friendship for him will render his loss a most serious object of regret to me. I am still willing to flatter myself that his wounds may not prove mortal, and his having survived the action so long, affords a faint ray of hope that he may not be lost to his friends and to his country. Captain Davies was one of my

Aides-de-Camp and Fort-Adjutant at Fort William. He obtained my permission to accompany Captain Cooke as a volunteer.

I take this opportunity of recommending again to your serious consideration the necessity of stationing some of your strongest ships at Bombay as soon as the navigation of the Red Sea shall be opened. The necessity of this suggestion would become less urgent if you should soon learn that Commodore Blankett had reached his station, and was superior to the enemy in that quarter, or if you should receive authentic accounts of the destruction of the French army in Egypt. But in any event the garrison of Bombay has been so much reduced by the necessary drafts for the coast of Malabar, that it would be extremely desirable to protect the harbour of Bombay during the whole of the approaching monsoon by a strong naval force. I have already stated to your Excellency, in a former despatch, that this is an object of great anxiety to the Government at home, and all the consideration which I have been enabled to give to the subject, induces me to take the liberty of adding my opinion to theirs, and of submitting the matter to your judgment with an anxious hope that it may appear to you in the same light in which I have viewed it. If your Excellency should intend any distribution of your force, founded on the principle which I have stated, an early communication of it to the Government of Bombay would tend to quiet their alarms.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLIX.

The Marquis Cornwallis to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Dublin Castle, March 18th, 1799.

I little thought when we parted that my first letter to you would have been dated from this place, but my evil stars have determined that I never should enjoy quiet or comfort, and after relieving me from what I then thought a painful task, (a second embarkation for India) have driven me into a situation

ten times more arduous, and in every respect more intolerable. You have many friends that will send you Irish news, and as I can say nothing on the melancholy situation of this unhappy country that can afford you satisfaction, I shall not enter into a detail of our calamities. Your letter, dated July 5th, gave me much concern from the account you give of your health, the failure of which is the only thing which alarms me about yourself or your government; in all other respects I have no doubt of your complete success.

With the most sincere good wishes for your welfare, power and happiness,

I am, my dear Lord,

Most truly yours,

CORNWALLIS.

No. CLX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 19th March, 1799.

The attempt of the Court of Poonah to divert the services of the detachment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Little, from their proper object, does not surprize me. It is consistent with the policy which for some time past has directed its conduct towards the British Government. You will continue steadily to resist the attempt whenever it may be renewed.

You will be pleased to furnish me, as soon as possible, with as full and distinct an account of the Guyckwar family, and of the views and disposition both of the reigning Rajah and of the Court of Poonah, with respect to the succession to that principality, as you may be able to procure without betraying any extraordinary solicitude or curiosity on the subject.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HON. SIRs,

Fort St. George, 20th March, 1799.

My separate despatch, under date the 21st November, forwarded by the *Eurydice*, will have apprized your Honourable Court of the measures which I took for the purpose of restoring to his Highness the Nizam the power of fulfilling his defensive engagements with the Company.

At the same time my endeavours were employed with equal assiduity to give vigour and effect to the treaties subsisting with his Highness the Peishwa. The return of Nana Furnaveese to the administration afforded for some time a just expectation that our alliance with the Mahrattas would speedily be restored with additional vigour and advantage, but the increasing distractions of the Mahratta empire unfortunately frustrated the wise counsels of that experienced and able statesman, and disappointed my views at the Court of Poonah. I had, however, the satisfaction to ascertain that the disposition of that Court, under the administration of Nana, continued perfectly favourable to the British interests, and that want of power would be the sole cause of its inaction in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

From the moment of my arrival at Fort St. George all the inhabitants of this settlement, and every officer, civil and military, appeared to be animated by an unanimous determination to discharge their respective duties with a degree of cheerfulness and ardour correspondent with the exigency and importance of the occasion; and I was soon satisfied that the disposition, of which I lamented the appearance in the months of July and August, had either been subdued by the just exercise of authority, or corrected by reflection, and by the more full disclosure of the views of the enemy. The zeal, alacrity, and public spirit of the bankers and commercial agents at Madras, as well as of the most respectable of your civil servants at this Presidency, enabled me, within a few weeks, to raise a large sum of money, by loan, for the public service. Previous to my departure from Bengal, I had remitted twenty lacs of rupees in specie for the use of this

Presidency; I now despatch the *Sybil* to Calcutta for a further supply; and the extraordinary exertion of his Excellency the Vice-President in Council, assisted by the diligence and ability of Mr. Thomas Myers, the Accountant-General of Bengal, furnished me with an additional aid of twenty lacs within so short a time, that the movement of the army was not delayed for an instant on account of a deficiency of treasure, and Lieutenant-General Harris was provided with a sufficient supply of specie to maintain his army in the field until the month of May.

Tippoo Sultaun remaining silent for a considerable time, after the receipt of my letter of the 9th of January, I concluded that his object must be to delay his answer until the season should be so far advanced as to render the capture of Seringapatam impracticable during the present year.

In the mean while the advices from Bussorah, Bagdad, Constantinople, and Bombay were of so uncertain a nature as to leave me still in doubt with respect to the condition of the French army in Egypt; the only safe conclusion which could be drawn from those advices being, that the French still maintained the possession of that country with a large army.

No intelligence had been received from the Red Sea respecting the arrival of any of his Majesty's ships on that station, nor had I been able to ascertain, with any degree of accuracy, what means the French might either have provided, or might find on the spot to enable them to reach the Sultaun's dominions.

In addition to these circumstances, I knew that, while Tippoo Sultaun had declined to receive an ambassador from the Honourable Company, and had omitted to answer my late letters, he had despatched native vakeels from Seringapatam, who, together with M. Du Buc, (one of the leaders of the French force, raised in the Isle of France under M. Malartic's proclamation) were on the point of embarking at Tranquebar with an avowed mission from the Sultaun to the Executive Directory of France.

On the 3rd of February I had received no answer from the Sultaun to my letter of the 9th of January; although the communication between Seringapatam and Fort St. George does not require, at the most, a longer time than eight, and is sometimes effected in four, days.

In order, therefore, to defeat the object of the Sultaun's silence, and to avail myself of the actual superiority of our force, and of the advantages of the present season, before the French could effect any junction with him, I determined to commence hostilities without delay, and to suspend all negotiation, until the united forces of the Company and of their allies should have made such an impression on the territories of Mysore, as might give full effect to our just representations.

With these views, on the 3d of February, I directed Lieut.-General Harris to enter the territory of Mysore with the army assembled under his command; and on the same day I issued orders to Lieut.-General Stuart, to be prepared to cooperate from Malabar, and I signified to Rear-Admiral Rainier, and to the several allies of the Company, that I now considered the British Government in India to be at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

At length, on the 13th of February, I received from Tippoo Sultaun the letter marked No. 7,* informing me, that, "being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt," he was, "accordingly, proceeding upon a hunting excursion," and desiring that I would "despatch Major Doveton slightly attended;" or "unattended."

But the season for negotiation, through the pacific channels, so often offered by me, was now elapsed. After mature deliberation, on the grounds already stated, I had directed the advance of the army into the territory of the Sultaun, and I had signified to the allies my determination to proceed to hostilities. To have delayed the advance of the army, would at once have thrown the advantages which I then possessed into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, and have rendered the siege of his capital impracticable during the present season. On the other hand, an embassy, combined with the hostile irruption of our army into Mysore, would have been liable to the imputation of insincerity towards Tippoo Sultaun, and while it bore the appearance of indecision in the eyes of the allies, would have promoted, and perhaps, warranted a similar degree of instability in their councils and operations.

The design of this tardy, reluctant, and insidious assent to

* See p. 433.

the admission of an embassy from the British Government could be considered in no other light than that of a new artifice for the purpose of gaining time, until a change of circumstances and of season might enable the Sultaun to avail himself of the assistance of France. This conclusion was now confirmed by my knowledge of the actual embarkation of M. Du Buc and two native vakeels on an embassy from Tippoo to the Executive Directory of France, an event which took place at Tranquebar on the 7th of February.

I, therefore, replied to the letter of Tippoo Sultaun in the terms of the enclosure, No. 8,* in which I have declared Lieut.-General Harris to be the only person now authorized by me to receive and to answer whatever communications the Sultaun may think fit to make, with a view to the restoration of peace on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to their common security. This letter I directed General Harris to forward to the Sultaun, on the day on which the army under his command should pass the frontier, and at the same time I instructed him to issue, in the name of the allies, the accompanying declaration marked No. 9.†

* See p. 453.

† The following is a copy of the declaration :—

The Proclamation of Lieut.-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of all his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's forces on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, to the Zemindars or Poligurs, Desmooks, Despondies, Canoongoes, Naurgours, Potails, Shambogues, and to all Aumuldars, Serishtadars, Kelladars, and other inhabitants of Mysore, who shall receive the Company's Cowle.

Whereas Tippoo Sultaun having concluded an offensive alliance with the French, the inveterate enemies of the English, the Peishwa, and the Nizam of Decan rejected all overtures on their part for effecting an accommodation, and giving proofs that he only waited the arrival of the French to involve all India in a war; the allies have sent their armies into this country, under my command, to frustrate his ambitious designs, and to secure their possessions against the future attempts of such insidious enemies.

These being the views of the allies, I come not to make war upon the defenceless inhabitants of this country, but to receive you under their protection, and promise you perfect security under their government, facilitate the carrying these intentions into execution. Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Read, the same officer under whose administration you expe-

The Nizam's contingent consists of above 6000 of the Honourable Company's troops subsidized by his Highness, of about the same number of his own infantry, (including a proportion of M. Peron's sepoys, now commanded by British officers,) and of a large body of cavalry.

This force, under the general command of Meer Allum, formed a junction with the British army on the 19th February: and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I remark to your Honourable Court the beneficial effects which the Company has already derived from the recent improvement of our alliance with the Court of Hyderabad. The Nizam's contingent actually arrived in the vicinity of Chittoor, in a state of preparation for the field, before General Harris was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore.

I have annexed to this despatch the last return of Lieut.-General Harris's army, previous to his passing the frontier; an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally supplied in every department, or more perfect in its discipline, and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal of its

rienced last war the benefits of a British Government, is again appointed to superintend the affairs of all the districts dependent on Mysore that may be reduced by the armies of the English; and as a further indication thereof, cowle flags shall be distributed over the country, and safe-guards sent to all the villages in the vicinity of the armies, to secure the inhabitants from depredation.

These measures being taken, and the allied armies sufficiently powerful to afford all the districts in their rear effectual protection, you will remain in your villages, proceed in the cultivation of your lands, and enjoy all the blessings of profound peace.

Benefitting so considerably by the liberal policy of the allies, it will become a duty on your part to merit their protection by serving them as obedient subjects, and rendering them the dues of the Sirkar, in the exaction of which will be evinced that moderation and justice, which distinguish the British from all the other nations of Europe in their conduct towards natives of India.

The general good of the people under them being the study of their Government, it evidently follows, that, whoever shall render them particular services during the present war, such as aiding Colonel Read in ascertaining the sources of the public revenue, in regulating the police, in procuring supplies for the army, or in giving intelligence of the enemy's designs, may be sure of rewards suitable to the importance and success of their endeavours.

Written at Head Quarters,
5th March, 1799.

GEORGE HARRIS.

officers, never took the field in India. The army on the coast of Malabar is in an equally efficient and respectable condition, and the extraordinary efforts which have been made by Lieut.-General Stuart and Major-General Hartley, seconded by the cordial attachment and unremitting assiduity of the Rajah of Coorga, have collected within a very short period of time a supply so abundant, that I am induced to transmit the particulars of it to your Honourable Court, as a testimony of the distinguished merits of those valuable officers, and of the loyalty and active exertion of that faithful tributary of the Honourable Company.

A considerable force, under the command of Lieut.-Colonels Read and Brown, will cooperate with Lieut.-General Harris in the southern districts of the Carnatic and Mysore.

Under these circumstances, General Harris entered the territory of Mysore on the 5th of March, with orders to proceed directly to Seringapatam.

Having thus submitted to your Honourable Court, according to the order of dates, a detailed relation of the events which have led to the war in which we are actually engaged, and having declared to you the motives and objects of my conduct in every stage of this important transaction, I must request your permission to conclude this despatch, with such reflections as arise in my mind from the review of my past measures, and from the prospect of their ultimate consequences and permanent effects.

From the first disclosure of the nature and object of Tippoo Sultaun's embassy to the Isle of France, every principle of justice and policy demanded from your Government in India that an instantaneous effort should be made to reduce his power and resources before he could avail himself of the advantages of the alliance which he had concluded. The defect of means is the sole consideration which can justify me for not having made that effort at the early period when its success would have placed the security of your possessions on a foundation, which the invasion of India by a French force could not have impaired. For without the aid of some native power it is scarcely possible that the French should ever make any permanent impression on your empire in India; and no native power (excepting Tippoo Sultaun) is so infatuated as to be disposed to assist or receive a French army.

The progress of events since the date of my orders of the 20th of June, 1798, has not only confirmed the principles of justice and policy, by which an attack upon the Sultaun was at that time demanded, but has manifested, that the designs of France as well as of the Sultaun, were of a much more extensive and formidable nature, than any which have ever been attempted against the British Empire in India, since the hour of its first foundation.

While the magnitude and danger of these designs were gradually disclosed, I had the satisfaction to feel, that the means of averting them were augmenting in a proportion nearly equal by the success of the negotiations at Hyderabad, and by the progress of the military preparations which I had ordered throughout your possessions.

At the commencement of the month of February the crisis arrived in which I was called upon to form my ultimate decision on the important question at issue with Tippoo Sultaun, and to determine the final result of the whole system of my measures.

On the one hand, the apparent establishment of the French army in Egypt, and the uncertainty of the state of our naval power in the Red Sea, rendered the danger still urgent from that quarter; while Tippoo Sultaun's repeated evasions of my proposals for negotiation, combined with his embassy to the Executive Directory of France, under the conduct of M. Du Buc, appeared to preclude all hope of detaching the Sultaun, from his recent alliance with the enemy. On the other hand, I now possessed ample means of frustrating the most dangerous effects of that alliance, by a seasonable application of the powerful force which the treachery and aggression of the Sultaun had compelled me to collect at a heavy expense to your finances.

Your Honourable Court will determine whether in this state of affairs my orders of the 3rd of February were premature; and whether I should have been justified on the 13th of February in recalling those orders, for the purpose of admitting at that late period a negotiation, which would have enabled Tippoo Sultaun to defeat every object of the armament of the allies for the present season, and would have afforded him ample time to reap the full benefit of his con-

nection with France before the season for besieging his capital should return.

In deciding these important questions, you will necessarily consider, what degree of reliance could be placed on the sincerity of the Sultaun's disposition to conclude an amicable adjustment with your Government at the very moment, when he had actually despatched on an embassy to the Executive Directory of France the commander of the French troops, raised in the Mauritius and admitted into the Sultaun's service for the express purpose of carrying on a war of aggression against your possessions in India.

The admirable condition of your armies on both coasts, and the unequalled perfection of their equipment in every department, added to the extraordinary spirit and animation with which the campaign has been opened, afford every reason to hope that the issue of the war will be speedy and prosperous, and that it must terminate in a considerable reduction of Tippoo Sultaun's resources and power.

The wisdom of your Honourable Court will anticipate the extensive benefits which must result to your interests from an event now become essential to the peace and security of your possessions in India.

The policy of the treaty of Seringapatam certainly was not to maintain Tippoo Sultaun's power in such a state as should leave him a constant object of alarm and apprehension to the Company. That he has been justly so considered for some years past, cannot be doubted by any person acquainted with the records of any of your Governments in India. The present is the second crisis, within the last three years, in which the Government General has thought it necessary to assemble the army on the coast of Coromandel for the sole purpose of checking his motions; and the apprehension of his intentions has obstructed our operations against our European enemies in India during the course of the present war.

The continuance of Tippoo's power on its actual scale, and under such circumstances, must have proved to the Company a perpetual source of solicitude, expense, and hazard. But the engagements which he has contracted with the French, the public proofs which he has given of his eagerness to receive in Mysore as large a force as they can furnish, combined

with the prodigious magnitude of their preparations, and the incredible progress of their army, evidently directed to the destruction of the British power in India, form new and prominent features in our political situation in this quarter of the world.

Admitting the wisdom of that policy which dictated the preservation of Tippoo Sultaun's power, at the close of the last war with Mysore, the spirit of our present Councils must be accommodated to the variation of circumstances, and to the actual position, character, and views of our enemies.

In such a conjuncture of affairs I am persuaded that your honourable Court will be of opinion, that no object can be deemed so urgent, or so necessary to the safety of your possessions, as the effectual reduction of the only declared ally of France now existing among the native powers of India.

If Tippoo Sultaun had been disposed to content himself with the quiet possession of his present dominions, if he could have been brought to a sense of his own peril in forming a connection with the French, the representations which I addressed to him would have produced an early and salutary impression; whatever speculative opinions might have been entertained with respect to his interests, views, and power, the justice and moderation of the British Government would never have disturbed his tranquillity. But he resolved to attempt the recovery of his lost dominions at the hazard of those which he still retains; and, in the ardour of his passionate pursuit, he overlooked not only the certain destruction of his own independence (the inevitable consequence even of the most prosperous success of any alliance with France;) but also the predominant influence of the English East India Company, and the vigilance of its Governments, which would probably detect his treachery, and turn against his own empire the ruin which he had meditated against theirs.

The secrecy of his councils, the promptitude of his resources, his constant and active state of equipment for war, added to the facility of his intercourse with the French through his remaining territories on the coast of Malabar, are the most dangerous circumstances in the actual condition of his power and dominion, and constitute his principal means of offence.

If success should attend your arms in this war, I entertain a firm confidence that those dangers will either be wholly averted, or so considerably diminished, as to afford to your government in India the prospect of durable security, and genuine peace.

I cannot close this letter without repeating to your honourable Court the cordial expression of my entire satisfaction in the zealous and honourable co-operation of Lord Clive, as well as of all the Members of this Government. The beneficial effect of their cheerful and ready concurrence in forwarding all my views, is manifest in the rapid progress and perfect completion of the equipments of the army in the field, and furnishes a striking and salutary example of the inestimable advantages of unanimity and concord among your servants in India.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs, with the greatest respect,
your most obedient and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. CLXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Stuart.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 21st March, 1799.

I take the earliest opportunity to congratulate you on the brilliant and important success of the troops under your command on the 6th of March. The victory is highly honourable to your ability and resolution, as well as to the promptitude and valour of those who executed your orders. I sincerely hope that the effect of this success may be felt not only in the additional security of the supplies collected in Coorg, but in the tranquillity of Malabar, and in accelerating the conclusion of the war.

I request you to express to General Hartley, to Colonel Montresor, and to the several officers under your command, named in your despatch, the high sense which I entertain of their conduct on the 6th of March.

Sincerely wishing that fortune may continue to throw in

your way the happy means of adding to your own reputation,
and to the security of the British power in India,

I have the honour to remain,
your faithful servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXIII.

Copy of a Letter from General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp at Malvelly, 27th March, 1799.

The army marched this morning, many horse were seen as it approached Malvelly, and a large force appeared posted on a high commanding ridge, three miles beyond that place. The ruins of the fort were occupied by a part of our advanced guard, when at 10 o'clock A. M. Tippoo Sultaun opened a cannonade from several heavy guns, so distant, that I paid it little attention, and ordered the ground to be marked for encampment; the shot, however, falling in our lines, and horse menacing our picquet, the 1st European brigade, and two cavalry corps, were ordered to support it on the right, while Colonel Wellesley's division advanced on our left; this brought on a general action, in the course of which, a small body of horse charged the 1st European brigade, some individuals piercing the line, but most of them falling before it. Colonel Wellesley's division turning the right flank of the enemy, gave occasion to General Floyd, with three regiments of cavalry, to disperse a cutchery of infantry, cutting many of them in pieces. The enemy retired about one o'clock, having been driven completely from every position he attempted to maintain. It was my wish to have encamped on the ground he quitted, but a total want of water, obliged me to return to the ground I had first taken up at Malvelly. The whole of the enemy's force was, I believe, in the field; their loss I cannot ascertain; ours is trifling. The conduct of the troops on this occasion was such as I could not but approve; our baggage was, during the action, well secured by the left wing of the army, under Major-General Popham. I shall hereafter have the honour to transmit accurate returns of the small amount of our loss. I shall march to-morrow morning to a large tank

in the direction of the Cavery, to secure water by approaching the river.

Captain Kinnedy, of the 19th dragoons, Leonard and Strachan, native cavalry, Moore, 74th, are wounded. Part of his Highness the Nizam's horse were engaged, and behaved extremely well.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. CLXIV.

Sir John Anstruther, Chief Justice at Bengal, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Calcutta, 27th March, 1799.

I had the pleasure of your very kind letter yesterday, and feel very much obliged to you for your attention at a period when so many important objects press upon your mind.

You may believe the success of your measures gives me very sincere pleasure, both upon public and private grounds. I was early satisfied of the necessity of the vigorous exertions of the governor of this country, and I am perfectly convinced, however forward the army may now be, that it would still have been at the gates of Madras had you not gone to that settlement. Men concerned in the Government of India before your arrival, appear not only totally to have overlooked the nature of the war we were engaged in and the enemy we had to contend with, but to have contracted a narrow limited view of the political interests of England in India, every difficulty was a reason for inaction, and temporary pecuniary embarrassment afforded a satisfactory ground for neglecting the essential, permanent and political interests of the country; you have taught them a larger way of viewing the question, and shown them that difficulties vanish before activity, courage, and perseverance. It was by the vigour of our Councils, and the active energy of our preparations, that we acquired this country, and it will cease to be ours if for any length of time our Government wants these qualities. By this time every state in India, and what, perhaps, is of as great consequence, every man in the Company's service must be convinced they will not be wanting during your Govern-

ment; the consequence is, that this brush once over, you will, during your stay in India, have peace abroad and exertion at home. In all new Governments, but especially in all Indian Governments, much more depends upon the individual character of the Governor than men are willing to allow, especially those who have only looked to the old governments of Europe, these may and have gone on with little variety or change by the force of custom and habit, such governments as this never could so go on; and I believe since the French revolution it will be long before the European governments do so again.

Every day increases our anxiety to hear from the army, although few have any doubt of the event, and the preparations and exertions seem almost to set fortune at defiance. I am not sure that I have made up my mind to wish submission on the part of Tippoo without some action which shall disperse or destroy part of his army, and tarnish his military reputation. A treaty following a battle operates more powerfully upon the mind than one which leaves the army entire.

We all wish your presence here as soon as the more important affairs will allow; there seems much to do to regulate the submission of the provinces as well as the dominions of Oude. It does appear as if these provinces were not quite free from the turbulent spirit which agitates the world. Many here are disposed to ascribe it to the mild spirit of our Government, and the decrease of respect for the European character, and particularly to the diminished visible effects of authority, in consequence of the equality of rights introduced by the late system for the administration of justice; and, as usual in India, instead of correcting the present, would propose to recur to the old.

It may be here, and probably it is, that being more acquainted with the European character, acquaintance has diminished respect, and that security, while it has banished fear, has led a corrupt, unprincipled people, in many instances, to abuse that security, and to use it as the means of misusing a freedom of action they are not yet quite fitted to possess. It may also be true that they are as yet short sighted enough to prefer present advantage to distant retribution. Yet still I am satisfied, that if the system be vigorously adhered to they will not only feel its benefits, but dread its effects, equally with the old. The existing evil seems to be the delay

and arrear of judicial business which afford a security to injustice, in no way the fault of the system. This will probably call for much of your attention. It strikes me that many of the regulations are passed with a distrust of the instruments who are to execute them, and in consequence all discretionary authority is at an end, and every trifling dispute which might be settled by a magistrate, like a justice of peace, in a summary way, is loaded with all the form and guarded with all the care as if it was a dispute about the Zemindary of Burdwan.

I have insensibly got into a subject very foreign to your present business, which, anxiously as we wish you here, I hope will not be till it is completed; at all events, whatever you leave to be done, will be much better done for your having been upon the coast.

I am sure amidst the pleasure you felt at the capture of La Forte, poor Cooke's and Davies's fate would grieve you. I am sorry to say that poor Cooke is still in a very dangerous way; after apparently recovering as well as possible, he was taken last week with a fever, and upon Friday and Saturday was in very great danger; upon Saturday an incision was made into the wound in his side, and a seton passed through part of it. Monday and Tuesday he was rather better, although still feverish and very weak; his wound also put on a better appearance; to-day he is much the same, but still there are considerable apprehensions, more especially as the fever is not accounted for from any apparent cause.

I am, my dear Lord,

Your's, very sincerely, ever,

J. ANSTRUTHERS.

No. CLXV.

The Earl of Mornington to R. Liston, Esq., his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, Philadelphia.

SIR,

Fort St. George, April 1, 1799.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 22nd June and 17th July.

I have issued the necessary orders to the Board of Trade at Calcutta to forward by every means in their power the views of the Captains of the American vessels recommended by you, and you may rely upon my manifesting every disposition to favour such American ships as may find it expedient to touch at any port within the limits of the Government-General of the British possessions in India.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 3rd April, 1799.

From the tenor of your latest despatches, I conclude that Lieutenant-Colonel Little's detachment must have been recalled from Jyeghur before you can receive this letter.

The reasons which induced me to order the recall of the detachment must be obvious to the Durbar of Poonah; and, I imagine they have already been fully stated to you. It is, however, desirable that the whole subject of the late negotiations at Poonah and of the conduct of the Peishwa should undergo the most detailed and formal discussions—I, therefore, direct you either at an audience, to be demanded for the purpose, or by a written memorial to state to the Peishwa and to Nana Furnavese, without reserve, the whole course of my sentiments on this occasion, observing the general outline of the statement contained in this letter.

At the period of my arrival in Bengal, the Peishwa's affairs were in the lowest condition of disorder and distress; and the destruction of his authority, if not of his office, was menaced

by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. In this crisis Baagy Rao urged the most earnest entreaties for the assistance of the Company's troops, and also for my good offices with the Nizam, who at that moment possessed the means of affording considerable assistance to the cause, either of the Peishwa or of Scindiah.

The laws of my country restrained me from aiding the Peishwa in the manner required by himself, until the period arrived when the hostile preparations of Tippoo Sultaun released me from all restraint with respect to such engagements with any of the country powers as might appear to me beneficial in the event of hostilities with that Prince. I then embraced the earliest opportunity to offer to the Peishwa the aid which he had required in troops, as well as my mediation with the Nizam, on conditions not only just and liberal, but calculated to strengthen and perpetuate the internal authority of the Peishwa's Government, by the accession of the whole consolidated weight of the triple alliance. The circumstances under which my propositions were made, as well as the nature of those propositions, and the various explanatory discussions by which they were followed, sufficiently demonstrated my utter repugnance to any officious interference in the Peishwa's affairs, or to any intrigue calculated to favour the views of any party or individual at the Court of Poonah, my object was evidently to give efficacy to the public engagements of the State by acceding to the declared wishes of the reigning Prince, to be extricated from the usurpation of one of his feudatory Chiefs, and my offer of affording to the Peishwa a retreat at Bombay in the most desperate state of his affairs, is an unequivocal proof of the sincerity of my wishes for his safety and honor.

To propositions founded on the Peishwa's repeated and anxious solicitations; and directed to no other objects than the equal and reciprocal benefit of the Company, of the Peishwa himself, and of the Nizam, I was surprised and disgusted to receive the unmerited return of jealousy, distrust, and evasion. Since that period your despatches have abounded with the proofs of a system of studied neglect, of mysterious reserve, and of ungenerous suspicion, wholly irreconcilable with the character and spirit of alliance and friendship.

Under these circumstances, the proposition for employing a detachment of the Company's troops with the Peishwa's con-

tingent in the eventual prosecution of hostilities against Tippoo Sultaun, did not originate with me, but with the Peishwa himself. In acceding to that proposition, I manifested a peculiar consideration for the embarrassments of his Highness's situation by waving the Company's just title to an augmentation of the former subsidy; proportioned to the actual increase of the charges of the detachment. In this instance, a degree of indulgence was shewn to the Peishwa's pecuniary difficulties, which has not been extended to the Nizam, whose present subsidy is calculated upon the actual charges of the detachment in his Highness's service.

In order to comply with the wishes of the Peishwa for the service of the detachment in question, I made considerable sacrifices of interest and convenience, in the confidence that his Highness applied for the detachment with a sincere desire of cooperating, to the extent of his power, with the Company and the Nizam, against the common enemy.

But it appears that, in this instance also, my compliance with the Peishwa's own wishes has only served to excite in his mind fresh emotions of distrust, and to open a new scene of subterfuge and insincerity. Every artifice of vexatious delay has been employed to frustrate the necessary means of enabling the detachment to move from Jyeghur. It has been placed in a position, where its services can contribute nothing to the common cause. The necessary funds for its subsistence have been neglected; and your repeated attempts to draw the attention of the Peishwa to your just representations have been treated with a disregard, which demonstrates that in applying for the use of the detachment, the Peishwa had nothing less in view than to employ it in active operations against the enemy.

Such conduct has a necessary tendency to impair the efficiency of the triple alliance, and to encourage the hopes of Tippoo Sultaun.

The detention of the Sultaun's vakeels at Poonah, in contempt of my repeated remonstrances, must produce effects of the same mischievous tendency. The arguments of Nana, drawn from the last war with Mysore, are not applicable to the present case. The connection between the Court of Poonah and the Company had not at that time been so defined and cemented as to render the admission of vakeels from

Tippoo Sultaun incompatible with the spirit of the subsisting treaties. But under the present circumstances, the Peishwa must be considered to be actually at war with the Sultaun; and in this case, therefore, the reception of ambassadors, in opposition to the declared sense of the allies actually engaged in the war, is nearly equivalent to a violation of faith, and to a dissolution of the alliance.

These considerations compelled me to direct that the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Little should quit a position in which its services must be equally lost to the Peishwa and to the Company.

I am fully aware of the justice of Nana's observations on the present distracted state of the Peishwa's Government, and its consequent inability to engage with effect in foreign war. It would be equally unjust and ungenerous to take advantage of any failure in the Peishwa's engagements, arising from a defect of power, and from the unfortunate condition of his affairs; even in this view, however, I might remark, that the actual distress of the Peishwa is to be attributed principally, if not solely, to his unaccountable rejection of my propositions of the 8th July, 1798,* which would have placed his dignity, authority and power, on an immovable foundation.

If the Peishwa had candidly declared his present inability to assist in the war against Tippoo, accompanying that declaration by any satisfactory proofs of good faith, or good will, I should have lamented, but I never should have censured his misfortune. But the dismissal of the vakeels of Tippoo Sultaun, an amicable attention to the just representations of the British Resident, and a more upright and sincere policy in the demand of the detachment were within the power of the Peishwa, even in his present reduced condition, and the ancient friendship subsisting between his family and the Company, as well as the peculiar anxiety which I have manifested for his prosperity and honour, entitled me to expect from him, in his intercourse with the British Government, a disposition of more candour, integrity, and justice. Whatever may be my disappointment, it shall not influence my conduct in the event of any treaty of peace with Tippoo Sultaun.

It is evident, that, if the Peishwa, either from want of will or power, shall continue neutral in the war, he cannot be entitled, on any ground of right, to share with the other allies the eventual advantages of the terms of peace.

My confident expectation is, that the allies will speedily reduce the vindictive spirit of Tippoo Sultaun to submission without the aid of the Peishwa; and if that event should take place, notwithstanding the perverse and forbidding policy of the Court of Poonah, I shall not fail to secure for the Peishwa an equal participation with the other allies in any cessions which may be enforced from Tippoo Sultaun. I authorize you to make this declaration, in the most unequivocal terms, to the Peishwa and to Nana. If even this declaration shall fail to excite the Peishwa to employ every practicable effort to fulfil his defensive engagements with the Company, I trust it will, at least, serve to prove the disinterested attachment of the British Government to every branch of the triple alliance.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

NO. CLXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieutenant-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, April 3rd, 1799.

I take the earliest opportunity of congratulating you, on the important success of the Troops under your Command engaged with Tippoo Sultaun's Army on the 27th, of March, and I request that you will signify to the Officers and Men, who distinguished themselves on that day, my cordial approbation of their services.

It gives me particular pleasure to learn from you that the Nizam's forces have conducted themselves with so much credit, and I must also request you, to convey my thanks to them, in the most public manner.

I am very happy to inform you, that Mrs Harris is quite well, and highly pleased at this early instance of your success. I entertain no doubt that victory will continue to attend the powerful army under your Command.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXVIII.

Lieut.-Gen. Harris, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp before Seringapatam April, 5th, 1799.

I have particular satisfaction in reporting to your Lordship that the army under my command, encamped this morning before Seringapatam ; taking up the position, which with little variation it will be expedient to occupy, till the Division under General Stuart joins me. A strong detachment, commanded by Major General Floyd, marches to morrow morning to facilitate the junction, and I take the occasion of addressing your Lordship, by what I consider as a safe channel of communication, to report generally what I have by various hircarals attempted to transmit to your Lordship as the Army advanced on its march.

I left Killamungalum on the 10th of March ; and our first movement shewed a very serious deficiency in the Bullock department, particularly in those attached to the Commissary General of Stores. The succeeding march of the 12th, although short and with an intermediate day of halt, marked this deficiency more strongly ; crippled in our movements from this cause, our marches have been tedious though short ; our halts have been frequent and our progress has been slow, unremitting attention to every species of arrangement by which the store department could be assisted or lightened, was indispensably necessary : some losses were daily sustained. The zeal of individuals was called forth with considerable advantage, and we have succeeded in surmounting these difficulties, and taking our position before the capital of Mysore, with an ordnance equipment which I hope is amply sufficient for its reduction.

The army marched by the route of Anicul, Talgautporam, Cagliaporam, Kankanhilli, and Sultanpett to Malavelly where I arrived on the morning of the 27th of March : The army of Tippoo Sultaun occupying the heights beyond the town from which at about 10 o'clock he commenced a distant cannonade ; some shot falling in the line marked for our camp, and a body of horse menacing the picquets of our right, it became necessary to advance corps for their support, which

led to a general action. The Infantry line of the Enemy was on commanding ground in rear of his artillery. His Cavalry advanced under cover of his cannon, and a cutcherie or Brigade of Infantry was pushed forward in front of each flank of his Line, mixed with many rocket men. The right wing of the army under my command formed on the picquets of the right; Colonel Wellesley's division, advanced from a considerable distance on the left to attack the right flank of the enemy, and Major General Floyd with the 19th and two regiments of native cavalry moved between these corps. The 25th dragoons and a native regiment keeping in check a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had assembled on our right, while the left wing of the army and a regiment of native cavalry remained halted to protect our stores and baggage. The weak state of the artillery bullocks considerably retarded the advance and formation of our line, with which they were unable to keep pace. A small body of horse, profiting by this circumstance, made a daring charge on the 1st. European brigade; they were received with firmness, and repulsed with considerable loss; their infantry in front of our right, being at the same time driven from their position. On the left, the corps of infantry called the *Kerim Ketcherie* advanced on Colonel Wellesley's column. His Majesty's 33rd. regiment which opposed soon put them in confusion, and the cavalry under Major General Floyd advancing at this moment to the charge, cut them to pieces. Six colours were taken. The retreat of the enemy soon became general; their cannon were drawn off, and at two o'clock the action had entirely ceased; our line halting on the heights whence theirs had been driven: a total want of water preventing our encamping there, the line returned to the ground originally marked for its encampment at Malavelly. The loss of the enemy as collected from various accounts received since the action, amounted to near two thousand killed and wounded; a return of the casualties of this army is enclosed.

At an early period of our march it had occurred to me, that if it were possible to cross the Cavery, at a ford some distance below Seringapatam, the measure might be attended with considerable advantage, by embarrassing the motions of the enemy, defeating the preparations he might have made to oppose us on the Northern side of the river, and facilitating

our communication with the army of Malabar and the force under Colonel Brown and Read. In addition to these inducements the ford was said to be easy; we had reason to hope the country was still undestroyed, and the southern part of Seringapatam was considered as the least capable of defence. The destruction of the tanks on the road from Malvelly to Arakeery, rendered an oblique movement towards the Cavery less liable to suspicion than it might otherwise have been, and we arrived on the 29th of March at Sosilly on the Cavery, before any measures had been taken to oppose our movement, by destroying forage, or driving off cattle, of which we here procured a considerable supply. The army crossed the river the next day without difficulty, and after halting on the 30th to arrange our departments, marched on the succeeding morning towards Harwelly, the weak state of our cattle, the barren nature of the soil, the total destruction of forage, which immediately followed our passage of the river, and the necessity for regulating our marches by the situation of water, the road leaving the river at some distance on the right, obliged us to make five marches from Sosilly to our present camp, three of which have been in sight of Seringapatam. Numbers of horse have daily watched our motions, but, although the ground was favourable, no attempt has been made to oppose our progress.

The detachment with Major General Floyd consists of H. M. 73rd regiment, three Bengal and two coast battalions of Sepoys with their guns, and one regiment of European and three of native cavalry, with their galloper guns; and a party of the Nizam's horse. During the absence of this party, I shall be employed in preparing materials for the more active operation of the siege, which will commence with the junction of General Stuart's force and I am happy to add that on this side of the river, I apprehend no want of materials for the siege. We have a sufficient stock of provisions to subsist the troops beyond the time, when the union of our forces, from the opposite coasts may enable me to spare an army of sufficient force, to cover our communication with the stations, whence our supplies are prepared to join us; the cattle now with the camp must in the mean time suffer greatly, but this is no longer an object of consequence.

Numbers of people are employed on this side of Seringa-

patam, in repairing the fort. It seems to us to require all their labour, appearing to be in a very imperfect state.*

I cannot conclude without expressing to your Lordship, in the strongest terms, the obligations I feel myself under to Meer Allum Bahadur, for the promptitude with which he has in every instance met my wishes in the cooperation, required from the forces of His Highness the Nizam. Their aid in transporting the shot, has been of the greatest use, and it is an act of justice due to Captain Malcolm, to report to your Lordship that his unceasing zeal, in pointing out the manner in which the contingent could promote the common cause of the allies, has been equalled only by the chearful readiness shewn by Meer Allum, in adopting his suggestions.

I have the honor to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and faithful Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. CLXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel William Palmer.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 7th April, 1799.

However proper it might be on general grounds that you should accompany the Peishwa in the event of his being obliged to retire from Poonah, yet as it is to be apprehended that your doing so might lead to an interruption of the communication between Bombay and the other Presidencies, which it is of peculiar importance to maintain in the present conjuncture, I must desire that you will suspend the execution of that measure, in the event of the Peishwa's flight, until you shall receive my further instructions on the subject.

I am, &c.,

MORNINGTON.

* Lord Cornwallis's attack was directed to the northern side of the Fort of Seringapatam, Tippoo therefore expected General Harris to make his attack on the same quarter, where he had prepared means of resistance; but General Harris's most judicious and able movement to the southern side of the Fort, had all the effect of a surprise, and entirely disconcerted Tippoo's plans of defence.

No. CLXX.

Lieut.-Gen. Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp before Seringapatam, 7th April, 1799.

After crossing the Cauvery on the 30th ultimo at Sosilly, where the army halted the next day, I advanced by easy marches to this place, and took up my position within two miles south-west of Seringapatam without opposition. On the 5th of this month, wishing to occupy the post where Gen. Abercromby's picquets were attacked in 1792, and the large tope and village of Sultanpetta, both were attacked the night of our arrival, but owing (in great measure) to the darkness of the night, the attack on the first only was partially successful. We sustained some loss from the fire of the enemy, which continued heavily till late next morning, when the posts were again attacked with perfect and rapid success. They give this army a very strong position, and greatly confine that of the enemy. Major Colin Campbell, of the 1st native regiment; Lieutenant George Nixon, and Tulla, of the 12th; and Fitzgerald, of the 33rd, were killed; in these attacks Lieutenants R. Nixon and King of his Majesty's 12th regiment, and Brooke of Bengal artillery, wounded. Gen. Floyd marched on the morning of the 6th to join General Stuart, with his infantry and four cavalry corps, twenty field-pieces, and a body of the Nizam's horse. This force I consider superior to any thing that can be opposed to it by the enemy. The army has now taken up its position for the siege.

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. CLXXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathon Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 7th April, 1799.

Although I have already addressed to you my public congratulations upon the brilliant and important victory gained by Lieut.-General Stuart over the flower of the army of Mysore, commanded by Tippoo Sultaun in person, on the 6th of March, I cannot omit the repetition of my sense of the honour of that day in this private communication.

The merits of Generals Stuart and Hartley, as well as of Colonel Montresor and the other officers have seldom been equalled and never surpassed in India; and the most happy consequences may be expected from this early and decisive success, not only in bringing the present war to a speedy and honourable conclusion, but in establishing the character of our arms among the refractory inhabitants of Malabar. We may reasonably hope that the effects of this victory will long be felt in the dejection of Tippoo's adherents on that coast, and among our subjects in the settlement of tranquillity and order on permanent foundations.

You will have learnt with satisfaction by the extraordinary Gazette forwarded from hence, that Tippoo Sultaun's army met with an equally warm reception from General Harris on the 27th of March. To this intelligence I have the satisfaction to be able to add, that all my private accounts from Gen. Harris's army leave no doubt that the whole of that immense equipment will reach Seringapatam in time to commence the siege under circumstances which must render the fall of the place inevitable, unless prevented by the previous submission of the enemy. This is the universal opinion of every officer of experience and judgment in the army.

I shall take an opportunity hereafter of communicating to you the terms of peace on which I am resolved to insist.

I approved your instructions to Agha Abul Hussun, sent on a mission to Scind, in consequence of my former suggestion.

The prospect of establishing a British factory in that country appears to me to be a very desirable object, not so much with a view to commercial as to political advantages. I, therefore, wish that you should by all means encourage the favourable disposition of Futteh Ali Khan, and endeavour, if possible, to settle a factory in Scind. Whenever such a factory shall be established your attention will of course be directed to facilitate the means of communication with it, as the most probable mode of obtaining authentic information relating to Zemaun Shah. I do not see the necessity of entering into any engagements with Futteh Ali Khan, which might hereafter impose on us the obligation of supporting him against Zemaun Shah by any further exertion than by furnishing him with arms and ammunition. To this extent

I authorize you to afford him whatever assistance may appear necessary. Assistance of this nature will, probably, be sufficient to induce him to admit a British factory; but if the factory cannot be established otherwise than by contracting extensive engagements for the eventual support of Futteh Ali, the object must be relinquished.

I entirely approve your plan of raising a corps for garrison duty at Bombay. On this subject I would only suggest two considerations which I wish you to keep in view in any military association or militia corps which either has been or may be formed under your Government. First, the necessity of maintaining, in the fullest extent, the unqualified right of your Government to command the personal services of all its subjects in the event of danger to the Presidency.

Secondly, to admit no constitution or establishment of any military corps which shall exempt it from the constant controul of Government, as well in the appointment of officers, as in every matter of discipline and subordination. An attention to these principles is essentially necessary to the preservation of the authority and vigour of Government. And it is not difficult to conciliate these principles with every degree of encouragement to the voluntary zeal and loyalty of the subject. I have found no impediment in establishing the militia at Calcutta under a system which equally secures the power of Government and the ease and honour of the individuals serving in the militia.

I observe a complaint of the general ignorance of the junior servants, sent to the coast of Malabar, in the native languages. I wish to receive from you a particular report on this subject, accompanied by the suggestion of such regulations as may appear to you most eligible for the purpose of encouraging and enforcing the study of the native languages among the junior servants of your Presidency,

I received with much gratitude your offer of assistance at Benares, and I consider your readiness to return to your former station in that country as a strong proof of your zeal for the public service. I need not assure you that I shall most willingly accept the offer of your services, if upon my return to Bengal I should find it necessary to call for them.

You are aware that the arrangement could not be made in the only manner in which it could be acceptable to you with-

out a total alteration of the judicial and other establishments now existing at Benares. I have appointed Mr. Vanderheyden to succeed to Mr. Cherry's station, and I have great hopes that under Mr. Vanderheyden the present system may answer the desirable end of composing the unhappy commotions which have lately disturbed the peace of that country. If my hopes should be disappointed I shall not forget your obliging and public spirited offer.

I entirely approve your proceedings with respect to the French supposed to have been at Muscat, and I cannot recommend to you more earnestly than I feel the absolute necessity of keeping a most vigilant eye on the proceedings of any French who may arrive in Persia, or on your side of India.

I am very glad to hear of your intention to visit the coast of Malabar in October. I should hope, at an early period, to receive a full statement of the actual condition of that province, as well as of the means of improving its system of police and revenue. I suspect that your present settlement is founded upon a principle wholly irreconcilable with the tranquillity of the country. It appears to me that we have not kept faith with the different Rajahs and Chieftains according to the terms on which we received the country at the conclusion of the last war with Mysore. You will set me right if I have conceived an erroneous opinion on the subject ; but if the fact be as I suppose, you may be assured that I shall be ready to repair the breach which has been made in the national faith at any expense, being convinced that it will ever be impossible to introduce order into any country in contempt of the confidence and respect of the inhabitants.

I wish you to understand that I shall always be happy to receive from your Government the fullest details, either public or private, relating to your local department, with this single reservation, that your communications shall not be given in a manner either to impede the prompt execution of those measures which I deem necessary for the public service, or to draw me into any controversial public correspondence in defence of my own orders. With my most cordial assurance of every sentiment of personal confidence, and of

every disposition to assist you in the discharge of the important duties confided to your particular care,

I have the honour to be, Sir,
with the highest respect and esteem,
your most faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXII.

From Lieut.-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington, enclosing a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris, received the 9th April; and his

MY LORD, Camp before Seringapatam, 9th April, 1799.

I this morning received a letter of the 6th, from General Stuart, who was to march on the 7th, in consequence of a letter he had received from me, of the 4th, informing him of the intended march of Gen. Floyd's detachment, which I trust will join the Bombay army this day, near Periapatam. I expect their united force here the 14th instant. I also this day received a letter from Tippoo Sultaun, a copy of which and of my proposed answer is inclosed. The persons who brought it were informed that "a reply would be sent when necessary." Nothing else has occurred deserving of report.

GEORGE HARRIS.

From Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris.

The Governor-General Lord Mornington, Behauder, sent me a letter, copy of which is enclosed. You will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties; what then is the meaning of the advance of the English armies and the occurrence of hostilities. Inform me. What need I say more?

From General Harris to Tippoo Sultaun.

10th April, 1799.

Your letter enclosing copies of the Governor-General's letter has been received. For the advance of the English and Allied armies and for the actual hostilities, I refer you to the several letters of the Governor-General, which are sufficiently explanatory on the subject.

No. CLXXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Commissioners of Malabar.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 10th April, 1799.

The details contained in your letters of the 12th and 17th January, of the measures which had then been adopted, under my orders, for the purpose of establishing large magazines of grain in the district of Coorga, afforded me the highest satisfaction, and the distinguished success of those measures, as reported in your subsequent advices, has surpassed my most sanguine expectation.

The zeal and ability, with which this important service has been executed, reflect the highest credit on all the civil and military officers concerned in conducting it. My particular approbation and acknowledgements are due on this occasion to Major-General Hartley, to Mr. Uthoff and to Capt. Mahony.

The Rajah of Coorga has seconded my views, and the exertions of the Company's servants on this occasion, with a degree of spirit, energy, and fidelity, which confirm the high character he had justly obtained in the late war. I have expressed my sense of his zealous attachment and honourable services in a letter to him, which will be forwarded to you by the Persian translator, with a copy for your information. I think it proper to apprise you that I have determined, (as a testimony of the satisfaction which his conduct has afforded me, and with a view of encouraging the imitation of his example among the other tributories of the Company,) to relinquish the tribute at present payable by the Rajah, and to substitute some annual acknowledgment of the Company's claim to his allegiance. The Government of Bombay will receive the necessary directions from me for giving effect to this arrangement.

I have no doubt that the exertions of the Rajah to collect grain for the use of the army will be continued, (as long as they shall be necessary) with the same spirit which has hitherto distinguished them; and I am equally confident that those exertions will be ably and zealously seconded by you, and by those under your orders on the coast of Malabar.

I approve your appointment of Captain Mahony to be resident with the Rajah of Coorga; and the instructions with which you furnished Captain Mahony on that occasion.

In one of your letters which is without date, but which appears to have been written about the 5th of March, you have thought it necessary to assure me, after a representation of the defenceless state of the province of Malabar, "that you are disposed to submit to temporary inconveniencies, and evils, even to a considerable extent, rather than purchase present tranquillity at the expense of making permanent sacrifices either to Tippoo Sultaun, or any of the native Chiefs of Malabar, of a nature unbecoming the dignity or rightful interests of the Company."

Entertaining the high sense which I have already expressed of your merits in the discharge of your proper duties, I am concerned to be under the necessity of observing that the tenor of this passage is utterly incompatible with the dependent and subordinate nature of the commission under which you act. It is your duty to submit implicitly to whatever inconveniencies may result from the execution of the orders proceeding from the superior authorities of the British Government in India, and arising not from partial or local, but from general and comprehensive views of the public interests. Your authority is not competent in any case, or for any purpose whatever, to make either a permanent or a temporary sacrifice of the rights, dignity, or interests of the Company to Tippoo Sultaun or to any other power.

It is my duty to call your attention to any point in which you may appear to have formed an erroneous opinion of the limits or nature of your powers; and I now discharge that duty with a full conviction of the uprightness of your intentions, and of your sincere zeal for the promotion of the public service.

I approve the letters despatched by your Resident to the Pychy Rajah and to Yemaun Nair, of which copies were enclosed in your letter of the 16th March; and I concur in opinion with you, that those persons are not likely to aid the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, particularly after the defeat which that Prince has lately sustained from the army under the command of General Stuart. Accordingly, I am happy to think that the tranquillity of the province of Malabar will not be disturbed by the open or secret movements of those Nairs.

I entirely agree with you in your construction of the letter

from Ayappin to the Rajah of Coorga, a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch of the 25th March ; and I desire you will signify to the Rajah of Coorga, that I have viewed with the utmost contempt and indignation, this weak, and insidious attempt of Tippoo Sultaun to cast doubts upon the faith of an Ally, whose attachment, fortitude, wisdom, and integrity have secured the affection and admiration of the British Government.

I entirely approve the spirit and substance of the instructions contained in the extract of your President's letter to the Resident with the Rajah of Coorga, under date the 30th ult., and enclosed in your despatch of the same date. It is my anxious desire that you should continue to recommend sentiments of humanity and moderation, not only to the Rajah of Coorga but to all the other tributaries of the company on the coast of Malabar, whenever the occasion may admit of your interposition to mitigate the unavoidable calamities of war.

I am, Gentlemen, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXIV.

Major-General Floyd to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp at Periapatam, April 10th, 1799.

As it is possible General Harris's despatches may not have reached you, I beg leave to give a short statement of events, as far as have come to my knowledge.

On the 27th of March the enemy was seen, in force, on the high ground west of Malavilly. General Harris, with the right wing, attacked the enemy in front. Two regiments of cavalry supported. Colonel Wellesley, with the Nizam's army, took a most judicious situation on the enemy's right flank, and attacked it, and threw it into confusion. I was observing, with three regiments of cavalry, between the right flank of Colonel Wellesley and the left of General Harris, and charged and destroyed a great number of the enemy's infantry, taking six stands of colours. About the same period, a number of the enemy's horse had charged the European brigade of the right wing ; several of them were killed, and the

rest fled ; the infantry also were repulsed by ours, and the whole retired out of our reach. It seems, from subsequent accounts, that about 500 wounded men reached the enemy's camp, and that their loss was about 2000 men. Our loss amounted to about 7 or 8 killed, and about 40 wounded—and about 45 horses killed and wounded. No officer killed, and four only wounded. I have no copy of the return by me.

On the 29th March the army encamped at Sosilly, on the bank of the Cavery. Here we found a great collection of inhabitants, and cattle, and rice, and a good deal of paddy and other grain. The army was considerably refreshed.

30th of March, the army had all crossed the river at a good ford.

5th of April, the army took its situation before Seringapatam at the west point of the fort. That night Lieut.-Colonel Shawe took possession of a post between seventeen and eighteen hundred yards from the fort. An attack was also made by Colonel Wellesley on a tope, but the troops were withdrawn on our part—a spent ball, as I have heard, struck the Colonel on the knee, but it did not prevent his walking.

6th April, early in the morning, I marched off for Periapatam with four regiments of cavalry, one regiment European (73d,) and five battalions native infantry, and about 2000 of the Nizam's horse. All last night, and most of this day, there was a continued peal of small arms, and, occasionally, heavy guns. We still hear heavy guns at intervals, but I have no account whatever since we left the army.

8th April, I encamped at Periapatam. My signals were answered, and I had communication with General Stuart that night.

9th April, I rode over to General Stuart, and after some arrangements, returned to camp ; immediately a considerable number of the enemy's horse appeared, and hovered round most of the day without effecting anything, but with some slight loss on their part.

10th April, General Stuart joined me this day, with rice and some other articles for between 30 and 40 days for his army, and a quantity of military stores. We proceed to-morrow to join the army at Seringapatam, and shall probably reach it in five marches. Having no cypher I refrain from

some particulars; the troops are, in general, healthy, and in high spirits, and full of good will.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect, my Lord,
your most obedient and humble Servant,
J. FLOYD, M. G.

On my marching from hence to-morrow, the communication will be entirely closed on this side.

No. CLXXV.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 17th of April, 1799.

I had yesterday the satisfaction to receive your letter of the 7th instant, and I congratulate you on the complete success with which you have established your position for the siege of Seringapatam.

I approve and admire the judgment and alacrity which mark the detachment of the force under General Floyd on the same morning on which you established your posts, by the action you describe.

The position which you have taken, among other advantages, is highly important in the facility which it would afford you of detaching a force against any body of French which might effect a landing on the Malabar coast, either before or during the approaching monsoon. I trust that our great naval superiority will secure us from this danger; but you will learn from General Stuart that I have considered the possibility of the event, and have been anxious to provide against it. I wish you to give the matter your joint and serious consideration.

I beg you will offer my hearty thanks to those officers and corps who distinguished themselves in the attacks of the 5th and 6th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency Sir Alured Clarke.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 17th April, 1799.

I have just received the communication which you instructed Mr. Barlow to make to me on the subject of the message addressed to you by Shums-ud-dowlah.

I entirely approve your judgment in referring so delicate and important a question to my decision. Whatever temporary inconveniences may occasionally result from the delay incident to such references, the principle on which they are founded ought to be strictly observed in all cases of great moment. It is equally certain that no disadvantages can arise from such a system of precaution which will not ultimately be overbalanced by its general benefits and permanent effects. The main spring of such a machine as the Government of India can never be safely touched by any other hand than that of the principal mover.

I am persuaded that you have taken the proper steps to secure Calcutta against the danger of a sudden attack from the river. If the Imaum should assist General Buonaparte (whom I believe to be still in Egypt, with 17 or 18,000 men,) their object would be to sail directly up the Hoogly, and to surprize Calcutta.

I am concerned to observe the slow progress made by Major-General Stuart against Vizier Ali and his banditti. I scarcely know a point of more importance to our interests in India than the capture or death of that young assassin, and the early dispersion of his followers.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 20th April, 1799.

I now proceed to submit to you a detail of the operations of the armies in Mysore.

The army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant General Stuart, marched from Cananore on the 21st of Feb.,

arrived at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut on the 25th of the same month, and took post at Sedapore and Sedasere on the 2nd of March, for the protection of the large supplies which had been collected at Verajunder Pett, in the district of Coorga. From these positions, on Lieutenant-General Harris's approach, Lieutenant-General Stuart intended to form a junction with the army of Madras.

The army of Madras, under the command of Lieutenant-General Harris, entered the territory of Mysore on the 5th of March, and its operations commenced by the reduction of several forts upon the frontier. Some of these forts surrendered without any resistance, and none of them were defended with spirit, although the Sultaun appears, from the improved establishment on which he had placed their garrisons, to have provided as well as he could for a different result.

The progress of the army of Madras, owing to its ample equipments in every department, particularly in that of the ordnance necessary for the siege of Seringapatam, was unavoidably slow. Its movements, however, were but little impeded by the enemy. Considerable bodies of horse hovered about its line of march, but without any other effect than that of rendering the communication with the Company's territories extremely difficult. Some parties of horse attacked the Nizam's contingent, and his Highness's cavalry are reported by General Harris to have conducted themselves with great spirit, a circumstance which may partly be attributed to the improvements recently introduced into the discipline and establishments of his Highness's cavalry at the recommendation of the British Resident under my instructions.

At the period when the army of Madras entered Mysore, Tippoo Sultaun was supposed to be encamped in the vicinity of Maddoor, and to be preparing to move in the direction of Bangalore for the purpose of opposing the progress of the Madras army, in the event of Lieutenant-General Harris actually passing the frontier. But it soon appeared that although the Sultaun had so recently affected a disposition to admit an embassy from the British Government, he had probably no other view than to conceal the design which he had formed of striking a sudden and early blow against the army

of Bombay. For without allowing me the same time to answer his last letter which he had taken for replying to those addressed by me to him, and without waiting to hear of the actual commencement of hostilities on the part of the British Government, he came to the resolution of attacking the army of Bombay then assembled beyond the line of his frontier, in the district of Coorga, under the command of Lieut.-General Stuart.

For this purpose Tippoo, taking with him the flower of his army, appears to have marched from his camp near Cenapatam, on the 28th of February, (when General Harris was still within the Company's territories,) and moving rapidly in the direction of Periapatam, to have arrived there on the morning of the 5th of March, (being the same day on which Lieutenant-Gen. Harris entered Mysore on the eastern frontier.)

On the 6th of March Tippoo Sultaun passed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the army of Bombay, under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Stuart, the total strength of whose entire army did not amount to more than 6000 fighting men. The attack of the Sultaun's force was resisted by a body not exceeding 2,000 men, and the Sultaun's army was finally defeated and totally dispersed, before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. It is with infinite satisfaction that I enclose for the information of your honourable Court the paper marked No. 1, containing Gen. Stuart's account of this brilliant and important action which took place at Sedasere on the 8th of March.*

After this signal defeat, Tippoo retreated precipitately to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th of March without making any further attempt to molest the army. The loss sustained by Tippoo's army on the 6th of March appears to have amounted to near 2,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, which included several officers of rank, and some of considerable distinction. That sustained by the army of Bombay will appear in Lieut.-General Stuart's letter.

Adverting to the great disproportion of numbers, and to other circumstances of disadvantage, I am confident that your honourable Court will be of opinion, that the conduct and

* See p. 483.

success of the army of Bombay on that day has seldom been equalled, and never surpassed in India.

Under this impression I take the liberty of recommending to your favourable notice the several officers and corps named by Lieut.-General Stuart, in his letter of the 8th of March,* and I am anxious to request your particular attention to the distinguished conduct of Lieut.-General Stuart and Major-General Hartley, as well as of Lieut.-Colonel Montresor and of Lieut.-Colonel Dunlop. Major-General Hartley had already received a public testimony of my particular approbation of his extraordinary merit in collecting stores and provisions in the district of Coorga, previously to the arrival of General Stuart on the coast of Malabar.

Tippoo returned from Periapatam to Seringapatam, and arriving at the latter place on the 14th of March, moved from thence immediately to meet Lieut.-Gen. Harris and the army of Madras.

Lieut.-General Harris had advanced on the 26th of March to a position between Sultanpett and Malavelly, having met with no considerable impediment from the enemy. The enemy made their appearance in force on that day, but without attempting to disturb our army. On the 27th of March, when the army reached its ground at Malavelly, Tippoo opened a distant cannonade upon it, which, though at first disregarded by Lieut.-General Harris, ultimately led to a general engagement, in which the enemy was completely defeated, and driven from every post which he attempted to maintain: our loss on this occasion was very inconsiderable, only seven rank and file being killed, and a few men (including four officers) wounded, while that of the enemy is supposed to have amounted to near 700.

I refer your honourable Court to Lieut.-General Harris's letter of the 27th of March,† which forms part of the enclosure No. 1, for a more particular account of this important victory, requesting also your attention to the merits of the several officers and corps distinguished by the notice of Lieut.-General Harris.

General Harris marched on the 28th a few miles to the southward of Malavelly, without the least interruption from

* See page 485

† See page 505.

the enemy, from whence it may be inferred that Tippoo Sul-taun was considerably dispirited by the defeat which he had sustained on the preceding day, added to the previous success obtained over him by the army of Bombay.

On the 29th of March General Harris happily accomplished a movement which must have greatly astonished and disconcerted the enemy: instead of proceeding in the direction of Arakerry and Karagat, Lieut.-Gen. Harris suddenly turned towards the River Cavery, where finding a ford at some distance above the junction of the Cavery and Copany, he immediately crossed the Cavery with a part of his army, and occupied strong positions on both banks of that river, at the distance of about fifteen miles from Seringapatam. This movement was also made without the least opposition on the part of the enemy, who indeed does not seem to have entertained the most distant suspicion of the British General's design.

Lord Cornwallis, at a more advanced period of the year, having in vain sought for a practicable ford to the southward of Seringapatam, Tippoo probably concluded that Lieut.-General Harris would have pursued his Lordship's route to the ford of Caniambaddy, northward of Seringapatam, for the purpose of effecting a junction from thence with the army of Bombay. It is difficult to account otherwise for Tippoo's inaction while General Harris executed this arduous and important movement.

The advantages of the position thus acquired by General Harris must prove considerable. In addition to the immediate acquisition of cattle and forage, it must facilitate the junction with the army of Bombay; it must afford additional security to the abundant magazines which have been formed in the Coorga country, and favour the safe approach of our convoys from the southern districts, and from the Barramahli by the pass of Coveriporam; and it promises to open to our army that range of forage, situated to the southward of Seringapatam, which Tippoo seems to have reserved for the consumption of his own army.

Lieut.-General Harris, with his whole army, having crossed the Cavery on the 30th of March, halted near the village of Soselly on the 31st; on the 1st of April he moved towards Seringapatam, and on the 5th encamped two miles south-

west of that city, having experienced no opposition from the enemy since the 27th of March. On the morning of the 6th of April, after an engagement in which the enemy appears to have made considerable resistance, Lieut.-General Harris took possession of Sultanpetta and an adjacent tope or grove, and about the same time Major-General Floyd, with a strong detachment, was sent to effect a junction with the army of Bombay: on the morning of the 6th of April Lieut.-General Stuart received at Sedapore a note from Lieut.-Gen. Harris, announcing the arrival of the latter at Seringapatam, and also signifying that Major-General Floyd was to be detached from the army of Madras on the 6th of April for the purpose already stated. In consequence of this intelligence, Lieut.-General Stuart had determined to march from Sedapore to Sedasere on the 7th of April, and it is probable that the junction of the army of Bombay with the detachment under the command of Major-General Floyd was effected on the 8th in the neighbourhood of Periapatam. The last accounts received by me from General Harris are dated on the 7th instant, when he states that he had taken up his position for the siege of Seringapatam.

Tippoo Sultaun, on the 7th of April, had not returned any answer to my letter of the 22nd of February, nor had he manifested any disposition to propose a negotiation. Lieut.-General Harris is instructed to propose preliminary articles of peace to the Sultaun before the British batteries shall be opened against Seringapatam.

While General Harris was advancing towards Seringapatam, Lieut.-Colonel Read was employed in reducing the country to the northward of Ryakottah. His operations were intended to have embraced a wide range, and he had made considerable progress in them, when the more urgent service of convoying to the army the large supplies which were collected in the Barramahl, made it necessary for him to change the direction of his march. He is now drawing together in the vicinity of Coveryporam the numerous brinjaries and other supplies intended for the army encamped before Seringapatam, which place it is hoped he may be able to reach early in May.

To the southward of the Carnatic and of Mysore, Lieut.-Col. Browne, at the head of a respectable detachment, began

his operations by the reduction of Carroor, which surrendered to him, without any serious resistance, on the 5th of April. On the 8th he sent a detachment against Errode, and marched himself on the 9th to reduce Aravacourchy. He would, however, be obliged to suspend his intended operations in the district of Coimbatoor, and to unite his detachment to that of Col. Read, with the view of forming a force sufficiently strong to give due protection to the large and important supplies proceeding to Seringapatam.

Aravacourchy, which had been considerably strengthened since last war, surrendered to Lieut.-Col. Brown on the 10th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P. S. 22nd April, 1799.—After closing my letter I had the satisfaction to receive despatches from Generals Harris and Stuart.

I congratulate your honourable Court on the successful junction of the detachment under General Floyd with the army of Bombay. The final junction of the whole army of Bombay with the army before Seringapatam was expected to take place about the 13th instant. It may be safely affirmed not to be in the power of Tippoo, even materially, to retard this junction, which, when effected, must excite a serious alarm in the mind of the Sultaun for the safety of his capital if not of his person.

Your honourable Court will perceive that Lieut.-General Harris, in his progress to Seringapatam, encountered the same difficulties which were experienced by Lord Cornwallis from the failure of the cattle provided for the service of the army, which, although amply sufficient in point of number at the commencement of the expedition, appear to have rapidly decreased on the entrance of the army into Mysore; the climate and water of that country are represented to be extremely unfavourable to the cattle of the Carnatic. The delay which arose from this unavoidable contingency seems to have been considerable; but your honourable Court will, no doubt, view with satisfaction the spirit and firmness with which this difficulty was met by the Commander-in-Chief, and the zealous exertion of the whole army by which he was enabled to proceed on his march.

No. CLXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 22nd April, 1799.

The distractions in the Government of Poonah have increased to such a degree as to preclude all hope of assistance in the war with Tippoo Sultaun, from that quarter. On the other hand, however, this state of confusion in the Mahratta empire equally prevents the possibility of any attempt against your interests.

The sudden flight of Vizier Ali from Benares having enabled the magistrate of that city to secure the papers of the assassin, a scene of the utmost importance to your interests has been disclosed by the examination of those authentic documents. Copies of the several papers which fell into our hands were transmitted to me, and under my orders several persons involved in the designs of Vizier Ali have been apprehended in different parts of the provinces. The inspection of their papers has led to further discoveries, and although I cannot yet communicate to you a detailed account of the nature and objects of the designs and the views of those who have been apprehended or of their chief, I am already in possession of sufficient evidence to prove that a conspiracy had been formed for the purpose not only of restoring Vizier Ali to the throne of Oude, but also of favouring the invasion of Zemaun Shah, and of expelling the English nation from the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa.

The leaders of the conspiracy having been apprehended, and every precaution having been taken to prevent disorder or tumult, I do not expect that any of the intended objects of the conspirators can now be effected. It appears more probable, that the premature disclosure of the conspiracy, and the seasonable measures which have been taken for averting its evil consequences, will disconcert and intimidate such accomplices as may happen to elude the vigilance of Government.

But the complexion of this transaction leads to serious reflections on the condition of your possessions in Bengal and the provinces. The defective state of the police in the provinces and the several great cities will require immediate

attention. You will observe that the persons concerned in this treason are almost exclusively Mahomedans, and several of them of high rank. It is a radical imperfection in the constitution of our establishments in India, that no system appears to have been adopted with a view either to conciliate the good will or to controul the disaffection of this description of our subjects, whom we found in possession of the Government, and whom we have excluded from all share of emolument, honour, and authority, without providing any adequate corrective of those passions incident to the loss of dignity, wealth, and power.

The last accounts from Bengal state, that Vizier Ali was still in the neighbourhood of Goruckpoor at the head of a considerable body of banditti; but as the Rajahs of Napaul and Betoul had abandoned his cause, and a considerable detachment of our troops under the command of Major-General Stuart, had advanced within a few miles of his position, no doubt appeared that his followers would soon be dispersed, and a confident hope was entertained that his person would fall into our hands.

I have the satisfaction to inform you, that notwithstanding the export of forty lacs of rupees in specie to this Presidency, and the actual commencement of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun, the discount upon all the public securities in Bengal has experienced a considerable diminution during the course of the last month; and with the aid of the supplies in specie which we expect from England, I flatter myself that I shall be enabled, within a short period of time, to direct an enlargement of the commercial investment at all the Presidencies. I am naturally impatient to return to Bengal, but the experience of every hour convinces me more strongly that the avowed projects of Tippoo Sultaun, combined with his acknowledged means of carrying them into effect, have been among the most efficient causes not only of the decline of public and private credit in Bengal, but also of encouragement to the disaffected and disorderly class of your subjects. I am, therefore, persuaded that the effectual reduction of Tippoo's means of mischief is indispensable to the welfare and tranquillity of all your possessions. Under this impression I feel it to be my duty to remain at this Presidency so long as

my presence can in any degree contribute to the energy and vigour of our military operations.

It is a most extraordinary circumstance, that we have not yet received any authentic intelligence of the condition of the French army in Egypt, nor of that of our naval defences in the Red Sea. By the ships lately arrived from the Cape I learn that Commodore Blanket was in the Mozambique channel towards the end of October, that he had met with adverse winds, and was apprehensive that he should be obliged to bear up for Bombay. Since that period I am entirely ignorant of his course or condition.

By the latest accounts from Constantinople it appears that General Buonaparte's army still consisted of 17 or 18,000 fighting men.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

NO. CLXXIX.

Lieut-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD, Camp before Seringapatam, 22nd April, 1799.

On the 18th instant I had the honour to address to your Lordship a report of the proceedings of the army to that date, which was given in charge to General Floyd, who on the 19th marched with the cavalry, a brigade of native infantry, and the Nizam's horse, to meet Colonel Read near Cauveriporam, and assist in escorting the Brinjarries to camp. That morning a battery was opened on the north side of the Cauvery, to enfilade the enemy's entrenchments in front of our intended attack. The 20th, in the evening, the most advanced of these was carried by our troops, and a parallel established on the spot on that night; the letter of which, a translation is annexed, was received from Tippoo Suldaun. On the night of the 21st a battery for six guns was erected near the ruins of the powder mill, and as a violent attack was made before day of the 22nd on all General Stuart's posts, four guns and two howitzers opened from this battery on the fort this morning with considerable effect, in destroying its defences and reducing its fire.

Yesterday, after consulting the Commissioners appointed to assist me in subjects of political arrangement, and with

Meer Allum Bahadur, I determined, in reply to the Sultaun, to transmit a draft of preliminaries founded on your Lordship's paper B., with such alterations as the change of circumstances seemed to require in the security exacted—additional hostages in lieu of forts, which now we have no time to receive. I have required as hostages four sons of the Sultaun and four of his principal officers, to be selected by me. These, with the treasure to be sent in forty-eight hours to camp, or I reserve to myself the power of extending the demand even to the possession of Seringapatam. The letter was sent this day at noon. A duplicate of your Lordship's letter of the 29th ultimo has been received from the Coorga country. The particular accounts you require cannot now be sent. We want only provisions and cattle at present. Money will be necessary next month. Of rice we have collected, by various modes, enough to subsist our fighting men to the middle of May.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE HARRIS.

Translation of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Lieut.-General Harris, bearing no date, but received in camp before Seringapatam on the evening of the 20th April, 1799.

In the letter of Lord Mornington it is written that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, and that, therefore, you having been empowered for the purpose, will appoint such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference and renewing the business of a treaty. You are the well wisher of both Circars. In this matter what is your pleasure, inform me, that a conference may take place.

A true Translation,

BARRY CLOSE.

No. CLXXX.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, April 23rd, 1799.

Various circumstances, of which the general nature is stated to you in another despatch of this date, combine to render it desirable that Tippoo Sultaun's power and resources should be reduced to the lowest possible state, and even ut-

terly destroyed, if the events of war should afford the opportunity.

One of these circumstances is the equivocal conduct of the Mahrattas, which leads me to conclude that they will afford us no assistance against Tippoo, and to apprehend that they may assist him, if any favourable occasion should occur.

The victory of the 27th of March, combined with that of the 6th of March, has, I trust, induced you to adopt draft B* as the basis of any propositions which you may have made to Tippoo, previous to opening your batteries against Seringapatam.

If Tippoo should have agreed to preliminary articles founded on draft B., in framing the definitive treaty, you will express the cessions of territories and the payments of money in such terms as shall leave at my option the Peishwa's proportion of either.

For this purpose, the preamble to any definitive treaty which you may conclude, should not contain any specification of the allies. The Company only should be specified, and the allies be included in general terms, according to the following draft.

“Definitive treaty, &c. between the Honourable English Company and *their allies*, concluded by Lieut.-General Harris on the part of the said Company and of *their allies*, by virtue of powers from the Governor-General, &c.”

The name of Meer Allum, or of the Nizam, should not appear in the treaty; you will treat under powers from me. I have little apprehension that Meer Allum will disapprove the terms and form of this preamble; but if he should entertain any doubts on the occasion, they would be immediately removed by apprizing him, in confidence, that the arrangement was designed to exclude the Mahrattas from an equal participation in the successes of the war, excepting on conditions which should operate to the particular benefit of the Nizam's Government.

Upon the same principle, and with the same view, it will be necessary that those articles of the definitive treaty regarding cessions, and specifying the several districts and forts to be respectively ceded to the allies, should be so qualified as to

* See p. 463.

place the share to be allotted to the Peishwa at the disposal of the Company and of the Nizam.

After a specification of the several districts to be ceded respectively to the Company and to the Nizam, the schedule of the territory to be ceded to the Peishwa might be qualified according to the following draft.

“ But whereas the Peishwa has borne no part in the present war, and all the expenses of it have been defrayed by the Company and the Nizam, it is hereby declared that the foregoing districts shall be deemed to belong to the Peishwa only on condition of the said Peishwa making, within a period of two months from the date of this treaty, a satisfactory adjustment with the Company and the Nizam, on account of the burthen of the war having exclusively fallen on them; and in default of the Peishwa's making such a satisfactory adjustment, the districts to be ceded by the present treaty to the Peishwa, shall be deemed to belong to the Company and to the Nizam, who shall be at liberty to divide them as they shall judge proper.”

I wish the terms of any treaty which you may conclude with Tippoo Sultaun, to be regulated by the principles which I have laid down in the present letter.

I also wish (if you have entered into no engagements with Tippoo Sultaun when you receive this letter) that the power and resources of that prince should be reduced to as low a state as possible. You are, therefore, authorized to proceed to any extremity which you shall consider practicable, without exposing us to the expense of a protracted and tedious war; or endangering the safety of your army, or any of the advantages already acquired.

In the event of any treaty with Tippoo, you must *now* obtain the utmost possible degree of security for his faithful execution of its stipulations. If this question is still open, I authorize you to demand the temporary possession of the fort of Seringapatam, to be holden as an additional pledge of security; provided that your superiority shall be so decisive as to entitle you to require such a concession.

I desire that the names of Lieut.-General Stuart and of Major-General Hartley be added to the commission appointed to assist you in all matters of negotiation. The knowledge which those officers possess of the interests of the Company;

on the coast of Malabar, will prove very useful to you; and I authorize you to make any variation, in the terms of peace, relating to Malabar, which may be suggested by those officers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXXI.

The Earl of Mornington to his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic.

Fort St. George, 24th April, 1799.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HIGHNESS

1. Within a few days subsequent to my arrival at this Presidency, I had the honour to inform your Highness of the state of the differences existing between the Honourable Company and Tippoo Sultaun, and conformably to the tenth article of the treaty of 1792. I explained to your Highness, in the fullest manner, the probability of an approaching rupture with that prince.

2. The conduct of Tippoo Sultaun since that time having rendered war absolutely necessary for the security of the allied powers, hostilities have actually commenced.

3. The third article of the treaty of 1792 stipulates that, "in the event of war breaking out in the Carnatic, and countries appertaining to either party, and dependent on the Carnatic, or contiguous thereto, it is agreed, for the better prosecution of it, that as long as it shall last, the said Company shall possess full authority over the Carnatic, except the Jaghurs belonging to the family of the said Nawaub, and except also certain charities, and shall collect the revenues thereof, the said Company hereby engaging that, during such war, they will pay to the said Nawaub one-fifth share of the net revenue arising therefrom."

4. Under this article it is now become the right of the Company to exercise that full authority over the Carnatic which is thus formally acknowledged to be necessary for the better prosecution of war.

5. Your Highness, I am persuaded, is also satisfied, that it is now become my indispensable duty, without delay, to assume the revenues of the Carnatic conformably to the third article of the treaty of 1792, unless some new arrangement can now

be framed, with the consent of both parties, which shall afford equal security to the common interests of your Highness and of the Company, for the vigorous and effectual prosecution of the war.

6. I am aware that both your Highness and your respected father have ever been disinclined to the assumption of the Carnatic by the Company, in the manner specified by the article in question, and entertaining an anxious and sincere desire, not only to promote your Highness's interests and welfare, but to respect your inclinations and sentiments to the utmost extent compatible with the security of the Carnatic, I am induced to submit to your Highness's consideration the plan of a new arrangement between your Highness and the Company, which, if it shall prove acceptable to your Highness, will preclude the necessity of resorting to the stipulations of the third article of the treaty of 1792, and of assuming the whole of the Carnatic, not only during the present, but during any future, war.

7. In framing an arrangement on this foundation, I have endeavoured to extend its provisions with the view of comprehending the whole state and condition of your Highness's connection with the Company, as well as the equitable adjustment of the various subjects of complaint, which your Highness has been pleased to represent to me since the period of my taking charge of the general Government of India.

8. Before I proceed to the details of this plan, I shall submit to your Highness's consideration some observations, which as they proceed from my good wishes for your prosperity and happiness, I trust you will receive with the cordiality of friendship.

9. Your Highness's situation for some years past, has neither been satisfactory to yourself, nor advantageous to the interests, either of your own subjects or of the Company.

10. Your stipulated monthly payments, under the treaty of 1792, are not only moderate in their amount, but cannot be stated to bear a due proportion to the increased military charges, now defrayed by the Company, for the defence of the Carnatic.

11. Your Highness will never forget that the amount of these payments was settled by Lord Cornwallis, under an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, the benefits of

which the Company cheerfully relinquished, for the purpose of relieving his Highness, the late Nabob of the Carnatic, and ultimately your Highness from distress of circumstances and from anxiety of mind.

12. Moderate as these payments are in their amount, they have proved the source of continual vexation to the late Nabob of the Carnatic and to your Highness; and you have never been able to realize them in the Company's Treasury, without the utmost degree of difficulty and embarrassment, arising from unfortunate defects in the administration of your affairs.

13. These embarrassments have occasioned the adoption of temporary expedients, for the purpose of removing the pressure of the moment; and the consequences of resorting to such expedients have been injurious not only to the peace of your Highness's mind, but to the permanent interests and happiness of your subjects, and to the foundations of the opulence and prosperity of the Carnatic.

14. The truth of this faithful and amicable representation, will, I am persuaded, produce a just impression on your Highness's mind, when you reflect on the large amount of those sums of money applied to defray the exorbitant rates of interest, on all the various loans occasioned by the necessity of discharging your monthly payments.

15. These loans have usually been accompanied by assignments of territory to the creditors, whose vexatious management of the revenues assigned, has been the continual cause of of the most aggravated calamities to the inhabitants of the Carnatic.

16. In these transactions the loss has fallen on your Highness, your subjects, and your friends, and the illicit profit has enriched those, who (to use the words of your respected father, addressed to Lord Cornwallis) "never approach your Durbar for any other purpose, than to pursue their habitual views of plunder and rapine."

17. Upon the whole, the final result of this system has been, that your Highness's mind has continued in a perpetual state of solicitude and alarm, from the difficulty of satisfying the Company's claims, of which the moderation and justice cannot be contested. That the resources of your country have fallen into a state of progressive decay; and that the Company regularly receiving your Highness's monthly payments into the

treasury, has viewed with unavailing regret, the rapid approach of that crisis in the Carnatic, when every source of public revenue and credit, as well as of private opulence, industry, and population must be reduced to the lowest condition.

18. Neither your Highness nor the Company can reflect with satisfaction on the regular discharge of your monthly payments, when those payments are known and acknowledged to be effected by means, which aggravate your Highness's embarrassments, and rapidly exhaust the territorial security pledged to the Company for the military subsidy.

19. The collateral operation of this unhappy system is not less injurious, than its direct tendency. The notoriety of those embarrassments which compel your Highness to resort to the expedient of loans and assignments of territory, leads to a general expectation of the approaching failure of your monthly payments and consequently of a speedy transfer of the pledged districts to the management of the Company.

20. A constant expectation of war for some years past has further countenanced the notion, that the Company's management must soon be extended over a large part of your Highness's territories, under the 3rd article of the treaty of 1792.

21. These expectations have precluded the possibility of introducing for the relief of your Highness's subjects, any improvement founded on fixed and durable principles.

22. The Carnatic, therefore, in addition to the calamitous misrule of those who have governed it, under temporary assignments of territory, has been subjected to all the accumulated evils of a divided Government and of a fluctuating and precarious authority.

23. These sentiments relating to your Highness's situation are not the result of my judgment alone; I submit them to you as the result of the deliberate judgment of the Honorable Court of Directors, and of his Majesty's Ministers, formed upon a full, dispassionate, and impartial investigation of the relation in which your Highness stands towards the Company, and of the whole state of your affairs.

24. The principles of sound and comprehensive policy, the duties of respect and regard for your Highness, as well as those of humane consideration for the welfare of your subjects demand, that the Company and his Majesty's Ministers should look beyond the mere convenience of the present hour to the

certain operation of evils, menacing the permanent resources of your country.

25. The apprehension of the approach of that period, when the necessary effect of these evils must break forth to the entire ruin of the interests of your Highness and of the Company in the Carnatic, has induced the Court of Directors, and the Government of Fort St. George, to urge with earnestness the necessity of a new arrangement with your Highness. They have, however refrained from insisting to its full extent on that claim of justice and right, which the Company derives from the letter as well as the general substance and spirit of the treaty of 1792, according to the established maxims of public law and national faith.

26. Under that treaty, your Highness's faith is unequivocally pledged never to grant tunkwahs or assignments of revenue on the districts composing the security of your monthly payments to the Company.

27. I am aware that the same article has also provided for the avoidance of all such tunkwahs or assignments as shall be found to exist on any of the pledged districts, which shall pass into the hands of the Company under the operation of the preceding articles of the treaty. But this provision cannot be viewed in any other light than that of an extraordinary precaution, to establish an additional security for the interests of the Company. It cannot be construed to absolve your Highness from the positive obligation, which you have contracted in specific terms, "not to grant tunkwahs or assignments on any account on the revenues of the districts, responsible for any arrears, which may accrue in the payment of the stipulated kists."

28. If the treaty of 1792, has not provided a sufficient security for the due performance of this obligation, and if the neglect of this obligation threatens to defeat the primary object of the whole treaty, and to destroy the fundamental principle of your Highness's connection with the Company, the contracting parties must resort to the general law of nations, to supply the defective provisions of an engagement, which it is their mutual interests to preserve inviolate, according to its true tenor and original spirit.

29. The permanent establishment of an adequate territorial security for the payment of your Highness's share of the

expenditure of defending the Carnatic, is the principal object of the treaty of 1792. The treaty, therefore, would become nugatory and delusive, if no remedy could be provided against the continuance of a system, whose unrestrained progress must ultimately deprive your Highness of the power of satisfying your engagements to the Company, and must leave the Company bereft of all means of recovering the ruinous consequences of such failure. Your Highness's own discernment, will at once enable you to judge, whether it was the intention of Lord Cornwallis in signing the treaty of 1792, to provide a real, substantial, and lasting security for the Company's military subsidy, or to sanction a system of disorder, by which the whole value and efficiency of that security must be annihilated before the Company could derive any benefit from it.

30. It is not necessary at present to trouble your Highness with a more detailed representation on this part of the subject, —the plan which I now have the honor to submit to you, is calculated to preclude all such discussions, and I have revived the subject in this place, merely for the purpose of pointing your attention to one of the principal causes, which have rendered a new arrangement with your Highness indispensable.

31. Your Highness, I am persuaded, cannot reasonably view the proposition for a new arrangement proceeding from the Company, with any degree of jealousy or alarm; I must repeat the observation (and I recommend it with all the earnestness of friendship to your most serious consideration) that a similar jealousy on the part of the Company, would have bound his Highness, the late Nabob, and your Highness to the stipulations of the treaty of 1787.

32. If the Company had pertinaciously adhered to the letter of that treaty, and had insisted on a strict performance of the engagements contracted under it, I leave it to your Highness's candour and justice to declare, what would have been the actual condition of your affairs? But the Company then waved its undeniable rights under a subsisting treaty, and consented to a new arrangement at your solicitation and for your benefit. The Company has, therefore, a just claim to your Highness's favourable attention on the present occasion, and I trust, that under this impression, your Highness will not receive my earnest proposition for a modification of the treaty of 1792, with any other sensation, than those with which

Lord Cornwallis received your respected father's application for a modification of the treaty of 1787.

33. In proceeding to submit to your Highness the details of my proposed plan, I shall in the first instance state certain general principles, which appear to me necessary to be observed for the common benefit of all parties. 1st.—That the new treaty shall comprehend the adjustment of every branch of your Highness's affairs, as connected with your relation to the Company, and shall leave no question open to future discussion.

2nd.—That whatever adjustment shall now take place, shall be so framed as to afford the utmost degree of practicable security against the possibility of future change in order that the new treaty may become a final and conclusive settlement between your Highness and the Company.

3rd.—That with a view to secure the stability of the new treaty, as well as to provide an adequate remedy for the evils already enumerated in this letter, effectual provision be made that no part of the Carnatic shall remain or fall under a divided Government, or a fluctuating or precarious authority.

34. Referring to these general principles, the first object of consideration in the state of your Highness's affairs, is your debt to the Company. This now consists,

First.—Of the balance as reported by Messrs. Woolf and Place, on the 1st July, 1793—35,06,135.

Second.—Balance of the Kistbundy Account, as per account, made up to 9th Sept., 1791—19,98,006.

Third.—Balance of the new Cavalry Loan, with interest at 8 per cent., to the 12th October 1798—11,62,770. Total—66,66,911.

35. The two first articles of this debt at the earnest desire of his Highness, the late Nabob of the Carnatic, were referred to the arbitration of the Governor-general in Council, in the year 1793, and a Committee was appointed in Bengal, for the purpose of assisting the Governor-General in deciding upon them. This Committee has never yet delivered in any report, but having myself entered into a minute examination of the whole of these disputed accounts, and having considered with impartiality, the respective claims of your Highness and of the Company, I have no doubt that upon the balance of these accounts, you will be found justly indebted to the Company

to a very large amount. If, however, a new arrangement should be acceptable to your Highness, I am ready on the part of the Company to consider whether it may not be practicable to compromise the whole of this claim, amounting to 55,04,141 pgs. as well as the amount of any claim arising out of the payments made by the Company to your Highness's consolidated creditors of 1787. The extreme solicitude manifested by the late Nabob of the Carnatic, to induce Lord Cornwallis to place these disputed accounts in a way of adjustment, by which his Highness bound himself to submit implicitly to the award of the Governor-General in Council, with relation to them, are sufficient testimonies of the importance and value of the concession which the Company may be disposed to make to your Highness in this article during the course of the negotiation.

36. With regard to the advance made by the Company to the late Nabob, for the discharge of his Highness's debt, denominated the new cavalry loan, I am satisfied that this branch of your Highness's debt to the Company should be liquidated, partly by an arrangement, stated from the 37th to the 41st paragraph of this letter, and partly (in the manner already proposed by your Highness to Sir John Shore,) by the application of the sum of 6,21,105 pagodas, after your Highness's present guaranteed debt shall have been liquidated by the operation of that fund.

37. The great pressure of the material branches of your debt to the Company would thus be entirely relieved by their indulgence, and the period of the discharge of your new cavalry debt would be settled in such a manner that it could never interfere with your convenience—a stipulation may be inserted in the Treaty, binding the Company never to apply to your Highness for any advance of money on account of the new cavalry debt, previous to the period when its liquidation shall commence by the operation of the fund assigned for that purpose.

38. Your Highness has, at different times, preferred certain claims with respect to the Ramnad surplus, and to the Peish-cush of Sadras, and to the pearl fishery of Ceylon.

39. Your Highness has been informed that the whole question respecting Ramnad has been referred to the Court of Directors. If, however, I should be enabled to conclude a

new Treaty with your Highness, I shall be ready to decide the question of Ramnad without waiting for the result of the reference to the Honourable the Court of Directors. And being anxious to pay every attention to your Highness's just claims I shall direct the balance of the revenues of Ramnad remaining (after the deduction of all expences according to the 9th article of the agreement of 1795, concluded by Lord Hobart,) to be carried to your Highness's credit in the account of the new cavalry debt, immediately after your acceptance of the general arrangement which may be concluded between your Highness and the Company, in consequence of this letter.

40. I propose to direct, that the whole amount of the Peiscush, due to your Highness, since Sadras has been in the hands of the Company, shall be carried to your credit in the same account.

41. Your Highness's share of the pearl fishery has been calculated on principles which admit of no contest, to be one-fifth part of the number of boats employed in the whole fishery in each season, and an equivalent sum of money has been allowed to your Highness in your general account. Immediately after the execution of the new Treaty, I shall direct this sum also to be carried to your credit on the same account, and in the same manner as the two preceding sums. The Governor of Ceylon being now at this Presidency, in consequence of having received my orders to meet me here for the purpose of settling the affairs of his Government under my directions, if the proposals stated in this letter should meet your Highness's approbation, I shall direct the Governor of Ceylon to form a Treaty with your Highness, securing to you the regular payment of your share of the pearl fishery. The payment to be made by the Governor of Ceylon into your Highness's treasury.

42. The Governor of Ceylon will state to your Highness the great injury which would arise to the fishery from suffering any persons to interfere with those to whom it is farmed. And I, therefore, trust that your Highness will not desire to send any boats to the fishery. The punctual payment of your just share appears to me to be the most advantageous settlement which can be made for your interests, as well as for those of the Government of Ceylon.

43. Having thus manifested my desire to attend to the several objects which I know to be interesting to your Highness, I am further to inform you that I am ready, by an article of the new Treaty, to relinquish the right of the Company to the assumption of the Carnatic during the present, and during all future wars, on the following conditions.

44. That your Highness shall place under the exclusive management, controul, and authority of the Company, in perpetuity, a territory, equal to secure the receipts of the whole of your monthly payments into the Company's treasury, which payments are of course to cease from that time. The territory to be placed under the management of the Company, is described in a memorandum annexed to this letter. Your Highness will observe, that I have included the southern division of the Arcot province, although not one of the mortgaged districts, with a view to preserve in your Highness's management the countries surrounding your capital, and that the territorial revenues, under each authority respectively, may be as compact as circumstances will admit. In place of the northern division of Arcot, I propose to hold a district in the southern division of that province, to the amount specified in the annexed memorandum. I shall also for the convenience of both parties, be ready to exchange districts in the southern division of Arcot, adjoining to those of the center in place of the Jaghire lands, which your Highness holds to the southward of the Coleroon, for a similar purpose of avoiding the evils of a divided authority.

45. If the territory, placed under the management of the Company, should produce more than the stipulated amounts of 12, 56, 400..15..54, the whole of the surplus shall be paid into your Highness's treasury, upon an account to be settled every third year, or more frequently, when a permanent settlement of the revenue of the Carnatic shall take place.

46. On the other hand, if, from any accident of season, or from any other casualty, any deficiency should arise in the revenue of the countries managed by the Company, the loss shall fall exclusively on the Company, and your Highness shall not be responsible for any part of it.

47. With respect to the districts remaining in your Highness's hands, your Highness shall not be accountable for any increase of their produce under your management, nor shall

the Company be responsible hereafter for any contingent diminution of it.

48. As the expence of maintaining and repairing the several forts contained in the districts to be placed under the Company's management will necessarily be transferred to the Company—an annual sum will be allotted for the purpose, chargeable on the assigned revenues. The amount of this sum will be settled with your Highness's approbation during the negotiation of the new Treaty.

49. I have already observed to your Highness, that the increase of military charges, for the defence of the Carnatic, has rendered the amount of your subsidy disproportioned to its original object; on every principle of justice the Company would be warranted in proposing to your Highness an augmentation of your military subsidy. But, as I am anxious to preserve to your Highness the full enjoyment of an ample and unincumbered revenue, I have endeavoured to provide a fund for the increase of the military subsidy without any diminution of your actual receipts.

50. I propose, therefore, that whatever claims on the part of your Highness, or of the Company, remain in doubt respecting the Polygars, under the Treaty of 1792, should be now fully adjusted with the Company, and I am willing to accept that adjustment in lieu of all claims for an increase of your military subsidy, proportioned to the increased expence of defending the Carnatic.

51. The principle which induced the Company to seek the transfer of the Polygar Peishcush will not admit any considerable augmentation of the annual payments from those Tributaries. If the Company should hereafter deem it to be a wise policy to increase the Peishcush of the Polygars, that increase must be very moderate, and must be considered as a commutation for the military services of the Polygars.

52. Under a new Treaty, founded on the basis described, I entertain no doubt that your Highness's clear revenue would be considerably increased, and I am persuaded that you will concur with me in this opinion, when you refer to the former and present value of the countries which will remain in your Highness's hands, and when you recollect the extent of your charges for collection and other contingencies, and the enor-

mous sums which you are compelled to waste every year on account of interest and charges attending loans of money.

53. Under such a Treaty the evils of a divided Government, and of an unsettled and ill-defined power, would cease throughout the Carnatic. The authority of the Company and that of your Highness could never interfere with each other, and the new settlement would bear such unequivocal marks of permanency and security as would inspire general confidence, facilitate the introduction of an improved system of management, and revive the decaying principles of general industry, productive labour, and individual affluence.

54. In order to render this settlement perfect in all its parts, and to secure your Highness's future ease and comfort under all possible contingencies, it will be expedient to establish some certain fund for the satisfaction of those private creditors of the late Nabob of the Carnatic and of your Highness, whose claims now stand without security.

55. The operation of the sum of 6,21,105 pagodas will have liquidated the whole of the consolidated private debt guaranteed by Parliament in the year 1794.

56. After that period, by your Highness's agreement with Sir John Shore, the whole of this fund would be made applicable to the new cavalry debt, but I propose that only half the sum, namely, 3,10,552 pagodas 8 fanams, be appropriated to the payment of the interest and principal of the new cavalry debt, and the remaining half to the discharge of such just unconsolidated debts due by your father and by your Highness to individuals as shall, after the most strict examination, receive the sanction of your Highness and of the Court of Directors.

57. After the liquidation of the new cavalry debt, I propose that the whole fund of 6,21,105 pagodas shall be applied to the payment of the unconsolidated debt, according to the principles stated in the foregoing paragraph, and when the whole of the private debts (thus sanctioned by your Highness and by the Court of Directors) shall have been discharged, I propose that the full amount of the sum of 6,21,105 pagodas shall be annually paid in cash by the Company into your Highness's treasury.

58. Thus, Sir, have I submitted to your Highness the outline of the only plan which appears to me to promise the hope of

order to your affairs, of tranquillity to your mind, and of security to the interests of the Company committed to my charge.

59. Under the new arrangement your Highness would be relieved from all urgent demands either of a public or private nature, and you would possess a much more ample revenue than you now enjoy, with the additional satisfaction of reflecting that your possession was liable to no disturbance, either from the contingency of war, or from any casual failure of your resources. You would be at liberty to direct your undivided attention to the cultivation and improvement of those resources to the utmost practical extent; and you never could feel the necessity of injuring the main springs of your revenue for the purpose of meeting the exigency of occasional difficulty.

60. Whatever increase of produce might arise in the districts managed by the Company, would be a new source of wealth to your Highness, and you would feel a personal interest in every improvement which the Company might be enabled to introduce into the system of your revenues.

61. With these observations I shall conclude, earnestly entreating your Highness to give your most serious attention to this letter. The opportunity is now peculiarly favourable to the final adjustment of your Highness's affairs; if you suffer it to pass away without improvement, events may intervene to aggravate your Highness's embarrassments, to postpone, or even to preclude, all final arrangement of your affairs, and ultimately, to involve you in inextricable distress.

62. If the general principles which I have suggested, with the freedom and sincerity of friendship, should meet your Highness's approbation, they may speedily be reduced to the form of a Treaty, and I may be enabled, before my return to Bengal, to have the satisfaction of laying the foundation of perpetual ease to your Highness's mind, and of progressive improvement to this fertile, but declining, country.

63. Your Highness will observe, that throughout the whole of this letter, I have avoided any reference to your late failure in your engagements to assist the Company in the present exigency, by the immediate payment of a part of the new cavalry debt; I trust you will attribute my silence on this

recent transaction to my earnest desire of abstaining from any discussion which can be painful to your Highness.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect and attachment,

Your Highness's most faithful, and humble servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. 1.

Memorandum of Sums, which, in the event of a general arrangement taking place between his Highness and the Company, it is proposed to carry to his credit in part payment of the Cavalry Loan Debt.

Sadras Peishcush, for three years, 4,350.27; Ramnad surplus, 57,820; Share of the Pearl Fishery for 1797, 54,892.26.65; Ditto for 1798, 56,488.12; Ditto estimated for 1799, 56,488.12. Total proposed to be credited in part of the Cavalry Loan Debt, 2,30,040.5.65.

Unadjusted. Balance due by his Highness the Nabob to the Company, which it is proposed to compromise in the event of his Highness agreeing to the proffered final arrangement of his affairs.

Balance as per account current, the result of an investigation of Messrs. Woolf and Place, 35,06,135.20.17; Balance of his Highness's Kist Bundy account closed July 1790, 19,98,006.10.22. 55,04,141.30.39. Total balances and claims to be adjusted, 57,34,182.24 sterling pagodas.

No. 2.

Memorandum of the districts, with the estimated amount of their net revenue, to be placed under the exclusive management, controul and orders of the English East India Company, by his Highness the Nawab, &c. of the Carnatic, by the proposed treaty, in lieu of his Highness's payment of pagodas, 12,56,400.15.54.

Setwadoo, including Calicut, &c., 9,800; Palnaud, 24,657; Ongole, 93,334; Nellore, 3,31,783; Trichinopoly, exclusive of Jaghires, 2,51,139; Madura, 64,945; Tinnevely, 4,06,508; Southern Division of Arcot to the amount of, 2,01,157; * Sadras Peiscush, 1,450. Total sterling pagodas, 13,84,773.

* Sadras being within the Company's Jaghire, is here inserted on the principle of preserving distinct the authority of the Company and his Highness in their respective districts.

No. 3.

Memorandum of the Districts and Revenue estimated to remain with his Highness and family.

Arcot Province, exclusive of the portion placed under the management of the Company, 3,09,215 ; Jaghires, 2,13,421.

Estimated surplus payable to his Highness from the districts under the Company's management, 1,28,373 pagodas. Deduct supposed amount required for the repairing forts, 20,000. Surplus, 1,08,373.

Estimated revenue from the Pearl fishery, 50,000. Total sterling pagodas, 6,81,009. To which add the amount that will revert to his Highness when his public and private debts are liquidated, 6,21,105. £5,20,845..12 per annum, and his total clear revenue will be, 13,02,114 pagodas.

It is here proper to remark, that there is greater room for improvement in the revenue of the Arcot province, where his Highness's districts are situated, than in any other in the Carnatic. Its former value was estimated at 12,54,655 sterling pagodas. It is in these Memoranda only estimated, including Jaghire, at 6,58,283 sterling pagodas. Decrease in the present estimate, 5,96,372 sterling pagodas.

From whatever causes this extraordinary failure has arisen, there can be no doubt that the province of Arcot, now protected by the Company's extended boundary, must progressively improve under good management, and consequently his Highness's revenue must increase; it will also increase from similar effects in those districts under the management of the Company.

A true Copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian translator to Govt.

No. CLXXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 24th April, 1799.

Shums-oo-Doulah, the brother-in-law of the Nabob of Bengal, having been detected in a design to invite Zemaun Shah to invade Hindostan for purposes hostile to the British possessions, has been lately taken into custody, and among his papers, which were secured upon that occasion, have been found letters from Shaikh Khulfaun, and other persons of note at Muscat, to the address of Shums-oo-Doulah and of the Nabob of Bengal, the contents of which afford the strongest reason to believe that some scheme, injurious to the British

interests, has been in agitation between these parties. The language is studiously obscure, and all explanation is referred to the verbal communications of the agent employed to negotiate between the parties. The specific object of the negotiation, therefore, cannot be traced in these papers, but it evidently appears to have been commenced by the people of Muscat; a circumstance which, added to other indications in these letters, renders it probable that the whole has its origin in the machinations of the French.

As Shums-oo-Doulah has offered to make an ample disclosure of all he knows respecting the various conspiracies which have lately been discovered, and as the agent Shaikh T'hamass, who by the late accounts was at Moorshedabad, will in all probability be apprehended, I trust we shall soon obtain satisfactory information upon the subject; in the meantime, however, I think it necessary to apprize you of what has already come to light, and to desire that you will keep a vigilant eye upon the port of Muscat, with a view to defeat the design, which there is reason to suspect that Government entertains of affording assistance to the French.

I request that you will convey the substance of this information to the Admiral, with my request that he will direct his attention to the port of Muscat.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 25th April, 1799.

The accounts of the treacherous designs of the Peishwa, and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, are rendered probable by the weakness, profligacy, and necessitous condition of both, as well as by the general tenor of their recent proceedings.

I have received from the Resident at Hyderabad communications, corresponding in all the leading points with your intelligence.

I hope to learn that, in consequence of this discovery, you have suspended the execution of that part of my instructions

of the 3rd instant which authorized you to declare to the Peishwa, "that, notwithstanding the perverse and forbidding policy of the Court of Poonah, I should not fail to secure to him an equal participation with the other allies in any cessions which might be enforced from Tippoo Sultaun."

The treachery and intended hostility of the Peishwa deprive him of any claim to consideration on the part of the British Government. His conduct would justify a declaration of war. For the present, however, it will be sufficient merely to withhold the assurances authorized in my letter to you of the 3rd instant; and I accordingly direct you not to communicate them to the Peishwa, or to his ministers, if you shall not have communicated them before this letter shall reach you.

But it is necessary to adopt a stronger and more decisive mode of proceeding with regard to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, whose unsatisfactory reply to your remonstrance against his admission of vakeels from Tippoo, renders it an indispensable duty to impose some restraint on his unprovoked and unprincipled projects of plunder and rapine.

I, therefore, direct you to signify, in my name, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, without delay, either verbally or by writing, "that reports have reached me of his hostile designs against the Nizam; that I sincerely hope, and am willing to believe, those reports to be groundless. You will add, that his Highness the Nizam, being now cordially and actively engaged in the war against Tippoo Sultaun, conformably to the defensive treaty of triple alliance, any attempt against his Highness the Nizam's dominions would be equivalent to an attack upon the Company. The British Government, therefore, could not view with indifference any such attempt on the part of any power whatever,—accordingly it is my determination, in the event of any violation of the territory of the Nizam, by whatever power, to support his Highness with the whole force of the Company."

Instead of making a similar declaration to the Peishwa, it will be sufficient to apprise him of the communication which I have directed to be made to Scindiah; he cannot fail to apply my admonition to himself; if it should excite in him any apprehensions for the consequences of his late connection with Scindiah, he will be the more encouraged to detach himself

from that chieftain, by the hope which our silence is calculated to lead him to entertain, that we have not discovered their intrigue; on the other hand, were he to know that I was fully apprized of the extent of his treacherous designs, despair might impel him to unite himself more closely with Scindiah.

I am, Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Major Bannerman.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 25th April, 1799.

I am extremely concerned to learn the death of the Dewan of the Rajah of Travancore, as well on account of his attachment to the interests of the Company, as from motives of respect for the character of his ability and prudence.

I am sensible of the difficulties which may attend the choice of a new Dewan, and I, therefore, authorize you to interfere as far as you may judge it advisable, in the recommendation of a proper person to succeed to that office. I rely, implicitly, on your honour and integrity on this delicate point, being persuaded, that in recommending a person to fill the office of Dewan, you will be guided by no other motive than an equal consideration of the interests of the Company and those of the Rajah of Travancore.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXXV.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 26th April, 1799.

The danger of an early attack upon the dominions of the Nizam by Doulut Rao Scindiah, either singly or in concert with the Peishwa, appears to have increased since my letter of the 23rd instant.* The greatest and most efficient part of the Nizam's army being now employed in Mysore; and the state of our force in the Carnatic not admitting of any prompt

* Vide page 538.

or effectual aid in troops from us, it is, therefore, extremely desirable that the Nizam's contingent, now serving with you, as well as the Company's subsidiary troops (or Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple's detachment) should be at liberty, as early as possible, to return to Hyderabad for the protection of his Highness's territories.

The early capture of Seringapatam would, probably, enable you to admit, without danger or inconvenience, the departure of the Nizam's contingent, and of the subsidiary troops. Leaving it to your discretion to determine the period of their dismissal, I trust that you will not detain them a moment after you shall judge your army (exclusive of the Nizam's contingent and subsidiary force) to be sufficient for the prosecution of the war against the Sultaun.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXXVI.

Lieut.-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD, Camp, before Seringapatam, 27th April, 1799.

Our approaches to the fort were advanced 250 yards on the night of the 24th, and a battery of four guns was erected on the 25th, which destroyed the defences of some which bore on our attack. This opened with considerable effect yesterday morning, and in the evening the enemy's entrenchments in advance were attacked and carried, not without an obstinate contest, which continued through the night. Our troops now occupy these works, and their lodgement will, I trust, this night be made secure. The possession of these works is of great importance as it gives us the ground on which the breaching battery must be erected, and every circumstance of the siege promises favourably. The enemy have disputed every inch of ground, and the spirit and conduct of the troops on every occasion, (and we have had several) which required animated exertion, has been such as I cannot applaud too highly.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. CLXXXVII.

Lieutenant General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp, Seringapatam, 28th April, 1799.

I yesterday reported to your Lordship the successful attack made the preceding evening on the advanced work of the enemy. In the course of last night, the position occupied by our troops was strongly secured. This morning a letter from Tippoo Sultaun, of which I annex a translation, was received. In reply, I have referred to the terms forwarded on the 22d, as those only on which I would treat, declining to admit any vakeels unless they were accompanied by the hostages and specie, in consequence of those terms being agreed to, and insisting on an answer by three o'clock to-morrow.

This night our breaching battery will be built, and its fire tomorrow will probably have considerable effect on the Sultaun's determination, no offer to negotiate shall for an instant delay our military operations, and every appearance of their present state and progress is extremely favourable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE HARRIS.

Translation of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Lieut-General Harris, having no date, but received in Camp before Seringapatam, on the 28th April. 1799.

I have the pleasure of your friendly letter and understand its contents. The points in question are weighty, and without the intervention of Ambassadors, cannot be brought to a conclusion; I am, therefore, about to send two gentlemen to you, and have no doubt but a conference will take place; they will personally explain themselves to you; what more can I write.

A true translation,

BARRY CLOSE.

No. CLXXXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 28th April, 1799.

Current accounts render it probable that Tippoo Sultaun will attempt to retire from Seringapatam to Chittledroog, or to some other of his strong hill forts. To counteract this attempt, you will employ the whole activity, skill, and zeal of your army; and you will omit no effort to intercept the Sultaun, if he should move out of his capital for the purpose of effecting such an escape.

If the Sultaun should escape and Seringapatam should fall into the possession of the British army, the power and reputation of Tippoo will certainly suffer a great blow, but while he is able to keep an army in the field, and to maintain himself in any strong position, our efforts to reduce him to the last extremity must be unremitted.

In the event supposed, after properly securing the possession of Seringapatam, and storing it as amply as it may be in your power with grain; you will resume your operations against the enemy, with as little delay, and with as much vigour as possible.

You can best judge whether it would be practicable to undertake the siege of Chittledroog, (supposing Tippoo to retire to that place) during the approaching monsoon. If you can pursue the enemy during the monsoon, without too great hazard to the health or safety of your army, every consideration of policy will require such a pursuit.

Should so vigorous a prosecution of the war be impracticable or inexpedient during the monsoon, you will employ the interval in securing the resources of the Enemy's country; endeavouring (as far as can be done without too great a dispersion of your force) to establish yourself in all the districts of Tippoo lying to the southward of the Cauvery; (including Periapatam) and opening a direct communication to the northward of that river between Seringapatam and Ryakottah, by seizing such places as may be necessary in that line.

In all your operations under the case supposed in the present letter, you must keep in view as much as possible, the

object of affording every practicable degree of protection to the Nizam's frontier, until you shall be able in pursuance of my instructions of the 26th instant, to dismiss from Mysore his Highness's contingent and subsidiary troops, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CLXXXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, April 30, 1799

1. Concurrent accounts render it probable that Tippoo Sul-taun will attempt to retire from Seringapatam to Chittledroog, or to some other of his strong hill forts.

2. If the Sul-taun should escape, and Seringapatam should fall into the possession of the British army, the power and reputation of Tippoo will certainly suffer a great blow, but while he is able to keep an army in the field, and to maintain himself in any strong position, our efforts to reduce him to the last extremity must be unremitted.

3. In the event supposed, it would be the object of General Harris, after properly securing the possession of Seringapatam, to resume his operations against the enemy with as little delay and with as much vigour as possible.

4. Whether it would be practicable to undertake the siege of Chittledroog (supposing Tippoo to retire to that place) during the approaching monsoon, General Harris alone is competent to judge; but at whatever period this expedition may be undertaken, the distance of the supposed field of action from Seringapatam and its vicinity to the Mahratta frontier, make it peculiarly desirable to secure to our army not only the resources of the adjacent Mahratta possessions, but the efficient cooperation of a considerable Mahratta force.

5. Neither the state of the Peishwa's authority, nor of his inclination to our cause, would justify the least expectation of the requisite cooperation from him; Purseram Bhow is the only Mahratta chieftain who is able to afford us the aid in question.

6. The present position of this chieftain's force, and the relative situation of the country under his management, with respect to Chittledroog and Bednore, render it particularly desirable to engage his cordial services, while the well known antipathy subsisting between him and Tippoo Sultaun offers a reasonable presumption that Purseram Bhow would be disposed, by a reasonable prospect of advantage, to assist in the reduction of the Sultaun's power.

7. With a view, therefore, to the accomplishment of this essential object, I wish a direct communication to be opened between the Company's Government and Purseram Bhow.

8. It has occurred to me that this communication can best be opened and maintained from the coast of Malabar, (perhaps from Goa,) from which place to the residence of Purseram Bhow, the route would probably be found sufficiently easy and secure.

9. It is my wish that Lieut.-Colonel Little and Mr. Uthoff should be employed on this mission, and that for this purpose they should proceed with as little delay as possible to Goa, there to hold themselves in readiness to repair either jointly or separately to the residence of Purseram Bhow, whenever they shall receive authentic information of the flight of Tippoo Sultaun from Seringapatam, whether to Chittledroog or to any other of his strong hill forts.

10. The main point which they must endeavour to carry with the Bhow is, his immediate and cordial cooperation at the head of the largest force in cavalry which he can assemble, with our army in Mysore, for the purpose of prosecuting the war against Tippoo with the utmost vigour.

11. The subordinate points relating to the specific manner in which the Bhow shall cooperate with our army in Mysore, must be adjusted in concert with General Harris, according to whose advice and requisitions the Bhow must engage to regulate all his movements. Without waiting, however, for any specific requisition from General Harris, the Bhow must be required to engage to advance, without loss of time, in the direction of Chittledroog, or of such fortress as may be occupied by the Sultaun.

12. The Commissioners will, of course, endeavour to obtain the concurrence of Purseram Bhow in these measures, on the

most reasonable terms, without prescribing the nature or extent of the encouragement to be held out to him.

13. I authorize the Commissioners to pledge the Company's Government to secure to Purseram Bhow, from the territories which may be obtained from Tippoo Sultaun by the allies, a Jaghire of such amount as they shall deem adequate to the service required. I also authorize them to promise to the Bhow, at the expiration of the war, a sum of money limited by the same principle. They may also advance to the Bhow immediately, for the purpose of enabling him to move into the enemy's country a sum of money, not exceeding a month's subsistence, for such force as he shall bring into the field. This advance will not be made unless the Bhow should absolutely require it.

14. The Commissioners must have the necessary credit given them for drawing on your Government for any such advance as they shall judge requisite to be furnished to the Bhow.

15. It is not improbable that Purseram Bhow may require to be joined by a detachment of the Company's troops. I should have no objection to complying with such an application did circumstances admit of it; but as this is not likely to be the case, I can only authorize the Commissioners to assure him, that he shall be joined, if he desires it, by a detachment of the Company's troops, on his approaching or reaching the army of General Harris.

16. I shall direct Mr. Uthoff to proceed to Goa by the first opportunity, in order that he may be prepared to repair from thence to Purseram Bhow's residence on receiving intelligence of the event stated in the 9th paragraph of this letter. In this event, both the Commissioners, if at Goa, will proceed together; but if only one of them should be arrived at Goa, he must proceed without waiting for the other, and execute singly the objects of the commission.

17 I should repose perfect confidence in the ability either of Mr. Uthoff or of Lieut.-Colonel Little, to accomplish the objects of the proposed embassy, and my view in calling for the services of both, is solely to provide equally against the accidents of season to the northward or southward of Goa.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

your most faithful servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CXC.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieutenant General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 30th April, 1799.

I entirely approve of your determination not to negotiate with the Suldaun. I trust that, before this letter can reach you, you will be in possession of Scringapatam. You will observe, that my instructions to you, in the event of your obtaining possession of the place were, that you should neither open nor conclude any negotiation without special authority from me. I am persuaded that you will pay particular attention to this instruction, and if you should be in possession of the place, that you will use every exertion to furnish me, without delay, with such information as may enable me to provide effectually for the complete and lasting security of the Company's interests in this quarter. I have made, and shall continue to employ, every possible effort to provide for the ample supply of your army in every respect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXCI.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency Sir Alured Clarke.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 30th April, 1799.

I request that, immediately on receiving this letter, you will appoint a committee "to take into consideration the state of the police in Calcutta, and in the cities of Moorshedabad, Dacca, Patna and Benares, and also in the several districts under the Company's Government, within the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, Orissa and Benares; and to report the same, together with such new regulations as may appear best adapted to the present circumstances of the said cities and districts."

To this committee I wish that the magistrates of the several cities and districts should be required forthwith to report the state of the police within their respective departments, together with such amendments as appear necessary and practicable for the improvement of the same.

I wish the committee to consist of Mr. Barlow, Mr. Harington, Mr. Macklew, and Mr. Blaquiere, with any other names which Mr. Barlow may suggest. The report of the committee to be transmitted to me, from time to time, during my absence from Bengal, and no measure to be adopted until I shall have had an opportunity of signifying my wishes to you. The committee cannot be appointed too soon nor proceed too early to report upon the police of Calcutta and of the several cities. It would be desirable that Mr. Barlow should communicate with Sir John Anstruther, from time to time, and should signify to him my request, that he will be so good as to aid the committee with his opinion during the progress of their enquiry. The judges have been already requested to furnish me with their advice respecting the state of the police at Calcutta, and I flatter myself that, with their assistance, added to the detailed report of the proposed committee, I may be enabled to establish such a system of regulation as shall tend to secure, on a more durable foundation, the good order and tranquillity of the cities and provinces under the peculiar charge of the Government of Bengal.

Believe me, my dear Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXCH.

[This letter was accidentally omitted under its proper date.]

Lord Clive to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 17th April, 1799.

Understanding that the Governor-General transmits to you by the present despatch a full and detailed account of the war in which we are engaged with Tippoo Sultaun, and of the circumstances, and motives which have determined his Lordship in the choice of the measures which he has pursued relative thereto, I should remain satisfied with what is written in the letter of this Government of this day's date to the Secret Committee, did it not occur to my mind that it may be satisfactory to you to know more explicitly my sentiments upon the actual state of our affairs respecting the war; and that I should not do justice to the Governor-General if I did not express my sense of the conduct which has put us in a

situation of such fair and well grounded expectation as that in which we are now placed. Upon my arrival here the end of August last, I entertained the most serious apprehensions of the Sultaun's invading the Carnatic, which, had he done, very difficult would it have been to have assembled the whole of our army, and vain would have been the hope of collecting a sufficiency of supplies and cattle to enable us to undertake the siege of Seringapatam this season, and finish the war in one campaign. But the fortune of the Company prevented, and possibly the complete success of the measure of annihilating the French party, and increasing the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, planned with so much wisdom by the Governor General, and executed with so much ability by Colonel Roberts, under the direction of the resident, Captain Kirkpatrick, confounded the Sultaun, and deterred him from bringing upon the Carnatic so severe a calamity.

From the time I was acquainted with the views and intentions of the Governor-General, it became the object of my constant solicitude, in conjunction with the other members of this Government, to promote his measures by the most zealous and cordial cooperation; and we had the gratification upon his Lordship's arrival here the end of the last year, to receive this full and entire approbation of the exertions that had been made, and of the advanced state in which he found our preparations for war. Since that period, the same wisdom and energy which had characterised the Governor-General's Councils has guided our exertions; and we have had the satisfaction to know that the most formidable and best equipped British army that ever took the field in India, combined with a respectable force from the Nizam, entered Mysore the 5th of last month. Bombay has not been less forward in its exertions, and the two victories obtained by General Stewart the 6th March, and by General Harris on the 27th, are presages of future success, and serve to evince how little able Tippoo is, without French aid, to contend against the force which is assailing him. The distracted state of the court of Poonah, whose friendship may be deemed equivocal, the effectual assistance of the Nizam, the close connection subsisting between that Prince and the Company, and the powerful state of our armies, encourage us to expect a speedy and glorious termination to the contest. The irreconcilable

hatred of the Sultaun, and the uncertain state of the French in Egypt, of whom we have no accounts to be depended upon since August last, when Buonaparte was still at the head of 17 or 18,000 men, authorize and point out the necessity of continuing the war till we can obtain complete security, and establish the foundations of a durable and undisturbed peace. The expenses of preparation have from their extent been unavoidably great; but as we have reason to expect that if the war is not entirely finished in one campaign, the weight of it will, I trust, upon the whole, prove an economical one, and that the acquisitions we may gain, and the security we shall derive from them, will amply repay the expenses we shall have incurred.

Concurring as I do in the views of the Governor-General, bearing testimony to the wisdom and decision of his councils, and sensible of the advantages which must ever result from the person who has the controul of the Company's affairs, and the means of drawing for the resources of the three Presidencies, being as near the scene of action as possible in a contest like the present, I desire to assure you of my continuing to give my utmost support and most cordial cooperation to measures which bid fair to reflect so much honour upon Lord Mornington's administration, and to secure the most solid advantages to the Company and the British Empire. In these sentiments I am most heartily joined by the other members of this Government.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration and respect,

Gentlemen,
your obliged and most faithful Servant,
CLIVE.

No. CXCIH.

Lieutenant-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Camp, Seringapatam, 4th May, 1799.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that this day, at one o'clock, a division of the army under my command assaulted Seringapatam; and that at half past two o'clock the place was completely in our possession. Tippoo Sultaun fell in the assault. Two of his sons, the Sultaun Padsha, and Mayen

ud Deen, are prisoners, with many of the principal Sirdars. Our success has been complete; I will forward to your Lordship details hereafter.*

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. HARRIS.

No. CXCIV.

Lieut.-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, 7th May, 1799.

On the 4th instant† I had the honour to address to your Lordship a hasty note, containing in few words the sum of our success, which I have now to report more in detail.

The fire of our batteries, which began to batter in breach on the 30th of April, had, on the evening of the 3rd instant, so much destroyed the walls against which it was directed, that the arrangement was then made for assaulting the place on the following day, when the breach was reported practicable. The troops intended to be employed were stationed on the trenches early on the morning of the 4th, that no extraordinary movement might lead the enemy to expect the assault, which I had determined to make in the heat of the day, as the time best calculated to ensure success, as their troops would then be least prepared to oppose us.

Two flank companies of Europeans, taken from those regiments necessarily left to guard our camps and out-posts, followed by the 12th, 33rd, 73rd, and 74th regiments, and three corps of grenadier sepoy, taken from the troops of the three Presidencies, with 200 of his Highness the Nizam's troops, formed the party for the assault, accompanied by 100 of the artillery, and the corps of pioneers, and supported in the trenches by the battalion companies of the regiment De Meuron, and four battalions of Madras sepoy. Colonel Sher-

* Received at Fort St. George the 11th of May, 1799. This despatch was inclosed in a sealed quill, and conveyed through Mysore by a secret messenger—the country being then filled with Tippoo Sultaun's troops and adherents. This circumstance accounts for the long delay in his arrival at Madras.

† See preceding page.

brooke and Lieut.-Colonels Dunlop, Dalrymple, Gardner, and Mignon, commanded the several flank corps, and Major-General Baird was entrusted with the direction of this important service.*

At one o'clock the troops moved from the trenches, crossed the rocky bed of the Cavery under an extremely heavy fire, passed the glacis and ditch, and ascended the breaches in the Fausse Braye, and rampart of the fort, surmounting in the most gallant manner every obstacle which the difficulty of the passage, and the resistance of the enemy presented to oppose their progress. Major-General Baird had divided his force for the purpose of clearing the ramparts to the right and left; one division was commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, the other by Lieut.-Colonel Dunlop; the latter was disabled in the breach, but both corps, although strongly opposed, were completely successful. Resistance continued to be made from the palace of Tippoo for some time after all firing had ceased from the works; two of his sons were there, who, on an assurance of safety, surrendered to the troops surrounding them, and guards were placed for the protection of the family, most of whom were in the palace. It was soon after reported that Tippoo Suldaun had fallen. Syed Saheb, Meer Saduc, Syed Gofar, and many others of his chiefs were also slain; measures were immediately adopted to stop the confusion, at first unavoidable, in a city strongly garrisoned, crowded with inhabitants, and their property in ruins, from the fire of a numerous artillery, and taken by assault. The princes were removed to camp.

It appeared to Major-General Baird so important to ascertain the fate of the Suldaun, that he caused immediate search to be made for his body, which, after much difficulty, was found late in the evening in one of the gates under a heap of slain, and placed in the palace. The corpse was the next day recognized by the family, and interred with the honours due to his rank, in the mausoleum of his father.

The strength of the fort is such, both from its natural position and the stupendous works by which it is surrounded, that all the exertions of the brave troops who attacked it, in whose praise it is impossible to say too much, were required

to place it in our hands. Of the merits of the army I have expressed my opinion in orders, a copy of which I shall forward to-morrow; and I trust your Lordship will point out their services to the favourable notice of their king and country.

I am sorry to add, that on collecting the returns of our loss it is found to have been much heavier than I had at first imagined. An accurate statement shall be sent to-morrow.*

On the 5th instant Abdul Khalic, the elder of the princes, formerly hostages with Lord Cornwallis, surrendered himself at our out-posts, demanding protection. Kerim Saheb, the brother of Tippoo had before sought refuge with Meer Alum Behadur. A Cowl Namah was yesterday despatched to Futteh Hyder, the eldest son of Tippoo, inviting him to join his brother. Purneah and Meer Cummer ul deen Khan have also been summoned to Seringapatam. No answers have yet been received, but I expect them shortly, as their families are in the fort.

This moment Ali Reza, formerly one of the vakeels from Tippoo Sultaun to Lord Cornwallis, has arrived from Meer Cummer ul Deen Khan to ask my orders for 4000 horse, now under his command. Ali Reza was commissioned to declare that Meer Cummer ul Deen would make no conditions, but rely on the generosity of the English. He desired merely to state, that his claim to the Jaghire of Gurramconda was well known, as was his family and character. If these and his connexion with the unfortunate family of the Tippoo Sultaun should give him a claim to this ancient possession of his house, his sense of obligation would bind him ever to the British interests. If this could not be granted to him, he hoped he might obtain permission to retire with his family to Hyderabad. On this subject I have promised to ask your Lordship's pleasure; he will shortly arrive, and as the army of the late Sultaun look up chiefly to him, I hope through his means to be enabled at once to restore tranquillity. Monsieur Chapuy and most of the French are prisoners. They have commissions from the French Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE HARRIS.

* See Appendix.

Abstract of a return of killed, wounded and missing, at the assault of Seringapatam, on the 4th May, 1799.

Europeans Killed.—2 captains, 6 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 1 drummer, and 58 rank and file.

Wounded.—1 lieut.-colonel, 4 captains, 8 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 2 conductors, 12 serjeants, 5 drummers, and 228 rank and file.

Missing.—1 serjeant and 3 rank and file.

Natives Killed.—13 rank and file.

Wounded.—1 Jemadar, two drummers, and 31 rank and file.

Missing.—2 rank and file.

P. A. AGNEW, Military Sec.

Names of Officers killed and wounded on the assault.

Killed.—Lieutenant Mather, 75th; Captain Owen, 77th; Lieutenants Lalor, 73rd, (flank company's) Farquhar, Prendergast, Hill, and Shawe, 74th; Captain Cormick, pioneers.

Wounded.—Lieutenants Turner, Broughton, and Skelton, 75th; Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop and Lieutenant Laurence, 77th; Lieutenant Webb, Bombay regiment; Captain Lurdy and Lieutenant Mackey, Meuron, flank companies; Lieutenant Shawe, 76th, serving with 12th regiment; Captain Mac Leod, Lieutenant Thomas, Ensigns Antil and Guthrie, 73rd regiment; Captain Caldwell, engineers; Captain Prescott, artillery.

P. A. AGNEW, Military Sec.

Copy of General Orders, dated Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

The Commander-in-Chief congratulates the gallant army, which he has the honour to command, on the conquest of yesterday. The effects arising from the attainment of such an acquisition, as far exceed the present limits of detail, as the unremitting zeal, labour, and unparalleled valour of the troops surpass his powers of praise. For services incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

While Lieut.-General Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men, who fell in the attack, he cannot omit to return his thanks in the warmest terms to Major-General Baird, for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and the humane measures which he subsequently adopted for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests Major-General Baird will communicate to the officers and men, who on that great occasion acted under his command, the high sense which he must ever entertain of their achievements and merits.

The Commander-in-Chief requests that Colonel Gent and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that very important department, and his best acknowledgements are due to Major Beatson for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service, by the constant exertions of his ability and zeal.

The merit of the artillery corps is so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the Commander-in-Chief can only desire Colonel Smith to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command, that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

In thus publicly expressing his sense of the good conduct of the army, the Commander-in-Chief finds himself called upon to notice in a most particular manner the exertions of Captain Dowse, and his corps of pioneers, which during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labour, and the ability with which that labour was applied.

On referring to the progress of the siege, so many occasions have occurred for applause to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel Money Penny, the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel St. John, Major Macdonald, Major Shelly, and Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, conducted the attacks on the several out-works and posts of the enemy, demand to be recorded, and the very spirited attack led by Lieut.-Colonel Campbell of H.M. 74th regiment, which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy's works, on the 26th ultimo, claims the strongest approbation of the Commander-in-Chief.

The important part taken by the Bombay army from the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which have led to its honourable conclusion, has been such as well sustains its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post at the village of Agrar was siezed by the force under Colonel Hart - the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there—the vigour with which every attack of the enemy on the out-posts of that army was repulsed—and the spirit shewn in the assault of the breach, by the corps led by Lieut.-Colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice, for which the Commander-in-Chief requests Lieut.-General Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

Lieut.-General Harris trusts that Lieut.-Gen. Stuart will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service, in the course of which, he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of his private friendship.

Extract from General Orders, dated Seringapatam, 8th May, 1779.

Lieut.-General Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army, the following extract of a report, transmitted to him yesterday by Major-General Baird, as it places in a distinguished point of view the merit of

an officer on the very important occasion referred to, whose general gallantry and good conduct since he has served with this army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the Commander-in-Chief.

“ If where all behaved nobly it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise, as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted, for the success of the attack.”

P. A. AGNEW, Military Sec.

No. CXCV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St George, 8th May, 1799.

The exemplary conduct and distinguished character of the Coorga Raja having rendered me desirous of manifesting some public testimony of my approbation of his recent services, the remission of his annual tribute to the Company appears to me to be a measure, which would combine the effects of an honourable distinction and of a profitable reward. My intention is that of the whole amount of the Rajah's present tribute, which I understand to be about 24,000 rupees, a sum not exceeding a thousand rupees be reserved to the Company, or that in place of tribute, some article of considerable value be annually required from him, as an acknowledgment of his allegiance to the British Government; I request, that after having determined the nature of the acknowledgement to be required, according to your own judgment, you will take the necessary measures for carrying my intentions into effect. I think the arrangement should be made to take place from the day of the junction of the army of Bombay with the detachment commanded by Major-General Floyd.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXCVI.

Lieut.-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington

MY DEAR LORD,

Seringapatam, May 9th, 1799.

That I most sincerely congratulate your Lordship on our most fortunate successes, I feel you will give me entire credit for, without my dwelling further on the point. The Almighty has been pleased to grant a victory so complete in all its events, as to leave nothing on my side to ask, but that your Lordship will come and regulate the political concerns for the benefit of all concerned.

You may be assured that every order or wish of yours signified to me, shall in future, as heretofore, be carried into execution with all possible despatch, but for the good of our country, I really think your presence necessary. For my part, politics have never been my study, exclusive of which, my constitution is evidently giving way to the anxieties I have already gone through, and I am fearful will fail altogether unless allowed to recruit in quiet. I cannot expect the world shall allow that the anxieties of the expedition were proportionally great to the shortness of the period in which it has been executed, but I best know, that had mine been divided into as many years as we have been months, they would still have worn me down—added to this, I am not as equal to bodily fatigue as I thought myself, from all which, I shall be much obliged, by your Lordship making such arrangements as to let me return as soon as convenient after our meeting here. In the meantime, you may depend that the same active measures, which under Providence, have so greatly tended to insure our success shall still be continued, and that we shall not sit down content with having taken the capital, but proceed with all possible despatch to secure the country.

I am, with the greatest regard,

My Lord,

Your very faithful and obliged

Friend and Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

P.S.—I have every reliance your Lordship will have no objection to my son's taking home the colours of the fort.

No. CXC VII.

Lord Clive to the Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 11th May, 1799.

Although Lord Mornington writes to inform you of the news received yesterday, and confirmed to-day, of the fall of Seringapatam upon the 4th instant, I cannot allow his Lordship's overland express to depart without conveying to you the supreme gratification I have in being able to offer you my warmest congratulations upon that event having taken place within the short period of two months from our army having entered the frontier of the enemy. The wisdom which has presided over and directed the conduct of this short war, the merit of which rests almost solely with the Governor-General, the extent of our preparations, and the vigour with which the army was equipped, and the celerity with which the great object of the campaign has been carried into execution, render the taking Seringapatam, with its concomitant circumstances of the flight and fall of the Suldaun, of the families of that Prince's principal officers having fallen into our power, and of the immense quantity of rice and provisions, and probably of treasure captured, one of the most brilliant and useful achievements of this or any other age. No event so important has occurred since the battle of Plassey in this country; that laid the foundations of our greatness in India, and this last glorious success will, I trust, confirm that greatness, and place in our power the means of durable, advantageous, and honourable peace. The details of the siege and storm have not yet reached us, but from the circumstance of the Forlorn Hope having employed only six minutes to cross the rocky bed of the river, and to reach the top of the breach, it is reasonable to believe that our loss has been small. Time does not permit of my troubling you further at present, it is more than probable that Lord Mornington will be under the necessity of proceeding to Seringapatam, in which case I shall accompany him, and you may be assured that nothing will give me more satisfaction than to have the honour of addressing you from that place.

I have the honour to be,
with great esteem and respect, dear Sir,
your much obliged and faithful servant,

CLIVE.

No. CXCVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 11th May, 1799.

No particular comment is required from me to illustrate the numerous advantages which cannot fail to flow from the brilliant and decisive achievement announced to your Honourable Court in the despatch of the Governor-General in Council of this date.* But I cannot refrain from offering to you my separate and most cordial congratulations on an event, the glory of which has never been surpassed (if it has ever been equalled), in the history of the military transactions of the British nation in India.

The fall of Seringapatam, under all the circumstances which accompanied that event, has placed the whole of the kingdom of Mysore, with all its resources, at the disposal of your Government; and the only power in India to which the French could look for assistance, or which could be deemed formidable to your interests, is now deprived of all vigour, if not entirely extinct. When your Honourable Court recollects that these advantages have been acquired within four months from the date of my arrival at this Presidency, and within two from the period of the army's entrance into Mysore, I trust you will be of opinion that your servants have not been deficient in alacrity or diligence.

When Lieutenant-General Harris took the field, I thought it my duty to invest him with the most efficient and extensive powers which it was possible for me to delegate; and he has carried with him to the gates of Seringapatam the full vigour and energy of your supreme Government. To the judicious exercise of this ample authority, combined with the liberal supplies which had been provided for the army, may be ascribed in a great measure the unparalleled rapidity and promptitude of its operations. I have the further satisfaction to add that the particular detail of those operations, which I shall hereafter submit to your Honourable Court, will furnish the most brilliant examples of judgment, skill, discipline, firmness

* The despatch adverted to is in substance the same as his Lordship's letter to the Court of Directors.

and valour, under many trials of all those distinguished qualities.

The dreadful fate of Tippoo Sultaun cannot be contemplated without emotions of pain and regret; but I trust it will serve as a salutary lesson to the native Princes of India, and will prove the danger of violating public engagements, and inviting foreign invasion for the prosecution of schemes of ambition and hatred against the British power. He was interred within his own capital on the day following its capture, in the mausoleum of his father, with the honours of war, paid to his remains by the British army. I am persuaded that your Honourable Court will derive peculiar satisfaction from the intelligence that his family and palace suffered no insult or violence during the heat of the assault, and have since been protected with the utmost care.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CXCIX.

Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 12th May, 1799.

I had yesterday the satisfaction to receive your letter of the 4th instant, advising me of the capture of Seringapatam, and of the death of Tippoo Sultaun.

With the warmest sensations of admiration, affection, and attachment, I offer my cordial thanks and zealous congratulations to you, and to all the officers and privates composing the gallant army, which has achieved this glorious and decisive victory with a degree of energy, rapidity and skill, unparalleled in this quarter of the globe, and seldom equalled in any part of the world.

It has afforded me peculiar satisfaction on this important occasion to learn, that every possible attention has been paid to the families of Tippoo Sultaun, and to those of his Chieftains.

Although I have not yet received directly from you any official details of the circumstances attending the assault and capture of Seringapatam, it is evident that the acquisition has been attended with circumstances of a nature to facilitate a final and satisfactory arrangement of the country.

I entirely approve all your proceedings of a political nature (as far as you have reported them to me) relative to the negotiations with the Sultaun previously to the assault of the city. You have faithfully pursued the spirit of my instructions, and departed from the letter only in such cases as would have compelled me to adopt similar alterations of principles and measures if I had been on the spot.

The subject of a final adjustment of Mysore is however so complicated and delicate as to appear to require my presence at Seringapatam. For this reason, I intend forthwith to proceed to Ryakottah; from which fortress I can advance to Seringapatam, if such a measure should appear to be necessary. In the meanwhile I have determined to despatch my brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, and Lieut.-Colonel Kirkpatrick to Ryakottah, with orders to proceed to the army whenever the communication shall be sufficiently open, for the purpose of acting with the commissioners appointed under my instructions of the 22nd of February, and of ascertaining a variety of points of detail on which it is necessary that I should be fully and accurately informed previously to the formation of any definitive adjustment of the affairs of the Kingdom of Mysore.

But it is requisite immediately that the Company should obtain full possession of all Canara (including Bilguy and the heads of all the Ghauts communicating between Canara and the Upper Country), as well as of the Coimbatoor Country. You will, therefore, without delay require from the proper persons the most peremptory and unequivocal orders for the immediate delivery to the Company's officers of all the forts, and of all other public property comprehended in these countries.

For the purpose of taking possession of Canara, you will (unless you should deem it imprudent) as soon as possible detach the army of Bombay, or such part of it as may be necessary. It appears probable that you may safely detach the army of Bombay on this service; on the other hand, the possibility of a French invasion in India from the Red Sea makes it desirable that the army of Bombay should return to the Coast of Malabar, and that we should obtain possession of Canara as soon as possible.

For the purpose of securing the Coimbatoor country, it

will perhaps be sufficient if you send thither the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Brown as soon as may be practicable.

The Barrahmahl at present containing an inconsiderable force, you will return Lieut.-Colonel Read's detachment as soon as you may judge expedient.

At the same time that you demand from the proper authorities the necessary orders for the surrender to the Company of the specified countries and forts, you are to require similar orders for the prompt and unconditional delivery to the officers of his Highness the Nizam of the forts and districts of Gooty Bulheri, Gurrumconda and Colar, with the exception only of any forts in the two latter, which may be situated at the head of passes leading from the table land of Mysore into any of the districts of the Company, or of the Nabob of the Carnatic, it being my intention that all such forts shall be occupied by the Company's troops.

For the purpose of occupying and securing these countries it will be necessary that the contingent of his Highness the Nizam, and the subsidiary detachment should move towards the north-east as soon as possible.

The country and principal forts situated between the north bank of the Cavery and Colar, may be occupied for the present either by the necessary detachments from your army or by Colonel Read. The ultimate allotment of this tract is a point for future consideration.

The Sirdars, on whose ready acquiescence and submission the Company and the Nizam must depend for an early and easy possession of the forts and countries which have been mentioned, must be plainly informed that the measure of favour and protection to be extended to them will be regulated by the alacrity and sincerity with which they shall exert themselves to satisfy the allies on this occasion.

With regard to Bednore, and other parts of the late Tippoo Sultaun's possessions bordering on the Mahratta frontier, I wish those countries to remain unoccupied for the present, until I shall have determined what portion of territory shall be assigned to the Peishwa.* Accordingly, no

* The necessity for this deliberation is explained in the Governor-General's letter to General Harris (paragraph 6) of the 23rd April, 1799 (see

orders for the delivery of any forts, or the cession of any districts to the Mahrattas must be issued by the Sirdars in authority without my specific requisition; and they must be apprised that I shall hold them responsible for the conduct of their respective managers and subordinate officers in the countries in question.

All the French whom you may be able to secure (and you will make the most diligent enquiry after persons of that na-

p. 538), where the following letter is referred to, and which would have been printed in its proper place could it then have been found.

The Earl of Mornington to General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, April 23rd, 1799.

Since the date of my instructions to you of the 22d and 25th of February, circumstances have occurred which render it absolutely necessary to reduce the power of Tippoo Sultaun as much as possible, and desirable to make certain modifications of the articles of peace transmitted to you with those instructions.

Of these circumstances the following paragraphs contain some of the leading points.

1. I have received fresh proofs of an obstinate adherence on the part of Tippoo Sultaun to his connexion with the French; to whom he has recently despatched M. Dubuc and two Native Vakeels on an Embassy from Tranquebar.

2. I am still ignorant of the actual condition of the French army in Egypt; and of the means possessed by General Buonaparte of aiding the Sultaun.

3. Commodore Blanket was not arrived in the Red Sea on the 31st of December; I fear he has lost his passage; consequently the mouth of the Red Sea may not be adequately guarded at the return of the periodical opening of the navigation.

4. Zemaun Shah may be enabled to resume his designs against Hindostan; and recent discoveries in Bengal prove those designs to have been more immediately dangerous to the British interests than I had supposed.

5. Dowlut Row Scindiah has been discovered to entertain hostile designs against the Company and the Nizam; and I have reason to suspect that a secret correspondence subsists between him and Tippoo.

6. *The Peishwa appears to have entered into Scindiah's views against the Company and the Nizam.*

The nature of this conveyance does not admit of my making such detailed reflections as arise from these circumstances, or of my stating other points intimately connected with them, you will receive my instructions, founded on the considerations above mentioned, in another despatch of this date.

MORNINGTON.

tion) must be sent to the Presidency by the first favourable opportunity.

I wish you to send a detachment of your army to meet me at Ryakottah whenever you deem it prudent to spare such a force. By the first opportunity you will inform me how far the state of Mysore may either require or admit of my proceeding to Seringapatam.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CC.

Lieut. Gen. Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, May 13, 1799.

I have forwarded to your Lordship, by various hircarahs. an account of the success of the army in the assault of Seringapatam, with copies of the orders issued on that occasion. In those orders I expressed my approbation of the conduct of the troops in general, and my sense of the merits of those officers whose behaviour had attracted particular notice.

It remains for me to state what is in justice due to those whom, for obvious reasons, I could not present in the same manner to your Lordship's notice; these are officers on the general staff, in my family, and others whose zeal induced them to forward the public service by the exertion of their abilities, in aid of departments to which they were not officially attached.

In every point of view I must call your Lordship's particular attention to the Adjutant-General of the army. His general character as an officer is too well established by a long and distinguished course of the most meritorious service to require my testimony; but the particular exertion of his talents on the present service in directing, regulating, and assisting the progress of our departments, when embarrassed by all the difficulties attending a deficiency of conveyance for an uncommonly extensive equipment during the advance of the army; and the ability, zeal, and energy displayed by him

in superintending the various operations of an arduous siege, where he was ever present, stimulating the exertions of others, or assisting their judgment and labours with his own, claim from me to be stated to your Lordship in the most forcible terms. It is my earnest wish that my sentiments on this subject may be publicly recorded, and it is my firm opinion that if the success of this army has been of importance to the British interests, that success is to be attributed in a very considerable degree to Lieut.-Colonel Close.

From the officers more immediately in my family, I have derived all the assistance, in the conduct of the public service, which I had reason to expect from their experience; and I am highly indebted to your Lordship for the indulgence with which you attended to my wishes in the selection of Lieut.-Colonel Agnew and Captain Macauley as my confidential staff.

The gentlemen of the commission named by your Lordship to assist me with their advice, on subjects of a political nature, have in every instance where I have found it expedient to refer to their judgment, acted in a manner with which I am particularly satisfied. Your Lordship is in possession of their proceedings on the subject of the various overtures for negotiation made by Tippoo Suldaun; and the orders I have since received on this head leave me no ground to doubt your Lordship's approbation of the line of conduct which they have uniformly pursued.

Major Dallas has strong claims to be particularly recommended to your Lordship's notice. The readiness with which he came forward to exert his personal influence with the principal natives in the bullock department, at a period when it seemed scarcely possible to move forward the public stores. The effectual aid which he gave to the store department by his personal assistance in its arrangements; and the duty equally important and laborious, which he voluntarily took upon himself, of seeking and securing forage for the public cattle during the marches of the army, are amongst the many instances in which his zeal has been distinguished, and which entitle him to the attention of Government.

In the department of the Quarter-Master-General the conduct of Lieut.-Col. Richardson and Major Allan has been very satisfactory to me. Captain Turing has ably assisted

Lieut.-Col. Close in the Adjutant-General's office; and Capt. Orr, of the guides, has merited great praise by his judgment, diligence, and activity, in conducting the marches of the army, and of all the detachments of importance, which, since our encampment here, it has been necessary to make under Major-General Floyd.

Captain Macleod, of the intelligence department, has been employed in the management of the bazars of the army, in the arrangement of the brinjarries, and on a variety of services not specially the duty of any regularly established office, but which required a perfect knowledge of the customs of India, and the strictest integrity in the person charged with their execution. I have on all such occasions given my full confidence to Captain Macleod, and his conduct has shewn him deserving of the trust.

I have thought it a necessary part of my public duty to make this report to your Lordship for the information of Government, and have the honour to be,

My Lord, your Lordship's most obedient,
and faithful servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

No. CCI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 15th May. 1799.

I have already expressed to you in my answer to your note of the 4th instant, my distinguished sense of the invaluable services of the admirable army under your command, and having now received the details of the assault of the 4th, I shall immediately issue a General Order in Council respecting the conduct of the rapid and brilliant campaign which terminated with such lustre on that memorable day.

My private and military secretaries will set out for Serin-gapatam by Ryakottah this evening, charged with instructions for your guidance until my arrival can take place. In the mean while I authorise you to assure Meer Cummur-ud-Deen Khan that I receive with great satisfaction his unconditional submission to the generosity of the British power: and that he may rely with confidence on my countenance and protec-

tion; you will add, that in concert with his Highness the Nizam I will readily take into consideration Meer Cummur-ud-Deen's claim to the Jaghire of Gurrumconda, but it would be premature at present to enter into any specific engagement on that head. However, I empower you to declare to Meer Cummur-ud-Deen immediately in my name, that if I shall be satisfied with his services in the restoration of tranquillity, I will make an ample and liberal provision for him, fully equal to whatever may appear to be his just claims. As it may tend to inspire Meer Cummur-ud-Deen with additional confidence, I enclose a letter for him under my own hand and seal.

You will inform all the Sirdars, and persons lately in high office in the government of Mysore, that the degree of favour and protection to be extended to them by the Company and the allies will be regulated according to the fidelity with which they shall respectively render an account of all the property of the Sircar under their charge; referring in particular to the stable horse; to the draft and carriage cattle; and to all arms, ordnance, and ordnance stores, belonging to the Sircar.

I desire that you will issue such orders as you may judge necessary to the different asophs and aumils of Tippoo Sultaun's government, requiring them to hold the public property of every description at present in their charge, as well as the revenue which may hereafter be collected, at the disposal of the allies; and apprising them that a regular account of all such property and revenue will be taken with the greatest accuracy as soon as circumstances will permit. I think it expedient that all these orders should be issued in your own name until my arrival at Seringapatam, as well for the purpose of giving the greater degree of force to them, as of obviating any jealousies which might arise from the immediate appointment of officers on the part of the Company for the collection of the revenues.

I have no doubt that you have adopted every necessary measure for securing to persons of every description the safe and undisturbed possession of their private properties.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CCII.

General Orders of the Governor General in Council.

Fort St. George, 15th May, 1799.

The Right Hon. the Governor General in Council, having this day received from the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam on the 4th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander-in-Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army which achieved the capture of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day. His Lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation and skill with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success. Under the favour of Providence, and the justice of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence, that the war in which we were engaged, would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honourable issue. But the events of the 4th of May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor General in Council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendour and glory unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world. The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, by restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India on a durable foundation of genuine security. The Governor General in Council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that, in this arduous crisis the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

By order of the Right Hon. the Governor General in Council.

J. WEBBE,
Secretary to Government.

No. CCIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 16th May, 1799.

Yesterday I received the enclosed despatch from Lieut.-General Harris,* containing the details of the capture of Seringapatam; they require no comment; and I am persuaded that no solicitation is necessary on my part to induce you to recommend the incomparable army which has gained this glorious triumph to the particular notice of his Majesty, and to the applause and gratitude of their country. The unconditional submission of Cummur-ud-Deen, accompanied by that of Futteh Hyder, will, I trust, much facilitate the means of making a new settlement. I am on the point of setting out for Seringapatam, and I have no doubt that, in any possible case, I shall be able to add to the annual revenues of the Company, in the peninsula of India, a sum not less than twelve lacs of pagodas, with the additional advantage of contracting and strengthening our frontier, and of establishing a continuity of our territory from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar.

In our present situation the arrival of a French force in India would be rather a desirable event than otherwise, as I am confident that the result must be an accession of reputation and honour to our troops, and the disappointment and ruin of the enemy. If the French should be established in Egypt, it might be advisable to consider whether an expedition might not be fitted out from India to cooperate, by way of the Red Sea, with any attempt which might be undertaken from the Mediterranean. I cannot venture to prepare any such expedition without orders from England; but if I should receive them, you may be assured that they will be executed with alacrity and diligence not only by me, but by the whole army in India.

Believe me, my dear Sir,

Yours most faithfully and affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

No. CCIV.

Lord Clive to the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 16th May, 1799.

I have the greatest satisfaction in offering to you my warmest congratulations upon the fall of Seringapatam, and upon the events which have since led to the extinction of the power of an inveterate enemy, who has for a series of years kept this Presidency in a state of constant inquietude, uncertainty, and expense. By the late despatches from hence you will have been made fully acquainted with the grounds and reasons upon which the line of conduct adopted by his Lordship has been pursued, and with the measures which have terminated in this most important conquest. The wisdom with which the plans of the Governor-General have been combined, was equal to the extent of the danger which threatened us; and the vigorous efforts which have been made for the completion of our military equipments were proportionate to the urgency of the occasion, which required all the energy of your Governments in India, while the ability, zeal, and valour which have been displayed in the execution of this arduous enterprize, have effected an achievement, the brilliancy of which has seldom been equalled in any part of the world.

In reflecting upon this important and unparalleled success, it is a cause of just triumph that the British councils have never departed from their characteristic moderation, and that we have been compelled, by the inveterate hatred of an implacable enemy, to adopt those decisive measures which have ended in the final subversion of his power, and in establishing a basis of lasting tranquillity throughout this part of your possessions. From the magnitude of this event we derive a just relief from the regret, which the loss of any part of that gallant army must inspire; and in the consequences which must follow it, we shall find more than a compensation for the expences which have been incurred in the prosecution of this necessary war.

The fall of Seringapatam, the death of the Sultaun, the surrender of the principal part of his family, with the submis-

sion of the most powerful of his chiefs, warrant the expectation of a speedy and permanent arrangement of the whole of his dominions. The advantages to be gained from an increase of revenue, it might not be difficult to estimate; but the solid benefits to be derived from an extension of commerce, and from the preservation of lasting tranquillity, which, under the blessing of Providence, it may now be in the power of those entrusted with the direction of your affairs in India to command and maintain, it is scarcely possible to appreciate.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect and esteem, Sir,
your most faithful and obliged humble servant,
CLIVE.

No. CCV.

Chief Justice Sir J. Anstruther to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Calcutta, 17th May, 1799.

It is with the most sincere satisfaction and heartfelt pleasure that I congratulate you upon the most brilliant and glorious event which ever occurred in our Indian history. The news of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of Tippoo, and your complete and decisive success is just announced to us.

Every man in the country will feel his security increased, and his character raised by the destruction of a power long looked up to as the only one capable of resisting the force of our arms. The events of last war, which, after two years of, I may say, defeat, ended in the third in a politic peace, proved to every native power the ability of a native power to resist even a confederacy against him with effect, at least, if not with success. It was reserved for the promptitude and vigour of your Government to shew our power irresistible—to render our empire permanent and secure in India, and your own name immortal.

All your friends will, no doubt, highly rejoice, but I who know the difficulties you had to encounter, the counteractions you had to experience, feel a degree of pleasure in the event not only as a public man and your private friend, but very considerably increased by the anxiety which my know-

ledge of those very circumstances has occasioned to me. Most heartily indeed do I rejoice. May every other plan you have be equally successful; and may you long enjoy, in the bosom of your friends and family, your well earned fame.

Adieu, your's affectionately,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. CCVI.

Lieutenant-General Sir Alured Clarke to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, 17th May, 1799.

The great and glorious news we have received of the fall of Seringapatam, and its late monarch, has filled me too full of joy to admit of my waiting the receipt of a letter from you, ere I offer my most hearty congratulations on it, which I beg leave now to do, with sincere assurances of my taking a particular interest in the personal satisfaction that your Lordship must, from peculiar circumstances, feel on the occasion.

The wisdom of that policy which dictated the measures that led to this brilliant and most important event, and your Lordship's persevering exertions to surmount the numerous difficulties that occurred in the execution of them, do you the greatest honour; and cannot fail of producing those marks of approbation and gratitude from your king and country which such conduct so highly merits.

I am extremely anxious to see more detailed accounts of the various transactions from the army. Harris's success, exclusive of public considerations, gives me sincere pleasure; and I earnestly hope that he and his gallant troops may derive every possible benefit of honour and profit that their zealous services and brilliant conquest can entitle them to.

I will do myself the honour of writing to you again soon; and in the meantime,

I remain, with true respect and esteem,

My dear Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

and most faithful humble servant,

ALURED CLARKE.

P. S. I remember your observations of “humbling Tippoo before the anniversary of your entering upon the duties of this Government;” which took place *precisely this day twelve-months*.

No. CCVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 19th May, 1799.

The accidental detention of the *Sarah Christiana* packet enables me to forward to your honourable Committee, by this despatch, documents of great importance, explanatory of the nature of the connexion between Tippoo Sultaun and the French republic.

These papers were found in the palace of Seringapatam, and were transmitted officially to my military secretary by the secretary of the commission appointed to assist Lieut.-General Harris in all matters of a political nature.

The paper No. 1* is a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory, and appears to be an attested copy of that which was despatched by M. Dubuc with two native vakeels of the 7th of February, 1799. The letter, however, is dated the 20th of July, 1798, at which time the military preparations in the Carnatic had scarcely commenced.

Your Honourable Committee will observe, that, Tippoo Sultaun, in the most distinct manner, states the nature of his late embassy to the Isle of France to have been the same which I have described in my minute of the 12th of August, and in my letter to Tippoo Sultaun of the 8th of November, notwithstanding that he had endeavoured to put a different colour on the transaction in his letter to me of the 18th of December, 1798, received at Fort St. George the 25th of the same month.

It is equally remarkable that he does not attempt to allege against the British Government any ground of complaint since the conclusion of the last war.

The object of his offensive and defensive alliance with France appears to have been not merely the recovery of his former dominions, but the expulsion of the English from all

* See Appendix.

their rich possessions in India, and the utter annihilation of their power in Asia.

You will further observe, that he declares it to be his intention to commence the attack on the first favourable occasion; and on the whole, that he professes to make common cause with France, under the most solemn protestations of fidelity and zeal to the republic.

The paper, No. 2,* is a note of the demands which Tippoo Sul-taun's ambassadors were authorized by him to make upon the Executive Directory at Paris. They correspond in substance with the requisitions announced in M. Malartic's proclamation at the Mauritius.†

In the articles 5 and 6 you will perceive that the Sul-taun intended to commence his operations in the heart of the Carnatic, in concert with a French army to be landed at Porto Novo, and that he did not propose to wait the actual arrival of the French force, but was resolved to make himself master of the coast of Coromandel as soon as he should find it convenient, after having received notice of the motions of the French.

In article 7 it appears that the Portuguese colonies in this quarter of India were to have been divided between Tippoo Sul-taun and the French. All the articles of this paper demand particular attention, as tending to prove, in the most conclusive manner, the entire devotion of this infatuated Prince to his alliance with France. This paper also is dated on the 20th July, 1798; both documents are signed in the Sul-taun's own hand writing, according to the abbreviated form of signature, which he was accustomed to use in all his letters and other official documents. This mode of signature is usual among the natives of Hindostan, and no doubt can be entertained of the authenticity of the papers.

Your Honourable Committee will observe, that the letter from Tippoo Sul-taun to me, which was received at Fort St. George on the 13th of February, must have been written subsequently to the despatch of the papers now enclosed, as M. Dubuc, with the Sul-taun's two vakeels, embarked at Tranquebar on the 7th of February.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* See Appendix.

† See Introduction.

No. CCVIII.

Major General Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 24th May, 1799.

Though I shall not be the foremost, I can assure your Lordship that I shall not be the least sincere in my congratulations, on the glorious event of the capture of Seringapatam. The fall of the Sultaun, and the destruction of the power of his family, by the capture of his sons, which so fortunately distinguished it, have completed the success; and to the energy and vigour of your Lordship's administration, Britain and the India Company will be indebted for the most important and beneficial event, that has arisen from the efforts of their arms, since the battle of Plassy established us in these provinces. Nor will the value of your Lordship's services be estimated alone, by their immediate effects in the established security of our possessions in the Carnatic. In my mind, at least, they carry with them, a still higher price in the restoration of our national character. This, your Lordship has already rescued from the contempt into which it had fallen; and to the wisdom and spirit of your Lordship's measures shall we owe the returning respect and awe, with which the Native Powers will, I doubt not, view us in future.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
and faithful humble Servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. CCIX.

General Orders of the Governor General in Council.

Madras, May 24th, 1799.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council directs the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army in the field to assure the officers on the general staff of the army, those composing the confidential staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and those whose zeal, ability, and exertion, have been distinguished in aid of the departments to which they were

not officially attached, that his lordship entertains the highest sense of their several eminent services during the late glorious campaign in Mysore.

The conduct of the Adjutant-General, Lieut.-Colonel Close, has amply justified the implicit confidence reposed by the Governor-General in Council in his extensive knowledge, approved experience, superior talents, ardent valour, and indefatigable activity.

The uniform zeal, perseverance, and fortitude, with which Lieut.-Colonel Close has exerted all these great qualities, in every trial of difficulty and danger, entitle him to the praise, respect and esteem of the Governor-General in Council. His Lordship feels himself bound, by every obligation of justice and public duty, to recommend the extraordinary merits of Lieut.-Colonel Close to the particular approbation of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to the applause and gratitude of his country.

The selection which the Commander-in-Chief had so judiciously made of Lieut.-Colonel Agnew and Captain Macaulay, for his confidential staff, was confirmed by the Governor-General in Council, with a just expectation that his Excellency would derive considerable advantage to the public service from their able assistance.

The Governor-General in Council is happy to record a public acknowledgment of the distinguished conduct of Major Dallas, and to assure that officer that his Lordship has a just sense of the important services which he has rendered in his successful superintendence of the laborious departments under his charge.

It is very satisfactory to his Lordship to remark, that the conduct of the Quarter-Master-General's department under Lieut.-Colonel Richardson and Major Allan, and that of the department of the guides under Captain Orr, has met with the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief; his Lordship desires that his public thanks may be conveyed to those officers, and on this occasion his Lordship thinks it proper to publish to the army the particular thanks which he had already directed the Commander-in-Chief to convey to Major Allan and Captain Orr, for the essential services rendered by them on the 22nd March last, after the battle of Mallavelly.

His Lordship is also happy to concur in the honourable

testimony borne by the Commander-in-Chief to the merits of Captain Turing and of Captain Macleod, and directs that his thanks may be conveyed to those meritorious officers.

In all ranks and departments of the allied army, his Lordship has observed, with sincere pleasure, a general spirit of harmony and concord, which (under the happy auspices of the Commander-in-Chief) has united every heart, head, and hand, in the common cause, signalized each progressive operation of the campaign, with a peculiar character of alacrity and ardour, and crowned its early conclusion with victory, triumph, and renown.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council,

J. WEBBE,
Secretary to Government.

No. CCX.

The Hon. Jonathan Duncan to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 25th May, 1799.

In acknowledging the news of your Lordship's glorious successes, I request of your Lordship to accept of my sincerest congratulations, as well as of my cordial wishes, that all the future measures of your Lordship's administration may be attended with equal proportionate lustre and advantage to the State. The bigotted Mussulmen here can hardly yet believe that their champion is fallen.

To-morrow there is to be a thanksgiving in our church for the Divine blessing on the British armies on the late occasion, of which I hope your Lordship will approve.

If your Lordship find leisure, the papers about Malabar may be taken up and decided on by your Lordship before the expiration of the leases in September render it necessary for me to act, and if in view to the late events, or from any other circumstance, your Lordship see any fundamental alteration necessary in the management of affairs in that quarter, I beg to assure your Lordship that it is my unfeigned desire that no consideration of delicacy or proposed accommodation towards me may for a moment interfere with your Lordship's views for the good of that country, to see which well esta-

blished, is either the first, or, at least, one of the first wishes of my heart.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,

JON. DUNCAN.

No.

From the Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 6th June, 1799.

I have received intelligence from Seringapatam that Futteh Hyder, eldest son of Tippoo Sultaun, Purneah, the Dewan of the Sultaun, and Meer Cummin-ud-Deen, have surrendered themselves to Lieutenant General Harris at Seringapatam. The whole of Tippoo Sultaun's sons, thirteen in number, together with all his sirdars of note, are now at Seringapatam.

The primary objects of General Harris's attention, after the fall of Seringapatam, were to disband the late Sultaun's army, and to obtain possession of the principal strongholds throughout his dominions. The measures necessary for the first of these objects were accordingly taken through the agency of Purneah. The Silledar horse, of their own accord, returned to their lands. Some discussions however took place with regard to the disposal of the Bargeer, or stable-horse, which were at length terminated on the 18th ultimo by the assistance of Purneah. The corps, formerly Lally's, has surrendered, and the Europeans, composing it, together with those under Monsieur Chapuy, recently arrived from Mauritius, were secured, and have been sent prisoners of war into the Carnatic. Upon the whole, I have the satisfaction to inform your Honourable Court that the late Sultaun's army is now entirely disbanded.

The stable-horses, elephants and camels, belonging to the Circar have been delivered up, and many of the former have been allotted to complete deficient corps of the Company's cavalry, while others, not calculated for that service, have been appropriated to the use of his Highness the Nizam.

In the meantime, the necessary measures have been pursued for taking possession of the remaining parts of the Sultaun's

dominions. On the 13th ultimo, the army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant General Stuart, marched on its return to Malabar by the way of Coorga, with the intention of detaching troops to take possession of the district of Canara. This army arrived at Cannanore on the 22nd ultimo, at which period the rains had not commenced. Circular orders were addressed by Lieutenant-General Harris to the commandants of the principal fortresses in Canara, and supported by similar requisitions from the Meer Sudder, or general superintendent of garrisons, under the late Sultaun's government, requiring the surrender of their respective forts to the British troops, and giving them general assurances of favour and countenance. There is every reason to believe that the forts will be quietly delivered up, in which case troops will be immediately detached by Lieutenant General Stuart to occupy them.

Similar measures have been adopted to obtain the surrender of the forts in other parts of the late Sultaun's dominions; and as far as our troops have yet proceeded, with uniform success.

The villagers have returned to their occupations in most parts of the country, and the strongest symptoms have appeared of a general disposition to submit to the orders of the British Government without opposition or reluctance.

I have great satisfaction in informing your Honourable Court that the whole of the late Tippoo Sultaun's records having been fortunately secured; they are found to contain a series of correspondence between the Sultaun and the French. I have now the honour to transmit to your Honourable Court a complete copy of the whole series. No comment upon them can be necessary. The circumstances under which they were found, as well as the internal evidence which they contain, render their authenticity indisputable.*

I am now occupied in framing a general arrangement of the

* The whole of these papers (occupying a large volume) were printed at Calcutta, and translated by N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., then filling the high and responsible station of Persian Translator to Government, now a Director of the East India Company, and one of the best informed men on all Oriental subjects, whether of a political or literary nature. Mr. Edmonstone's aid in the preparation of the present work has been freely and generously accorded.

affairs of Mysore, which I hope to be able to effect in a short space of time, upon principles calculated to promote the interests and honour of the Honourable Company, and to secure future tranquillity and safety to our Eastern dominions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. CCXII.

Major General Baird to the Earl of Mornington.

Camp, 23 miles W. of Seringapatam, June 27th, 1799.

MY LORD,

I am at a loss to express to your Lordship the warm feelings of pleasure and gratitude, which I have experienced in the perusal of your Lordship's letter of the 23rd which I had the honor to receive yesterday. Your Lordship's approbation of my conduct on the memorable 4th of May, in the command of those brave troops whose exertions, crowned with signal success the wisely concerted plans of your Lordship, affords me a gratification of the most flattering nature. In compliance with your Lordship's desire, I beg leave to reply that any mark whatever of honor which my Gracious Sovereign, or of favor which the Hon. Court of Directors may please to confer through your Lordship's intercession will be received by me with the utmost gratitude and respect, but to a Soldier I consider the order of the Bath the highest, of all military honors.

I have the honor to remain, my Lord, with the greatest respect and esteem.

Your Lordship's most obedient

and humble Servant,

D. BAIRD.

No. CCXIII.

The Marquis Cornwallis to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Phoenix Park, 20th Sept., 1799.

Captain Tweedale, who brought the first account of your glorious success, landed at Galway, and as he passed through

Dublin, sent to me your most welcome letter of the 18th of May. Exclusive of my public feelings on the great event which it announced, I beg leave to assure you, that none of your friends could more sincerely rejoice, at the well deserved lustre which it must reflect on your administration.

You have now, my dear Lord, every thing in your power, supported by the unanimous voice of your grateful country, and you will use that power, with wisdom, energy, and moderation. I wish I could say that things in this island wore as prosperous an aspect, but there remains still too much disaffection and treason on one side, and too much violence on the other ; on the whole, however, we are better than we have been, and the idea of union proves more popular, and gains ground both in and out of Parliament.

I am, with very sincere regard,
My dear Lord,
most faithfully yours,
CORNWALLIS.

[The following letters are here inserted as they refer to the transactions related in this volume.]

No. CCIV.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, 13th August, 1798.

I have been duly favoured with your Lordship's very important letters from the Cape of Good Hope of the following dates (No. 1) 23rd of February,* (No. 2) 28th of February,† and (No. 3) 7th of March,‡ 1798.

In my secret letter of the 16th of June last§ I wrote to your Lordship very fully on the subject of the hostile views of Tippoo Sultaun, as they had been stated to us by recent

* See page 1.

† See page 17.

‡ This was a brief note, mentioning his Lordship's continued detention at the Cape, owing to the *La Virginie* requiring so much repair.

§ See page 348.

despatches from the Cape, and also relative to the armament fitted out from Toulon, under the command of General Buonaparte. I at the same time enclosed copy of a proclamation said to have been issued by the Governor of Mauritius,* as well as the latest intelligence relative to the expedition above alluded to, by which it appeared that Egypt and India were the ultimate objects of the great preparations that had been made. Having in that letter fully detailed the measures proposed to be adopted at home, and pointed out such as appeared to be proper to be carried into execution by your Lordship in India, I shall not at present enter into any further detail on those subjects, but shall content myself with referring you to the despatches you will receive by this conveyance, through the Secret Committee, for a detail of the measures adopted by Government for the better security of our Indian possessions.

In my letter of the 16th of June I observed that I had, to a certain extent, given your Lordship my opinion upon part of the subjects to which you had called my attention in your despatches from the Cape, and stated my intention of reserving my sentiments on other matters of detail and of a less pressing nature, for some future conveyance; this I intended doing by the present opportunity: but as the ships are to be despatched immediately, and of which I was not informed till this morning, it is my intention to answer those letters, as well as any I may receive in the mean time, by the first ships of the ensuing season.

I am anxious to hear of your safe arrival in India, and of your having entered upon the very important functions committed to your charge, and in which I most cordially wish you success.

I am, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

* See Introduction.

No. CCXV.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, 27th November, 1798.

I have been duly honoured with the receipt of your Lordship's letters from Madras, dated the 8th of May,* and another from Calcutta, dated the 23rd of June last.†

I most sincerely congratulate your Lordship on your arrival at Fort William, and upon your assumption of the Government of that Presidency; and trust you will soon find little or no inconvenience from the climate, though it may appear dreadful at first.

By the present overland despatch, I can do little more than advert to the contents of the letters from your Lordship, the receipt of which I have above acknowledged.

One point, however, in your letters from Madras affords me the highest satisfaction, I mean where you state the coast army to be in the finest condition, and to be one of the noblest bodies of men in the world. I trust your Lordship will find the Bengal army far more respectable as to order and discipline than has been generally supposed; Lord Teignmouth has spoke very favourably to me of it, and especially of the troops in the upper provinces, and has done ample justice to the abilities and exertions of General Craig.

His Lordship has left with me the rough draft of the confidential letter he wrote to your Lordship, to be delivered to

* This was a brief note, mentioning his Lordship's arrival at Madras on the 26th of April, 1798; that the main object of his mission to the Presidency at Fort St. George (relative to the Nabob of Arcot) had not been accomplished; that the army was in the finest possible condition; that General Harris would make a good Commander-in-Chief in Bengal; and that his Lordship would sail for Fort William on the 9th of May.

† This is a brief letter, stating the Governor General's arrival at Fort William on the 17th of May; transmitting the Mauritius proclamation, and expressing an opinion that the judicial business ought to be separated from that of the Council.

you on your arrival at Calcutta.* I have not had time as yet to attend to the same, but from the conversations I have had

* The following is an extract of the letter referred to :—

From the Governor-General Sir John Shore to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Calcutta, March 7th, 1798.

After an absence of three months and a half, I returned to the Presidency from Lucknow on the 2nd instant, and with every inclination to communicate to your Lordship my detailed sentiments on the state of affairs in this country, I must plead the apology of incessant occupation and interruption, for a hurried address, neither conformable to my own wishes nor probably to your expectations.

As the transactions in which I have been lately engaged have occupied a large portion of my time and solicitude, I shall first briefly speak of them.

Upon the sudden death of the late Nabob Vizier, on the 21st of September last, we were compelled to admit the succession of his declared son Vizier Ali Khan, in opposition to universal opinion, that he was of spurious origin. For the principles on which this admission was first made, and afterwards confirmed, I refer your Lordship to my public Minutes, which will sufficiently evince the embarrassment and hesitation attending it. The state of affairs at Lucknow soon assumed an appearance which threatened the subversion of the influence and interests of the Company there, and compelled me to undertake the arduous task of attempting an arrangement of them at the moment when I was preparing to embark for Europe. I left Calcutta on the 25th of November, and in the progress of my journey to Lucknow, I found grounds of more serious alarm, and every indication of unprovoked hostile opposition. My determination upon it was the result of events which left me without option, and in its progress led to an enquiry, which established, upon the most solid evidence, the spurious birth of the successor to Asoph ud Doulah, and of all his reputed sons, a determined opposition little short of open hostility to the Company, and compelled me to change the line of succession, and establish the Nabob Saadit Ali Khan, the eldest surviving son of Sujah ud Doulah, on the Musnud of Oude, as the legitimate and rightful successor to the late Nabob.

This is a summary account of the most important occurrence of my Administration, the particulars of which are detailed in my public Minutes. In the perusal of them, your Lordship will participate the embarrassment attending a situation involving the interests, the justice, and reputation of the Company, risk, danger, and great personal responsibility, and without precedent or parallel. I have the fullest confidence that your Lordship's judgment on the occasion will concur with mine, and I most earnestly recommend to you an early declaration of your determination, to support the Nabob Saadit Ali Khan, in conformity to the

with Lord Teignmouth, I have no doubt but he has stated his sentiments in the most friendly and unreserved manner.

treaty which I have concluded with him, as essentially necessary to impart confidence to him, and suppress the intrigues and apprehensions incidental in India to a change in the administration of this country. In the documents referred to, your Lordship will find ample details of my transactions at Lucknow, of the conduct and characters of the natives there, and of every circumstance necessary to inform your judgment.

But as I consider our connection with Oude as one of the most important and delicate amongst our political relations in this country, and as no information can supply the advantages of personal observation, I cannot but recommend to your Lordship the propriety of visiting that country whenever the state of affairs and season will admit; and allow me further to suggest to your Lordship that the notification of such an intention to the Nabob Saadit Ali Khan, in your letter to him announcing your accession, may be attended with some advantage.

I have communicated, agreeably to usage, to all the native powers with whom we are connected, the information of your Lordship's accession and of my departure, in terms suitable to the occasion, and the rank and character of your Lordship.

The power of the British nation in India is most respectable, and their political reputation is most generally respected. It has ever been my anxious endeavour to promote it, by a steady adherence to every engagement, by the sincerity of my public conduct, and by an attention to avoid any interference or measure, which could excite jealousy or disgust. The political forbearance of the Company has not failed to make a sensible impression on the Mahrattas, Nizam, and throughout, of which, if time admitted, I could mention some striking and important instances, but it is not in the nature of things to be expected that we can ever have all the credit which our conduct deserves, with those who act upon different principles, and who limit their forbearance by the extent of their power. Such is the case with every Asiatic Prince, and the actual power of the Company is their only solid security, whilst it is, however, strongly supported by their reputation for political justice and sincerity.

The ambition of Scindiah appears unbounded, and in prosecuting the dictates of it, he has equally appealed to treachery and violence; his power is, in fact, a military usurpation, which, however irresistible at present, may be shaken or subverted by the same treachery and ambition in those by whose assistance it has been established. The Mahratta chieftain who commands the army of Scindiah in Hindostan, Ambajee, is not without apprehensions of his master, and he made some indirect overtures to me for an eventual union with the Company, against the apprehended violence of his master. The Rajah of Berar submits to the usurpations of Scindiah, from inability to resist them only, and the numbers of Mahratta chieftains who have been degraded or ill treated by him, would, probably, avail themselves of any fair opportunity for gratifying

I have carefully perused your orders to Madras and Bombay received from the latter Presidency, in consequence of the proclamation issued at the Mauritius; and it is a pleasing circumstance to find that, at the exact period we were framing our orders here on that subject, you were anticipating them by the orders issued by your Government.

As your Lordship must before now be in possession of the orders of the Secret Committee of June last,* I shall not here add any thing farther.

their resentment, or to re-establish themselves. It will require uncommon abilities in Scindiah to render his present power solid and permanent, and any serious misfortune to him would probably be succeeded by convulsions which might shake his power in Hindostan to its foundation. The Rajahs of Jeypore and Joudpore, and many others, would probably seize the opportunity of shaking off the Mahratta yoke; and if Scindiah should ever provoke a contest with the Company, much advantage, I am convinced, might be obtained from their assistance.

The power of the Nizam, as well as his health, is rapidly on the decline, and his Minister, Azim ul Omrah, has long pressed a closer union with the Company. Although I foresee great embarrassments, and the possibility of serious evils from the subversion of the power of the Nizam, I see still greater in an union which would impose upon us the prevention of it. This is the result of much deliberation on this important subject.

Tippoo will certainly avail himself of any fair opportunity to re-establish the power and reputation which he lost in his former contest with us.

Whether Zemaun Shah will ever invade Hindostan is a matter of doubtful speculation, although I give him credit for the determination. If we were assured of no hostile intentions on his part towards us or our allies, the event might, perhaps, operate to the advantage of our interests, by diminishing or destroying the Mahratta influence in Hindostan, under the uncertainty attending his designs, and the possible danger arising from his approach towards the frontiers of Oude, the question of a defensive union with the Mahrattas occurred. Without pretending to decide upon it, I am more inclined to rely upon our own strength, than enter into any union with the Mahrattas to oppose Zemaun Shah, which might carry our arms beyond the dominions of the Nabob Vizier.

I cannot conclude without expressing my sincerest satisfaction at your Lordship's appointment, my most cordial wishes for the prosperity of your administration, and my personal respect and esteem for your Lordship's character.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,

J. SHORE.

* They were received by the Governor General on the 18th of October, 1798.

I shall anxiously expect the details your Lordship has promised relative to Arcot and Tanjore, the finances of the Company, and the general politics of India. On the latter subject I intended to have written to your Lordship by an early opportunity, but shall defer it till I am favoured with your promised detail; and, indeed, by the pleasing change that has taken place in public affairs, by the glorious victory of Admiral Nelson, as well as from the uncertainty of the designs of Tippoo; it is not at this present moment necessary to enter particularly on the subject. I am confident your Lordship is feelingly alive as to the necessity of vigilantly watching of and guarding against the designs both of Tippoo and the French, as well as the other powers of India, who may be inimical to the interest of the British nation in India.

I am happy your Lordship is pleased with the appointment of Lord Clive to the Government of Madras; I trust he will do honour to our choice; in this opinion I am much confirmed by what Lord Teignmouth has stated to me, that his Lordship constantly grew upon him in the several conversations he had with Lord Clive at the Cape. As your Lordship will receive by this conveyance several letters, which we have directed the Secret Committee to transmit, it will be unnecessary for me to enter into any detail of their contents.

Lady Jane joins me in sincere respects.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,
yours faithfully,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CCXVI.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 29th December, 1798.

I have wrote to you many occasional letters since the one I wrote to you in the month of June last; but few of them were sent, because from the total want of information for a long time, of what was passing in Egypt and the Levant, and afterwards from the rapid change which was produced in those quarters by Nelson's splendid victory, I was literally

not in a situation to give to you any new idea beyond what I have detailed in my letter in the month of June; I have contented myself at present with barely alluding to Nelson's victory, and the state of affairs in the Mediterranean and Egypt, because I know from the steps that have been taken to convey information of those transactions directly to India, your Lordship and the Government in India are informed of them as soon as we are here. I have felt myself perfectly at ease with regard to what was going on in India amidst the arduous points on which I had every reason to believe you would be called upon to act, because from your own letters, particularly the one recently received of date 6th July, compared with what I had wrote to you in the month of June, when the scene first opened, I had the satisfaction to perceive that our ideas were so much in unison as to leave me no room to doubt that your conduct would be precisely what I could wish. I know not yet whether anything decisive has happened to Buonaparte and his army in Egypt, if there has you have heard it long before you can receive this. Our last authentic accounts were that he and his army were labouring under every species of difficulty, and recent reports, not however sufficiently authenticated have reached us, that he himself had been murdered at Cairo, and the remains of his army of course put into great dismay and confusion. This is all that at present I am in a situation to state to you with any authenticity, at the same time from every collateral circumstance entertaining the most sanguine hopes that he and his whole army must go to destruction. This feeling, however, has not and shall not relax my intention to give to you in India every aid of men and money that I possibly can, keeping always in view that you are or may be involved in hostilities and consequently in expense. If no French assistance arrives, which is not likely to arrive, I take it for granted that you will be enabled to shape your conduct with regard to Tippoo exactly as circumstances may dictate to your own judgment and discretion.

The pressure of other business and the uncertainty whether this letter may go to you by sea or overland, in the first instance, prevent me at this moment writing to you more at length; but it is my intention to take the first days of the holidays to write to you at full length in answer to your

letter of the 6th July, and I shall at the same time detail to you without reserve, every idea that occurs to me respecting India. Being possessed of these sentiments, it must be left entirely to your own judgment to apply them as circumstances may suggest.

As for our situation at home, it is every thing we could wish; we have followed the blow given in the Mediterranean by Lord Nelson, in the capture of Minorca, of which the accounts are received within these few days. The authentic accounts are not yet arrived, but we are in daily expectation of hearing of the recapture of Malta; and our success in the Mediterranean has emboldened Naples to take up arms against France in Italy, whether this circumstance, or indeed any other, will induce Austria and Russia to act upon their true interests by returning to a confederacy against France remains to be proved.

Russia has shewn them a noble example. Laying aside all former jealousies and animosities she proffered her aid to the Ottoman Porte, when the French directed their attacks against Egypt; and amidst all the extraordinary events which the present times have exhibited to the world; it is not the least extraordinary to see a Russian fleet in the Levant. So however stands the fact.

As to our civil and domestic situation it is equal to the proudest wish of our hearts. Founded chiefly on the voluntary zeal and exertions of the country we have not less than 240,000 men in arms within the island, and we may carry that principle as far as we please. No democrat dare show his face;—Government popular in every ale-house;—Our commerce and revenue flourishing beyond all former example;—Public credit thoroughly restored, and in order to render it so beyond future peril, the idea of raising a great part of the supply within the year, has become so universally recognised and approved, as to enable Mr. Pitt to bring forward the measure of raising ten millions annually by a direct tax, upon income, and against the measure not a murmur without doors, but the reverse, and in Parliament the opposition has been so feeble as not to be worth mentioning. As long, therefore, as our enemies shall choose to be distracted so long are we in a condition to carry on the war, and the wealth of the country is so great as to make the burden of it to be little

felt. The most pressing subject now remaining is the situation of Ireland, all the attempts of France to invade it have been discomfited, either by the surrender of their troops when landed, or by the capture of their fleets and troops by the navy, without permitting them to land. Notwithstanding all our exertions at home for our own security, and notwithstanding the appropriation of considerable force to our distant possessions and the Mediterranean, we have been enabled to send to the assistance of Ireland within the year not less than 25,000 troops, consisting partly of regular force, but chiefly of fencible and militia regiments who have volunteered the service. It is now decided that the plan of Union is to be immediately brought forward, and the whole strength of Government applied to carry it through. For the reason I have given to you I cannot write to you to day more in detail, but I flatter myself the short sketch I have given you of the leading points worthy of being communicated to you will afford you not an unpleasant morsel.

Lady Jane is well and desires to be kindly remembered to you, and I remain,

My dear Lord,

Your's sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CCXVII.

The Right Hon. H. Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Wimbledon, 18th March, 1799,
[Received 5th Aug. 1799.]

As the ships at present despatched are under orders to sail, it deprives me of the opportunity of writing to you upon the important subjects treated of in your letters, lately arrived overland. These letters are so voluminous that they are not yet decyphered; and from what is reported to me as to the progress made in decyphering, I have great doubts if these despatches will be ready to be brought under my view before the ships actually sail. From your general letter to the Secret Committee, I perceive that the subjects of those undecyphered papers are of a very interesting nature, and your

Lordship may be assured of hearing from me by the first opportunity after I have considered them.

It is my intention, in my present letter, to advert to some of the general topics to which you have referred in your letter of an earlier date, and the subject of which I may not have exhausted in any former communication.

It is impossible for me not to begin with noticing the letter recently received, enclosing the Treaty you have made with the Nizam.* Your Lordship has long before this time anticipated the satisfaction I have derived from that transaction, which has been completed in so masterly and effectual a manner. Long before this, I trust, it has been carried into final execution. I have long felt uneasy from the circumstance of the French force in the service of the Nizam; and it was, perhaps, the circumstance of all others which gave me the most uneasiness, when I became satisfied that the powerful armaments under Buonaparte were destined for Egypt, as his best road for the annoyance of our Indian possessions. Your Treaty with the Nizam effectually puts an end to every alarm upon that part of the business, and whether you consider it negatively as removing the French force from our neighbourhood, or positively in respect of the additional strength it affords to ourselves and the aid it gives to our finances, it is a transaction which tells in our favour in a variety of ways, and was well worth accomplishing at any risk, even if the Mahratta powers had been dissatisfied with it. I do not, however, see any real foundation for their being so, and I trust it will not be long before I shall hear that your Lordship has been able, by proper exertions with the Mahrattas, to connect them with the Nizam and us still more closely upon the principles of a common interest of defensive alliance against Tippoo, and every power in alliance with France.

Upon the subject of the Rajah of Berar, it is only necessary for me to say, that in so far as my general knowledge and recollection of Indian affairs enable me at present to decide, it appears to me that he has always been friendly to the British interests in India; and I should conceive that in no respect a close connection with him can be prejudicial to our defensive system, and the desire of preserving the gene-

* See Appendix.

ral peace of India, which, if it can be observed with honour, is certainly our wisest system; and as it is most likely to be disturbed by the hostility of Tippoo, it of course follows that every connection which strengthens our power against him must be ultimately beneficial to the Indian interests of Great Britain.* This naturally leads me to advert to the views of Zemaun Shah, and the situation of Scindia as connected with that subject.

It was some time ago the fashion, in my opinion, too much to undervalue the menaces of Zemaun Shah respecting India, but I think that opinion is gradually wearing away as it ought to do. You are more in the way of collecting accurate information than I am; but if the French were ever to obtain such a footing as to enable them seriously to distress us, I have long thought that it would be a material point of the plan to obtain the co-operation of Zemaun Shah. And even if Tippoo himself, from any misguided ambition, should be induced to undertake any extensive project against us, I must always believe that his best endeavours would be used to obtain the assistance of Zemaun Shah. I take it for granted, Mr. Jones, at Bagdad, transmits regularly to India the information his situation there enables him to collect; but in case, by any accident it should not have reached you, I herewith send you a copy of the information† recently received from him on the subject of Zemaun Shah, and comparing it with others, it strongly confirms me in the belief of his hostile designs, and that we ought to keep a very watchful eye upon the motions of that Prince, whose talents, military force, and pecuniary resources, afford to him the means of being a formidable opponent‡. It would be too strong for me to state, that under no given circumstances our own forces were to go beyond our own provinces and the territories of the Vizier; but the temptation must be very great, and the advantage very evident, to induce us to do so. The means of resisting any intended aggression on the part of Zemaun Shah appear to be the following. First, to encourage and keep up those dis-

* See the Governor General's letters to H. Colebrooke, Esq. at p. 479; and to Colonel Palmer at, p. 126.

† "The information alluded to by Mr. Dundas not having been received in time will be forwarded under a separate cover. W. CABELL."

‡ See Zemaun Shah's letters in the Appendix.

tractions and animosities within his own territories, the apprehensions of which must always, to a certain degree, keep him in a state of alarm, and which obliged him to return rapidly from his last attempt to invade Hindostan. Secondly, every encouragement should be given to the Seiks and Rajpoot tribes to harrass and distress him in his progress. But lastly, what of all others appears most material is, upon the ground of his own danger, to engage Scindia cordially in that defensive system of alliance, which it is our interest, by every means, to strengthen and confirm, with a view to the security of our Indian empire. It is perfectly obvious, that if ever Zemaun Shah gains a material footing in Hindostan, Scindia and his power must fall the first sacrifice to his ambition.

Under these circumstances I do not think your Lordship can do a more essential service to the interests of your country in India than by using your best endeavours to soothe and heal those jarring animosities which annihilate the force of the Government of Poonah, and render them an easy prey to the restless ambition either of Tippoo Sultaun or of Zemaun Shah. Nothing can more effectually tend to secure this object than persuading Scindia to abandon that system of wickedness, perfidy, and intrigue, which he is now pursuing at Poonah, and engaging him to return to the care and protection of his own territories which require his best attention, and must ultimately tend to gratify his ambition, and consolidate his power, more than any advantages he can hope to attain by aiming at more remote or distant objects of ambition. I cannot more strongly convey to your Lordship the importance I attach to the suggestions I have laid before you, than by stating it as my opinion, that if you are able to consolidate in one defensive system the Nizam's power, the Mahratta power, and the power of Great Britain in India, we have nothing to fear in that quarter of the globe from any combinations that can be formed against us.

Upon the subject of Tippoo Sultaun I have little to say in this letter, further than to express my approbation of the line of conduct you have pursued relative to that restless Prince. You will have seen long before this, from the letter I wrote to you in the month of June last, how much the principles upon which you have acted correspond with the suggestions I laid before you at that time, when the object of Buonaparte's expedition was not ascertained, but which for the reasons I

then gave, I was satisfied was intended for the prosecution of those objects which afterwards proved to be the case. The first thought which you seem to have entertained, viz., that of attacking Tippoo in consequence of his conduct at Mauritius, was a very natural feeling, and there can be no doubt that the Ambassadors he sent there, and the alliance he appears to have formed upon principles hostile to us, would have fully justified you in any measures you might have thought proper to adopt. His conduct was tantamount to a declaration of war against us, but still I think you judged well in not bringing it to that extremity. By the line of conduct you have pursued towards him, you have asserted the pride and honour of the British name, which must never for a moment be let down; but you have done it in a manner to enable you to review, deliberately, your resources, and to arrange your force in such a manner as will enable you to act with effect, if the humility of his acknowledgments is not adequate to what our power and the justice of our cause entitle us to demand. By this delay, likewise, you have accomplished the important point of strengthening the connexion with the Nizam, and of disbanding that pernicious French force which had grown up within his territory. Besides this you have received the additional confidence naturally resulting from the military force which has been sent to you from this country and from the Cape, and I likewise trust that the bullion which has been sent from this country has reached you before this time, and has tended to enliven your circulation and resources. It shall not be my fault if much more is not done in the same line in the course of the present season, but I do not enlarge upon that subject at present, as I will have occasion to advert to it in a letter upon the trade and finances of India, which I intend to write to you time enough I hope to go by the present conveyance. Neither has the delay been attended with any detriment to your affairs.

It is unnecessary to trouble you with any details with regard to the situation of the French army in Egypt. Our information of what passes there is so slow and tedious, I trust that the means which have been taken to supply you with intelligence from thence have kept you as well and early informed in India, if not more so than we are at home; but from what we have learnt from various quarters, I flatter myself Lord Nelson's splendid victory, and the exertions of

our fleet in the Mediterranean, leave us little reason to apprehend any danger at present to India from the French force which has landed in Egypt. I trust that army will find its grave in Egypt, and consequently as Tippoo must be well informed of those circumstances, you will not find that his expectation of a French succour will add much pride or vigour to his communications with you.

As your Lordship is perfectly familiar with the different points of which I have treated in this letter, I have not thought it necessary to trouble you with minute details on each topic; but I flatter myself I have said enough to make you perfectly acquainted with my sentiments on those leading points of Indian policy. The result of the whole is, that our security rests, primarily, on our own reputation and power; but that in order to render our exertions efficient and permanent, it ought to be our unceasing care to keep the power of the Nizam and of the whole branches of the Mahratta confederacy in a strict amity with us for the purpose of establishing an impregnable barrier against all Asiatic ambition, whether acting separately or in co-operation with European allies; as an essential ingredient of this system, I have no hesitation in stating that your Lordship is warranted to consider the nourishing and maintaining any French force or French men, within any of their territories, as an insurmountable bar against any close connexion with us.

It still remains for me to state to you my opinion upon one or two separate points on which you desire to be advised.

You desire to know what is meant by a considerable French force which is the expression generally used in the instructions from home on the subject of Tippoo Sultaun receiving French force into his country. The application of the principle to the particular occasion must be left to the exercise of sound discretion, but as a general principle, I have no hesitation in stating that we are entitled under the circumstances of the present times, to consider the admission of any French force into his army, be it greater or smaller, as direct hostility to us.

I remain, my dear Lord,
your's very faithfully,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CCXVIII.

From the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

East India House, London, 18th June, 1799.

As it must be satisfactory to your Lordship to be informed of our sentiments upon the leading points in your administration, so far as they have hitherto come to our knowledge, we shall briefly communicate them to you by the present despatch.

Tanjour.—We very much approve of the judicious arrangements formed by your Lordship at Madras preparatory to carrying into execution the orders relative to the Tanjour succession.*

Wynaad District.—For the reasons which have been assigned, we concur entirely in the propriety of your Lordship's decision for relinquishing the Wynaad district to Tippoo Sultaun.

Subsidiary Treaty with the Nizam.†—Without entering by this despatch into the particulars of the negotiations with the Nizam, which produced the late important arrangement we have only to express, in the highest terms of approbation, our sense of the wisdom of your Lordship's conduct in effecting the same. And as no doubt can be entertained that the introduction of French officers into the service of the native Princes, with a view of establishing the most certain means of subverting the British power in India, formed part of a regular system of French policy, the entire destruction of French influence at the Nizam's court and in his armies, must be considered as an object of the utmost importance to the peace and security of the Company's possessions.

We observe what is stated in your Lordship's minute of the 12th August, 1798, with respect to the sovereignty of the Decan being in Secunder Jah, the eldest son of the present Soubah, the Nizam. Although, under present circumstances, no apprehension can be entertained of a disputed succession, we think it necessary to follow up the idea suggested by your

* See Governor General's Minute on Tanjore, 31st May, 1798, p. 41.

† See Appendix.

Lordship on this occasion, and to direct that, upon the death of the Nizam, Secunder Jah be considered as the lawful successor, and that his right, if necessary, be supported by every possible exertion on our part.

Tippoo Sultaun.—In the minute of the 12th August* your Lordship takes a very able and comprehensive view of the situation of affairs with Tippoo Sultaun. As no doubt could be entertained of the positive infraction of the Treaty of Seringapatam on the part of the Mysore chief, it were to be wished that the state of the Carnatic army for offensive operations had been such as to have enabled you to act upon the first suggestions contained in that minute, consisting of five propositions:—We shall not, however, regret if the necessity of proceeding to actual hostilities shall have been averted by Tippoo Sultaun consenting to receive Major Doveton on the part of the allies, and by his acquiescence in the three propositions contained in the subsequent part of your Lordship's minute beforementioned. But should a war be rendered inevitable we trust that its conclusion will be marked by his cession to the Company of the whole maritime territory remaining between the ghauts on the coast of Malabar, agreeably to your Lordship's original idea upon the subject, which would effectually secure us against any apprehension from any future junction between the forces of Tippoo Sultaun and those of the French, and by his relinquishing the Coimbatore country, which would greatly tend to the security of the Carnatic, and enable us to reduce the military expences on the coast. At all events Tippoo Sultaun might be induced to assign over the Coimbatore country to the Company upon the receipt of a reasonable adequate revenue for the same, as a farther security against any hostile attempts on his part in future. In the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun the respective countries of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjour will of course come under the Company's management, and we direct that they be not relinquished without special orders from us, or from the Court of Directors for that purpose in order to afford sufficient time for the formation of arrangements for relieving those Princes from all incumbrances upon their revenues.

* See page 159.

In conclusion of this despatch we have only to express our approbation of the reasons which so zealously induced your Lordship to repair to Madras ; our entire reliance on the wisdom and firmness of your Lordship's measures for the support of the British possessions in the East Indies during the present arduous contest ; and our full approbation of those which have been already adopted to meet every possible exigency.

Although your Lordship's determination to proceed to Madras was influenced by the very critical situation of affairs with respect to Tippoo Sultaun, we observe with great satisfaction, by your minute of the 2nd January last, that in the exercise of your authority at that settlement it is not your intention to interfere in the details of that Government, a measure which must naturally tend to the support of that dignity and consequence which we always wish should be maintained by the respective governors and councils at the subordinate Presidencies. At the same time we have the farther satisfaction to witness the most zealous and cordial co-operation of Lord Clive and his Council in such measures as may be proposed by your Lordship for the Company's safety and prosperity.

We are,
Your affectionate friends,
STEP. LUSHINGTON.
HUGH INGLIS.
JOHN MANSHIP.

No. CCXIX.

MY DEAR SIR,

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable H. Dundas.

SIR,

Fort St. George—1799.

You will not be surprised at any degree of earnestness which I may feel to promote the interests of that gallant army by whose assistance I have effected the late important and happy resolution in the affairs of the British Nation, on this side of India..

Your own zeal for the public service, and the honorable support which it has always been your peculiar pride and pleasure to afford to those who have cooperated with you in the great cause in which we are all engaged, inspire me with a confident expectation, that I shall find in your sentiments a degree of cordiality, and ardour correspondent with my own.

The army at large have received in the captured property, taken at Seringapatam, a reward in some degree proportioned to their merits, and it is rather the Province of the Commander in Chief than mine to appreciate and recommend to notice the conduct of the officers of inferior rank to that of Generals on the Staff. I shall therefore confine my recommendations to that rank.

I have already had repeated occasion to express to you my feelings of public, and private, gratitude towards Lieut.-General Harris as well as to explain the strong grounds on which both those sentiments are founded in my mind.* The share, which General Harris has received, of the prize taken at Seringapatam has placed his fortune above the want of any public aid;† otherwise I have no doubt that the magnitude

* Upon the discussion in Council at Fort St George (31st July, 1798), relative to furnishing pecuniary funds for the detachment of the army ordered by the Governor General to be sent to Hyderabad, General Harris, then acting Governor, offered to be responsible in his private funds for the sum required to put the troops in motion (see p 156). This most generous and patriotic offer completely silenced all opposition; and orders were immediately issued for the advance of the troops to Hyderabad.

† The following is General Harris's letter to the Governor General on this subject.

MY DEAR LORD,

Camp, 27th June, 1799.

Your favour of the 23rd reached me yesterday evening, and be assured made me very happy, as I can so readily fall in with your Lordship's flattering wish, that I should repose my whole confidence in your favourable disposition towards me. Your kindness and pleasant manner with me, has put every gloomy idea to flight, and already most of them are even *forgot*. However, my dear Lord, you are far exceeding my humble wishes, and I really think those of Mrs. Harris, or rather you would do so if you preferred the request to his Majesty—to grant to me the dignity of a baron of Great Britain.

I am highly sensible of your Lordship's friendship, and any mark of his Majesty's favour would always be received by me with respect, but as

of his services would have insured to him a liberal and munificent provision from the East India Company.

I certainly do not wish these high honours, so, I should be truly sorry you should lay yourself under obligations for what, to say the truth, would annoy me exceedingly. Indeed, my dear Lord, you could not have puzzled me more—supposing I was solicitous to succeed—than by the question, what title I would chuse to take?

An humble clergyman's son, thrown very early in life into the army, entirely a soldier of fortune, with scarcely any assistance save his own exertions, is little likely to have any hereditary place he would chuse to commemorate; and in my instance the 5th regiment was near six and twenty years my constant home.

Your Lordship's wise policy and extraordinary exertions have thrown me into affluence equal to my most sanguine wishes, but what is affluence to my military rank, would be very moderate to support the honours you propose, and no doubt as I am above the want of a pension, so I think it most likely I shall keep clear of soliciting our honourable employers on that head, unless you should persist in forcing these honours on me; so take care. In respect of George and the colours, be so good, my dear Lord, to use your own good pleasure; for my part, I have no doubt they would be very safe by the *Cornwallis*, as I understand she is a most excellent sailer; and it would certainly be an object to have George in such good company as Beatson and Allan. I am rejoiced to hear your Lordship's determination of not leaving the coast before September, as that will surely give me the opportunity of a few days at least in your society, and which Mrs. Harris will inform you I much wish for, and I may add, even under the threat of the *triumphal entertainment*, which your Lordship is perfectly right in suspecting, as I perceive you do, I am not very ambitious of receiving. Years are creeping fast upon me, and I feel the the desire of retirement, which has always been my wish, growing daily stronger. Under these circumstances, the vanities of the world weigh but little. Indeed, the utmost I feel, is to close this campaign with satisfaction to your Lordship, and then those are welcome to the honours who are anxious for them. My Sovereign, I should hope, will receive me with some attention whenever I may get home, as having all my life endeavoured faithfully to do my duty by him, my country, and those who have employed me. I wish your Lordship may not think me too prolix, but aware of the difficulty of avoiding honours, without being suspected of more vanity than if I sought them, I have entered into a detail of my own concerns, which I could only submit to the eye of friendship.

Thus, my dear Lord, it will please me most to let the matter take its chance, giving me such credit as you think me deserving of, for believe me in this respect I am very ambitious. No one can set a higher value on your commendations than,

My dear Lord,
your very faithful and obliged friend and servant,
GEORGE HARRIS.

Under Lieut.-General Harris's actual circumstances I should hope that His Majesty might deem it proper to confer a distinguished mark of honor, upon that deserving officer; and impressed as I am with the importance of the conquest achieved under Lieut.-General Harris's command, I trust that His Majesty, will confer no honors on General Harris below those of the order of the Bath, and of a Peerage of Great Britain. It is my duty to state to you that any honors inferior to these would not meet the public opinion entertained in India, with respect to the importance of the late victories, nor satisfy that sentiment of honorable pride which they have diffused through every branch of the civil and military service in this country. I must therefore make it my most anxious and earnest request to you that you will omit no endeavour to obtain for Lieut.-General Harris, the honors which he has so well merited. Lieut.-General Stuart Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Bombay, has long been distinguished for the ability and eminence of his services in India. During the late War he has added considerably to his former laurels, and the victory obtained by the troops, under his command at Sedasere, must ever be remembered as one of the most brilliant events, in our military history in India. His health is now declining, and he proposes to return to Europe in the approaching season. His circumstances, even with the addition of his prize money, will be moderate; and certainly no military character in this quarter of the Globe, whether considered on the ground of long service, eminent success, or approved integrity, ever was a more proper object for the munificence of the East India Company. I also trust that the splendid and important victory of Sedasere will recommend Lieut.-General Stuart to His Majesty for the order of the Bath. It is impossible to bestow too much commendation on the conduct of Major-General Baird in the assault of Seringapatam. A more judicious operation conducted with more heroic gallantry and spirit never was achieved, and when you recollect the decisive consequences of the success of that day, effecting within the course of two hours the entire destruction of our most formidable enemy in India, I am persuaded you will concur with me, in an anxious solicitude to see the gallant leader of the assailants of Tippoo Sultaun's capital rewarded in a manner suitable to his exertions, and to

their beneficial effect. I have made it my particular business to enquire into Major-General Baird's circumstances; and I have ascertained that they are by no means affluent: It would therefore be a peculiar satisfaction to me if the East India Company should exercise their known liberality in his case. When it is remembered, that in the course of active and arduous service during the former war he fell into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun and suffered a long and cruel imprisonment in the dungeons of that Fortress, which on the 4th of May 1799, submitted to his irresistible valour and skill, I am persuaded that his claim to public reward and honor will be deemed peculiarly interesting, and powerful. I should also hope that his extraordinary merits on the 4th of May would induce His Majesty to consider him as a proper object for the order of the Bath, I enclose a letter from Major General Baird, which reflects the highest credit on his sentiments of honor and public spirit.*

The commander in Chief has made a very favorable report to me of the conduct of Major General Floyd who commanded the cavalry during the war, I understand that General Floyd proposes to return soon to Europe, and that his principal object is to obtain a regiment.† The commander in Chief has also made a very favorable report to me of the conduct of Major-Generals Bridges and Popham, of the Company's Service, during the Campaign. And I have already had occasion, in my letters to the Court of Directors, to applaud the services of Major-General Hartley, on the Coast of Malabar.

* See p 598.

† A letter from General Floyd to the Governor General, dated Bangalore, the 26th August, 1799, contains the following passage on this subject.
“MY LORD,

When you did me the honour to give me your thanks for my poor services in the late war, and to offer me the very material assistance of your influence in my personal pursuits, whether of honours or of other advantages, I mentioned to your Lordship how much I should be gratified should His Majesty honour me with the command of a regiment of cavalry. I am sensible my military situations must be determined by opinions already formed of me during a practice of several years. I am always ready and happy to receive your Lordship's command, and I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,
your most obedient and most humble Servant,
J. FLOYD.

It appeared to me that even those parts of this letter which relate to the bounty of the East India Company, would be more properly addressed to you, than to the Court of Directors, who might deem it presumptuous in one of their servants to affect to point out to them the proper objects of their liberality on such an occasion as the present. You will, however, make whatever use of this letter may appear to you most advisable.

With regard to the several able and gallant officers, whom I have named, their persons were entirely unknown to me previously to my arrival in India, nor have I any knowledge of their respective families or connections in Europe. The services which they have rendered to the public, form the sole ground of my own acquaintance with them, and the only motive of the interest which I take in their welfare and honor. I know that the same circumstances will be their best recommendation to your countenance and protection.

Believe me, Dear Sir,
with great respect and regard
Yours, most faithfully and affectionately,
MORNINGTON.

No. CCXX.

*Address from the Inhabitants of Fort St. George to the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington. K. P. Governor-general, &c. &c. **

MY LORD

WE the undersigned inhabitants of Madras, impressed with a deep sense of the glory and advantage derived to the British empire from your lordship's administration, beg leave to approach your lordship with our sincere congratulations on the successful termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The dawn of your lordship's government opened to us the early prospect of restoring the national interests in India, to that security and elevation which had been acquired by the victories, justice, and wisdom of the Marquis Cornwallis; the

* This address was agreed to unanimously at a public meeting, Major General Ross in the chair; it was presented to the Governor General by a deputation of the principal inhabitants, and received in presence of Lord Clive, the Members of Council, Lieutenant General Stuart, &c.

removal of a power, festering in the centre of our possessions, and corroding one of our most important alliances, evinced, as well your lordship's foresight of the dangerous cloud, which was collecting, under the councils of France, as the decision and energy with which your lordship prepared to meet the impending storm.

A prudence less penetrating, or a vigour less active, might have been appalled at the difficulties of supporting a war against the kingdom of Mysore; but it was the peculiar energy of your lordship's mind, to anticipate the growth and maturity of those difficulties, to estimate the true extent of our own power, to seize the critical period of action, and to create resources, by inspiring a confidence and energy, correspondent to the extent and importance of your lordship's measures.

The result of those measures we now view with triumph and exultation, in the complete subversion of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, of whose enmity the determined inveteracy rendered peace undesirable; and whose infatuated attachment to the implacable enemy of England, rendered war unavoidable. The rapidity with which this great event has, under Providence, by your lordship's wisdom, and the gallantry of the army, been achieved, has left on our minds impressions of admiration, at a conquest unequalled in its importance, in the annals of British India.

The brilliancy of this conquest has spread a blaze of glory over the meridian of your lordship's government; and from the extensive influence of its effects, we have a just confidence that your lordship's career in India will close by diffusing throughout Hindostan, the calm of genuine peace, and undisturbed tranquillity.

Feeling in our immediate situation the first consequences of your lordship's success, we beg leave to offer your lordship our warmest acknowledgments, and, while we contemplate the benefits we now enjoy, we are unable to express our gratitude in terms adequate to our sense of the decisive termination with which the brilliant achievements of the Marquis Cornwallis and the victory of Admiral Lord Nelson have been crowned by the Earl of Mornington.

Madras, 26th June, 1799.

The Earl of Mornington's reply.

GENTLEMEN,

The zeal which distinguishes your congratulations on the prosperous termination of the late campaign in Mysore, is suitable to the character of British subjects, animated by the glorious success of a just and necessary war, and by the happy prospect of an honourable and secure peace.

It would not become me either to depreciate the efforts which have been made for your defence, or to disclaim the share which my public duty required me to take in them.

It would have been criminal in me to have neglected any precaution, or to have declined any exertion which, in my judgment and conscience, appeared necessary to the important object of frustrating the avowed designs of the enemy, and of providing for the safety of the valuable interests committed to my charge.

In the discharge of this duty I am happy to declare, that I have received the most cordial assistance from every class and description of the inhabitants of this settlement.

My acknowledgments of the honourable, generous and disinterested support of Lord Clive, and of the zealous co-operation of the members of the council, are not perhaps introduced with strict propriety on this occasion; but his lordship will pardon my eagerness to offer to him a public tribute of my sincere gratitude, respect, and esteem.

In all the principal civil and military officers throughout every branch and department of this government, I have found an unanimous spirit of alacrity and diligence, equalled only by their eminent abilities and extensive knowledge. The same spirit has marked the conduct of the commercial houses, and of the banks established in this settlement; by their seasonable assistance I was enabled, in the most critical period of our military preparations, to avail myself of the resources of this presidency, to an extent unexampled in its history.

By these aids, and by the extraordinary exertions of the governments of Bengal and Bombay, I was empowered to call forth that gallant army, whose transcendent achievements have delivered the Carnatic from the perpetual alarm of invasion, and converted the strength of our implacable enemy

into a new source of security and power to us, and to our allies.

It is, therefore, in your energy and zeal, and in the co-operation of all the British governments of India, that I trace the primary causes of our recent victories, and anticipate the settlement of a peace as propitious to our interests, and honourable to our national character, as the events of the war have been glorious to our military reputation.

Concord, unanimity, and prompt obedience, combined with a faithful and assiduous discharge of public duty, and a high sense of public honour in the public service, will render the Supreme government of these extensive possessions a grateful task, in the severest trials of difficulty and danger.

With such an union of loyalty and public spirit, we may confidently expect to counteract every device and machination of our enemies; to detect their intrigues, to disappoint their treachery, to repel their violence, and to perpetuate the British empire in India on the solid foundations of humanity and valour, justice and power.

Madras, 26th June, 1799.

MORNINGTON.

No. CCXXI.

Address of the Inhabitants of Bombay to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 3rd Aug. 1799.

We the undersigned British subjects, civil and military, now residing in Bombay, beg leave to offer to your Lordship our sincere congratulations on the termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun; a war founded in necessity and justice, prosecuted with extraordinary vigour, and crowned with unexampled success. In the accomplishment of this great object, whether we consider your Lordship's penetration in fathoming the perfidious designs of the Sultaun, in alliance with the French nation, in violation of a solemn Treaty, and without a pretence of provocation, to attack the British possessions in India,—the subsequent solicitude evinced by your Lordship to conciliate the Sultaun's friendship, and by recalling him to a sense of his obligations, to avert the calamities of war—the policy, when every overture of conciliation had been disregarded, obviating the menaced aggression by an immediate

appeal to arms, or the vigorous adoption of all the various measures essential to a successful prosecution of the war, every thing equally excites our admiration and applause ; and while the transcendent achievements of a gallant army, in execution of your Lordship's measures, and in the final conquest of the Sultaun's kingdom, have added new and never fading laurels to their brow, it is matter of exultation to every British subject to observe your Lordship, in the moment of triumph, and in the plenitude of power and conquest, exhibiting to the descendant of a deposed Prince, to our allies, and to the world, a fresh instance of British honour, British faith, generosity, and justice.

In the result of this conquest, as unprecedented in the rapidity of its completion, as it is unequalled in its importance, we behold the entire extinction of a cruel and relentless foe, a valuable acquisition of territory and power, the strength of our alliances in India increased, a destructive confederacy dissolved and defeated ; which, whilst it affords us the fairest prospect of a permanent internal tranquillity and security, relieves us also from the apprehension of external violence and invasion, by giving us a well grounded confidence, that it must effectually frustrate the machinations and intrigues of the Directory of France, the inveterate and implacable foe of England, and the common enemy of established order, liberty, and government, in every part of the world.

In addition to these important benefits, arising from the glorious termination of the Mysore war, we entertain the pleasing hope that the brilliant achievements in India, so opportunely aiding the splendid successes of his Majesty's arms in other quarters of the globe, will, from the extent of their influence, have a forcible operation in restoring to us the blessings of a general, permanent, and honourable peace.

Impressed with a deep sense of the honour and advantage derived to the British empire under your Lordship's Government, feeling in common with his Majesty's subjects in every other part of India, the immediate effect of your Lordship's recent measures, which peculiarly call for our warmest acknowledgments of respect and gratitude, and fully confiding in your Lordship's wisdom, integrity, and justice, that the powers of Government will ever be directed to the true interests of the people, we cannot omit this occasion of assuring

your Lordship that we shall not, without regret, behold the arrival of the moment that shall put a period to your Lordship's administration of the Government in India.*

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

With great respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants.

The Earl of Mornington's Reply.

GENTLEMEN,

It is peculiarly satisfactory to me to receive the honourable testimonies of personal esteem, and to observe the cordial expressions of zeal for the public service contained in your able and animated address.

The vigorous prosecution and prosperous issue of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun are to be ascribed, under Providence, to that unanimous spirit of prompt obedience and cheerful co-operation which I found in every part of the British possessions, and in every branch of the public service in India. This happy disposition proceeded not more from a sense of duty and a regard for the principles of subordination, than from a general conviction of the justice of our cause, and of the indispensable necessity of frustrating, by a seasonable effort, the systematic treachery of our faithless, implacable, and infatuated enemy.

The distinguished part which the Settlement of Bombay has borne during the late crisis in the labours and honours of the common cause has repeatedly claimed my warm approbation, and will ever be remembered by me with gratitude and respect. In your liberal and voluntary contribution towards the exigencies of your native country, and towards the defence of the Presidency under whose Government you reside,†

* This address was passed unanimously at a great public meeting convened by the present Sir Charles Forbes, Bart., a gentleman who in India as well as in England has pre-eminently distinguished himself by his noble public spirit—an expansive mind, and a truly Christian philanthropy.

† The Bombay Presidency, with Bengal and Madras, was equally zealous to promote the success of the Governor-General's measures; the voluntary loan towards prosecuting the war in Europe amounted to upwards of 300,000 rupees, of which Mr. Duncan generously contributed 25,000; Lieut.-Gen. Stuart, 20,000; Major-Gen. James Rivett, 12,000; Mr. Page

and in the alacrity with which you have given your personal services for the military protection of Bombay, I have contemplated with pleasure the same character of public spirit, resolution, and activity, which has marked the splendid successes of the gallant army of Bombay from the commencement to the close of the late glorious campaign.

The extensive power which the result of the war has placed in the hands of the allies has enabled them to conclude the pacification on such principles of moderation and equity, as afford a reasonable prospect of permanent security and repose.

Your unsolicited assurances of confidence and esteem confirm my desire and hope of deriving from the recent settlement of Mysore the inestimable advantages which it promises to the interests and honour of Great Britain, and to the peace, happiness, and prosperity of the native inhabitants of India.

I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. CCXXII.

*Address of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta to the Right Honourable the Governor General.**

MY LORD,

Calcutta, 21st August, 1799.

We, the British inhabitants of Calcutta, impressed with a deep sense of the great benefits which the public interests have derived from the wisdom and energy of your Lordship's Councils, in the glorious termination of the late war with

(M. C.) 12,000; Mr. J. Forbes, 8,000. The corps of Fencibles raised by the Presidency was 1,000 strong, of which Sir Charles (then Mr.) Forbes equipped and paid 50 men. It is to these patriotic acts and to the heroism displayed by the Bombay army, especially in the battle of Seedasere, (see p. 483), that the Governor-General refers in his Lordship's answer to the address.

* As at the other Presidencies this address was unanimously agreed to at a public meeting, convened by the sheriff (Mr. Ewer), and signed by all the European gentlemen of the Presidency. There were also addresses from other parts of India, and from the Hindoo gentry, and other native inhabitants, all breathing a spirit of loyalty to the British Government, and gratitude for the result of the Governor General's exertions.

Tippoo Sultaun, beg leave to present our sincere congratulations on the splendid events which have crowned your Lordship's measures with such rapid and complete success.

The fall of Tippoo Sultaun and his capital, the capture of his sons, the submission of his chiefs, and annihilation of his power, must secure to the Company's possessions the blessings of internal tranquillity; increase, beyond calculation, the resources, strength and stability of the British empire in the East; and, while they reflect the highest honour on the General and the army by whose brilliant victories your Lordship's objects have been accomplished, must transmit your Lordship's name with distinguished lustre to posterity.

The restoration of the injured race of Princes, whose dominions their rebellious subject Hyder Ali had usurped, and whose immediate descendant your Lordship has raised from a prison to a throne; the liberal provision your Lordship has bestowed on the family and chiefs of our implacable and cruel enemy, the late Sultaun of Mysore; and the partition of the conquered countries,* demand our warmest applause; and cannot but increase the confidence of the native powers, in the justice and clemency of the British nation.

To your Lordship's vigilance, energy and wisdom, Great Britain is indebted for all these great events; which, combined with the invaluable result of your Lordship's previous negotiations at the Court of Hyderabad, have not only relieved the British possessions and those of their allies from the constant apprehension of invasion by a restless and ambitious Prince, whom no moderation could appease, but must also extinguish every hope our inveterate enemies of France so anxiously cherished, of involving these happy countries in the calamities and horrors which they have spread over so many other regions of the globe; and will, we trust, under Divine Providence, essentially contribute to the final deliverance of Europe, from the chains which they have imposed, and to the ultimate object of every just and necessary war, a lasting, safe, and honourable peace.

We beg leave to offer our most respectful congratulations to your Lordship on your safe return to the chief seat of Government; where we earnestly hope you will long continue

* This refers to the settlement of the Mysore territory, which will be detailed in the subsequent volume.

to preside, and add to those great and numerous claims on the public gratitude, which, by such important and distinguished services, your Lordship already has acquired.

We have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servants,

Reply of the Right Honourable the Governor General to an Address presented to his Lordship by the British Inhabitants of Calcutta on the 21st of September, 1799.

GENTLEMEN,

I receive this distinguished mark of your regard with sentiments of satisfaction and gratitude, proportioned to my experience of your approved loyalty and public spirit, and of your just sense of the interests and honour of the British empire in India.

The prosperous termination of the late campaign in Mysore is a proper subject of public congratulation. The British arms have seldom achieved a conquest of greater lustre or value, and never were employed in a cause of more urgent necessity, or of more manifest justice. The progress of our success has revealed additional justifications of our original appeal to the sword; and the final triumph of our arms has been enhanced by the satisfactory reflection, that the war, which terminated in the destruction of our enemy, originated in his implacable hatred, flagrant treachery, and unprovoked aggression.

Under the blessing of Providence, favouring the justice of our cause, the rapid and uninterrupted course of our victories is to be ascribed to the admirable valour, skill, and discipline of the gallant officers and troops employed in Mysore; to the predominant influence of the British character in India; and to the intrinsic vigour of our extensive resources and established power.

It was my duty to make a seasonable use of these eminent advantages; and in the unanimity of our counsels; in the zeal, talents, and happy subordination of every branch of the civil and military service throughout the British possessions, I found the principles of that spirit of alacrity and ardour,

which accelerated the equipment of the army, and secured the early success of the war.

My thanks have already been offered to the governments and inhabitants of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, for the distinguished part which they have borne respectively in the late arduous crisis of affairs.

I am happy to avail myself of this public occasion to declare, that, from this Presidency I received the most effectual and timely aid, to an extent, which fully justified my confident expectations of cordial cooperation from the respectable hands, which, during my absence, administered the Government of Bengal.

In reviewing the more immediate causes of our success, I cannot repress a tribute of gratitude to him who laid the foundations of that strength which it has been my lot to call into action. The name of the Marquis Cornwallis is inseparably connected with the fame and power of Great Britain in this quarter of the globe; and will continue to be an object of affection and reverence as long as wisdom, fortitude, and integrity shall be respected, or any sense retained of justice, clemency, benevolence, public faith, or military glory. The final conquest of Mysore recalls the memory of that glorious war, in which the first shock was given to the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun: it must never be forgotten, that, under the auspices of the Marquis Cornwallis in that war, the supply and movement of our armies in Mysore were first reduced to a system of regularity and order; and our officers acquired that experience and skill so conspicuous in the able and masterly operations of the late campaign.* Under the

* The following letter was written by the Marquis Cornwallis to the Earl of Mornington, on receiving the intelligence of the Governor-General's reply to the Calcutta Address.

Dublin Castle, March 2nd, 1800.

MY DEAR LORD,

Your answer to the Address of the inhabitants of Calcutta, on your return to Bengal, was gratifying to me in proportion to my esteem for the person who honoured my services with such flattering approbation.

If I am to derive any credit from posterity for my endeavours to establish order, honesty and dignity in the Government of our Indian empire, it is to you, my dear Lord, that my fame will be indebted; for unless you

same auspices, the whole system of our defensive alliances in the peninsula of India was founded; and the national faith was maintained in a degree of purity and lustre, which inspired a general confidence in the British Government, and disposed the native powers to strengthen and cement their connection with the Company on the solid basis of reciprocal interest and mutual security. This favourable disposition was confirmed by the prudence, integrity, and honour of my immediate predecessor (Sir John Shore); and in the important negotiations, which it has been my duty to conduct, I have derived considerable assistance from the advantageous impressions of the British character, which I found deeply fixed in the minds of our allies.

Possessed of such powerful means, I have been enabled not only to prosecute the war with success, but to conclude the partition of our conquests on principles of moderation and equity, conformable to the laws, the honour, and policy of the

had gone to Bengal, the transient fruits of my labour would soon have been done away and totally forgotten.

Your correspondents in England will probably tell you that every thing is going on well in Ireland, and that the union will be carried with ease; but believe me the task will turn out more difficult than *they imagine*, and although I trust that we shall ultimately succeed, it will be after a long and violent contest. The leaders of opposition are able, and their followers are animated with that zeal which vanity, prejudice, and self-interest naturally inspire; and since Mr. Grattan has come forward, their cause is espoused in distant parts of the kingdom by the lower class, who looked on with indifference as long as faction was untainted with disloyalty. We have a majority of between forty and fifty, scarcely any of whom will, I believe, desert from us, but they are in general cold and languid friends, and it is very difficult to procure such an attendance, as the importance of the case, and the activity and unfair dealing of the enemy, render necessary for our daily security. In the mean time we hear, from credible quarters, that an attack upon us is intended from Brest, which, however difficult the enterprize may appear on the part of the enemy, adds considerably to the weight of my occupation.

I shall refer you for the affairs of England, and the general politics of Europe, to your better informed friends on the eastern side of St. George's channel, and shall content myself with assuring you that I am, with the most earnest wishes for your health and prosperity,

My dear Lord,

Most sincerely yours,

CORNWALLIS.

British nation, and affording the most rational promise of permanent security to the possessions of the Company, and of general tranquillity to India.

To whatever situation the course of future events may call me, the assurances of your personal confidence and esteem must always be highly honourable to my character, and grateful to my recollection.

While the administration of this arduous Government shall be entrusted to my hands, my earnest endeavours shall be constantly employed to secure and improve our recent acquisitions of territory, wealth, and power, and to guard the prosperity and happiness of these opulent and flourishing dominions by such effectual precautions as shall avert the arts and arms of France, and discourage her spirit of enterprise, or frustrate its ruinous effects.

MORNINGTON.

No. CCXXIII.

From the Right Hon. Henry Addington to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Palace-yard, 5th October, 1799.

The reward of public approbation and gratitude has, on no occasion, been more cordially and deservedly bestowed, than by the inclosed resolutions, which I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship, in obedience to the commands of the House of Commons.

Wisdom and vigour in council, and talents and exertions in the field, have eminently characterized the civil and military services in India, during the period of your Lordship's administration; and the effects of the measures which have been adopted, are to be found in the overthrow of a restless and perfidious power, in the dissolution of a menacing and formidable confederacy, and in the improved security of the British possessions in that quarter of the world.

Allow me, my Lord, so far to indulge my own feelings, upon this occasion, as to assure your Lordship, and those, who, under your auspices, contributed to successes so splendid and important, that, in the discharge of my official duty, I have never experienced a higher gratification, than in being the channel of affording this additional proof, that great and glo-

rious services will ever be distinguished by the applause, admiration, and gratitude of the Commons of Great Britain.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,
and faithful humble servant,

HENRY ADDINGTON.

No. CCXXIV.

Vote of Thanks of the HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Veneris 4^o die Octobris, 1799.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente,

That the thanks of this House* be given to the Right Honourable Richard Lord Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, in the kingdom of Ireland, and Governor-General of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the wisdom, decision, and energy, with which he discharged the arduous duties of his station, from the time of his taking upon him the said Government to the glorious termination of the late war by the capture of Seringapatam; during which period, by opposing to the perfidy of the late Sultaun of Mysore, an uniform moderation, dignity, and firmness, and by counteracting with equal promptitude and ability, the dangerous intrigues and projects of the French, particularly by destroying their power and influence in the Decan, he prepared the way for the rapid and brilliant operations carried on under his superintendence and direction, the result of which has finally disappointed all the designs of our enemies in that quarter, and has established, on a basis of permanent security, the tranquillity and prosperity of the British empire in India.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente,

That the thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Lord Clive, Governor of the settlement of Fort St. George, for his zealous, cordial and honourable concurrence,

* A similar vote was passed unanimously by the House of Lords.

in forwarding the wise and dignified views of the Governor-General in Council, by which he has furnished a salutary and memorable example of the advantage of unanimity and concord among the persons employed in high stations in the British dominions in the East Indies, and has, to the utmost of his power, promoted the success of those measures, from which the most important public benefits have resulted to this country.

Resolved, *Nemine Contradicente*,

That the thanks of this House be given to Jonathan Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay, for the zeal and promptitude of his conduct in preparing the army of that Presidency for the field, agreeably to the orders of the Governor-General in Council, whereby the army was enabled materially to contribute to the successful and glorious termination of the late war in India.

Resolved, *Nemine Contradicente*,

That the thanks of this House be given to Lieut.-General George Harris, for the whole of his able and meritorious conduct in the command of the forces of his Majesty and of the East India Company, during the late glorious and decisive war with the Sultaun of Mysore; and particularly for the ability, judgment, and energy, with which he planned and directed the assault of Seringapatam, the success of which brilliant achievement has so highly contributed to the glory of the British name, and to the permanent tranquillity of our possessions in the East.

Resolved, *Nemine Contradicente*,

That the thanks of this House be given to Lieut.-General James Stuart, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, which so gloriously co-operated in the success of the late campaign in India, and also to the Major-Generals John Floyd, Thomas Bridges, William Popham, James Hartley, and David Baird, and to the respective officers of the armies employed on that occasion against the enemy, for their distinguished and meritorious services.

Resolved, *Nemine Contradicente*,

That this House doth highly approve of, and acknowledge, the services of the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers employed against the enemy, in the glorious and decisive war in the East Indies, and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.

Ordered,

That Mr. Speaker do transmit the said Resolutions to the Right Honourable the Governor-General; and that his Lordship be requested by Mr. Speaker, to signify the same to the Governors, Generals, and other officers, referred to therein.

J. LEY, A. D. Dom. Com.

Vote of Thanks of the Honourable East India Company.

At a Court of Directors held on Tuesday, the 24th September, 1799, the Deputy Chairman, agreeably to an intimation given on the 20th instant, moving the Court, it was, on the question being severally put, Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to the Earl of Mornington, Governor-General, for the able and successful measures which he adopted, whereby the complete annihilation of French influence at the Court of Hyderabad was happily accomplished; for the ability, firmness, and decision manifested by his Lordship in his conduct towards the late Tippoo Sultaun, and for the previous measures which he pursued for enabling the army to take the field, whereby it was put in a situation to act with vigor against the enemy, and to effect the speedy conquest of the capital of the Mysore dominions, the happy presage of a lasting peace in India, and the consequent increase of prosperity to the East India Company.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to the Right Honourable Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, for his zealous co-operation with the Earl of Mornington in the measures proposed by his Lordship; and particularly in the exertions which he made for equipping the

Madras army for those operations which have redounded so much to its honor and to the interests of this Company.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to Jonathan Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay, for the zeal and promptitude of his conduct, in preparing the army of that Presidency for the field, whereby it was enabled to take a conspicuous share in the glorious achievement of the late campaign against the Mysore dominions.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to Lieut.-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the King's and Company's forces employed in the siege of Seringapatam, for the very able and judicious manner in which the attack of that fortress was planned.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to the officers of the King's and Company's forces employed in the assault of Seringapatam on the 4th of May, 1799, for the rapidity, animation, and skill, which they manifested in the execution of this important service; and to the non-commissioned officers and privates for the courage and intrepidity of their conduct upon that brilliant occasion.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to Lieutenant-General Stuart, for his able conduct in the command of the Bombay army previous to its junction, and to the officers and men of that army, who were engaged in the action of the 6th of March with a chosen body of the troops of Tippoo Sultaun, for their able and spirited conduct upon that occasion.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of this Court be given to Lieut.-Gen. Harris, and the officers and men of the King's and Company's forces under his command, for the great and important services rendered to the East India Company throughout the whole of the late glorious campaign, which has terminated to the advantage of the Company and the nation, by affording a well-grounded hope that the peace of India will be secured on a solid and lasting foundation.

APPENDIX

OF OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.

A.

Queries proposed by Lord Mornington to Major Kirkpatrick, with the Answers of the latter, (referred to in the Governor General's letters from the Cape of Good Hope, p. 2.

Question 1st.—What was the origin of the corps disciplined by European officers now in the service of the Nizam ?

Answer.—This corps consisted during the late war in Mysore (or at so recent a period as 1792) of no more, I think, than one battalion, at most, only of two ; which had been raised not long before the commencement of that war by its present chief commander, Raymond, a French adventurer, formerly belonging to the corps of Lally. Du Boigne's, and some other regular bodies of infantry (with field pieces attached) had been formed, antecedently to this period both by Mhadajee, Scindeah, and Tuckojee Holcar ; and it was probably in consideration of the important and abundantly obvious advantages which the former of these chiefs in particular had derived from such an establishment that first suggested to Azim ul Omra the expediency of a military institution. Raymond's battalion served during the war, principally, I believe, in conjunction with the detachment of the Company's troops furnished, according to treaty, to the Nizam.

Question 2nd.—What has been the augmentation of that corps ? At what periods of time has that augmentation taken place ? To what causes is it to be attributed ? And is there any ground for believing that either the formation or augmentation of that corps proceeded from any hostile disposition towards the British interests ?

Answer.—I am not acquainted with the terms or the extent of Azim ul Omra's original agreement with Raymond, but I deem it probable that it went to the establishment of more corps than were immediately raised. Be this as it may, the peace of Seringapatam had not been long concluded when the minister authorised, and, I believe, afterwards from time to time frequently urged him to complete his corps with all possible expedition to fourteen battalions, or regiments, of a thousand men each. Such a large augmentation might in some measure appear expedient on account of the great extension of territory obtained by the Court of Hyderabad through that peace : but I am disposed to think that it sprung principally from a desire of preparing for that contest with the Mahrattas so long before in contemplation of the minister, and which accordingly followed soon after. I see no reason to suppose that the measure was connected either immediately or remotely, at least in the mind of Azim ul Omra (whatever might

be the case in regard to Raymond) with any views of a nature hostile to our interests.

But although the corps was thus directed to be augmented to 14,000 men, yet Raymond had not been able to complete it to this establishment when the Nizam took the field against the Mahrattas. Its strength at the affair of Khurdlah hardly exceeded 11,000 men; but that he should have been able to increase it even to this amount within so short a period as two years, is a circumstance that no doubt evinces the activity and resources of himself and officers to have been very considerable.

Sometime after the return of the army to Hyderabad from the unfortunate expedition just alluded to, a nominal reduction of Raymond's corps took place; that is to say, the acting minister, in a fit either of economy, or of temporary dissatisfaction with its commander, directed the recruiting for it to be discontinued: in consequence of which its remains were compressed into 10 battalions or regiments of 1,000 men each.

In this state it appears to have continued till the return of Azim ul Omra to Hyderabad; but, according to the latest accounts the minister would seem disposed, if he had not actually agreed, to its being once more augmented to at least its formerly intended establishment of 14,000 men. If he should absolutely have adopted the measure, either he has done so on some particular suggestion of Raymond, or with some sinister view of thereby working upon our jealousy of that Frenchman's growing power. For, if he had really judged an increase of the regular infantry of the state necessary, his purpose would have been equally well answered by making the requisite augmentation upon the rival corps of Finglass. This too is the step which he ought rather to have taken consistently with his own spontaneous professions on the subject of Raymond to the assistant at Hyderabad immediately upon his return thither from Poonah, when he affected at least if he did not feel, considerable uneasiness at the conduct and dispositions displayed by that Frenchman in his absence, and no less solicitude to circumscribe within very narrow limits, if not altogether annihilate his power. Neither the fact, however, upon which the present reasoning proceeds (that is to say, the actual augmentation of the corps), nor the still more important one of the annexation of *Kummum-mai** the already enormous territorial assignments held by Raymond is sufficiently established to permit of our building any strong conclusions upon one or the other. It may, nevertheless, be allowable to observe in this place, that there will be but too much ground for fearing, should either or both of the points in question turn out to be true that Azim ul Omra must have been moved to proceedings so offensive (as he well knows) to us, and so much at variance with his own recent declarations, by a notion of the possibility, not to say probability, of the "French nation," acquiring, at no distant period, decided ascendancy in India as well as in Europe. There can be no doubt of the unceasing endeavours of the French party at Hyderabad to instil this notion into every one about that Court; and when it is considered that they have from 10,000 to 12,000 tongues, by means of which they can diffuse among a people, prone from the highest to the lowest, to believe the marvellous and striking, their true, false, or exaggerated accounts of the successes and *projects* of their nation, it will not, perhaps, be wondered at that the efforts of the Residency to expose their misrepresentations, or counteract their views in them, should not always be successful.

Question 3d —What is the present strength of the corps, the state of its discipline, and the number of European officers? Of what nation is the

* Alluded to in the notes.

majority of those officers composed? And what are the characters and principles of those who bear the chief command.

Answer.—With respect to its present strength the answer occurs (as far as circumstances enable me to furnish it with accuracy) in the preceding reply; to which it seems only necessary to add that, besides a field train of artillery, consisting of about 30 pieces, and on the whole pretty well appointed; there is attached to the corps a troop of perhaps 60 native dragoons (the embryo of a larger body of regular cavalry which Raymond manifests a desire of raising). With the exception of an European officer to each battalion or regiment (as it is most commonly called) and a sort of second to a few of them, all the other Europeans, to the number I apprehend of about 50, constituted, at one time, a separate corps. They have latterly, however, either been stationed to the artillery, or distributed in the character of serjeants among the several regiments; an alteration that I take to be an important improvement in his system. These men consist of various nations; and among them there are, I am sorry to say, but too many English deserters from the Company's artillery, who have been often, but fruitlessly, reclaimed. The parade appearance of the corps is, in general, good; that of Perron's regiment is particularly so. In other respects, however, its discipline would not seem to be very strict; which most probably speaks as a powerful inducement with many of the natives of the Company's as well as of the Nizam's country, to prefer the service of Raymond to ours. Whatever may be the cause, it is too certain a fact, I fear, that this Frenchman has greater facility in recruiting than our Carnatic officers experience.

I believe the number of the officers, properly so called, do not at present, or did not lately, exceed 12; and that the whole of these are Frenchmen, with the exception, perhaps, of one or more jacobinized Germans. He had formerly a Hanoverian of some professional merit in his corps, who had been an ensign in His Majesty's service. This man, however, was soon dismissed, and afterwards assassinated by a furious Demonah, in the employ of the Chief of the *Pungahs*. He had also with him at one time a French gentleman who had been an officer in the regiment at Pondicherry, but openly professing his attachment to royalty, he likewise speedily lost his situation, and was finally obliged to quit the country. The best disposed man in the corps is, or was some time since, one Salmave, commandant of a regiment, and supposed to be secretly averse to the democratic party. With the exception of Perron, Baptiste, and perhaps one or two more favourites, the officers were represented to be dissatisfied with Raymond on account of his hardness and want of liberality in pecuniary matters. But as they would nearly all appear to be of the jacobinical stamp, and have no prospect of bettering themselves elsewhere, this circumstance alone will hardly induce any of them to leave him, especially as he has contrived to make it very difficult for them to do so without his consent. Besides, he possesses a resource (such as it is), for replacing any he may lose by desertion or otherwise in his rank of serjeants, most of whom are just as likely to be qualified for the commands of corps as the majority of those at present holding them.

Raymond himself would not appear to be a man of vigorous mind; or, in any respect, of a very decided character. He has never shown himself to be much of a soldier; but he is artful, seems to have an arranging head, and is sufficiently conciliating in his manner towards those he has to deal with. He is an undoubted republican in principle; but I don't know that he is a violent one. I should rather suppose from the general mould of his character, that he was not. I take him to be about forty-five years of age.

Perron, who is his second, is a native of Alsace, and several years

younger than his Chief. He appears to be a far more enterprising and active man than the latter, and to be particularly fond of the military profession. I understand he is an outrageous Jacobin; as some proof of which it may be mentioned that he sent, not long since, to his namesake and countryman, the successor of Du Boigne, in the service of Scindeah, a silver tree and cap of liberty; the acceptance of which, however, is said to have been declined by the latter. Perron, at the head of two regiments, was with Azim ul Omra during the latter part of that minister's stay at Poonah; on which occasion he would, of course, not neglect to cultivate his namesake, or to disseminate his own principles as well as he could among the officers belonging to him. It happens, however, either that Scindeah's Perron is lukewarm in his politics, or that having several British subjects in his corps (introduced into it by Du Boigne), one of whom, named Sutherland, commands a brigade of six or seven battalions; he does not yet consider it safe or prudent to countenance any movements of this nature.

Baptiste, who stands next in rank to, is not a less bitter Jacobin than, Perron; but he is very much his inferior in point of military endowments. What he wants, however, as a soldier is made up for by a certain gasconading manner that suits very well the genius of the Court he belongs to, by great activity and cunning, and above all, by a large stock of that unprincipled sort of address so useful in the management of low intrigue, and the conduct of pecuniary transactions with the classes he has usually to deal with. He is also eminently and peculiarly serviceable to Raymond as the main link of his correspondence with Pondicherry, Tranquebar, and Marpilly; and as his agent for enticing French and other deserters, both native and European, and facilitating their escape to Khummm; where, just at our doors, as may be said, this bustling emissary of seduction, and procurator of all material supplies any way connected with, or depending on the Carnatic, has established his head quarters. I consider both Perron and Baptiste as much abler men, that is, more equal to the purposes of mischief or such purposes as the French Government may be supposed to machinate against us in the Hyderabad question—than Raymond; and should accordingly be sorry to see his command devolve on either of them.

I have nothing to add respecting the characters or dispositions of any of the rest of the officers of this corps to what has already been said generally of the whole,—at least not of sufficient interest or certainty to merit attention.

Question 4th.—In what mode is the corps paid and recruited? Of what nation are the ranks composed?—Where is it stationed? What have been its operations? What effects has its existence already produced upon the British interests at the Court of Hyderabad or elsewhere? And what dangers are to be apprehended to those interests from its continuance?

Answer.—Till the period of Azim ul Omra's captivity the corps had always been paid either immediately from the treasury at Hyderabad, or by occasional *tunkhaws*, on the revenue collectors, with the exception only of a permanent assignment, on the revenues of *Khummm* proper, which he had previously obtained as a fund for the payment of a particular division of his corps, nominally distinguished by the appellation of *Solyman Jakh's Rissalah*. During the administration, however, of the Roy Royan, he contrived to procure on a still better footing the whole Sircar of *Maiduck*, a fertile district, computed to yield about 18 lacks of rupees; and fully adequate, I believe, to the total charges of his corps, as fixed by agreement. This was among the financial arrangements of the Roy Royan in the absence of Azim ul Omra that appeared to give the latter the most displeasure, as placing the corps in a higher and more independent view than it had hitherto been his own policy to assign to it. We have nevertheless

since heard of his being prepared to follow the example of the Roy Royan in this particular, by granting to Raymond another extensive district, (namely, Khummum-mait), in addition to what he already held.

The corps is recruited more or less from all the provinces of the Nizam's dominions, but from none so much as Aurungabad; partly, I believe, from the adjacent Mahratta districts; and but in too great a measure from the dependencies of the Carnatic, particularly the northern sircars. The majority of the native officers would, more especially, appear to be natives of the latter; and of these a large proportion have been educated in the military service of the Company. I had taken some measures before my departure from Hyderabad for ascertaining, as well as possible, the names and birth-places of all the men of this corps, but in particular of its native officers, with the view of thereby obtaining some hold, through the medium of their families, on such as might prove to belong to the Company's dominions. It may be observed in this place that the pay of the coast sepoy in garrison, or cantonment, is less by a rupee (I believe) than that of Raymond's sepoy, whose duty too is easier. If it were raised a rupee, the effect would, probably, soon appear both in the decrease of desertion, and in a greater facility of recruiting than is experienced at present. A proclamation too might be issued, forbidding the natives of our territories, under certain penalties, from entering into the military service of foreign powers.

The station of the corps has varied according to circumstances. Raymond seems averse (and several reasons for this may be conceived) to its being divided; and its usual head-quarters are in the vicinity of Hyderabad, where he has established a sort of cantonment for it. Its professional services have hitherto been very inconsiderable. I have already glanced at those performed by what may be called the root of it, in conjunction with one detachment last war; and which principally appeared in the siege of *Kopul*. At *Khurdlah* (in 1795) the corps certainly gathered no laurels; but if it did not acquit itself on that occasion with spirit, the Nizam himself, as well as his Minister displayed still less. The rebellion of Rachore, headed by the late Darah Jah's son, was subdued by our detachment; for two regiments of Raymond employed on that service, under the command of the Mons. Salnave, mentioned above, had but little share in the business. In the insurrection of the late Jah, it happened fortunately for Raymond, that the Prince directed his flight to a quarter whither he could not be pursued by our troops without the consent of the Mahrattas. Raymond by simply following him to *Aurungabad*, where the Prince submitted without further struggle, acquired the credit of having crushed a formidable conspiracy. The military actions of neither party in the course of this short contest, were of the least importance. For the rest, the services of the corps have been much of the nature of those performed elsewhere by *Sebundy* or *Purgunnah* troops.

The principal effects hitherto produced, or likely hereafter to be produced by this corps upon the British interests, are referable to the circumstance of its being commanded by men belonging to a nation, and very probably devoted to a Government, which we have abundant reasons to believe have nothing so much at heart as the destruction of our power in India. It cannot, I am persuaded be requisite to enlarge on the dangers liable to proceed from such a source; or to expatiate either on the probable or possible consequences of so constant, intimate, and unrestrained an intercourse as must necessarily subsist, in the case before us, between the agents of Jacobinism and under the implacable enemies of Great Britain, and the Court of one of our principal allies—that Court too never distinguished for the inviolability of its engagements; and certainly governed less by views of honour, sound policy or justice, than by the variable mo-

tives of supposed safety, of low prudence, of personal ease, and of immediate advantage. It is plain that so close and mutual a relation between the Nizam and the notorious rivals of the English, is but too well calculated, in the present conjuncture, to excite doubts in many of the sincerity of his Highness's friendship for us, and to encourage a notion of the probability of the French regaining their former ascendancy at Hyderabad. Nor is the natural tendency of such a persuasion to promote the purposes and aid the operations of Raymond, by gaining him many useful instruments and adherents, so little obvious as to need being further insisted on.

There is, however, one particular danger connected with the point immediately under discussion, of such an aspect as to challenge the most serious consideration. What I allude to is the predicament we should be placed in, supposing a war with Tippoo to break out, by the unquestionably hostile dispositions of Raymond and his officers in general, seconded by the enterprising spirit of some individuals among them, which might in such a case, become more or less transfused into the Commander himself. It is manifest that though this corps constitutes the chief—nay, almost the sole strength of the Nizam's army, we should, notwithstanding, be unable to employ it against the common enemy, except at a risk, to which its total inactivity would be far preferable. But it is likewise obvious that we should not be altogether safe in leaving it behind us; since upon any sinister accident to our arms, or in the possible (happily no longer probable) event of a French armament appearing at such a crisis in India, the temptation to Raymond and his officers, openly to attempt something against us, might become very powerful. If time permitted, yet it would not perhaps be necessary to pursue this consideration further; the bare mention of the matter seeming sufficient to suggest the whole train of its consequences. Whether the evil admits of any eligible remedy, short of the radical one of entirely annihilating the corps in question, is a point on which different opinions may be entertained. My own, however, is, that under the existing circumstances with respect to us and France—circumstances, too, to the continuance of which no period can be assigned—it *does not*. Another prejudicial effect of this corps upon our interests, and which, though not of the same political importance as the one just noticed is, nevertheless, of sufficient magnitude to claim attention, has already been touched on, and consists in the inducements it holds out to our European and native soldiery on the coast, and in general to those classes of the inhabitants inclined to a military life, to join its standard; giving birth by this means, to numerous desertions from the Company's army, and rendering it extremely difficult to raise recruits for supplying even the ordinary casualties of the service. This is a mischief that, no doubt, might be corrected in a material degree, as far as regarded Europeans particularly, by suitable arrangements of precaution and vigilance; while, with respect to the natives, some augmentation of the Sepoy's pay, followed by such a proclamation as before suggested, would be found a still more effectual remedy. The evil, however, can never, perhaps, be completely removed while we have such a neighbour as Raymond.

Additional Questions—to be inserted (with their answers) in the proper places among the original ones.

Question 5th.—Have you any reason for believing that Raymond is in correspondence with the French Government in Europe, or that of the Isle of France—or with Tippoo Sultaun?

Answer.—I have no very substantial proof of his being in correspond-

I have dwelt the longer on the consideration of the expedient suggested in the present article (from the subject of which, however, the whole of the preceding paragraph must be owned to be a digression,) because I apprehend there may be some persons capable of imagining our political position in India, as ascertained at the peace of Seringapatam, to be so commanding as to enable us to carry a point of this kind with little or no difficulty. No doubt we were placed by that event, or rather by the political sagacity and military skill which conducted to it, on higher and more respectable grounds than we had ever before occupied in India; but we shall, nevertheless, do well always to bear in mind, that it is an envied eminence we stand on; and to beware how we forfeit or hazard, by a domineering spirit, what a spirit of moderation so much contributed to our gaining.

Before we dismiss the consideration of the measure suggested in this article, it may be proper to notice a modification of which it may be thought susceptible, and which presents itself in a limitation of its operation to the *European part of the corps*, and an offer of replacing this immediately by British subjects. But though the main obstacle to the measure, namely, that of depriving the state of its principal military force, would by this means be got rid of; yet it would, at the same time, become liable to much of the objection lying against the first expedient; from which it would not then materially differ in the chief feature.

3rd. I shall confine myself to observing with regard to the suggestion contained in this article, that although I have little doubt of the general efficacy of the measure, yet its adoption would not seem to be warrantable or prudent in any other cases than those of an absolute rupture with the Nizam, or of some strong and open act of hostility on the part of Raymond himself. Such cases have, in some degree, been secretly provided for, but not to the extent that would, probably, be requisite. For though a simple pecuniary *douceur* might answer in some instances, yet in others it might be necessary to hold out something like a permanent provision, if not even employment.

4th. It has long been a favourite object with the court of Hyderabad to make the defensive engagements, subsisting between it and the Company, *general* instead of *particular*; or, in other words, *that we should guarantee its possessions against the Mahrattas, as well as Tippoo Sultan*. It has also long sought to prevail on us to relax from the strictness of that article of the agreement of 1789 with Lord Cornwallis, conformably to which we have always, not only restrained our detachment from acting against certain polygars, tributary to the Mahrattas as well as to the Nizam, but also carefully prevented it from passing the Mahratta boundaries whenever this has appeared necessary (as owing to the mingled nature of their respective dominions, has sometimes happened,) in order to reaching the point where its services were required. Such, for instance, was its situation towards the close of the rebellion of Ali Jah, whom it was obliged to decline pursuing to Aurungabad, because this could not be done without its occasionally entering the Mahratta territory; and because the court of Hyderabad either would not apply for, or could not obtain, the consent of the Poonah Government for that purpose.

By complying with the wishes of the Nizam's Ministers in these respects, and agreeing to such an augmentation of the detachment at present employed with his Highness, as might be judged necessary, there is little doubt but we should obtain our object with regard to Raymond to whatever extent we pleased: to say nothing of other advantages that we might either expressly and previously stipulate for, or subsequently derive from the ascendancy which we should in this case, acquire at the court of Hyderabad.

Perhaps even something short of these compliances might procure us

Allum, the expediency of introducing some select British subjects into his Highness's employ, for the purpose of raising and disciplining for his services such a body of troops as would, in the first instance, have served as a counterpoise to the corps of Raymond; and, perhaps, ultimately have led, by gradual reforms, to its complete reduction. At the same time that I started this idea, I fully admitted the mischievous tendency, in an absolute view, of the general measure; offering it simply in correction of an evil that already reached to an enormous height, that bore, for obvious reasons, a particularly threatening aspect at Hyderabad: that called for a speedy remedy in that, more pressing than in any other quarter; and that did not admit, as well as I could judge, either of a prompter or more certain one than that which I, or rather Meer Allum, (not to say the Nizam himself) had recommended. The Governor-General seemed to be sensible of the necessity of the experiment; and even to have fixed, at one time, upon a person every way qualified, I believe, for conducting it to a favourable issue. In the meanwhile, however, Lord Hobart declared himself to be decidedly averse to the measure; inasmuch, that I thought it would be no longer easy or prudent to pursue it. Here then it dropped for the present.

I cannot call to mind, at this time, the particular arguments publicly opposed by Lord Hobart to the measure; but, I recollect that I myself furnished him with the objection that had all along appeared to me (though with him it was only of secondary consideration) to be the most forcible of the whole; and that was *the offence it might possibly give to the Mahrattas*. Yet, neither was this an insuperable obstacle, since the circumstance of there being several British subjects in the service of the Mahrattas themselves, would have furnished (if the affairs had been conducted as I proposed) a sufficient answer to any dissatisfaction they might have manifested on the occasion.

But though I cannot detail Lord Hobart's reasoning on the subject, I have not forgotten, that it comprehended all the topics obviously adverse to such a question considered absolutely; and that though he did not, in my judgment, demonstrate the inexpediency of the thing, as an insulated measure, yet he abundantly proved its danger, as a general one: of which truth no person indeed could be better satisfied than I myself had always been.

The Governor-General continuing to deem it extremely desirable to oppose the best check that circumstances might admit of to the growing power of Raymond, (which, indeed, daily became more and more alarming) thought proper to authorise the resident at Poonah to promote, but with due precaution, the introduction into Azim ul Omra's (or rather the Nizam's) service, of certain Europeans at that place, who appeared disposed to engage in it, and to be of a description likely to answer as some sort of counterpoise to that Frenchman. The consequence was, that an American named Boyd, and a British subject of the name of Finglass, were entertained by the Minister; the former bringing with him a ready-formed and experienced corps of about 1500 men; but the latter only a small body, which it was settled should be (as it since, I believe, has been) considerably augmented. Mutual disgust, however, soon arising between Mr. Boyd and the Court of Hyderabad, he quitted the service. Mr. Finglass proving more tractable, appears to be rising in favour with the Ministry.—I am not qualified to speak from my own knowledge of this man; but Mr. Uthoff, the assistant at Poonah, has reported favourably of his character. He was formerly, I think, quarter-master of his Majesty's 19th regiment of dragoons.

It may not be amiss to mention in this place, that on occasion of an alarm somewhat hastily taken, in August last, by our detachment at Hyderabad, in consequence of a report of Raymond's designing to attack their camp

both Mr. Boyd and Mr. Finglass, on being apprised of the circumstance, instantly prepared their corps, and signified their determination, in the supposed event, of supporting the Company's troops.

I shall close this head with remarking, that if a fair trial of the project suggested (as above related) in 1795, had been made, I think there is a considerable probability that Raymond's would by this time, either have ceased to exist, or, at least, to be an object of the reasonable solicitude which it excites at present.

Question 8th.—What measures now appear to you to be the best adapted to the object of inducing the Nizam to disband this corps?

Answer.—The pressing importance to the British interests in India, of effecting (and with as little further delay, too, as possible) the subversion of this party, though a point only incidentally considered in the preceding pages, and by no means any where urged with the force of which it is susceptible, may be presumed (as it is, indeed, by the question supposed) to be fully established. It only remains then to enquire how this desirable object may be best attained.

The most attentive examination I have been able to bestow on the subject, has suggested to me nothing better than the four following modes of proceeding.

1.—By introducing, with every possible previous attention to their characters and principles, British subjects (or other Europeans, being the subjects of friendly powers) into the service of his Highness, with a view in the first instance, to balancing the French corps, and of ultimately, completely suppressing it.

2.—By pointedly and firmly demanding the dismissal of the corps, and signifying the determination of our Government to withdraw itself, in case of refusal, from its existing engagements with his Highness.

3.—By holding out suitable inducements to the European and principal native officers, as well as to the European serjeants of the corps to quit it, and retire into the Company's dominions: a measure which, if tolerably successful, would necessarily either bring about the entire dissolution of it, or at least, reduce it to a state of comparative insignificance.

4.—By meeting the wishes so often expressed by the Nizam's Government, for a closer connexion with the Company; and for such an augmentation of the detachment of our troops already allowed his Highness by treaty, as should in some measure preclude the necessity of retaining Raymond's corps

I shall consider each of these expedients in order.

1st.—Regarding the first of them, however, little remains to be said, the subject being nearly exhausted in the reply to query the 7th.—It would, no doubt, under present circumstances, although a foundation for it is already laid by the establishment of Finglass's corps, be of slow operation.—Besides the inclination of Azim ul Omra to countenance the measure farther, is at least uncertain. He may possibly imagine that by manifesting a backwardness in this respect, we may be the more readily induced to do what he would like still better—that is, augment our detachment and take off some of the restrictions under which it has hitherto acted. It may be added, that the Government at home, having thought proper to discourage the measure immediately under consideration, (though on what grounds is not known to me) it is the less necessary to enlarge on it at present.

2nd. With the exception of *the Peishoush*, which, perhaps, no circumstance short of an open rupture with the Nizam, would warrant our withholding, there seems nothing in the measure suggested in this article that might not be vindicated both to the world at large and to the other member of the triple alliance (or the Mahratta state), by a variety of forcible arguments deducible from the absolute impossibility of our ever acting to-

gether, under any critical state of things, with the confidence and concord necessary to the success of our joint operations, or even with entire safety to ourselves, composed as his Highness's principal military force virtually is, and swayed as his councils are, or may be, by the inveterate enemies of our nation. But however defensible, or reconcilable with the spirit of treaties, such a step might be, I very much doubt whether it would at any time, and especially in the present conjuncture, produce the desired effect. The proud spirit of this court (still proud under its recent humiliations), would revolt at such a capitulation; and, most probably, hazard much rather than subscribe to it. It would talk, as it has already done, more than once, on occasion of some temperate and distant expostulations on the same head, of its independence; of its right to employ and favour whom it pleases; of its reliance on the fidelity and attachment of its French servants; and of the unreasonableness of our entertaining any distrust of men entirely at the devotion, and the mere creatures, of a friendly power, having no interests but what are inseparable from ours. But these arguments, plausible as they are, do not constitute the sole, or perhaps principal difficulty in the present case. One of the consequences of Raymond's corps (and besides Raymond's corps there is another consisting of from twelve to fifteen hundred sepoys, commanded also by Frenchmen, attached to the Rissalah of Umjid ud Dowlah)*, has been a material reduction of every other description of military force; insomuch that, excepting the regular infantry of the state, it has few other troops of any estimation. Were it then to comply with the proposed demand, it would be left without sufficient means not only of defending itself against foreign attack and domestic insurrection, but of collecting its revenues; for it is not to be supposed that our small detachment would be adequate, even if there subsisted no objections to its being applied, to all these purposes. The experiment failing (as I am of opinion it almost necessarily must), and we following up our provisional resolution in that case, the consequence, it is natural to suppose, would very soon be a closer connexion than ever, if that should be practicable, between this court and the French; and at all events, such an understanding with Tippoo as would hardly fail to give him that ascendancy in its councils which he has long been endeavouring (more sedulously than artfully, perhaps,) to acquire.

It may be thought that the abominable tendency of French principles (in whatever view considered,) and the evil consequences which have resulted to almost every power that that nation has drawn into its alliance, if properly exposed and illustrated, ought to have the effect of exciting, at the different courts of India such a detestation of the one, and dread of the other, as to render any connexion between them next to impossible. But though these are topics which have not been neglected; and though they doubtlessly seem well calculated to produce the sort of impressions to be wished for, yet it would be wrong to place any great reliance in considerations which unfortunately have not always had the weight they were entitled to with European powers better qualified, in general, to appreciate their force (as being more conversant in systematic and prospective politics,) more immediately liable to suffer from a coalition with the new republic; and, finally, more interested to oppose its aggrandizement, than any of the princes or states of India can be. It is true, that a French connexion would be dangerous even to Tippoo Sultan; but remote and speculative danger is often overlooked in favour of immediate, and, perhaps, only apparent, benefit. With regard to the court of Hyderabad in particular, I may venture to say, that its political views hardly ever embrace a very distant period, or any combinations having the permanent advantage of the state for their object.

* The principal Pungah Chief.

ence either with the Government of France, or with that of the Mauritius; though whispers to this effect have reached me from his camp. The strongest circumstance I know of, indicating such an intercourse, is his having fired a salute about two years ago on occasion, as was at least given out in his party, and reported to me by one of them, of his having recently received the commission and uniform of a general officer from the French Government in Europe. Considering, indeed, the great activity of that Government—the obvious interest it has in attaching Raymond to its cause—and the dispositions of the latter and his officers, nothing certainly can be more reasonable than to suppose such an intercourse subsists between them.

The proofs of the existence of a correspondence between Raymond and Tippoo Sultaun will, perhaps, be deemed less vague, when one of these is stated to be the discovery, a few months ago, by the Assistant at Hyderabad, of a secret intercourse between him and the vakeel of the latter (Medina Sahab) residing at the Nizam's Court. It was conducted through the medium of a third person who, it is remarkable, disappeared immediately after his name had been confidentially communicated to Azim ul Omrah by Captain Kirkpatrick.

It is also a fact sufficiently well established, that the last secret agent deputed by Tippoo to Hyderabad, (namely, Kâdir Hûsain Khan) had charge of some letters for Raymond; but whether they were from the Sultaun himself or only from Vigee's (formerly Lally's) corps in the service of Tippoo, I had not the means of ascertaining.

Question 6th.—Does Raymond occupy any fortified posts either on the Company's frontier, or elsewhere? and if he does, what is their strength and garrisons; and what are the advantages he derives, or disadvantages we suffer, from his possession of them?

Answer.—He occupies two or three small forts in the district of *Maiduck*, of which, as has been already mentioned, he is in some sort the renter. They are, however, of but little importance in a military view; and are in a quarter remote from the Carnatic.

The only post he holds in our neighbourhood is *Khumum*, where *Baptiste* (otherwise *Talihar*) has commanded for several years; and where a regiment of the corps has usually been stationed. The fortifications are not, I believe, considerable, but they have been improved, I understand, by Baptiste. It serves Raymond as a magazine; the stores he from time to time procures from the Carnatic, being in the first instance deposited here, and forwarded, as occasion requires, to Hyderabad. It is also conveniently situated for communication with Narpilly (formerly a French post in the Guntoor) where Raymond has a store-house, (ostensibly belonging to the Nizam) in charge of a Frenchman of the name of *L'Empereur*. This is also the point whence Baptiste's emissaries issue for the purpose of inveigling deserters, and procuring recruits from the adjacent districts of *Ongole*, *Guntoor*, &c. It is likewise the principal link in Raymond's communication with *Pondicherry*; most of his messengers to and from thence; all the French fugitives, and many recruits obtained in the same quarter, pursuing the route by *Kurpal* and *Khumum*.

It is presumed that this hasty sketch of the advantages which Raymond derives from the possession of this post, will sufficiently show the detriment it is of, and may be to us.

Question 7th.—What measures have been suggested for the purpose of inducing the Nizam to disband this corps, and what have been the objections to the adoption of any measures suggested for that purpose?

Answer.—I suggested some time in 1795, in a private correspondence with the Governor-General and Lord Hobart, under sufficient encouragement to that end received from the Nizam, through the medium of Meer

our main object. But as perfect confidence is not likely to subsist for any long time together between the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, and as apprehensions of future encroachments by the latter will ever continue, most probably, to be entertained by the former, who, on this account, will always deem it necessary to be prepared for such a contingency, it may be presumed that it will scarcely consent to part with Raymond's corps, without our undertaking, in some shape or other, if not by express defensive engagements, to secure it against that danger. It would be to no purpose, as to this particular, that we replaced that corps by an adequate body of our own troops, if those troops, in case of an invasion of his Highness's territories by the Mahrattas, should not be at liberty to assist in repelling it; which, however, is the predicament that our detachment stood in during the late contest between these two powers.

There is, probably, one point at least that Azim ul Omra would consider as an indispensable condition in such an arrangement as we are now contemplating, though he were even to waive insisting on a general defensive alliance against the Mahrattas; and that is a positive engagement to support the succession as it might be settled by the nomination of the Nizam (or, in other words, by himself,) against all opponents whatsoever. Now such an engagement might happen to place us in opposition to the Mahrattas, who, upon the Nizam's death, might be disposed to favour some other Pretender to the Musnud; and, persisting to maintain his cause, make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for us to avoid a war with them. Here is an impediment that deserves to be well considered, and weighed against the advantages of the measure immediately in question.

In regard to the restrictions under which our detachment has hitherto served, I am of opinion that without their being removed, no body of troops that we might supply to replace Raymond's corps would compensate, to the Nizam for its loss, since while they continue, they must operate, as hitherto, to deprive him of its services in cases, perhaps, of the first importance in his estimation. Besides, though these restrictions were properly enough established by us, yet they are considered, and not entirely without reason, as great hardships by the court of Hyderabad, between which and the Government of Poonah there subsists a sort of tacit convention, whereby the forces of his Highness have not only occasionally passed through the other's territories, but even acted against the Polygars tributary to both states (as those of Shorepoor and Gudwaul,) without any visible objection on the part of the Mahrattas. We certainly could not now relax from the rigidity of our practice in these particulars without giving offence, and furnishing a just ground of complaint, to the Government of Poonah; but, on the other hand the peculiar nature of the case would appear to warrant a hope that the difficulty might be surmounted by means of a suitable representation to the court of Poonah, made in concert with that of Hyderabad.

But however practicable it should be to obtain the acquiescence of the Mahrattas in these points, or with whatever indifference they might view even our determination to interfere in the settlement of the succession to the Musnud of Hyderabad, it can scarcely be doubted that such an extension of our defensive engagements with the Nizam, and such an augmentation of our detachment serving with him as above spoken of, would excite in them considerable jealousy and alarm. The consequences to which sentiments of this kind might lead are not difficult to conceive; and though they are not, perhaps, inevitable, yet in measuring the advantages against the disadvantages of the proceeding under discussion, it may be right (and will, at least, be the safest way,) to take these last in the extreme. And here it is proper I should acknowledge my own incompetency, and the superior means of the Residency at Poonah to appreciate, with

due exactness and greater certainty, the extent of the effects capable of being, or likely to be, produced on the Mahratta Government by the different measures in question. That Residency also will be best able to ascertain how far, and to suggest in what manner, it may be possible to reconcile it to those measures. On this last head I shall, for my own part, only venture to hint, that perhaps an offer to admit it to a participation of any advantages granted to the court of Hyderabad, might conduce to remove its objections to the arrangement; and that though the Mahrattas are not likely ever to stand in need either of our troops, or our guarantee against the Nizam, yet they might not be unwilling to accede to the projected Treaty with his Highness, on condition of our agreeing to a defensive alliance with them against Zemaun Shah and the Seiks, which it may sooner or later be advisable for us to do with other views besides that of propitiating them in regard to the objects of the present enquiry.

In conclusion, and on an attentive review of all that has been advanced, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be my opinion that of the four different modes which have been suggested for arriving at our object with regard to the corps of Raymond, the one calculated to accomplish it with the most promptitude and efficacy, and the least liable to failure, is the fourth or last. It must at the same time be confessed, that owing partly to a certain unaccommodating and illiberal spirit in the Government, and partly to the generally disordered state of its finances, our present detachment suffers inconveniences on the score sometimes of pay and at others of provisions, that would, as well as the unpleasant expostulations and discussions to which they occasionally give rise, be but too likely to increase with any considerable augmentation of its numbers. The most effectual way of preventing these difficulties under a new arrangement would probably be by procuring the assignment of one or more districts known to be adequate in point of revenue to the discharge of the subsidy; and, in their other resources, to supplying the remaining wants of the troops. *Kurpah* alone, if not entirely, would yet, in a great measure, particularly well answer these purposes; at the same time that our possession of it would, on account of its local position with regard to the north-eastern parts of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, add considerably to the security of the Carnatic, and especially of the Sircars. Whether the jealousy and discontent which that Prince would no doubt conceive at our gaining even a footing of so limited a nature in *Kurpah* ought to make us waive so great an advantage, is a point for the consideration of others.

It would likewise, in the event of such a connection between us and the Court of Hyderabad as the one in contemplation, particularly behave us to be on our guard against the arts which the latter might be but too apt to practise for the purpose of provoking an attack from the Mahrattas, and with the secret view of prosecuting in that case, by our means, some project of resentment or aggrandisement.

The only remaining precaution that occurs to me as particularly necessary to be taken in case of a material augmentation of our troops at Hyderabad, respects the selection of not only their commander, but of all the principal officers; in whom it would be desirable, for obvious reasons, that temperate and conciliatory manners, a just solicitude for the maintenance of the national character, together with a competent knowledge of the customs and language of the country, should be joined to the qualifications more properly professional.

Notes to the Answers.

Page 639. *Pungah*, in its more restrained sense, signifies cavalry mounted on horses, the property of the Sircar; and is equivalent to what we call the *stable-horse* of Tippoo Sultaun. At the Court of Hyderabad, however, it has come to be applied more generally, being used there to denote what may otherwise be called the household or body guards, comprehending foot as well as horse; and the commanders of which have been commonly distinguished by the appellation of *Pungah Salah Sidars*. By the *Pungah party* is meant that political division among the Omras of this state, headed by the chiefs of the *Paugah*. It was established by the late Shums ul Omra, principal commander of these troops, and sometimes called commander in chief of the Nizam's army. He had a great jealousy of the influence of Azim ul Omra, whom he was much in the habit of opposing during his life-time. He died at Paangul early in the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, leaving an infant son on whom the Nizam conferred the title of his father (or Shums ul Omra), as well as the principal command of the *Pungah*. But though this youth is, in consequence, strictly speaking, the chief of the *Pungah*, yet his maternal uncle and guardian, Umjid ud Dowlah, has hitherto been more usually considered as such. Next in rank of this party to Umjid ud Dowlah is Ghasimeea, who is likewise a kinsman of Shums ul Omra. The most efficient member of it however, till lately, was supposed to be Mahommed Azeen Khan, who aspired, as it was thought, to the station of minister; but who is at present a state prisoner in the fort of Golconda. This party continued its opposition to Azim ul Omra, after the death of the elder Shums ul Omra, and in fact were, in conjunction with Govind Kishen, the Mahratta Vakeel at the Nizam's Court, the framers of the treaty of Khurdlah, which led to, if it did not actually stipulate by a secret article, the surrender of the minister's person. But the victory of the *Pungah* party in this instance was of short duration; for the Nizam had scarcely got back to Hyderabad when he discovered, or was made to believe, that his honour and interests had been basely sacrificed on that occasion. In consequence, the active members of the party soon fell into disgrace; but as Umjid ud Dowlah either was not considered as falling under this description, or was thought to have atoned for his past errors by his early separation from his colleagues, he escaped their punishment. The credit of the party has since been rapidly on the decline, insomuch that it may be doubted whether it is any longer an object of solicitude to Azim ul Omra, though heretofore very much his dread.

Page 639. That we must depend principally if not solely on our own arrangements for intercepting deserters, &c. from the Carnatic, will appear from the answer once given to the resident upon his complaining to the Nizam's ministers, that his Highness's *Aumils* and other officers did not duly exert themselves to prevent such persons from entering into or proceeding through their respective districts. "If the more watchful and active officers of your Government (said they), cannot prevent deserters from passing through and escaping beyond the Company's country, it cannot be a matter of surprise that they should be able to elude the vigilance of our's."

APPENDIX B.

Extract of a Letter from Jacob Bosanquet, Esq., Chairman of the Court of Directors, to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, dated East India House, 1st June, 1798.

France is now fitting out a considerable fleet in the Mediterranean, the destination of which is unknown; amongst other objects, the conquest of Egypt has been mentioned, and though I do not think it very probable, either that the attempt will be made, or that it could succeed if it was, I think it is impossible for us to be too much upon our guard, as we know India to be one of the great objects to which the French at present are directing their attention. By every thing that I can collect, it appears that both the conquest of Egypt, and the conveyance of a force down the Red Sea, might be carried into execution by France under certain circumstances, and therefore what is not impossible, ought always to be looked to with a certain degree of caution by prudent men. All I propose by this letter is to call your attention to the subject, and to recommend you to neglect none of those precautions that you may think may reasonably be employed to frustrate any attempt of the French, either to pass a body of men to India surreptitiously, or by the more open mode of really taking possession of any part of Egypt.

A true Extract. JONATHAN DUNCAN.

APPENDIX C.

An Abstract of the present State of Tippoo Sultaun. By Captain (subsequently Sir John) Malcolm.

In drawing up the Abstract I have neither time nor information to take a wide range, I shall therefore confine myself to a few principal points.

The nature of the intelligence on which the knowledge of the Sultaun's designs and actions is founded must create diffidence in any person who relates them. I have made it a rule to assume no fact that is not minutely corroborated by two or more persons who were employed for the same purpose of obtaining intelligence, but who, from circumstances must have been wholly unacquainted both with the persons and occupation of each other.

I mean to arrange this abstract under three general heads.

1st. The military force, which will include the fixed establishment. Their present strength, mode of payment, state of discipline, principal military officers, their characters, their estimation with Tippoo, garrisons, and their present state.

2nd. The revenue department. State of his treasury, alterations of his mode of management, principal revenue officers, their characters and estimation.

3d. Late occurrences, present stations of troops, policy of the Sultaun, and reflections.

1st. *Military Force.* The fixed establishment of the Sultaun's standing army is as follows:—Three Kutcheries of regular cavalry called Askars, each to consist of four Mokums, of 1000 horsemen each, amounting to

12,000. Three Kutcherries of irregular cavalry, called Suars, Sillahdars; indifferently each Kutcherrie to consist of four *Rissallas*, of 1,000 men each, 12,000. Three Kutcherries of regular infantry, called Jiesh; each Kutcherrie consists of four Cushoons, of 4,000 firelocks and eight field pieces, two battering guns, and two camel load of Rockets attached; men 48,000, field pieces 128, and battering guns 32. One Kutcherrie of Slaves, to consist of two Cushoons, called *Assudullah* and *Ahmedu*, who are considered as the guards of the Sultaun, and generally do fort duty; 8,000 men, sixteen field pieces, and four battering guns. One Kutcherrie of pikemen, called Jelloo, that attend always the Sultaun's person, 2,000. One Kutcherrie of pioneers, 8,000. A Kutcherrie of Carnatic peons, called Sooder, who are employed in collecting the revenues, and as garrisons to small forts, 8,000.

Abstract of Established Force.

	Regular Cavalry.	Irregular Cavalry.	Infantry.	Slaves or Guards.	Pikemen.	Peons.	Pioneers.	Field Pieces.	Battering Guns.
Total	2,000	1,200	48,000	8,000	2,000	8,000	8,000	144	36

About 500 have been lately entertained and though admitted on the strength, have not yet joined this corps, as both men and horses are yet training; 300 of the horses were brought from Poonah, and 200 by ships to Mangalore.

N. B. There are besides these many local corps of peons that are not included.

N. B. Though no corps of Golendanzes, or gunners, are stated in the above, they are supposed attached as well as gun lascars.

N. B. Independent of the horse abovementioned, there are about 800 Beyd or Looties, who follow the army, and whose occupation is plunder.

The establishment has never been completed; its present strength, from the best information I have may be reckoned as follows:—Regular horse, 6,000; Irregular horse, 7,000; Regular infantry, 30,000.

Guards, viz. Ahmasy and Assadulah, 4,000; pikemen, 1,500; pioneers, 6,000; Carnatic peons, 8,000.

Abstract of real Strength.

	Regular Horse.	Irregular Horse.	Regular Infantry.	Guards, &c	Pikemen.	Carnatic Peons.	Pioneers.
Total	6,000	7,000	30,000	4,000	15,000	8,000	6,000

N. B. I have not yet included battering guns, field pieces, or rockets, imagining he has at all times as many of these as he can transport, and also as many elephants, camels, and draught and carriage cattle as he ever can require; he has with his army 100 mules, which are reported to be for his guns.

Tippoo's European or French Force, as it is called, consists as follows:—

	Officers.	Private Europeans.	Half-Cast and Caffries.
Lally's Party	4	40	350
Lately arrived from the Mauritius	6	50	100
Total	10	90	450

Pay and the Mode of Payment.

The mode of payment of the army differs as much as the troops do of which it is composed.

The Askars or stable horse receive a monthly net* pay of twelve rupees. The horses are the property of the Circar, at whose expense the men are clothed and armed.

The horses of the irregular cavalry belong either to the Commander or the horsemen, and the Circar pay a regular monthly sum for each; 40 rps. a Hindoo horseman, and 45 to a Mahomedan. If a horse belonging to the irregular cavalry is killed on service, the Circar to pay a stated price, and half of all plunder is considered as the Circar right.

The Sultaun has lately ordered that the Jimmidars of the irregular horse should have lands (*Jaidads*) assigned them for payment in lieu of receiving cash from the Treasury.

The regular infantry are divided into three classes, which receive a net pay as follows:—1st† class, 10 rupees per month; 2nd ditto 8½ ditto; 3rd ditto, 7 ditto.

The Assoudullha and Ahmedu or guards, formerly received 5 rupees per month; and were victualled by the Circar, but I am informed they now provide themselves and receive monthly 15 rupees.

The pikemen per month, 10 rupees; the Carnatic peons, 5 ditto; the pioneers, 8 ditto; golandanzes, 10 ditto; gun lascars, 7 ditto.

* I stile it *net pay*, because all the troops have a nominal pay, exceeding considerably what they actually receive, a circumstance which arises from the difference of exchange in the Circar payments, and in the Bazaar.

† All these three classes meet in one kutcherry, of which they compose different *bessallahs*.—Between the two first, the difference of pay is made on account of the difference of size and appearance; they do similar duties. The third class are subordinates, put on all duties of fatigue, and into garrison, but never hardly brought into action.

Lally's party are paid by contract. The Sultaun allows the Commandant, for each European horseman, 90 rupees per month; for each European foot soldier, 30 ditto; for Caffries and half-cast, 20 ditto; for native Sepoys, 16 ditto; for a gun, 500 ditto; for an elephant, 12 pagodas; for his own pay as Commandant, 2000 rupees.

From this allowance, the Commandant is obliged to pay whatever officers he may have in his party, as also to purchase and feed horses for his cavalry, and to find bullocks for his gun and to cloth and arm his party.

N.B.—The troops do not receive their pay regularly, but are seldom more than four months in arrears.

The Government benefits considerably by keeping the troops in arrears from an institution of the Sultaun's, of a bank called *Malek Toujar*,* which is kept in camp by the servants of the Circar; here cash is lent at high interest to the troops for orders on their arrears, by which interest and a double management of the exchange, a soldier is generally defrauded near one-sixth of his pay.

The pay of the regular army is the same in the field and garrison, but their constitution supposes them always encamped.

Discipline.—With regard to discipline, the chief attention of the Sultaun seems still directed to his infantry. The regular cavalry exercise in body. They march regularly in file—form in line and charge. The irregular horse have no discipline whatever. The infantry are said to be much improved since last war. The gollandanzes or artillery, are also kept in constant practice.

The whole of his army is kept in a state of activity—movements are perpetual—and no kutcherric or cushoon is ever allowed to remain more than two years and seldom so long in any station.

The regular army are almost always in the field, except during the monsoon, when it is cantoned, but seldom any part of it is put in garrison, except the guards, who do duty in Seringapatam.

Principal Officers and Estimation.—The Sultaun employs his officers in a civil and military line, as the occasion demands, but I shall in this place only mention those who may be deemed his chief military Commanders.

The first is Meer Cummur u Deen, an officer of acknowledged bravery and ability—he is idolized by the army, and, therefore, an object of jealousy to the Sultaun, who is, however, sensible of his superior merit, and always employs him in cases of emergency.

Reza Saheb, commonly called the Banky Nabob, a relation of the Sultaun's, and in high estimation. He has the character of being a brave officer, but is acknowledged impetuous and headstrong. He is about thirty years of age.

Mahomed Reza, son of Waken Khan, Nabob of Savenore—an officer of merit, and in favour with the Sultaun.

Syd Ghoffer, formerly Commandant in the Nabob's service at Tanjore—about 54 years of age—a man of great experience and bravery, in favour with the Sultaun.

Meer Mohin u Deen, better known by the name of Syd Saheb—a miser and a coward, but an able manager, in which line he has been lately employed, though he still holds high military command. He possesses the confidence of the Sultaun who is married to his daughter.†

Foker u Deen and Meer Nazur Ali, are also Chiefs of estimation.

* There is one of those Circar shops or *Malek Toujar*'s with every detachment.

† Who died about twelve days ago

Garrisons—their State.—The Sultaun has expended great sums in improvements, or rather additions to the works of Seringapatam, on which he has been employed ever since the conclusion of the peace in 1792. I cannot form any distinct idea of the nature of the works he is constructing—from what I have hitherto heard, one account says, he is carrying two walls round the fort, each of which is of much more strength and solidity than the old one, which is destroyed as the new work advances, but of which *not one half is yet finished.*

Another states he is also occupied in cutting a broad deep ditch across the island, from the Deriah Daulet Bagh to the south branch of the river. There is to be a drawbridge over the ditch opposite to the east gate of the fort, and the only high-road to the fort to be over it.

It is highly probable that he will weaken instead of strengthen his capital, by multiplying unnecessary works, particularly as no account mentions their being under the direction of an European engineer.

Bangalore and Ossore have both been destroyed. The former has not been so completely demolished as the latter. Many parts yet remaining entire, particularly the east gate and the lower parts of most of the rampart, a circumstance which would seem to have originated more in the unskilfulness of the miners than any design.

Both Savendroog and Nemdydroog have been repaired and stored with provisions. The other garrisons remain much in their former state; he has built a small fort and pettah close to Old Mysore.

2nd. Revenue Department, state of Treasury.—Although it is generally reported among the nations that Tippoo has, by assessments on the inhabitants of his remaining territories, repaired the breach that was made in his treasury at the peace of 1792. A moment's reflection will shew the fallaciousness of this idea. Tippoo paid to the allies three crores and thirty lack, which is considerably more than two year's revenue of the country left in his possession. He has had not only the current expences of his Government to defray, but to repair the ravages of war which may surely be calculated to have deprived him of at least six months nett revenue. Independent of this, he had to remount great part of his cavalry, and to purchase or make up both arms and stores to replace those that were destroyed or lost during the war. When to this we add the vast sums expended on the fortifications of Seringapatam, on which 6000 men have been at work for near six years, we cannot suppose his revenues, which do not amount to one and a half crore, have more than met his annual expenditure.

If this is the case, his treasury cannot contain more than two crores at the utmost, as between five and six crore was the greatest supposed amount at the conclusion of the peace, out of which he paid three crores and thirty lack, and in all probability, that amount was exaggerated.

Alterations in management—Tippoo has varied in many points at different periods from that mode of management which was prescribed in a code of revenue regulations which was translated into English, and published in Calcutta in 1792.*

It is an ascertained fact that he has not collected so much from his country as his father, a circumstance which may be ascribed to his chiefly employing Mussulmen, Assofs, and Aumildars, which Hyder seldom did.—The Hindoos still do the business, but are more venal from having less responsibility.

Among the greatest changes that have taken place lately in his revenue

* Indeed I believe those never were observed.

system, may be reckoned that of his granting *assigned lands* to some of his military commanders for the maintenance of themselves and party, and his having diminished much the number of revenue officers, by allotting larger managements. No assof is now appointed to a country that does produce a lack, and no Aumildar to one under thirty thousand.

Chief Revenue Officer Characters.—At the head of the revenue officers may be placed Meer Mahomed Saduk (Duan,) to which high station he was promoted by Hyder, from being cutval to the army. He is an able man, devoted to the will of the Sultaun, with whom he is esteemed a favourite; he is accounted a prudent statesman, and a strong adviser of peace.

Meer Hussan, brother-in-law to Cummer u Deen, an officer high in trust. Sied Mahomed Khan, an officer of high repute in the revenue line.

Purneya, treasurer.—He was in the same employment with Hyder; he is reputed an able financier.

There are besides many revenue officers of reputation, whom I have not mentioned from want of sufficient information to speak of them with exactness.

Detail of occurrences since January, 1798.—I mean not in this part of the account to take a long retrospect. I shall confine myself to this year, and briefly state those occurrences which appear most worthy of note.

In January the Sultaun joined his camp near Seringapatam, and published that he was going towards Mangalore, where it was rumoured several French ships were expected with troops on board; to this was added a report, that the Sultaun meant on their arrival to attack the English, which gained force from the circumstance of all applications for leave being denied, and a mutchelka (or obligatory note) taken from each sepoy, that his family was above the Ghauts.*

February.—Tippoo was reported next to have changed his intention of going towards Mangalore, and to have turned his thoughts towards visiting his northern frontier, in order to intimidate the Mahrattas who had demanded seven years' arrears of Chout, and also with a view to visit the celebrated Peerzadah at Keyserimoorus, whose murud or disciple he had been long anxious to become. He received and despatched again in this month a vakeel from Poonah

He encamped with some part of his army at a village called Arukera, two marches from the capital, for several days, and from it detached the Banky Nabob, Rezah Saheb, in one direction, and Meer Saduk in another, in order to distribute the lands to the Jemmidars of Sillabdhahr horse, agreeably to the new system of supporting them that he had resolved upon.

March.—The Sultaun went with his escort to a place on the banks of the Caveri (Tilcar,) 25 miles from Seringapatam, to superintend the repair of a dam across the river; he returned to the city to be present at the Ramzan feast, but ordered his tents and escort to pass on to encamp near Motta Talow, where he joined them after the feast was over.

He despatched a vakeel with letters to Scindiah, and report said he was much inclined to join the Mahrattas in an attack on the Sultaun,† but that both Meer Saduk and Purneah exerted all their influence to prevent such an event occurring.

About this period news reached the capital that the Annagoondy Rajah had been successful against the Sultaun's troops, in consequence of

* An alarm was also spread at this period about the Coorga Rajah, who, it afterwards appeared had taken unnecessary alarm at the approach of some irregular horse, who were foraging, and had in consequence assembled his troops near Periapatam. This matter was settled on explanation.

† So in copy, but most probably the Nizam.

which a strong detachment was ordered to hold itself in readiness to proceed against the insurgents.

April—The Sultaun remained at his camp near Moota Falou. The principal event of this month was cutting the bank of this famous tank, which he did contrary to the opinion of several of his Omrahs. Two motives were conjectured to induce him to this extraordinary action.

The one supposed it the effect of avarice, the other of policy. If the former, he was disappointed, for two old guns were all that its drained-bed produced; but it is more reasonable to ascribe it to policy, as he destroyed several other small tanks in its vicinity, apparently with a view of distressing any numerous army that might hereafter encamp near his capital.

It is not unworthy of observation, that immediately previous to the breaking out of last war, he destroyed the large tank near Bangalore, and similar conjectures were then made.

Letters were despatched to the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah; from the former letters had been received by Camel Kerkerrah, and from the latter a vakeel.

The stable horse were kept at the capital, and every division of the country *was ordered to store grain and ghee, and to send a proportion of draught cattle to the capital.*

May.—Not only all the Aumildars, Assoffs, &c. were required to swear allegiance to the Sultaun, a custom which with them has been annual for five years past; but every soldier of the army was directed to swear (in the form prescribed by the religion he professed,) *to be faithful to his standard.**

The Sultaun went for a short time into the city, but returned to camp on the 2nd of June with part of his zannana, and all *the Sillahdar horse were ordered to join from their foraging stations.* Accounts were received of a French party landing at Mangalore, and preparation was directed to be made for their march to, and reception at, Seringapatam.

June.—On the 3rd of June the river came down, and all communication with the capital was obliged to be carried on by means of basket boats.

On the 18th Shire Khan returned with three cushoons to the capital from the Malabar coast, where he had been to settle some differences between the Sultaun and Coorjah Rajah, relating to the disputed territories. It is not stated what has been done, but there appears to have been an amicable adjustment.

On the 20th, in the evening, the long expected French party reached camp, they consisted of about 50 Europeans and about 100 half-cast; one of the Europeans was in a palanquin, five on horseback, and the rest, with the coffrees and half-cast, marched on foot. They had only one tent on their march: the Sultaun, however, directed an ample supply of camp equipage, and fixed their encampment at about a mile from his own quarters; next day six of the party who were said to be officers, paid him a visit; the Major of Lally's party interpreted; what passed is unknown, *as all others were excluded.* It appeared by the countenances of the French gentlemen when they came out that they were pleased with their reception.

Two of the French gentlemen have since had frequent intercourse, but no arrangement of consequence has yet been made. It is believed the Sultaun means they should discipline a considerable body of sepoys.

The Mohurruum feast was celebrated with splendour, but no part of the army was after it was over ordered to forage.

The Sultaun gave out that he meant to remain in camp for some months, and various reports were at the same time spread as to his design of march-

* A few months previous to the breaking out of last war, he took a similar precaution of swearing his men.

ing, which it is now thought he is resolved upon, as tents had been sent from the fort to his camp.

July.—At Seringapatam it was reported he meant to take the route of Gootty towards his eastern frontier. It was believed he meant to invade the Carnatic; and this report had made such an impression that fifty families had left the Baramahl on the 30th of June for Mysore, and gave as a reason when interrogated as to their emigration, that they had relations in the Sul-taun's army, and were afraid of being punished if found below the Ghauts when Tippoo descended. This belief and alarm would appear the natural effect of the oath he had required of his troops, and the mutchelka he had one month before exacted.

Present position of troops.—Having now finished the detail of his transactions for these few months past, I shall state what I believe to be the present position of his troops.

He has immediately with him encamped near the French rocks his son, Futtee Hyder, Cunnur u Deen, and all the principal officers, both civil and military, of his country.

As his army are for convenience encamped in parties at the distance of a few miles, I shall state for the sake of perspicuity, under one head.

His whole army on the island and in the environs of Seringapatam, that could be assembled in two days—

Regular horse	-	-	-	-	6,000
Irregulars	-	-	-	-	3,500
Regular infantry	-	-	-	-	14,000
Pikemen	-	-	-	-	1,500
Gunners and Lascars	-	-	-	-	2,000

10 battering guns, and 40 field pieces on this side the river, 30 elephants, 100 mules, 100 camels, and 1,500 draught bullocks; in camp, as many more as are wanted, within two days march, at forage.

Garrison of Seringapatam—

The Guards or Ahmady, and Assoudullah	-	3,000
Infantry, 2nd Kutcherry	-	1,000

Total - 4,000

Troops in the Harponelly district, acting against the Annagoondy Rajah, under the command of Mahomed Khan and Mahomed Ali Zettuh	-
Selladars, or irregular cavalry	- 1,000
Regular infantry	- 3,000
At Gootty, under Kistnapah and Banker Beg—	-
infantry	- 4,000

Some infantry are still on the Malabar coast, and some Sillahdar horse and a large party of infantry at Sadashavagur; and also some of the Sillahdar's horse and Byeds at forage in different parts of the country.

Policy of the Sul-taun and reflections on it.

Tippoo is generally described as a Prince equally destitute of humanity and reason, as one whose passions ever triumph over his judgment.

Whatever arguments may be brought against the first part of this accusation from the treatment of his subjects, the tyrannical cruelty he exercised on his English prisoners, will ever warrant their countrymen in affixing it on his name.

As to the latter points, I am not disposed to allow them just, as general positions. His conduct since the peace of 1792, has shewn that though he possesses those feelings which are allowed not only to be natural, but honourable in a humbled Monarch (viz. a spirit of ambition to regain lost power and fame, and a spirit of revenge against the State that has humbled him). Yet, that he pursues these objects, not with that heedless and impatient rage that characterizes a man guided wholly by his passions; but

with that unremitting activity and zealous warmth which we would look for in a Prince, who had come to a serious determination to endeavour by every reasonable means in his power to regain what he had lost.

To prove what I have said, I shall take a short retrospect of the leading features of his conduct since 1792.

This was first marked by an honourable and unusually punctual discharge of the large sum which remained due at the conclusion of the peace to the allies. Instead of sinking under his misfortunes, he exerted all his activity to repair the ravages of war. He began to add to the fortifications of his capital—to remount his cavalry—to recruit and discipline his infantry—to punish his refractory tributaries—and to encourage the cultivation of his country, which was soon restored to its former prosperity.

He next (near two years after the war) took the wise resolution of destroying Ossoor and Bangalore, as he had seen they were easy conquests to the English, and served them both as useful posts to cover their convoys and secure their depots for their grain and military stores; this was surely the action of a man who had benefitted by experience.

During the first two or three years he seemed wholly devoted to domestic arrangements—when all was settled he found himself at liberty to engage again in politics.

He appears first to have intrigued at Hyderabad, with a design to separate that Court from the English interests, but without success.

An important scene soon opened, the imprisonment of Azim-ul-Omrah and the contemptible interregnum (if I may term it so) at the Court of Hyderabad. This added to the divisions at Poonah and the declining health of the Nizam offered a fair prospect. The Sultaun took every step that prudence could suggest to make the most of the opportunity without involving himself in any risk till success was highly probable, if not certain. He sent a large and well appointed detachment to Ghooty under one of his ablest officers (Syd Ghofter) on the pretext of enforcing payment of some of his unsettled claims on Karnoul.

At this period, Nana Furnaveze, who was expelled from Poonah by the dread of Scindiah's power, solicited the Sultaun's aid, who, aware of the ex-Minister's influence and wealth, flattered him with the promise of support.

The improvement of the Nizam's health—the return of Nana to Poonah. The emancipation and restoration to power of Azim-ul-Omrah,—events as extraordinary as they were unexpected, disappointed the success, but did not impeach the wisdom of the Sultaun's schemes.

His French visitors, of whom he had several, flattered him with hopes of future success against the English, the power with whom he was naturally the most exasperated; but he does not appear to have entered into serious negotiations with any of them before September, 1797, when two gentlemen from the Mauritius made him large offers of aid, and induced him to send a vakeel to the islands authorized, (*as would appear from Governor Malartic's proclamation*) to enlist whatever number of Frenchmen could be induced to enter the Sultaun's service.

He has had of late some correspondence, both with the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, of what nature I know not—but he is well versed in Mah-ratta politics, and knows that they solicit foreign interference, more with a view of intimidating domestic foes into some arrangement, than with any serious intention of using it—and he also knows that whatever appearances Azim-ul-Omrah may from political design assume, that he is his fixed enemy on principle.

From what I have stated, I infer that the policy of the Sultaun is obviously to regain his former power, and that all his intrigues and preparations, whatever may appear their immediate object, are ultimately directed against the English, on the principle that it is their declared and invariable policy to check his aggrandizement.

But at the same time. I do not think he will deviate from that line which

he has obviously hitherto preserved of not engaging in hostilities till success is highly probable if not certain. I consider him at this moment pausing for events. The French buoyed him up with hopes of England being ruined, and of their sharing with him—the territories of that kingdom in India—and have probably, at all events, promised him the immediate co-operation of a large force.

On the other hand, he views with anxiety the tedious troubles of Poonah, which certainly now appear approaching to a crisis, and that he conjectures may afford him a favourable opportunity of action.

These are reasons, more than sufficient for his keeping so large a force in readiness near Seringapatam, and there is no doubt, had the French been able to have landed a respectable force at Mangalore, at the same period which they did that contemptible party which have reached Seringapatam, he would before this have engaged in hostilities with the English—but I cannot conceive for a moment, that the aid he has received will tempt him to so *bold* a measure.

My object in this hasty abstract, has been solely to throw such light as my information enabled me on the Sultaun's situation and views. On the conduct, we should at this period observe towards him, I shall not presume to offer an opinion. The consideration of this important point is fortunately entrusted to those whose high reputation leaves not a doubt, but the line of conduct they pursue, on this and every occasion, will be that which is best calculated to promote the prosperity of the British nation.

JOHN MALCOLM, Persian Interpreter.

Madras, 16th July, 1798.

APPENDIX D.

*From Zemaun Shah to Sir John Shore.**

Received 3d June, 1798.

At this time the trusty Ghoolaum Ahmed Khan, the news-writer in Hindostan, after having the honour of paying his respects at the resplendent presence, described to us the excess of your attachment and fidelity which afforded us much satisfaction, and prompted further marks of our favour towards you. It is our intention to visit Hindostan, and at a proper season shall accordingly set out where we shall encourage friends and chastise enemies. We have, therefore, now deputed Ghoolaum Ahmed Khan thither to ascertain who are our friends and who are our enemies, which we will communicate accordingly; let your mind be perfectly at ease, and continue to walk in the path of allegiance and fidelity. Dated in the month of Zehidja, 1211 Hedegiree, answering to June, 1797.

From Zemaun Shah to Mr. Lumsden.

Received 27th May, 1798.

Ghoollum Ahmed Khan, our news writer for Hindostan, being admitted into our presence, made us happy by representing your attachment and regard, and caused an increase of our favour and good will towards you, we have resolved to visit Hindostan, and by God's help, the time will come, when we shall raise our royal standard in those countries; our victorious armies shall bring honour to the well affected, and punishment to the refractory. For this reason, we have sent before us Ghoollum Ahmed Khan, to ascertain who are our friends and who are our enemies, you will in every respect be confident, and firm in your attachment and regard, considering that you are covered with the royal favour.

Zehize, 1211.

* Referred to at page 188.

APPENDIX E.

*Memoir, with Observations on the probable invasion of Zemaun Shah, by Major-General Sir James Craig.**

The prominent feature in the politics of this part of the country, at the present moment, seems to be the threatened hostility on the part of Zemaun Shah.

It cannot be denied that, if the invasion with which he menaces these and the neighbouring provinces takes place, it will be an event productive of much mischief at any rate, and pregnant with no small degree of eventual danger, for it may be held as certain, that if he succeeds in his attempt so far as to penetrate to Delhi, he will become exceedingly formidable. The glare of victory, the influence of religion, and the allurements of plunder, will draw to his standard numbers probably greater than have appeared united in one cause since the days of Aurengzebe. On the one hand the Rohillas, and on the other every disaffected Rajah bordering on the Mahratta dominions, will look up to him as a deliverer and protector, and will hasten to unite their efforts to those which they will consider as operating to their benefit. While every unemployed chief, capable of collecting a few followers, and impatient of a state of inactivity, will eagerly embrace a new adventure, and will have the less hesitation in joining the invader, that his success seems to be already established as certain in the public mind; but great as this resource appears to be for the increase of his numbers beyond what his original army will consist of, it is still looked on as less than that which he will derive from the Seiks, whose country he must traverse ere he can reach the capital of the Mogul empire.

These people he cannot leave behind him as enemies; if he reaches Delhi, it can only be after having conquered and reduced them to subjection, or, however improbable such an event may at present appear, after having concluded a treaty of friendship with them. In the latter case they will voluntarily join him; in the former he will force them to do so; in neither can a regard to his own safety permit him to dispense with their attendance, the only pledge he can have of their fidelity to their engagements; on these grounds it is that I have made the assertion, that if the Shah ever reaches Delhi, he will command a force, which in point of numbers, at least, will be truly formidable.

But the probability of his ever making the attempt is doubted by many, and the chief foundation on which these doubts are built is, first, that he is not possessed of the necessary resources to enable him to undertake an enterprize of such magnitude, and next, that the same threats of invasion have been invariably held up these several years past, without their having ever produced any effect.

With respect to the first of these arguments, I confess the information I have been able to collect as to the state of the Shah's country, his revenues or his resources, is by much too limited to enable me to ground any solid argument upon, and I much doubt whether any account, that can be depended upon, relative to these points, has ever reached us yet; that his army is not deficient in numbers we have good reason to believe, and though it be admitted that he has not a treasure sufficient to maintain them long, the hope of plunder, and attachment to a Prince, who, by

* Referred to, at page 270.

every account, stands high in their opinion, may nevertheless lead them on under a bare subsistence, in the confidence of experiencing his future generosity in a liberal share of the spoils they will expect to procure for him.

The other argument has always appeared most futile in my eyes,—though repeated obstacles may have hitherto prevented the accomplishment of his project, can that circumstance be brought as a proof, that he will never be able to attain it. The existence of his intention is ascertained by his having the year before last actually reached Lahore in the attempt to carry it into effect, and are these any good grounds for imagining that the difficulties which he has hitherto met, and that the reasons which on that occasion forced him to quit his enterprize and return to his own dominions, are always to exist! In truth we know, or at least, all our accounts say, that they have, in a great measure, actually ceased by the subjection of his domestic enemies. I think it is pretty certain, that he enjoys, at this moment, a degree of internal tranquillity, to which his reign has hitherto been a stranger.

But on this point let us ever bear in mind, that there is danger in being misled by the idea of the impracticability of the attempt; there is none in embracing the contrary opinion.

The line of conduct to be adopted towards the Shah, supposing him really to carry his threatened plan into effect, and whether we shall consider him as an enemy in the first instance, that is, the moment his intention is avowed by the advance of his forces, or whether we shall remain unconcerned spectators so long as he abstains from molesting us or our allies, are subjects of political, and not military, consideration; and intending to confine these observations entirely to the latter view of the subject, I shall enter into the former no further than may be necessary in order to consider the military arrangements to be adopted in either case. I the more readily decline entering into this question, because I confess myself too little informed upon the subject, not to be extremely diffident of any opinion I might adopt upon it.

Exclusive of ourselves and our immediate ally or dependent, the Nabob Vizier, the three great powers that will appear in this contest, are the Shah, the Seiks, and the Mahrattas; and it is a very singular circumstance attending the relative situation of these powers, that they appear to be all three guided by such a rooted and determined animosity to each other, that it seems at this moment scarcely possible to expect that any two should unite in opposition to the third. Could a view of the common danger be held up to the Seiks and Mahrattas in so strong a light as to induce them to lay aside their hatred to each other, and to act with cordiality to avert it, there is no doubt but that they might offer a formidable opposition to the Shah's advance. I confess this is little to be expected, but the attempt is well worth the trial; an able resident with the Mahrattas might possibly succeed in persuading them to enter into the negotiation; I fear our relation with the Seiks is too feeble to admit of any communication with them upon the subject, if it is not, encouragement from us might at least have the effect of uniting them among themselves; disunited and distracted by jealousies and animosities, as they are at present, it seems little probable that any considerable effort can be expected from them, unless a point of union is offered, to which all may look, and which may serve as a common channel of conciliation between them.

After all, the probability of reducing these people to any sort of co-operating system, especially where the Mahrattas, who are considered by them as their natural and inveterate enemies, are to be parties, must be very small. A sense of their danger however, and the inveterate hatred

that they bear to the Afghans, may possibly bring it about, and it may be worth while to consider what may be the line of conduct to be pursued in such an event, improbable as it is.

Exclusive of the Douab, the Vizier's dominions, including Rohilcund, are bounded by the Ganges, which forms to them a natural, and what would be a formidable, barrier, were it not fordable in so many parts during the dry season, these fords, however, from all the information I have been able to procure, are confined to the space between Anopshire and Hurdwar, though I believe that in a dry season there is also one at Ramgaut.* A Memoir, which I have now before me, mentions by name fourteen of them, including those at the above mentioned places.

It is of the first consequence, that the whole of this space be examined by able, active, and intelligent officers, of rank and experience, capable of determining the positions to be taken, and the works to be erected, for the defence of all the fords that may be found included in it, whatever their number may be. Against an army, consisting almost exclusively of cavalry, and totally unprovided with artillery, nothing seems so easy, as with well disposed works, and well served guns, to render fords and narrow passes of every sort almost impracticable; the nature of the works to be erected, and the number of men and guns which their defence will require cannot be ascertained till this examination has been made. On the former subject, however, it may not be improper to observe, that these works should all be enclosed, not only on account of the facility with which cavalry can turn them, but to prevent any bad consequence from any possible attempts of the Rohillas.

The composition of the corps to be formed for the defence of this line, which, in every possible light in which the subject can be viewed, and in every event ought to be prepared and occupied, seems naturally to fall to the Nabob's troops, and appears, indeed, to be as well adapted to them as any service that can be allotted for them; each post should be occupied by a proportion of cavalry as well as infantry, and his artillery appear to be competent to every thing that could be required of them.

The detail on this subject, would be a matter of deliberation, to be founded upon the knowledge of the different spots to be occupied, and at any rate would be misplaced here.

The upper part of the Ganges being thus secured, and if I am not mistaken, a very little, but well directed labour would render it effectually so,—the remainder of the barrier may at any time be equally formed, by seizing and securing all the boats upon the river; to effect this point beyond the possibility of doubt, it would be proper not to depend upon the execution of the Nabob's orders by his aumils and collectors—but upon the more certain effect of one or two good gun-boats, fitted up as galleys, which manned by strong parties of our Sepoys, might follow the promulgation of the Nabob's directions down the river, and secure the certain execution of them, the boats should be lodged at Allahabad, or any intermediate posts which it may be found expedient to occupy, except such as may be wanted for purposes hereafter specified.

I have already observed, that these preparatory measures, are totally independent of every consideration with respect to the conduct to be pursued by us, and ought to be adopted, whether it be found expedient to act in concert with other powers, or to depend solely on our own arms, and those of our ally, the Vizier.

Of the same nature, is that of putting the fortress of Allahabad into an immediate state of defence—by this I do not mean, the proceeding on

* Forded by the English army in March, 1773.

the proposed alterations, by which it will be rendered an effectual and important barrier to our territories, and a key to other countries—but I allude to the providing it with the necessary artillery, ammunition, and provisions. It is obvious, that the works which will be required in the former case, cannot be finished in time, for any purpose which can be the object of the present memoir; but, exclusive of the steps already mentioned, such measures should be immediately adopted with respect to the works as may probably be completed in time, and which may give them every additional strength they are capable of admitting. I am not at present prepared to give a decisive opinion on the subject, not having sufficiently examined the ground with a view to it—but it may be well worth considering, whether it would not be advantageous to cover the front, from river to river, by a chain of detached redoubts, which would be erected in a short space of time, and at little expense, would be easily guarded, and render the protections afforded them by the walls of the fort of great defence, even against an enemy, more skilled in attacks of that nature, than the one at present in view—at the same time, that they would form an excellent entrenched camp, to receive a retreating or inferior army, in case of necessity. I mean this, however, only as a temporary expedient for this occasion, because in a general view, I consider Allahabad as a point of such importance to us, that I would not miss a moment, in which it could be done with propriety, in proceeding on the works proposed, to render it a complete fortress according to our system, and perhaps the detached redoubts, if practicable in other respects, would be found to facilitate the doing so, by affording security, while the body of the place itself must necessarily be open, during the carrying on of the works.

Defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in this country, and recourse must, therefore, be had to it, only where uncontrollable circumstances render operations of another complexion impracticable. In the present case, we cannot invade the Shah's dominions—the most sanguine disposition could hardly propose the attempt. In a general view, therefore, a war with him must be defensive—it must be our business, however, if possible, to carry it on with that vigour, which may demonstrate that its being so, proceeds solely from the situation of the respective parties, and not from any deficiency of resources or spirit on our side; unfortunately from the composition of the two armies, the choice of action must ever remain with the enemy, who may at any time elude our pursuit, with the same facility that he can advance to the attack, whenever he judges proper to do so, and still more unfortunately from the same cause, though we may refuse his attack, we can never reap the full profit of victory, and though we may defeat we cannot destroy.

The Shah's army is understood to be composed almost entirely of cavalry, while ours is nearly as much so of infantry—but on the other hand, he has little or no artillery, of the use of which his people are entirely ignorant, while ours is well served; and we should be careful to have as much in the field as can be got together, regard being had to the number of which our army will consist, to which it should always be in a certain proportion, to enable the column of march to cover and protect it; nothing, however, is more advantageous and decisive against cavalry than heavy artillery. We have here in the field at present four 18-pounders and nine 12-pounders, with four small howitzers; we have also about twenty-four 6-pounders.

The army which will be collected in the event of the Shah's approach, must depend upon circumstances, particularly upon the issue of the impending hostilities on the coast, at present we have one battalion of Europeans, about 700 men, and ten of Sepoys complete, exclusive of the gur-

arrison of Allahabad, from whence another battalion of Europeans may be drawn, amounting to about 900 men. Our cavalry consists of a European regiment, which cannot be depended on for above 350 men—two regiments of native cavalry complete, and Major Bruce's independent regiment, likewise complete—three last composing about 1,400 men; we have also four companies of artillery with their lascars. It is not likely that the situation of affairs will, during this season at least, admit of any increase of this force beyond perhaps a couple of battalions more of native infantry, and supplying the deficiency of the garrison of Allahabad, which should indeed be augmented with at least another battalion, while in strict prudence, it ought never to be without a proportion of Europeans. The aggregate force thus supposed in the field, will amount to something better than 16,000 men. To this number of men, and to the exigency of the circumstances, I do not deem our artillery sufficient, I would augment it, (provided it be possible to send a proportionable number of artillerymen) to sixteen 12-pounders, and four howitzers, of a larger calibre than those we have, which are only four and a half inch—I would also have six or eight 6-pounders, exclusive of two to each battalion including those to be formed of the grenadier companies. I know that this will be looked upon as a very high proportion of artillery, and it is probably more than has yet been seen, in our service, in this part of India. I have, however, well reflected on the subject, and though aware of the embarrassment that arises from a numerous train, I am under the conviction, that it will be found prudent to submit to it on the present occasion.

It may not be improper here, to offer an observation on the state of our cavalry. Of the European regiment I shall say nothing, it is already in very good order, and I have no reason to doubt, that it will be found equal to every thing that can be expected from its numbers. I have a good opinion of Major Bruce's regiment, and think them capable of much service: as to their fidelity, I see no reason to doubt it—they serve for pay and are well paid, and as they will, spite of every effort that can be made to prevent it, find plunder in whatever country they may be, I can see no inducement for them to betray the service they are in. It might be well to increase this corps to 700 or 800 men.

The two native regiments are complete in men and horses. I have not seen the first regiment lately, but Colonel Welsh's has improved much; they have acquired rapidity, and a considerable degree of solidity in all their movements, their horses are not bad, and their men are young and able,—with all this, I find that a general want of confidence in them prevails every where. I do not mean to confine this to the 2nd regiment, our cavalry is in general considered as not to be depended upon, and as little better than useless; the idea is, that they are of a cast much inferior to the usual horsemen of the country, and that consequently they are deficient in that high spirit and sense of honor, on which is founded the supposed superiority of personal valour in the latter. Allowing the fact, it would be of much weight, were it intended, that our cavalry should charge in the disorderly and irregular manner, which is the practice of the native troops, by which the action soon becomes an aggregate of personal conflicts between man and man, where courage and superiority of numbers must prevail, but the real force of cavalry consists in its weight and solidity, and if the former is secured to ours by the style of horses on which they are mounted, and the latter by their discipline, I can see no reason why our cavalry should not experience every benefit arising from these important qualities, and why these should not in that arm, as well as in the infantry, compensate for superiority of numbers and cast, with all its supposed attendant virtues; for in our infantry it is admitted

that our men are in general also of a cast inferior to that of their opponents. On these grounds it is always with concern that I hear the very general and public opinion which prevails on this point, and which appears to me to have in some degree infected the officers of those corps themselves; it were much to be wished that some measure were fallen upon that would be likely to do away an impression of so pernicious a tendency, and which I firmly believe myself to be without foundation.

Perhaps the best plan that could be adopted, with this view, would be to put the whole in the charge of a general officer, who would take a lead among them, would give them weight and confidence, and who would carefully watch the opportunities of pointing out to them their advantages, and in what their strength consists. It is true that it would require an officer well conversant in the cavalry service, and I believe there is but one in this part of the country who has any knowledge of it; among the officers at present attached to the cavalry regiments, there is much commendable zeal and good will, but it would be vain to seek for any real professional knowledge of that service amongst them.

Lord Cornwallis found benefit from his cavalry in the Mysore, though it did not exceed 1,100 men; ours actually in the field amounts to 1,300 regular cavalry, exclusive of Major Bruce's regiment; and it might probably be augmented by the third regiment from below.

In this examination of the state of our force in the field, it is impossible to avoid adverting to an object of important consideration in it, I mean the Nabob's troops; though in the preceding observations I have assigned a portion of them to the defence of a part of the frontier, of much consequence to the general defence, yet I did so, merely as being that species of service for which alone I thought it probable that a few might be selected as competent to it, and even in that situation I should be extremely diffident of them, unless means could be found to support them by some of our troops.

In the field it is obvious that no sort of reliance can be placed on, or any species of service expected from them; totally undisciplined, equally inefficient in numbers, insolent, licentious, and disaffected, they would embarrass their friends infinitely more than they would injure their enemies; the only possible use to which I think they could be put would be by quartering them in large bodies in the Rohilla and Patan countries, with the view of overawing and keeping quiet, if it be possible, those turbulent and restless people, with respect to whom, some measures must be adopted; there can be no doubt of their inclination to join the Shah, to whom they are supposed to be warmly attached; some few might be engaged to follow our standard by paying them well, but the inclination of the majority would certainly lead them to the opposite side; perhaps the sudden appearance of bodies of the Nabob's troops in different parts, ready to seize the families of such as should attempt to stir to join the Shah, together with the difficulty of doing so in their own persons, and the impracticability of their families escaping, while the passes on the river are occupied, might force them, however unwillingly, to remain quiet; at any rate, every effort should be used in the attempt, and means should be adopted to take the best security that can be obtained for their fidelity the instant the Shah's movements are ascertained.

As it is undoubted, that no real use can ever be made of the Nabob's army in the field, it becomes a matter of serious consideration, whether the force that we shall be able to collect is such as to give us well grounded hopes of opposing so formidable an enemy, as I believe the Shah will be found to be.

The extent to which we shall be able to carry that force, in the present state of the establishment, I have already stated to be, as I imagine, be-

tween 16,000 and 17,000 men, of which the proportion of Europeans will not be above an eighth; this will, it is true, be a larger army than has ever appeared in our service on this side of India, but it will also be for a more arduous contest than any that has yet occurred; and I have no hesitation in saying that every possible means should be used to increase it. The want of officers presents, however, a very great difficulty to any general augmentation; the number would be found to be very inadequate to any efficient increase of the army, by new levies; the mode of affording a greater force in the field, which presents itself to my mind as the readiest, the most certain, and in all the least objectionable, is that of detaching the grenadier companies of all the other regiments completed in officers, and then to be formed, together with those of the regiments now in the field, into battalions; the battalions not in the field to be augmented by new levies to 125 men a company, they would then remain of the same force in point of numbers as at present, and the additional 25 men per company by being incorporated with already formed soldiers, would sooner become fit for service than new corps probably would.

If there are 12 native battalions in the field, there will remain 14, exclusive of the regiment at Hyderabad, the grenadier companies of which would form the augmentation; it would amount to 2,800 men, completing the army to near 20,000 men.

Little can be expected from any augmentation that can now take place in the cavalry, as it is impossible that either men or horses could be sufficiently trained to be of use; but surely some means might be fallen upon to supply the regiments we actually have with horses in some more expeditious manner than is now followed.

With respect to artillery men and lascars, the number with the army must be increased to the greatest extent that the exigency of other services will admit of; at present it is very inadequate to the service that would be required.

To these preparatory steps I have only to add, that exclusive of the ammunition, &c. necessary for the defence of Allahabad, large supplies of every species of stores should be lodged in that fortress, as the *dépôt* of the army.

These preparatory, and as they appear to me indispensable steps, being adopted, and I confess in my mind no time should be lost before they are commenced, the determination of Government with respect to the line to be pursued towards the Shah, must regulate our first motions, should it be thought proper to remain in a state of neutrality so long as he abstains from molesting us or our allies; and should we not be bound by any treaty with the Mahrattas, upon which point I am entirely ignorant, it would still appear advisable that we should adopt measures of security and precaution against a new and powerful neighbour, whose real views cannot be ascertained, who cannot approach our frontier but in the full career of victory, and who being master at Delhi, can scarcely avoid, sooner or later, entering into discussion with our ally the Nabob, who holds the office of Vizier of the Empire, which, however nominal it may be, must furnish whoever rules at Delhi with claims and objects of adjustment to stimulate his ambition or his avarice. It is possible, also, that even viewing the Shah as an enemy, circumstances of policy may nevertheless render it expedient that we should act by ourselves, and avoid any junction with the Mahratta forces in either case; the measure to be pursued appears to me to be the same. A strong position should be taken about Anopshire, where a well fortified camp would, I think, prove the surest, and indeed, seems to me to be the only means by which we can expect to stop the career of the enemy, and preserve the best part of the

Nabob's dominions from ravage and devastation. The precise position to be taken must depend upon a thorough and deliberate examination of the country; but as near to Anopshire, as local circumstances will permit, appears to be the most eligible. Here we should be on the direct road from Delhi, from which it is distant only 50 miles; our supplies would be secured from the Vizier's country, and the Rohillas would be kept in awe; the camp should be well fortified, and should command a spot where at least two bridges could be constructed on the Ganges.

While we are in this position, the Shah will scarcely venture to pass the river, even if he should be able to force the fords, to which we should be at hand to give assistance; for in that case, our communication by the Douab would remain equally open, while his with Delhi would be cut off; his supplies from thence would be at our mercy, while such troops as the Nabob should have it in his power to collect, would prevent him from procuring any from the country in which he would be, which he would also find carefully exhausted, by our having already formed our magazines from it; and though the Nabob's army might not perhaps be able to oppose him effectually, yet by taking up a new line on the river that runs near Bareilly, it might impede his progress, till unable any longer to subsist; he would find that his only safety would be in an immediate return.

As little is it to be apprehended that he would pass us on the other route, and enter the Douab to attack Allahabad, as he would here find himself subject to the same inconveniences in either case, three marches would put us in possession of Delhi; it is true that the district of the Douab would be open to the ravages of the Shah's horse, but it does not in any event appear to be practicable to prevent it with so very inferior a body of cavalry as we shall have. The only means of covering the country would be by a chain of well connected posts from the Ganges to the Jumna; but it does not appear by the map that any feature exists in the country by which the extent necessary to be occupied in this manner could be lessened, while the whole of the space, from river to river, is much too considerable for any force that we could apply to the purpose, and even if it were not, this line could only be formed below Calpee, as the shallowness of the Jumna would leave open the flank of any other that might be taken above that place.

It thus appears, I think, that the Shah could continue his conquests, or molest us or the Nabob Vizier, only by attacking us in our position; but ten or twelve thousand infantry, or even a lesser number, in a camp previously secured by works skilfully constructed, and defended by a well served artillery, might surely bid defiance to any army, constituted as his is, nor does it seem likely that such a post could be forced by any operations that could be devised by their skill, or executed by their courage, though it should be found on trial to merit all that is said of it.

Though a lesser number might suffice for their defence, yet the main body posted here ought certainly not to consist of fewer than 10,000 infantry at the least; because it is necessary that it be of that strength that cannot with safety be left behind; a weaker corps might be masked, or would be unable to act in the manner pointed out for it in the rear of the enemy, should his presumption lead him to offer the opportunity for doing so. The remainder of the infantry might be employed in supporting the Nabob's troops in guarding the fords of the river to Hurdwar.

I am well aware that this system of operations may be construed into an exhibition of timidity, and that it may be said to militate against the principle which I have myself pointed out, that defensive war must be ruinous to us, and that where such, from uncontrollable circumstances,

becomes unavoidable, it should be conducted with the utmost vigour and spirit. I consider this to be an unavoidable defensive war on our part. We can have no object of attack to which we could direct offensive operations, and the experiment which has been already made in this country offers no encouragement to the system of a continued succession of uninterrupted marches, in pursuit of an army constituted and equipped as is that of the enemy we are considering. If he wishes to avoid us, our object of bringing him to action will be found to be unattainable, while fatigue, and its consequent effect among our Europeans, will every day lessen the equality of terms, upon which we could view it as desirable. If on the other hand action is his choice (and I own I think Zemaun Shah is not at present sufficiently aware of our advantage over his indisciplined multitude, to enable him to subdue the pride and arrogance which will lead him to regard our numbers with contempt) he will not fail to find us out, indeed it is our object to reduce him to the necessity of attacking us; to deprive him of the power of choosing, but I would wish it to be with every possible advantage on our side, that skill can add to discipline. It must be remembered, that we are considering the case of our acting alone, without the cooperation or assistance of any other power; and it must also be remembered, that we can never enter into the contest till both the Seiks and Mahrattas are subdued; till the Shah is master of Delhi, and of a tract of country almost equal in extent to the whole of his natural dominions, till he shall have been able to augment his army, by every disaffected or unemployed Rajah or Chief in the country; in short, till his numbers, as I said before, will probably exceed what have appeared in one cause since the days of Aurengzebe.

Should it, indeed, be judged expedient to oppose the Shah in the first instance—should policy dictate the measure of preventing the establishment of a new, and probably, not a feeble power in Hindostan, and in a part of it too, where no counter-balance can be found but in ourselves. In that case, there seems to be little doubt, but that we might appear with that forward activity, which when practicable, is certainly more becoming our station in India, than the line of conduct which I have recommended in the other case, would at first view seem to be. It is imagined that the Mahrattas would with readiness accept the proposal of a junction of interests and of forces; this, however, should be ascertained beyond the possibility of doubt. It will then remain to be determined by what route the Shah proposes to advance.

For the general report is, that avoiding the Seik's country altogether, it is his intention to enter Hindostan, by the route of Moulton, across the desert of Bikaner to Jyepoor, and various accounts have already appeared of his having directed the necessary measures to be taken for providing his army with water, which is not to be had in many parts of that route; this does not, I confess, appear to me to be probable, the subjugation of the Seiks, and the possession of their country must be a part, or rather the ground work, of his plan, for he could never hope to remain master of Delhi and the surrounding provinces, while the intermediate country between him and his own dominions, remained in the hands of his inveterate enemies, to whose incursions he would leave the latter entirely open.

It is not, however, impossible, that advancing himself through the country of the Seiks, he may detach at the same time a large part of his army to advance by the other route.

They would find upon the frontiers a number of considerable Rajahs, extremely disaffected to the Mahratta Government, who would probably follow his standard, and in conjunction with his detachment, create a very powerful diversion in that quarter. To this the Mahrattas must oppose a part of their force, while the remainder, joined with us, should, I think,

advance beyond Delhi, and take up the most favourable position that may present itself on the Shah's route.

I fear the Mahratta cavalry will be found to be very unequal to that of the enemy, and that it will be difficult to bring on an action with any prospect of rendering it decisive in our favour by any other means than by reducing the Shah to the necessity of attacking us in our position; fortunately the pride and native arrogance of these people will ensure us this advantage, in whatever strength we may be, and when repulsed and disheartened by their loss from a well-disposed artillery, it is not improbable that the Mahratta horse may be encouraged to complete their defeat.

It would require a more complete knowledge of the country than I, or indeed, I might say we, possess, to enter into any detail as to the exact position it may be proper for us to take; but in general terms it may be said, that it should be a position of defence, and upon the route by which the enemy is coming; previous examination should determine several, to be taken according to the different circumstances under which the Shah may advance.

The disposition of the Seiks, and of what are called the Hill Rajahs, inhabiting the hilly country to the northward of the great road, may also enter very much in the consideration to be given to the measures to be pursued; every encouragement should be held out to the former in particular, to protract their defence as long as may be practicable, and when no longer able to offer a direct opposition to the Shah's advance, they should, if possible, be induced to retire to the difficult parts of the country, and from thence act by continual incursions upon the flanks and in the rear of his army.

In the same manner, if any of the Hill Rajahs can be induced to enter into the opposition against the Shah, their acting in the way proposed for the Seiks, would be found more advantageous to us than any junction of their forces with ours, would probably be; to them the most decisive language should be held, they should be assured of favour and protection if they concurred in the general defence, and the most rigorous measures should be held out to them, if they suffered a man from their dominions to act against us.

If the face of the country presented any natural barrier, if the Jumna, for example, were not fordable in almost every part above Calpee, a position along its banks would effectually cover the only frontier by which it is possible to enter the Douab, and by our well disciplined infantry, and superior artillery, I have no doubt but that it might be done with the utmost certainty against all the force of India put together; but that not being the case, and as a junction of interests with the Mahrattas could not be reasonably pursued, if we were not to co-operate in the defence of their frontier, as well as of our own, the advance beyond Delhi, seems to be an indispensable step; the very boldness of the measure would give confidence to our allies, and assure them of our good faith; it is likewise the only means by which we can hope to influence the operations of the Seiks, and obtain a chance of directing them to the general benefit.

I have not a doubt that the Shah would attack us, and as little of the issue of the action, but our object should be to endeavour to bring it on, in such a manner as would give hopes of rendering it decisive; should, however, misfortune, or any other circumstances render a retreat necessary, it should be made to the Ganges somewhere near Anopshire, here a bridge previously constructed, with its head on the western bank well secured by good redoubts, should ensure the passage of the Ganges, and where, having the fords on the river properly secured, and the fortress of Allahabad in a state of defence, abandoning the Douab only to the ravages of the enemy, we should, it is to be hoped, be able effectually to secure our own and the remainder

of the Nabob's dominions, till an accession of additional strength, or other circumstances enable us again to advance, and in conjunction with our allies, act with the vigour becoming our station in this part of the world.

Among the preparatory steps to be adopted, I would recommend the embodying a corps of pioneers, properly provided with the means of working, to be always carried with them. Action and attack should indeed be ever our object in this country, but circumstances may frequently render defensive measures indispensable, and under none are they more likely to become so than in the probable operations under consideration; the superiority of numbers, on the part of the enemy, will undoubtedly be great, and although it may in some measure be compensated by our discipline and artillery, it will nevertheless require every additional aid. A single redoubt may in many instances turn the fortune of a day, and to the enemy with whom we shall have to deal, a very slight work, well defended, must be almost impregnable.

In a country in which the movements of cavalry are so unrestrained, as they are in the extensive plains that are every where found in these parts, it behoves us to give every additional aid to ours, which must ever be so greatly inferior in number. With this view, the establishment of a small corps of Horse Artillery to be attached to the brigade, seems a very desirable object. Lieutenant-Colonel Montague has some good ideas on this head, such as probably would be found better adapted to this country than any which could be taken up from the plan pursued in Europe.

Intending this memoir merely as tracing the outline of the measures which have appeared to me to be proper on the present occasion, I have avoided entering into detail, or extending it to several collateral circumstances, which, though demanding attention, would be obvious the moment a determination is taken upon the general system; amongst others, however, it may not be amiss to notice, that in either of the cases which we have considered, the possession of two or three intermediate posts on the southern bank of the river, between Anopshire and Allahabad, might prove extremely beneficial. Nothing can ever render Cawnpoor tenable; neither can the fort at Futty Ghur, in my opinion, be made such as it would be safe to occupy. The cantonment itself might be made into a good post, but it would require a considerable corps to defend it. Mehindy Gaut is surrounded by a mud wall, and if the Shah is so unprovided of the means necessary for the attack of fortified posts, as we are told he is, it might, perhaps, be rendered respectable in his eyes, with the assistance of a few detached works; the great point is to find spots that are not commanded and previous examination can alone determine where such are to be met with. It is to be observed, that in the whole course of the river in the space mentioned, the southern bank is the highest and commands the other.

I recollect when I was at Bombay last year, conversing with Sir Charles Mallett on this subject, he suggested the idea of creating a diversion by encouraging the inhabitants about the lower parts of the Sind or Indus, who are supposed to be much disaffected to the Afghan Government. This might perhaps be worth the trial; the communication is not difficult from Bombay.

APPENDIX F.*

Hyderabad Treaty, 1st September, 1798.

An enlarged perpetual subsidiary treaty between the Honourable United English East India Company and his Highness the Nawaub, Nizam ul Mulk Asoph Jah Behadur, Subadar of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors, settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, knight of the most illustrious order of St Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Governor General in Council, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company, to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas his Highness Nizam ul Mulk Asoph Jah Behadur, has from the greatness of existing friendship, expressed a desire for an increase of the detachment of the Honourable Company's troops at present serving his Highness, the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, Governor General, has taken the proposals to that effect into his most serious consideration, and the present juncture of affairs, and the recent hostile conduct and evil designs of Tippoo Sultaun (as fully evinced by his sending ambassadors to the Isle of France; by his proposing to enter into a treaty offensive and defensive with the French Republic against the English nation; and by actually receiving a body of French troops into his dominions and immediate pay), rendering it indispensably necessary that effectual measures for the mutual defence of their respective possessions, should be immediately taken by the three allied powers, united in a defensive league against the aforesaid Tippoo Sultaun, the aforesaid Governor General has, in consequence, empowered Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Acting Resident at the court of his Highness the Nizam, to enter in behalf of the Honourable United English East India Company, into certain engagements with his Highness Nizam ul Mulk Asoph Jah Behadur, for a permanent increase of the Honourable Company's troops in his Highness's pay, in the proportion and on the conditions specified in the following articles, which must be understood to be of full validity, when this treaty shall be returned, signed and sealed by the Governor General.—

Article 1st.—Such parts of the letter from Earl Cornwallis to his Highness the Nizam, dated 7th July, 1789 (and which has always been considered in the light of a treaty), as relate to the stationing of troops with his Highness, are to be considered as in full force, that the services of the new permanent subsidiary force are to be regulated precisely by the same restrictive clauses that operate on the present detachment, unless the Peishwa shall hereafter consent to any alterations in those conditions, and his Highness likewise approve of the same.

Article 2d.—Agreeably to the practice in the Company's service, the new subsidiary force shall be subject to reliefs, either partial or entire, as often and in such manner as the Company's Government may require, provided withal, that no diminution takes place by such means in the stipulated number to be stationed with his Highness.

Article 3d.—The proposed reinforcement of subsidiary troops shall be in the pay of this state from the day of their crossing the boundaries. Satisfactory and effectual provision shall be made for the regular payment of this force, which, including the present detachment, is to amount to

* Referred to at pages 272, 290, and 609.

6000 sepoys, with firelocks, with a due proportion of field pieces, manned by Europeans, and as at the monthly rate of two lacs, one thousand four hundred and twenty-five rupees, the yearly amount of subsidy for the aforesaid force of 6000 men, with guns, artillery-men, and other necessary appurtenances, is twenty-four lacs, seventeen thousand one hundred rupees. The said sum shall be completely discharged in the course of the year by four equal instalments, that is, at the expiration of every three English months, the sum of six lacs, four thousand two hundred and seventy-five rupees, in silver of full currency, shall be issued without hesitation or demur from his Highness's treasury. And should the aforesaid instalments happen to fall at any time the least in arrears, such arrears shall be deducted, notwithstanding any objections thereto, from the current kist of Peishcush, payable to his Highness on account of the Northern Sirkars. Should it, at any time, so happen, moreover, that delay were to occur in the issue of the instalments aforesaid, at the stated periods, in such case, assignments shall be granted on the collections of certain districts in this state, the real and actual revenue of which shall be adequate to the discharge of the yearly subsidy of the aforesaid force.

Article 4th.—The duties on grain and on all articles of consumption, as well as on all necessities whatever, for the use of the new subsidiary force, shall be commuted agreeably to the practice that obtained with the former detachment. A place likewise shall be fixed on as the head quarters of the said force, where it shall always remain, except when services of importance are required to be performed; and whenever either the whole, or part of the said force, is to be employed in the business of the state, a person of respectability, and who is a servant of this Sirkar, shall be appointed to attend it. The commanding officer and officers of the said subsidiary force shall be treated in all respects in a manner suitable to the greatness and dignity of both states.

Article 5th.—The said subsidiary force will at all times be ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of his Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race, and the overawing and chastizing all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of this state; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor like Sebendy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues thereof.

Article 6th.—Immediately upon the arrival of the aforesaid subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the whole of the officers and serjeants of the French party are to be dismissed, and the troops composing it, so dispersed and disorganised, that no trace of the former establishment shall remain. And his Highness hereby engages for himself, his heirs and successors, that no Frenchman whatever shall ever hereafter be entertained in his own service, or in that of any of his chiefs or dependants, nor be suffered to remain in any part of his Highness's dominions. Nor shall any Europeans whatever be admitted into the service of this state, nor be permitted to remain within its territories, without the knowledge and consent of the Company's government.

Article 7th.—The whole of the European and sepoy deserters from the Company's service, that may be in the French or any other party of troops belonging to this state, are to be seized and delivered up to the British resident; and no persons of the above description are to be allowed refuge in future in his Highness's territories, but are (on the contrary) to be seized without delay, and delivered up to the British resident. Neither shall any refuge be allowed in the Company's territories to sepoy deserters from the service of his Highness, who shall, in like manner, be seized and delivered up without delay.

Article 8th.—Whereas his Highness the Nizam, from considerations of prudence and foresight, and with a view of avoiding manifold evils, has

determined on dismissing the French from his service, and in dispersing and disorganising the troops commanded by them, as specified in the 6th Article, and on entertaining a perpetual standing force, of the Honourable Company's, in their room, subject to the limitations and restrictions prescribed by Earl Cornwallis's letter to the Nizam, mentioned in the 1st Article; it is therefore hereby agreed, with a view to the mutual benefit of his Highness and the Peishwa, and the happiness of their respective subjects, that the Company's government will use their best endeavours to have inserted with the consent and approbation of both, in the new treaty in contemplation between the three allied powers, such a clause as shall set at ease with regard to the other. Should the Peishwa, however, not accede to a proposal so highly advantageous and profitable to both governments, and differences hereafter arise between the two states, namely, that of the Nawaub Asof Jah Behadur, and of the Rao Pundit Perdhaun, in such case, the Company's government hereby engage, that interposing their mediation, in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship and union, they will apply themselves to the adjustment thereof, conformably to propriety, truth and justice. The Nawaub Asof Jah Behadur accordingly hereby engages, never to commit on his part any excess or aggression against the Sirkar of Rao Pundit Perdhaun; and in the event of such differences arising, whatever adjustment of them the Company's government, weighing things in the scales of truth and justice, may determine upon, shall without hesitation or objection, meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

Article 9th.—All former treaties between the Honourable East India Company and the governments of the Nawaub Asof Jah and the Peishwa, remain in full force. Should hereafter the Rao Pundit Perdhaun express a desire to enter into subsidiary engagements, similar to the present, with the Honourable Company, the Nawaub Asof Jah will most readily give his concurrence.

Article 10th.—This enlarged subsidiary treaty, consisting of Ten Articles, being this day settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, with the Nawaub Asof Jah Behadur, Captain Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy hereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawaub, who, on his part, has also delivered to Captain Kirkpatrick one copy of the same, duly executed by himself; and Captain Kirkpatrick hereby engages to procure and deliver to his Highness, in the space of fifty days, a ratified copy from the Governor General, in every respect the counterpart of the one executed by himself; and on the delivery of such copy, which will then have become a full and complete instrument, the treaty executed by Captain Kirkpatrick shall be returned. In the mean while, no time shall be lost in writing for the advance of the proposed reinforcement.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad,
1st September, A.D. 1798, or 19th Rubby
ul-awul, A.H. 1213.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK.

Separate article appertaining to the perpetual subsidiary treaty concluded between the Honourable English East India Company and his Highness the Nawaub Asof Jah Behadur, on the 1st of September, A.D. 1798, or 19th of Rubby-ul-awul, A.H. 1213.

Whereas in conformity to a wish expressed by his Highness the Nizam, the stipulation in the 6th Article of the Subsidiary Treaty respecting the delivering up of the French is agreed to be made a separate one, his Highness hereby engages, that after the arrival of the Company's troops at Hyderabad, the whole of the French officers and soldiers in his service shall be apprehended in such way as Captain Kirkpatrick may point out,

and be delivered up to him, or for a time be kept in confinement in an habitation belonging to this Sirkar, but in the custody of the Company's troops, and upon the reorganisation of the party lately under the command of the aforesaid French officers, they, the said French officers and soldiers shall, within the space of two months, be delivered up to the British resident. Strict orders shall, moreover, be issued to all talookdars on the frontiers, and to those in charge of all fords and passes, to seize any Europeans whatever, attempting to pass their respective stations, and send them immediately with all due precaution, prisoners to Hyderabad, where they shall instantly be delivered up to the British resident. On the above condition it is hereby agreed that the Frenchmen thus delivered up, shall not be common prisoners of war, nor be in any respect maltreated. They shall be conveyed at the Company's expense, and with as little restraint as possible to England, and from thence be sent by the first favourable opportunity to France, without being detained for a cartel or exchange of prisoners.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged, at Hyderabad,
1st September, A.D. 1798, or 19th Rubby-
ul-awul, A.H. 1213.

Separate article appertaining to the perpetual Subsidiary Treaty concluded between the Honourable English East India Company and his Highness the Nawaub Asof Jah Behadur, on the 1st September, A.D. 1798, or 19th Rubby-ul-awul, A. H. 1213.

No correspondence on affairs of importance, shall, in future, on any account, be carried on with the Sirkar of Rao Pundit Perdhaun, or with any of his dependants, either by the Nawaub Asof Jah Behadur, or by the Honourable Company's government, without the mutual privity and consent of both contracting parties. And whatever transactions, whether of great or small import, may in future take place with the aforesaid Rao Pundit Perdhaun, or his dependants, a reciprocal communication of the same shall be made to the other contracting party, without delay and without reserve.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged, at Hyderabad,
1st September, A.D. 1798, or 19th Rubby-
ul-awul, A. H. 1213.

Ratified by the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Knight of the most illustrious order of St. Patrick, &c. &c. &c. Governor General in council.

Fort William,
18th day of September, 1798.

APPENDIX F.

Memorandum relative to the late French corps in the Deccan, by Capt. Malcolm.

The French corps in the Deccan, have for several years past hoisted the national flag, and most of the lapells and epaulets of their new clothing, had the words *liberté* and *constitution* embroidered on them.

The general conversation of the French officers after they were dismissed, proved that they had entertained ambitious designs, and considered themselves as forwarding the interests of their mother country. Captain Christoff, an officer of the party who had been formerly a serjeant of sepoy

in the English service, affirmed that the late Monsieur Raymond had formed the most ambitious projects, and that the same were adopted by his successor—and that the landing of any French in India, would probably have been the signal to commence their intrigues.*

It was generally reported and believed that Raymond had a General's commission from the Directory, but it has not been discovered.

In a letter which passed through the resident at Hyderabad, recommending a person to Monsieur Piron—it was stated that the person recommended would, from having respectable connexions at Paris, be useful in transacting Monsieur Piron's affairs with the Directory.

In a letter from Monsieur Baptiste, the second officer in the corps, to Captain Kirkpatrick, relative to his claims on the party and property at Hyderabad—Monsieur Baptiste expresses an apprehension that he will be unable to return to France, as Monsieur Piron will represent his conduct (to the Directory) in odious colours.

There was found in store when our troops took possession of the French lines, small arms and clothing for 12,000 men beyond the force then serving under Mons. Piron, besides a number of pistols for cavalry.

The French corps had three arsenals and two founderies. I only saw these at their lines, near Hyderabad. The arsenal there was full of military stores, and in the foundery, there were a number of brass cannon newly cast, which our artillery officers judged as good and as well finished as any they had ever seen. They also made swords, muskets, and pistols. The specimens I sent to Lord Mornington, will shew the great progress they had made in these manufactures.

The French party were always well paid—their clothing was neat and their discipline superior to any troops I ever saw in a native service. The men were the best of the country—and from the regularity of their pay, they could recruit at pleasure.

APPENDIX G.

Buonaparte's Letter to Tippoo Sultaun.†

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Liberty

Equality.

Buonaparte, Member of the National Convention, General-in-Chief, to the most Magnificent Sultaun, our greatest Friend, Tippoo Saib.

Head-Quarters at Cairo, 7th Pluviose, 7th Year
of the Republic, One and Indivisible.

You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England.

I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have

* This information I had from a gentleman to whom Christoff had communicated it.

† Referred to at page 295.

of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

I would even wish you could send some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer.

May the Almighty increase your power and destroy your enemies.

BUONAPARTE.

True Translation from the French,

FRANCIS WAPPERS, Translator.

APPENDIX H.

*Proclamation du General Buonaparte aux Habitans au Caire le 1er Nivose,
l'an 7me de la Republique Française.*

Des hommes pervers avoient égaré une partie d'entre nous ; ils ont péri. Dieu m'a ordonné pour être misericordieux pour le peuple ; J'ai été clement et misericordieux pour vous.

J'ai été fâché contre vous de votre revolte, je vous ai privé pendant deux mois de votre Divan mais aujourd'hui je vous le restitue, votre bonne conduite a effacé la tache de votre revolte.

Scherifs, Ulemas, Orateurs des mosquées faites bien connaître au peuple, que ceux qui de gaieté de cœur se declareront nos ennemis n'auront de refuge ni dans ce monde ni l'autre.

Y aura-t-il un homme assez aveugle pour ne pas voir que le Destin dirige toutes nos operations ; y auroit il quelqu'un assez incrédule, pour revoquer en doute que tout dans ce vaste univers, est soumis a l'empire du Destin.

Faites connaître au peuple que depuis que ce monde est monde il étoit écrit qu'après avoir détruit les Ennemis de l'Islamisme fait abattre la Croix. Je viendrois du fond de l'occident remplir la tache qui m'a été imposée. Faites voir au peuple que dans le saint livre du Coran, dans plus de vingt passages, ce qui arrive a été prévu, et ce qui arrivera est également expliqué.

Que ceux donc que la crainte seule de nos armes empêche de nous nuire changent : car en faisant au Ciel des vœux contre nous, ils solliciteroient leur condamnation, que ces vrais croyants fassent des vœux pour la prospérité de nos armes.

Je pourrois demander compte à chacun de vous, des sentiments les plus secrets de son cœur, car je sais tout, même ce que vous n'avez dit à personne.

Mais un jour viendra que tout le monde verra avec evidence, que je suis conduit par des Ordres Supérieurs ; et que tous les efforts humains ne peuvent rien contre moi. Heureux ceux qui de bonne foi sont les premiers à se mettre avec moi.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Udney to Lord Grenville, dated Leghorn, 16th April, 1798.

A gentleman of extensive correspondence, has given me every assistance, and taken much pains to discover the destination of the armament carrying on in Genoa and the rest of Italy and France. The result of which has been as follows, and well-founded—"That the rendezvous is to be at Ajaccio, in Corsica, from Genoa and Toulon; that from the 25th of this month to the 10th of May, the whole are to be assembled there, or at Malta, which is to be given up on their appearance; that twenty sail of the line and frigates, French, Venetian, &c., are to be employed with 600 sail of transports, and 50,000 men. Alexandria is the principal destination, and even the Black Sea, with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, and that however executed, *the blow is meant against the East India Company's power in India.* Should not this be put a stop to, the consequences may be fatal; for whether by the Gulph of Persia—by land from Egypt—or the Red Sea, *troops may be got out either now or at a future time*, and by keeping possession of Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez, they might even on a peace, *make alliances and occasion great disturbances in India.*

*Copy of a letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Lord Grenville.**

MY DEAR LORD,

Wimbledon, 13th June, 1798.

In consequence of the intelligence from Mr. Udney, lately transmitted to me by your Lordship, and the still more recent intelligence from Frankfort, and the communication made to me last night, relative to the proposed disposal of the Portuguese troops, I have thought it right to put my ideas on paper upon the subject of the supposed expedition of Buonaparte to Egypt, in order that this important subject, with all its bearings, may receive a mature consideration. In executing this intention, however, I must content myself with throwing my ideas loosely together, for although I have ever since my connection with the administration of India, been at great pains to collect information by every means, and have long made up my mind to a conviction that the possession of Egypt by any great European power would be a fatal circumstance to the interests of this country, I cannot collect together my memorandums upon the subject so immediately as to answer my purpose in the present moment; but having weighed the opinion I now give very maturely at the time of the threatened war with Russia, I am pretty certain I will not be very erroneous in the statement I mean to give you.

I am sanguine in my hopes that our fleet now in the Mediterranean will supersede the necessity of deciding upon any practical conclusions, which may flow from our speculations upon this subject, but as the prospect is liable to disappointment, I must presume and proceed upon the supposition that the French armament has successfully reached Alexandria; and if they have done so, it is needless to trouble you with a detail of the interior weakness of Egypt in every respect whatever, in order to prove the facility of its subjugation, whether done without the concurrence of the Ottoman Porte or with their concurrence, as stated in your information from Frankfort. Even if they were to rest contented with that conquest, without extending their views further at present, I should think they had performed the most masterly stroke they have ever yet done for their future aggrandizement in power and in wealth. This is too large a field to enter upon at present; but I cannot refrain from putting into your hands

* Referred to at p. 350.

a paper upon that subject recently put into my hands by Lord Spencer. It succinctly states the outlines of what is to be expected from such a possession in the hands of France, and I certainly concur in every idea he states, with many additional ones which my official situation has led me often to revolve upon.

But to return to the purpose of this letter, which is directed to the further views of the French, as stated in your intelligence, namely, *the overthrow of our Indian power* by an attack upon the British territories there. I believe it is not a new idea, and I have reason to suppose that the Empress of Russia had it in contemplation, at the time that hostilities between that Court and Great Britain were likely to take place.

The transporting an army to India from the Mediterranean must be attempted in one of four ways—*either* by Constantinople and the Black Sea, or *secondly*, by vessels from the Red Sea, or *thirdly*, by land from Jidda through the Upper Yemen to Muscat, or rather to that part of the Arabian coast where the sea is most narrow (which is about opposite the island of Kishmish,) and there by the help of vessels to be procured at Muscat to cross the gulph, and thence proceed through the remainder of Persia, entering Hindostan by crossing the Indus; or if sufficiency of vessels could be had at Muscat they might avoid the necessity of crossing the gulph of Persia, and pass over directly by sea to the western side of India; or *lastly*, the army must march to Aleppo, and at Bir cross the Euphrates, and following that river and the Tigris, descend to the Persian gulph, and thence proceed along the coast to the Indus.

As to the first of those routes, if it be true that the Ottoman Porte has been so perfectly insane as to form the connexion mentioned in your Frankfort information, this route might certainly be pursued by the Dardanelles into the Black Sea; but it is impossible to suppose, that if they were to reach the Black Sea, Russia which has made such struggles to obtain the command of that Sea, would permit the transit of a French force, which it must see would ultimately establish the power and influence of the French Republic in the centre of the Ottoman dominion. Holding it impossible that the Emperor of Russia would suffer such a circumstance to take place, it is unnecessary to trouble you with the further detail of this route; it would be towards the Caspian, and thence to penetrate into India, which would be very difficult, and barely possible through that part of Persia.

The second and third routes are certainly practicable, upon supposition that the Frankfort intelligence is true, of this expedition having been concerted with Tippoo Sultaun, because in that case vessels may have been sent either from the Mauritius or from the ports of Tippoo Sultaun, or from both, and in that case there could be no difficulty in transporting a body of troops either from the Red Sea or from the Persian gulph, in the manner I have already supposed, in detailing the different routes from Egypt to India; but I am not of opinion that the French Government can have formed a sufficient concert, or would run the risk of all the difficulties which stand in the way of their enterprize in either of the two ways now supposed.

The following reasons lead me to this conclusion—in the first place, although the possession of Egypt has been long a favourite object both with the old and new French Government, and was always considered by them *as the most obvious means of undermining the British power in India*; I do not think till recently they ever entertained an idea to accomplish it in the gigantic manner now proposed, and consequently cannot have concerted or prepared early enough to meet them in the Red Sea or in the gulph of Persia such an extent of shipping as would be requisite for the transportation of such an army to the coasts of India, and unless they had made such a preparation, they are too well informed not to know that without previous preparation they had no chance of finding the requisite ton-

nage either in the Arabian, or the Persian, gulph ; secondly, if they had thought of this enterprize sufficiently early for such preparation, their own judgment must have suggested to them the risk of their whole plan being frustrated by storms, or by the vigilance of our cruisers in the Indian seas ; thirdly, they were not certain but their plans would be discomfited by a very small naval force being stationed either at the mouth of the Red Sea, or at the mouth of the Persian gulph ; and, in fact, I conceive it even now not to be too late to use that precaution.

These various reasons satisfy me, that if this enterprize is really to be undertaken, Buonaparte will, as much as possible, avoid the dangers of the sea, which is not his element, but trusting to his own exertions and the enthusiasm of his followers, endeavour to accomplish his object by marching to Aleppo, cross the Euphrates, and following the example of Alexander, by following the river Euphrates and the Tigris, and descending to the Persian gulph, and thence proceeding along the coast to the Indus. This route requires no vessels to transport troops. The roads are much more practicable, and the resources of provisions and forage much greater ; if, indeed, the Turks were hostile to their views, they could in a variety of ways annoy them, both in their first project and in their after plans of recruiting their army, by the means of landing them at Alexandretta or Scandroon, the nearest port to Aleppo. But if, as stated in the Frankfort intelligence, the Turks are really friendly to the views of France, I do not see any reason to suppose that the object of reaching India may not be accomplished. It will be done, no doubt, with great fatigue and loss of men ; it must be a tedious operation, and many hardships must be undergone ; but these are considerations which will not operate either upon the leader or upon the followers of this enterprize, and therefore it appears to me we will act most unwisely if we omit any one exertion to protect our Indian interests against the most formidable danger to which, in my opinion, it was ever exposed.

The first and most obvious measure that can be pursued from this country is a direct representation, both to the Emperor of Russia and at Constantinople. If the Turks have formed any such connexion, and entered into any such alliance, as stated in the Frankfort intelligence, their conduct is so directly hostile to us as to relieve us from every ceremony with regard to them. The interest of Russia itself is so nearly concerned by the admission of the French into Egypt, and the means thereby afforded them of gaining a pre-eminence in, and ultimately the conquest of, Turkey, that I cannot conceive the Emperor, with all his pacific dispositions, will choose to be a tame spectator of such transactions. Nothing should be left undone on our part to excite him to a sense of his danger ; and if the Turks, notwithstanding the representations of Russia, persist in such an alliance as is supposed, we ought to connect ourselves as closely with Russia as possible, and aid her in every project she may undertake for the chastisement of the Turks.

Information will be immediately and by the speediest modes conveyed to our governments in India, stating the intelligence we have received, and guarding them against the danger with which they are threatened ; and a naval force, either from the Cape or from India, must be directed to cruise at the mouth of the Red Sea, and at the mouth of the Persian Gulph, in order to prevent any naval communication between the French and the continent of India.

For these two years past there has been, from time to time, appearances of French emissaries, both in Persia and in Egypt, and it is not probable that the French would have formed such a project as this without having endeavoured to secure a co-operation with some of the powers, through whose countries they are to pass ; and, in the last despatches from India, there seems to be a floating idea as if Tippoo had been holding out the

hopes of a French co-operation to one of our refractory rajahs, on the coast of Malabar. It must be the object of our government in India, by every means in their power, to counteract the intrigues which the French may have used for facilitating their present enterprise. I hope much may be done in this way; and considering the desultory politics of Indian powers, the French may very speedily find themselves disappointed in the co-operation they have counted upon. Any material disappointment in this respect must be fatal to their project—their army must be much fatigued and exhausted after so long a march; and if in that situation we can induce the Abdalli, the Afghans, and other tribes bordering upon the Indus, and also the other powers in the north of India, to annoy the French army in their progress to our territories, they would be cut up before we were called to encounter them, as would render our success tolerably certain. At the same time, it must not be forgot, that in all systems of intrigue with the native powers in India, we labour under a great disadvantage in a competition with France. However much we may endeavour to use our power in India with fairness and with moderation, still we are an upstart power, and our dominion there is established on the foundation of the conquests or cessions, made to us by a variety of the native powers. It is impossible to suppose that they do not feel uneasy under such circumstances, and therefore a more easy prey to the representation, seduction, and intrigue of another power, who comes in the plausible form of offering to deliver them from English bondage, without desiring any recompence in return; in short, it is a rivalry, where our enemy has every thing to gain and nothing to lose, and where we have nothing to gain and every thing to lose.

Under these circumstances we have no certain security, except what rests upon our own independent and solid power; it is for this reason I urge the absolute necessity of reinforcing our governments in India, by every means in our power. The great demand for troops upon the Continent at the beginning of the war, together with the expeditions and loss of men in the West Indies, and the conquest of the Cape, joined to the apparent security of India, has induced us to keep back from the Indian establishments those recruits necessary even for keeping up their peace arrangement. The 10th and 11th regiments were destined many months ago for the East India service, but you know that both the one and the other have been since appropriated to other services, and are, of course, withdrawn from their former destination; and it does not occur to me that we have a possible resource for sending the requisite force to India, except in two ways. The one is, to send the regiments, being two in number, lately recruited from the supplemental militia, to Gibraltar, and to send an equal number from thence to the East Indies. The other resource is the troops in Portugal, and even after both of these are applied to that service, our Indian security will not be adequate to our wishes.

Do not conceive that I am undervaluing the service to which you wish to apply the troops in Portugal. I know and feel its importance, but I have uniformly and invariably maintained that it is our duty, in the distribution of our force, both naval and military, never to abandon the security of our distant possessions. Their distance places them out of the reach of all extraordinary resources. No militia regiment will volunteer its service for the security of India—many will for the security of Ireland. Every man in the kingdom will arm himself for the security of England, but the East and West Indies can look to no such resource. When attacked they must stand or fall by the force appropriated to them, but they are placed beyond the reach of those innumerable resources which present themselves when an urgent danger presses at home.

I remain,

My dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

H. DUNN

Secret intelligence from Frankfort.

[Enclosed in the foregoing letter.]

A Monsieur Faujas de St. Fond (known as a man of letters before the revolution) arrived at Frankfort a few days ago. He is employed by the French Government to make enquiries into subjects of Natural History. The Abbé de Lisle is here likewise on his way to Brunswick; he was visited by Faujas, with whom he was formerly acquainted, and who in conversation informed him that the expedition from Toulon was certainly destined to Egypt; that it had been long in agitation; that Buonaparte had formed the plan, and prevailed on the Directory to adopt it; that the Porte had agreed that they might take possession of Egypt, in return for which they had stipulated the future payment of a large sum of money, the cession of some islands taken from the Venetians, and the free exportation of grain from Egypt to Constantinople, which condition they had persuaded the Porte would always be observed, being in effect mutually advantageous; that the army under Buonaparte consisted of 40,000 men, the *élite* of the French troops, which would be gradually reinforced, and that all the principal officers in every corps and department of the army, were chosen by Buonaparte; that the project was, after having secured possession of certain parts of Egypt to take the nearest route by Arabia, through Persia, cross the Indus nearly where Alexander did, and from thence advance into the British territories. He said that the Directory for a long time past had employed Agents in Persia and India, that those who at present had the chief power in Persia had agreed to assist in and facilitate the enterprize; that the Prince on the borders of the Indus (meaning, I suppose, Zemaun Shah) had done the same, and that measures had been *fully concerted with Tippoo Sultaun, to whom the Government would endeavour (or were endeavouring) to convey the number of troops he had required.* He observed that this enterprize embraced a number of great public objects, as well as many private views; that Buonaparte saw in it an ample field for gratifying his ambition, and perhaps a prospect of establishing himself in some great and independent situation, which he could scarcely have done in Italy. Mr Faujas pretended also that the projected invasion of England was intended merely to create expense, excite apprehension, and cover this expedition, so as to prevent the British Ministry from taking measures for the security of their Asiatic dominions.

Importance of Egypt to the French.

[Enclosed in Mr. Dundas's letter to Lord Grenville.]

The probability of the French taking possession of Egypt, naturally leads us, as a great commercial nation, to consider the question of the probability, as well as the consequences that may arise from the accomplishment of such an undertaking.

I believe it will be very generally admitted, that the possession of Egypt has been a long time an object of French politics; the sending of Monsieur de Tott to survey the levels and roads practicable across the Isthmus of Suez remains as full proof of such a design, which perhaps was retarded at that moment by ideas of justice, now no longer prevailing.

M. Volney, one of the latest writers on the affairs of Egypt, and a man of some influence with the existing Government of France, speaks but slightly of the military prowess of the present Mamaluke Government, and considers 10,000 effective men as the greatest number they can bring into the field; so that it appears, if in this hour of arrogance, the French

intend the invasion of Egypt, they will not be prevented by the opposition that can be given to them by the Mamaluke Government.

The immediate advantages that may lead the French to this measure are, that after the various revolutions of parties that have taken place, an establishment in Egypt may, perhaps, be deemed necessary to transplant such subjects as might otherwise be troublesome at home. The idea of settling and parcelling out a country whose riches and fertility have been the theme of all ages, cannot fail to catch the minds of those men, who, from habits of licentiousness and dissipation, are no longer fitted to return to the restraints of industry, or the sobriety of regular government.

Another very material argument arises in favour of such an establishment. It is well known that the southern provinces of France are not equal to the supply of their own wants for corn, which they have been always used to purchase of the Barbary States. Egypt will afford them abundance in return for the common manufactures of France, and by this means, form a basis for that commerce by barter, which will easily extend itself whenever their Government shall attain a sufficient degree of consistency; so much, therefore, may be said on the question of probability.

As to the advantages that may in future arise from such a possession, they are great and manifold; I know that it has been an opinion long prevailing in France, that Egypt would afford most of the articles of the East and West India growth, and I have reason to think such an opinion well founded. The productions of this country as it now stands are wheat, rice, Indian corn, millet, jesamum, cotton, flax, senna cassia, sugar, nitre, natron, sal ammonia, honey, and wax.

But if we extend our idea, and consider the situation of Grand Cairo, we shall find it calculated for a great mart, extending its commerce to all around it. It is the centre of the Carravan trade, and unites Europe with Africa and Asia by its circuitous commerce. Carravans from Morocco, Nubia, Abyssinia, Armenia, Persia, Syria, Damascus, Aleppo, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and various others, arrive annually at Cairo, and bring the produce of their several countries, and a large sum in specie for the purchase of such commodities as they want.

When the trade of Cairo was flourishing, it consisted of spices of all kinds, gums of various sorts, drugs of most kinds, silk, cotton, and all sorts of china and India produce, which were exchanged with the Carravans for gold dust, ivory, and slaves, and with Europe for gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, coral, and most articles of European manufacture. The Venetians, who carried on the greatest part of this trade to Europe in the 15th century, employed 43,000 seamen in it, nor has this commerce entirely yielded to the destructive Government of the Turks; for, according to Monsieur Volney, the worth of the commerce of Cairo amounts annually to 150 millions of livres.

Should the French restore the commerce to India by the Red Sea, which is, undoubtedly, their object, they will do it to more advantage than ever it has yet been done. For our commerce to India has introduced into these countries more of the European manufactures than were formerly in demand, as well as familiarized the use of China and India produce to every part of the world.

Coffee and tea, two articles little known in former times, are now become generally and extensively in common use, and form a very considerable branch of commerce. The growth of sugar and indigo in India are likewise new articles, and of great consideration, so that the commerce of the Red Sea is materially changed in its favour.

The navigation of the Red Sea is by no means so dangerous as ignorance has represented it. The winds are periodical, making the passage very short both to and from India, and the passage from Suez to Cairo

is twenty days by the Carravans, and from Cairo the passage down the Nile is through a channel of about two hundred miles to the sea.

We were formerly in the practice of trading to Suez with assorted cargoes known in India by the name of Gulph goods, but the late troubles in Egypt have greatly disturbed this commercial intercourse.

When I was in India I procured several statements of the nature of this trade from a free merchant who had himself been there, and he calculates that on the sale of two cargoes of the amount of £300,000, the profits would arise from 75 to 100 per cent., deducting 14 per cent. for the charges of land carriage from Suez to Cairo, the duties, presents to the Beys and all contingencies. The returns to be made in Mocha coffee, on which there is a great profit both in Europe and Asia, and in bills as a remittance of their money to Europe.

Should this trade, therefore, be once established in the hands of the French, it is easy to foresee the attendant consequences. It would give them the preference, if not the monopoly, in the supply of the whole Mediterranean in corn, rice, tea, coffee, sugar, indigo, spices, and all sorts of India and China goods, in return for all the articles of their own manufacture, most of which are well calculated for the demand of the Carravans; and by means of remittances from India, this commerce would be carried on for a time with the capitals of other countries, which is an advantage peculiarly necessary to France at this moment.

To follow all the circuitous branches of such a commerce would lead to lengths I cannot permit myself to follow; I fear they are too obvious not to shew themselves on the slightest examination, but there is one advantage left to a maritime nation—there are no ports of shelter on the whole coasts of Syria and Egypt, of course the intention may be defeated by a naval force in its infancy, or its progress may be always impeded by our superior activity and naval skill.

20th April, 1798.

From the Earl of Mornington to Dowlut Row Scindiah.

Fort William, July 8th, 1798.*

I have already had the pleasure to address a letter to you, notifying my arrival in this country, and expressive of the kind and friendly sentiments I entertain towards you, which I trust you will have received.

It is always my wish to maintain the relations of amity and good-will with you, and being constantly anxious for the maintenance of your prosperity and welfare, I inform you that I have received a communication from Zemaun Shah, announcing his intention of visiting Hindostan, and demanding my assistance and that of the Nabob Vizier, for the purpose of restoring the throne of Delhi to Shah Allum, and of expelling the Mah-rattas from Hindostan. Colonel Palmer, in whose wisdom and experience I repose the greatest confidence, will have the honour to communicate to you the papers which were received by the Resident of Lucknow, from Zemaun Shah.

If Zemaun Shah should invade Hindostan, it will be necessary for all the established powers upon the north-western frontier to be vigilant, and to attend carefully to the defence of their respective territories. For this

* This letter was procured for the Editor by the kindness of Mr. Edmonstone, after the text had gone to press; but as it is of importance, it is here given.

purpose whenever you shall return into your own dominions, you shall find the British Resident at your Durbar, instructed by me to enter into a defensive Treaty with you for the reciprocal protection of your dominions, of those of the Nabob Vizier, and of those of the Company, against the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah.

With these friendly intentions towards you, it would give me great satisfaction to learn that your own prudence, and your regard for the safety of your invaluable possessions on the north-western frontier of India, had suggested to you the propriety of returning to Hindostan for the purpose of taking the requisite precautions against the impending danger. Your friendship for the Company, which I believe always to be sincere, furnishes another motive to induce you not to protract your stay in the dominions of the Peishwa.

The conduct of Tippoo Sultaun having lately been of a very offensive and hostile nature towards the British Government and its allies, it is therefore necessary for me, in conjunction with the Nizam and with the Peishwa, (being all united by Treaty,) to demand satisfaction of Tippoo. I earnestly hope that Tippoo may satisfy the just expectations of the allies without compelling them to resort to arms; my uniform disposition being to preserve peace with him and with every power in India. But under the circumstances of Tippoo's preparations for war, prudence requires that the allies should be prepared on their part to meet any exigency that may arise. The present position of your army prevents both the Peishwa and the Nizam from fulfilling their defensive engagements with the British Government against the menaced attacks of Tippoo. As you are the friend of the Company, you will be sensible of the propriety and justice of my amicable request, and you will not continue to occupy a position which disables the allies of the Company from acting, where their assistance is due under the solemn obligation of existing Treaties.

When you arrive in your own dominions, you will there find Colonel Collins, whom Sir John Shore appointed Resident at your Durbar, and whom I have confirmed in that appointment; placing equal reliance on his abilities. He will have the honour to present my particular respects to you, and in addition to a defensive Treaty against Zemaun Shah, he will offer my mediation for the adjustment of all differences between you and the Nizam and the Peishwa.

Nothing would make me so happy as to become the instrument of peace and reconciliation between you and the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah; for I consider you all as the friends of the Company, and it has given me great concern to witness your late unfortunate dissensions.

I entreat you to understand that this letter is dictated by a spirit of friendship, and of anxiety for your real interests. I refer you to Colonel Palmer for the particulars of all my sentiments towards you, and I hope through him to hear a satisfactory account of your welfare, and to obtain an additional pledge of your amicable disposition.

MORNINGTON.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian translator to Govt.

(A true copy.)

MILITIA ORDERS.

By the Right Honourable the Governor General.

Fort William, Dec. 21st, 1798.

The Governor-General has observed, with the utmost satisfaction, the zeal and alacrity with which all ranks of the European, Armenian, and Portuguese inhabitants of the town of Calcutta, have applied themselves to learn the use of arms, since the re-establishment of the corps of European militia.

The regular and assiduous attention of the infantry and cavalry, comprising this respectable corps, will soon render it an important addition to the military force of this Presidency, and will contribute essentially to the security of the seat of the supreme Government of the British possessions in India.

The Governor-General being on the eve of his departure for Fort St. George, takes this opportunity of declaring his public approbation of exertions so honourable to the character of this settlement, and so conformable to that spirit which now secures the British empire in Europe against the combined efforts of all its enemies.

All the officers bearing commissions in the militia having, without exception, manifested every possible degree of activity and diligence in the formation and discipline of their respective companies and troops, the Governor-General will not attempt to discriminate the merits of individuals belonging to the corps. But it is his duty to express a particular sense of the service rendered by Lieut.-Colonel Welsh, of the 2nd regiment of native cavalry, in forming the corps of militia cavalry, which has derived great advantage from the valuable instructions of that respectable officer.

The Governor-General is persuaded, that no incitement is necessary to sustain the zeal which now animates the whole settlement; but he cannot withhold from the gentlemen who have exerted themselves on this occasion, the accompanying testimony of the value of their services, contained in a letter from the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, which did not reach Fort William until some weeks after the re-establishment of the Calcutta European militia had taken place.

Extract of a letter from the Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Right Hon. the Governor-General, dated the 16th June, 1798.

In consequence of the menaces and arrogant language of our enemy, threatening, by an invasion of our own island, at once to strike at the whole vitals of our strength and power, a spirit of zeal, ardent loyalty, and national pride, has been excited to a degree unequalled at any period of our history; and the consequence of it is, that all ranks and degrees of men are coming forward to be trained in arms—determined to repel every attempt to insult our coasts, or to disturb the internal peace and prosperity of the country. We are, in truth, become an armed nation; and, in addition to all our other advantages, have formed a bulwark of internal security, founded upon the voluntary zeal, loyalty, and valour of the country. I wish, earnestly, to urge your Lordship to take this statement under your consideration, as applicable to the situation of India. If it be true that a successful invasion of this country would prove fatal to us, in every one interest worthy to bestow a thought upon, it is still more peculiarly true, with regard to his Majesty's subjects settled in India. A successful attack upon our possessions in India, and the overthrow of the British interests there, would be a death's wound to every prospect which any civil ser-

vant of the company can entertain. Why then are not they, so far as is consistent with their other avocations and duties, to devote some leisure hours in each week, in order to learn the use of arms, and to form themselves into corps, under the authority of the Government, for the purpose of adding to your European strength in India, and preparing themselves, in case of the last extremity, to sacrifice their lives in defence of those interests, upon which every thing essential in life must depend. This is an advantage which, in the day of difficulty, no other European nation but ourselves, have the means of resorting to.

APPENDIX I.

*To Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief, &c.**

SIR,

Having in obedience to your orders taken the command of the troops ordered for the assault of the Fort of Seringapatam, consisting of a corps of six companies of European flankers from the Bombay army, under Lieut.-Colonel Dunlop; a corps of four companies of European flankers from the Scotch Brigade, and the Regiment de Meurone, under Colonel Sherbrooke; his Majesty's 12th, 33rd, 73rd, and 74th regiments; ten companies of Bengal sepoy flankers, under Lieut.-Colonel Gardener; eight companies of coast sepoy flankers, under Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple; six companies of Bombay sepoy flankers, under Lieut.-Colonel Mignan; one hundred artillerymen, with a proportion of gun lascars, under Major Bell. The European and Native pioneers under Captain Dowse, amounting as per enclosed return of men actually under arms at the assault, to—

Firelocks	{ Europeans	-	-	2,494	} Total - 4,376
	{ Natives	-	-	1,882	

I have now the honour to report to you the measures I took to secure the success of the important object entrusted to me, and the result, and to enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the assault.

Having received your instructions to make the capture of the ramparts my first object, as the force under my command was not deemed sufficient to assault the ramparts and town at the same time, when defended by Tippoo's whole army, I directed Lieut.-Colonel Dunlop, with six companies of Bombay European flankers, supported by his Majesty's 12th and 33rd regiments, and ten companies of Bengal sepoy flankers, with fifty artillerymen, to assault the North ramparts, and to push on with the European flank companies until he met the South attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke, consisting of the flank companies of the Scotch Brigade and Regiment de Meurone, reinforced by the Grenadier companies of his Majesty's 73rd and 74th regiments, in consequence of the vigorous resistance, there was reason to apprehend at the several heavy batteries on the South face of the fort, and supported by his Majesty's 73rd and 74th regiments, eight companies of coast native, and six companies of Bombay native flankers, with fifty artillerymen, when the whole were directed to form on the East face, until arrangements were made for the attack of such of the Cavaliers as might not already have been seized on, or for proceeding to the attack of the body of the place, if with the force remaining such a measure should be deemed advisable.

The assault commenced, in obedience to your orders, at one p.m. Colonels Sherbrooke and Dunlop were directed on no account to quit the inner rampart previous to their junction, for any other object but that of

* Referred to at page 570.

seizing on the cavaliers in the neighbourhood of their respective attacks, and to lose no time in regaining their situation on the ramparts, as soon as that object should be attained, and every cavalier or post on the rampart, which it might be deemed essential to secure, were immediately to be occupied by a battalion company or companies from the supporting European regiments, so that the whole of the ground once captured might be secured, and the flankers on their junction be in full force to follow up their success, by an attack on any of the cavaliers which had not fallen in their way, or by an assault on the body of the town and the palace of the Sultaun.

In the success of every part of this plan my warmest wishes were gratified; the whole of the ramparts, and every cavalier in the fort, were in a vigorous assault of a few hours, in the possession of our troops, who were too well acquainted with the value of their conquest to render the retaining it against the whole of Tippoo's army at all doubtful. The place, therefore, being so securely our own, I was not anxious, by an immediate attack on the palace, to bring on a fresh and unnecessary slaughter; and indeed the exhausted state of the gallant flankers rendered it expedient for me to halt a short time before I proceeded to the attack of the palace, which, if Tippoo was in it, there was every reason to suppose would be, if possible, as gallantly defended as attacked.

During this halt, two fresh battalions of sepoys arrived, and trusting that by this time the Sultaun would see how fruitless any further resistance must prove, I requested Major Allen, Deputy Quarter-Master-General, who had just arrived from camp, and who, from his knowledge of the language, was well qualified to execute the duty, to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace, and offer Cowle to Tippoo Sultaun, and every person in his palace, on his immediate and unconditional surrender of himself and family to me; at the same time informing him, if there was the smallest hesitation in acceding to this offer, that an immediate assault on the palace would take place, and every man in it be put to the sword. The Grenadiers, and part of the 12th regiment under Major Craigie, with the 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment of sepoys, accompanied Major Allen to put this threat into immediate execution, if necessary; and I prepared the flankers, now a little recovered from their fatigues, to follow to the attack of the palace on the first signal of hostilities having recommenced (for the firing had ceased on all sides for upwards of an hour). In the mean time I received intelligence from one of the prisoners, of whom I caused enquiry to be made as to the place where the English soldiers, who had been taken in the different assaults on the enemy's out posts during the siege were confined, that they had all been put to death about ten days before in the most barbarous manner, by having nails driven through their skulls. On this I immediately advanced with the flankers of the 74th regiment and the light infantry, and remaining part of the 12th regiment, resolved, if Cowle had not already been granted, and the dreadful accounts of the fate of our fellow soldiers were confirmed, to sacrifice the tyrant to their manes.

On reaching the palace, Major Allen came out to me, and informed me he had been with Tippoo's two youngest sons, who were ignorant where their father was, but were disposed to surrender themselves and the palace on a promise of protection. Anxious, if possible, to discover Tippoo, who I had been informed was certainly in the palace, I hesitated to agree to these conditions unless they would inform me where their father was, and threatened to search the most secret recesses of the palace if he was not instantly produced; but not being able to learn from them where the Sultaun was, and wishing to get them out of the fort before it was dark, after giving them every assurance of protection and kind treatment, I sent

them off to you, under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, your public Secretary, and Captain Merriott, your Aid-de-Camp, escorted by the light infantry company of his Majesty's 33rd regiment. The palace was then taken possession of without opposition. I now proceeded to the search of the palace, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Close and Major Allen, taking care, however, to avoid the Leuana, round which I had posted a sufficient force to make his escape from it impracticable. In the palace we found a man who, on being severely threatened, said that the Sultaun was killed in attempting to escape through the Northern Sally Port, and offered to conduct us to the body. We accordingly proceeded thither, and under a slaughtered heap of several hundreds, many of whom were men of consequence in his service, had the pleasure to discover the body of the Sultaun, he had been shot through the head and body, and was quite dead, I caused him immediately to be put into a palanquin, and conveyed to the palace, where the body was identified by some of the principal men who had fallen into our hands, and by two of the eunuchs belonging to his Haram.

I now proceeded to give such protection to the inhabitants as was in my power, and although it was by this time dark, as I have heard no complaints of outrage or insult being offered to any after the conflict ceased, I may venture to say the natives of India will be satisfied that the British soldiers are not more brave than humane.

Early the next morning Abdual Cawlic, the second son of Tippoo, and the elder son of the two who were delivered to Lord Cornwallis as hostages at the conclusion of the last war, was met by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple coming from the island to deliver himself up, he was immediately assured of protection and the most liberal treatment, and I went to meet him to shew how much satisfied I was with the confidence he placed in us by thus delivering himself into our hands when the means of escape were perfectly in his power.

Having been led to expect you in the fort yesterday morning, I waited with Abdual Cawlic to deliver him into your own hands. But on being relieved by Colonel Wellesley, I proceeded with him to camp, and delivered him over to you. I perceive, in the general orders of yesterday, that no mention is made of Colonel Sherbrooke. This, I perceive, is owing to that order being published before I had time to make my report to you of the conduct of the troops under my command on the assault, which was highly exemplary throughout, and if, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack.

I make no doubt but Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, who commanded a party of equal force with that of Colonel Sherbrooke, would have merited equal praise for his exertions had he not most unfortunately been disabled by a wound very early in the assault, a circumstance I most sincerely regretted, as from the well known character of that officer, and the clear manner in which he understood the instructions I gave him relative to the attack he was to lead, I put the greatest confidence in the success of the attack.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,
DAVID BAIRD, Major-General.

Camp at Seringapatam,
6th May, 1799.

Statement of the Force composing the Grand Army
under the Command of Lieutenant General Harris, February, 1799.

Corps.	Non Commissioned Drums Rank and File.	Total.
19th Regiment Light Dragoons	447	912
25th Do. Do.	465	
1st Do Native Cavalry	443	
2nd Do. Do.	443	
3d Do. Do.	443	
4th Do. Do.	437	1766
Total Cavalry	2678
2 Companies Bengal Artillery	118	576
1st Battalion Artillery	128	
2nd Do. Do.	300	
Total Artillery	576
12th Regiment Foot	773	4608
33rd Do. Do.	869	
73rd Do. Do.	851	
74th Do. Do.	801	
Scotch Brigade	500	
Swiss Regiment	814	
Total European Infantry	4608
1st Battalion 1st Regiment	1077	11,061
2nd Do. 3rd Do.	1022	
2nd Do. 5th Do.	1086	
1st Do. 6th Do.	1012	
1st Do. 8th Do.	1101	
2nd Do. 9th Do.	857	
1st Do. 12th Do.	838	
2nd Do. 12th Do.	1068	
Three Battalions Bengal Volunteers	3000	
Total Native Infantry	11,061
Gun Lascars	1726	2726
Pioneers	1000	
Total Gun Lascars and Pioneers	2726
Abstract.		
Cavalry	2678	18,923
Artillery	576	
European Infantry	4608	
Native Infantry	11,061	
Total Fighting Men	18,923	
Lascars and Pioneers	2726	21,649
Grand Total	21,649	

Detachment under the Command of Colonel Roberts.

Corps.	Non Commissioned Drums Rank and File.	Total.
1 Company Bengal Artillery . . .	57	142
1 Do. Coast . . .	85	
1 Battalion 10th Regiment B N I.	993	
2nd Do. 10th Do Do . . .	1008	
2nd Do 2nd Do. C N. I . . .	1065	
2nd Do. 7th Do. Do . . .	1068	
1st Do. 11th Do. Do . . .	1092	
2nd Do 11th Do. Do. . . .	1099	6325
Companies of Gun Lascars	318
Total		6785

Detachment in the Southern Division under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Brown.

Detachment of the 1st Battalion Artillery . . .	58	58
1st Division 1st European Regiment . . .	300	646
2nd Do. 2nd Do. Do. . . .	346	
2nd Battalion 1st Regiment (3 Companies) . . .	349	2737
1st Do. 2nd Do.	1040	
1st Do. 3rd Do.	900	
1st Do. 13th Do. (2 Flank Companies) . . .	224	
2nd Do. 13th Do. (2 Do. . Do.) . . .	224	
New Troop of Cavalry	108	108
Gun Lascars	168	168
Pioneers	100	100
Total	. . .	3817

Northern Division Commanded by Colonel Vigors.

European Infantry	129	6841
Native Infantry including Revenue Corps and Invalids	6712	
Total	. . .	6841

N. B. A Detachment of Recruits from Hyderabad, consisting of 7 Havildars, 6 Naiques, 7 Puckallies and 743 Sepoys, at Masulipatam, not included above. Five Companies of His Majesty's 19th Regiment of Foot, and one Company of Bengal Artillery, ordered from Columbo to join the Troops in the Field in the Southern Division, not included in the above. Also a Detachment of 1500 Men under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Read in the Barahmahaul.

GENERAL ORDER OF ENCAMPMENT OF THE GRAND ARMY.

RIGHT WING.	3rd Brigade	1st Batt. 1st Reg. 1st Do. 12th Do. 1st Do. 6th Do.	Major of Brigade Lt. Lauder. Colonel Gowdie Commanding. Qr. Mast. Brig. Lieut. Brice.	Maj. Gen. Bridges Commanding. Staff Maj. of Brig. Capt. Ogg. Do. Aid de Camp Lieut. Cosby. Battering Train with the Army. 4 Iron 24 Pounders. 30 Do. 18 Do. 8 Do. 12 Do. 2 Brass 8 Inch Mortars. 6 Do. 5½ Do.
	1st Brigade	H. M. 12th Foot. Scotch Brigade. H. M. 74th Foot.	Maj. Gen. Baird Commanding. Major of Brigade Lt. Lambton.	
	5th Brigade	1st Batt. 8th Reg. 2nd Do. 12th Do. 2nd Do. 3rd Do.	Maj. of Brigade Lt. Colebrooke. Col. Sherbrooke Commanding. Qr. Mast. Brigade Lieut. Kelly.	
LEFT WING.	4th Brigade	1st Bengal Volunt. 3rd Do. Do. 2nd Do. Do.	Maj. of Brigade Capt. Cuppage. Lt. Col. Gardiner Commanding. Qr. Mst. Brig. Lt. R. Marriott.	Maj. Gen. Popham Commanding. Staff Maj. of Brig. Capt. Grant. Do. Aid de Camp Lt. G. M. Popham. Field Train. 2 Brass 18 Pounders. 8 Do. 12 Do. 32 Do. 6 Do. 1 Do. 8 Inch Howitzer. 4 Do. 5½ Do.
	2nd Brigade	H. M. 33rd Foot. Reg. de Meuron. H. M. 73rd Foot.	The Hon. Col. Wellesley Comg. Maj. of Brigade Capt. Hughes.	
	6th Brigade	2nd Batt. 9th Reg. 2nd Do. 5th Do.	Maj. Brig. Capt. Lt. M'Pherson. Lieut. Col. Scott Commanding. Qr. Mast. Brig. Lt. Armstrong.	
CAVALRY.	1st Brigade	1st Reg. Nat. Cav. 19th Do. Dragoons. 4th Do. Native Cav.	Col. Stevenson Commanding. Maj. of Brigade Lt. Strachan.	Major General Floyd, Commanding. Staff Maj. of Brigade, Captain Wilson. Staff Aid de Camp, Captain Monteath. Attached to Cavalry. 4 Brass 6 Pns. } Horse 8 Do. 3 Do. } Arty.
	2nd Brigade	2nd Do. Do. 25th Do. Dragoons 3rd Do. Nat. Cav.	Colonel Pater Commanding. Major Brigade Major Patterson.	

APPENDIX L.

GENERAL RETURN of the Troops belonging to the Presidency of Bombay, composing the Army assembled for Field Service.
 Lieutenant-General James Stuart, Commander-in-Chief, Head Quarters, Cananore, 11th February, 1799.

CORPS.	Commanded by	Europeans.		Natives.		Total fighting men.		Total fighting men.	
		Rank & File,		Rank & File,		fighting men,		fighting men,	
Detachment of Artillery and Lascars	Lt.-Col. Lawman.	137		314		166		344	
Ditto of Engineers	Col. Sartorius.		7		..	
Right Native Brigade, com. { 1st bat. 2d reg. N. S.	Major Lawrence.	..		584		..		653	
by Lieut.-Col. Montresor, { 1st bat. 4th reg.	Major Disney.	..		600		..		672	
77th regiment { 1st bat. 3d reg.	Lt.-Col. Mignan.	..		599		..		663	
Centre or European Brigade, { H. M. 75th reg. foot.	Major Forbes.	200		..		223		..	
com. by Lt.-Col. Dunlop, { H. C. E. reg. foot.	Major Fyfe.	467		..		528		..	
77th regiment	Major Spry.	618		..		693		..	
Left Native Brigade, com. { 2d bat. 3d reg. N. I., with	} Lt.-Col. Home.	..		639		..		717	
by Lt.-Col. Wiseman, C.S. { det. of 1st or 9th bat.		..		593		..		663	
Pioneer Corps	Capt. B. Moncrieff	..		597		..		675	
		..		390		..		416	
	Total .	1,422		4,316		1,617		4,803	
									6,420

ROBERT GORDON, Adjut- t-Gen

APPENDIX M.

General Return of Killed and Missing, in that part of the Army engaged with Tippoo Sultan's Troops at and near
 Settaseer on the 6th of March, 1799. Camp near Sedapore, March 8, 1799.

	Killed.						Wounded.								Missing.				Grand Total.					
	Captain.	Havildars.	Rank and File.	Paukanly.	Total.		Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Subahdar.	Jemmedar.	Sergeant.	Haveldare.	Drummers and Rifers.	Rank and File.	Paukanly.	Total.		Captain.		Drummers and Rifers.	Rank and File.	Total.		
					Europeans.	Native.										Europeans.	Natives.					Europeans.	Natives.	
1st t. 2nd Reg.	1	1	3		3	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	12	1	1	1	27	1	1	2	1	3	5	
1st do. 4th do.		1	10		1	2	1	1	1	1		2	12	1	1	1	3	8	1	1	3	1	3	46
1st do 3rd do.			2			1						1	32	8			1	33			3			14
75th Reg.			3	1	3	4	1										6							38
77th Reg.			3		2								1	6	7		9			3		3		9
1st Bat. 5th Reg.			2																					14
Pioneer Corps		1	1			1							6	6						6			6	10
Total	1	324	1	9	20	4	1	1	1	1	1	3	284	1	21	77	1	1	14	4	12			143

Names of Officers—*Killed*, Capt. S. Thompson, 1st Bat. 2nd Reg.—*Wounded*, Lieut. Lighton, Artillery; Lieut. H. Ronne, Lieut. Wilkinson, Eusign Eldridge, 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment; Subahdar Norape, Jem. Mah. Sophy, Lieut. Maxwell, 1st. Battalion, 3rd Regiment *Missing*, Capt. Sholl, 1st. Br. 2nd Regiment.

ROBERT GORDON, Adjutant General.

APPENDIX N.

Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing, of the Corps which were engaged under the command of Lieutenant-General Harris in the action with Tippoo Sultaun's Army near Mallavilly, on the 27th of March, 1799.

Corps.	Europeans.			Natives.			Horses.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
His Majesty's 19th Dragoons	8	2	322	3
..... 25th do.	2	32
Hon. Com. 1st. Reg of N. Cav...	2	34
..... 2nd. do.	1	1	21
..... 3rd. do.	1	14
His Majesty's 33rd Regiment	4
..... 74th do.	5	17
..... Scotch Brigade	1	5
Hon. Com. 10th Reg. Bengal N. I.	3
..... 1st Bat. 1st Reg. Coast	1	1	4
..... 1st do. 6th do.	1
..... 2d do. 3rd do.	3	1
..... 2d do. 11th do.	1
..... 1st do. 12th do.	2	1
..... 2d do. 12th do.	1
Total	6	37	1	16	6	1233	3

Officers included in the Return. — *Wounded*, Captain Kennedy, 19th Light Dragoons; Lieutenant Strachan, 2nd Regiment of Native Cavalry; Lieutenant Moore, 74th Regiment.

B. CLOSE, *Adjutant General*.

ABSTRACT of the Returns of the Army commanded by Lieut.-General Harris, shewing its strength at various periods of the Campaign, with an Abstract of Ordnance and principal Stores conveyed with the Army, and remaining at the conclusion of the siege of Seringapatam.

Periods of Returns.	EUROPEANS.						NATIVES.						Grand Total.											
	For Duty, including Officers.			Sick Present, including Officers.			For Duty, including Officers.			Sick Present, including Officers.														
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Horses.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Horses.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Pioneers.	Total.		Horses.	Europeans.	Natives.	Horses.							
Strength of the Army in the Field on marching from the Carnatic, exclusive of his Highness the Nizam's cavalry and infantry	926	689	4462	6070	859	89	26	264	61727	1697	14397	1028	18779	1697	60	63	800	923	56	4834	19702	2018		
Strength of the Army before Seringapatam, after the march of Major-General Floyd to Pienrapatam, exclusive of his Highness the Nizam's cavalry and infantry	404	531	3304	4239	446	38	26	339	4	430	1396	10455	891	13179	406	10	86	684	50	840	34	4632	14012	890
Strength of the Army on the return of Major-General Floyd and junction of the Bombay Army	928	736	6101	7768	859	89	26	264	61727	2015	17791	1346	22859	1697	60	63	956	1079	56	8026	23948	2018		
Strength of the Army on the return of Major-General Floyd from Caveriporum, with the Detachments of Lieut.-Colonels Brown and Read	735	738	6247	7767	808	87	64	896	3	1858	2806	10754	1395	25213	1471	43	112	1413	70	1038	74	8704	26851	2351

N. B. 23 Engineers, 3,621 of his Highness the Nizam's Infantry, and about 6,000 Cavalry, not included.

ABSTRACT OF ORDNANCE AND PRINCIPAL STORES.

24 pounder.	18 ditto.	12 ditto.	12 ditto.	18 Brass.	13 ditto.	6 ditto.	3 ditto.	8 inch Howitzers.	54 ditto.	Shot.	24 pounder.	Ditto.	18 ditto.	Ditto.	6 ditto.	Ditto.	3 ditto.	8 inch Shells.	54 inch Shells.	Powder.
2	30	8	8	2	8	38	8	3	4	2800	1176	9595	3600	1200	1000	2000	5867	2000	1158	2353
2	29	8	8	2	8	33	8	3	4	1176	10150	2821	1214	656	708	1158	2353	1158	1158	2353

N. B. The Field Ordnance and Stores with the Bombay Army, and the Detachments under Lieut.-Colonels Brown and Read, not included above.

APPENDIX P.

General Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing, of Corps composing the Army before Seringapatam, from the 4th of April to the 4th May, 1799, both days inclusive.

Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

Corps.	Europeans.			Natives.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Madras Engineers	1
Bombay do.
Bengal Artillery	4	12	..	2	10	..
1st Battalion Coast do.	6	6	5	..
2nd do. do.	8	15	1	9	27	3
Bombay Artillery	4	6	..	5	4	..
His Majesty's 12th Regiment	17	49	1
. 33rd do.	6	28	12
. 73rd do.	21	99	1
. 74th do.	45	111
. 75th do.	16	64	3
. 77th do.	10	51	1
. Scotch Brigade	14	86	1
. Regiment de Meuron	16	60	1
Bombay Regiment of European Infantry	9	23	1
1st Bat. 10th Bengal Reg. Native Infantry	3	3	..
2nd do. do. do.	5	5	..
1st Battalion Bengal Volunteers	3	3	12
2nd do. do.	6	30	9
3rd do. do.	2	8	5
1st Bat. 1st Reg. Madras Native Infantry	1	3	14	..
2nd do. 2nd do. do.	4	10	..
2nd do. 3rd do. do.	1	2	..	12	47	15
2nd do. 5th do. do.	11	33	..
1st do. 6th do. do.
2nd do. 7th do. do.	4	16	..
1st do. 8th do. do.	5	13	..
2nd do. 9th do. do.	4	7	5
1st do. 11th do. do.	3	11	..
2nd do. 11th do. do.	1	4	..
1st do. 12th do. do.	1
2nd do. 12th do. do.	1	3	..	7	46	51
Pioneer Corps	1	8	37	..
1st Bat. 2nd Reg. Bombay Nat. Infantry	1	1	..	4	10	..
2nd do. 2nd do. do.	2	..	2	10	..
1st do. 3rd do. do.	1	..	4	15	..
2nd do. 3rd do. do.	2	6	..
1st do. 4th do. do.	3	14	..
1st do. 5th do. do.	1	..	4	7	..
Pioneer Corps	1	..	2	25	..
Total	101	622	22	119	420	100

OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED, INCLUDED IN THE GENERAL RETURN.

Major C. Campbell, 1st bat. 1st Madras reg. N. I. killed 5th April, 1799. Lieut. G. Nixon, H. M. 12th reg. do. 5th do. Lieut. T. Falla, do. do. 6th do. Lieut. Fitzgerald, 33rd, do. 5th do. Lieut. Fireworker A. Brooke, Bengal artillery, wounded 5th do. Lieut. R. Nixon, H. M. 12th reg. do. 5th do. Lieut. King, do. do. 6th do. Ensign Neville, do. do. 17th do. Capt. I. Munro, 2nd bat. 12th Madras N. I. do. 18th do. Lieut. I. Vernon, do. do. do. do. Lieut. Moore, do. do. do. do. Lieut. Mackintosh, 2nd bat. 3rd Madras reg. N. I. do. 17th do. Capt. Alexander Torriano, Bombay artillery, killed 18th do. Lieut. Wm. M'Reddie, do. do. 18th do. Lieut. Wm. Taylor, staff, wounded, do. do. Lieut. Jeremiah Lock, 2nd bat. 2nd reg. Bombay N. I. do. do. do. Lieut. John Barnard, do. do. do. do. Assist.-surgeon Glasser, Reg. de Meuron, killed 19th do. Lieut. I. Fish, 2nd bat. 3rd Madras reg. N. I. do. 20th do. Lieut. S. Smith, do. wounded do. do. Lieut. Fletcher, H. M. 74th reg. do. do. do. Capt. C. I. Mears, 1st bat. 2nd Bombay reg. N. I. killed 21st do. Capt. John Gordon, H. M. 75th reg. wounded do. do. Capt. Marshall, 1st bat. 5th Bombay reg. N. I. do. do. do. Capt. Wm. Brown, 1st bat. 3rd do. do. do. do. do. Lieut. Todd, H. M. 73rd reg. do. 26th do. Capt. Hay, H. M. Scotch brigade, killed do. do. Lieut. M'Beath, do. do. wounded do. do. Lieut. Innes, do. do. do. do. Lt. M'Lean, do. do. do. do. Lt. Blair, 1st bat. Madras artil. do. 25th do. Lt. Irvine, H. M. 74th reg. killed 26th do. Capt. Aytone, do. wounded do. do. Lieut. Maxwell, do. do. do. do. Lieut. Carrington, do. do. do. do. Lieut. M'Lean, jun. H. M. 73rd reg. do. 27th do. Capt. Molle, H. M. Scotch brigade, do. do. do. Capt. Piauchaud, Reg. de Meuron, do. do. do. Lieut. Fagen, 3rd bat. Bengal volunteers do. do. do. Lieut.-Col. Montagu, Bengal artillery, wounded 2nd May (since dead.) Lieut. Cookesley, 1st bat. Madras artillery, killed do. do. Capt. Cosby, staff, do. 3rd do. Capt. Lt. Caldwell, Madras engineers, wounded 4th do. Major Mandeville, 2nd bat. Madras artillery, do. do. do. Capt. Jourdan, 2nd bat. do. killed do. do. Capt. Lieut. Prescott, 1st bat. do. wounded do. do. Lieut. Shawe, H. M. 12th reg. do. do. do. Capt. Macleod, 73rd, do. do. do. Lieut. Lalor, 73rd, killed, do. do. Lieut. Thomas, 73rd, wounded, do. do. Ensign Antil, 73rd, do. do. do. Ensign Guthrie, 73rd, do. do. do. Lieut. Farquhar, 74th, killed, do. do. Lieut. Prendergast, 74th, do. do. do. Lieut. Hill, 74th, do. do. do. Lieut. Shaw, 74th, do. do. do. Lieut. Mather, H. M. 75th reg. killed 4th May. Lieut. Turner, 75th, wounded, do. do. Lieut. Broughton, 75th, do. do. do. Lieut. Skelton, 75th, do. do. do. Lieut.-Col. Dunlop, 77th, do. do. do. Capt. Owen, 77th, killed, do. do. do. Lieut. Lawrence, 77th, wounded, do. do. do. Capt. Lardy, Reg. de Meuron, do. do. do. Lieut. Mathey, do. do. do. do. Lieut. R. Webb, Bombay European reg. do. do. do. Lieut. Cormick, Madras pioneers, killed do. do.

ABSTRACT OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Madras engineers, 1 wounded. Bombay do., 0. Bengal artillery, 2 wounded. Madras do. 2 killed, 3 wounded. Bombay do. 2 killed. Bengal infantry, 1 wounded. Madras do. 14 killed, 26 wounded. Bombay do. 3 killed, 12 wounded. Madras pioneers, 1 killed. Bombay do. 0.—Total killed and wounded 67.

BARRY CLOSE, Adj.-Gen.

APPENDIX Q.

Abstract of Ordnance, &c. in Seringapatam.

	Guns.																Mortars.										Cohorns.					Howitzers.			Grand Total.							
	42 pounders.	36 do.	32 do.	30 do.	26 do.	24 do.	20 do.	18 do.	16 do.	14 do.	12 do.	10 do.	9 do.	8 do.	7 do.	6 do.	5 do.	4 do.	3 do.	2 do.	1 do.	16 inch.	13 do.	11 do.	10 do.	9 do.	8 do.	7 do.	6 do.	5 do.	4 do.	3 do.	2 do.	1 do.		16 inch.	12 do.	11 do.	8 do.			
Brass Ordnance	1	1	1	1	2	5	6	1	22	6	6	9	51	3	24	62	39	82	26	14	15	9	3	3	1	2	6	2	5	19	2	1	16	1	7	3	1	444				
Do. unfinished in the Foundry	7				
Iron Ordnance.....	...	1	2	1	11	19	5	27	10	9	51	8	75	28	10	36	12	87	24	16	22	53	6	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	478				
Grand Total of Ordnance..	1	1	3	1	11	21	5	32	16	10	73	8	81	34	19	87	15	2	88	27	63	98	48	14	68	5	13	2	4	4	1	5	1	8	1	6	2	5	19	2	1	929

Account of Military Buildings, &c.

Large Buildings for boring and polishing Guns	2
Do. Muskets, containing four separate machines	1
Large Arsenals for Guns, Carriages, &c.	2
Do. Musketry, &c.	1
Do. Shot, Grape, Entrenching Tools, &c.	1
Large Magazines for Powder	11
Small Expense Magazines	72
Armouries for making and finishing Small Arms, &c.	12
Foundries, with buildings for Moulds, &c.	2

Principal Stores.

Grand total of Round Iron Shot, of different sizes	424,400
Do. do. of Gunpowder loose in the different Magazines	520,000
Do. do. of Firelocks, Carbines, &c.	99,000
Do. do. of Musket Barrels, whereof 12,000 are serviceable	22,000
Do. do. Guns mounted on the works	287

The above is a rough Abstract, it not having been possible hitherto to prepare a correct Statement.

P. A. ACHARY, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX R.

MEMORANDUM

Respecting the Prize Property captured at Seringapatam.

Although it is not possible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy what the prize property in Seringapatam will amount to, yet from the various information obtained through the Mutseddies and others, employed in different departments under the late Sultaun, I am enabled to form the following estimation :—

1st—specie, 16,74,350 star pagodas; 2nd—jewels, gold and silver bullion, 25,00,000; 3rd—paddy, pepper, salt, and other articles, in the different granaries, 1,10,000; 4th—copper and brass pots, glasses, carpets, &c., 20,000; 5th—elephants, camels, horses, bullocks, would amount to 54,000; 6th—cloths of various sorts, &c. in the Tosha Khana, 2,00,000. Total, 45,58,350 star pagodas. Military stores not included.

No remark is necessary on the 1st article. The estimation on the jewels is very uncertain; there are still twenty and more boxes, the contents of which have not been valued; very little is known upon the subject of jewels, for no one among Tippoo's people has any idea of the contents of his treasury; so that information is very little to be depended upon relative to this 2nd article. With regard to the third, I have every reason to think that the estimation is correct. The 4th article consists of a variety of things, which, most probably, will produce the estimated sum. The 5th is composed of property of which I cannot procure an exact account. The 6th includes all the gold and silver cloths, and every article of that description, as well as sundry other commodities too particular to enumerate; the estimation is within bounds.

As the greater part of the captured property is composed of jewels, &c., articles which either Tippoo or his father Hyder had plundered, the Mutseddies and other persons, of whom I have enquired, declare that they cannot give any exact statement of the late Sultaun's riches.

W. M. GORDON.

Seringapatam, June 9, 1799.

APPENDIX S.

*The Sircar Coudadad to the Exæcutive Directory, representing the French Republic, One and Indivisible, at Paris.**

In the name of that friendship which the Sircar Coudadad, and the subjects of the Sircar, vow to the French republic, which friendship and alliance shall endure as long as the sun and moon shine in the heavens, and which shall be so solid that the most extraordinary events shall neither break nor disunite them.

The English, jealous of the connection and friendship which, for so long a time, has subsisted between my Sircar and France, some years ago united against me with the Marhattas, the Nizam Ally Khan, and my other enemies; and declared a war as odious as unjust, which lasted several years, and of which the result was so fatal, that it cost me three crores and thirty lacks of rupees in money, and my finest provinces.

* Referred to at page 591.

The republic is certainly not ignorant of any of these unfortunate circumstances, nor of the many efforts I made to dispute, inch by inch, the possession of that country, which at last I was obliged to relinquish to our common enemy. I should not have been driven to such cruel sacrifices had I been aided by my ancient allies the French, who were deceived by the perfidious machinations of Conway, the Governor-General of Pondicherry, who was then plotting with Campbell, the Governor of Madras, for the evacuation of the place commanded by the former. No doubt the republic will now repair the fault of their former Government, by driving the English from their rich possessions in India.

These sentiments, with which I have long been animated, I have made known to the Government of the Isle of France, through the organ of two Ambassadors, from whom I have had the great satisfaction of receiving such an answer as I desired, together with the republican flag, by the hands of Chapuis, Chief of a brigade, and Dubuc, a Captain of a ship, who also brought with them the inconsiderable succour of officers and men, with which circumstances permitted General Malartic and Rear-Admiral Sercey to supply me.

I retain with me the first of these officers, and send the second to you as my Ambassador, who, in requesting your alliance, offensive and defensive, will, I trust, obtain such a reinforcement of troops as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack, and annihilate for ever, our common enemies in Asia.

I send you my standard (which, united with that of the republic, will serve as a basis for the alliance into which our respective nations are about, to contract), and with it the particular articles which I have charged Captain Dubuc to communicate to you.

I join with him my subjects Sheik Abdoulraim and Mahomet Bismilla, who are equally authorized to represent me with your Government.

Whatever may be the future state of our two nations, whether blended or separate, into whatever engagements they may respectively enter, may the prosperity, the glory, and the success of both, be still the common object of each; may the sentiments which they feel for each other, be guaranteed by mutual assurances of fidelity, and by oaths of reciprocal obligation; and may the heavens and the earth meet and unite, ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest alteration."

In my Palace at Seringapatam, 20th July, 1798.

A true Translation,

G. G. KEBLE, French Translator.

*A Note of the Proposals to be made by my Ambassadors to the Executive Directory at Paris.**

Article 1.—For ten or fifteen thousand troops, of every description, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Article 2.—A naval force to act on the coast where our armies may be, to favour, and to reinforce them, in case of necessity.

Article 3.—The Sircar will furnish all military stores and provisions for the army of the republic, as well as horses, bullocks, carts, and tents, together with every other necessary; excepting European liquors, which his country does not afford.

* Referred to at page 592.

Article 4.—On all marches and military operations, the King's orders are to be observed.

Article 5.—The expedition shall be directed to some point of the Coromandel coast, and in preference, to Porto Novo, where the disembarkation of the troops shall take place, and where the King, with his whole army, will appear, either before the arrival of the French army or at any time appointed, it being his intention to commence operations in the heart of the enemy's country.

Article 6.—The King desires that the republic will inform him, by despatching to Mangalore two corvettes from Europe, within 20 days of each other, of the number of ships and troops which are to be sent from France, in order that he may take the field immediately, and be master of the Coromandel coast, before the arrival of the republican forces, and thus be enabled to provide for all their wants.

Article 7.—All the conquests which may be made from the enemy, excepting those provinces which the King has been obliged to cede to the English, to the Marhattas, and to the Nizam Ally Khan, shall be equally divided between the two nations, and according to their respective convenience. The same division shall also be made of the enemies ships, and of the Portuguese colonies, in order to indemnify the King for the expences of the war.

Article 8.—Should any difficulty arise between the allied armies, each shall observe justice, according to their own laws and customs; and every discussion relating to them shall be conducted in writing between the two nations.

Article 9.—Whatever may be the desire of the republic, whether to give peace to England, or to continue war, the King trusts the republic will always have the kindness to consider him as a friend and faithful ally, accordingly comprehend him in all its treaties, and apprise him of all its intentions.

Article 10.—All French whatever, who now are or may hereafter come within the territories of the King, shall be treated as friends and allies; they shall have the liberty of passing and repassing, and of trading, without any molestation or hindrance; on the contrary, they shall receive every assistance and succour which they may want.

Article 11.—To procure for my service four founders of brass and four founders of iron cannon, four paper makers, twelve manufacturers of glass, in different branches of the manufacture, two naval engineers, and two good ship-builders.

Given in my Palace of Seringapatam, under my signature, and that of my Prime Minister, with the seal of state affixed, the 20th July, 1798.

A true Translation,

G. G. KEBLE, French Translator.

CRITIQUES

ON THE

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With numerous Maps and authorised Official Documents and hitherto (unpublished) Statistical Charts, from the Colonial Office, East India House, Board of Trade, Custom House, and Board of Control, &c.

'Mr. Martin possesses eminent qualifications for the task he has undertaken—he has not merely a taste but a passion for statistics; a sheet of figures is to him as delightful as a landscape of Claude's to a virtuoso, and he frames tables with as much facility as if Babbage's calculating engine formed a part of his mental machinery. Connected for many years with the colonies, he has acquired a thorough knowledge of colonial and commercial policy—an economist of no mean order, he has arranged and digested that knowledge so as to afford information and guidance for the future. Above all, imbued with the purest principles of philanthropy, his aim, in all his publications, has been to point out the best means for increasing the amount of human happiness.'—*Athenæum*, March, 1834.

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'It is highly honourable to his Majesty as the 'Sovereign of the greatest Colonial Empire in the world,' that he should have accorded to Mr. Martin his gracious permission to inscribe to him the first history of that empire; and we cordially congratulate the author on this distinguishing mark of royal favour. The History of the British Colonies teems with information, the most diversified and valuable information in every page, written with a noble, generous, patriotic, proud, and lofty spirit.'—*Court Journal*.

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'A ponderous work upon a gigantic subject:—it is a page of history that has long been required to be filled up, and we are glad that the work has been undertaken by one, who is in every way so competent to undertake it by his long acquaintance with the subject on which he writes; if the succeeding volumes should be equal to this, it will be one of the most valuable and complete works ever published; as it sets before us in all its departments, physical, statistical, political, and ecclesiastical, the history of those countries, which, being the offspring of our own, are undoubtedly entitled to the highest place. The statements must have cost Mr. Martin immense labour and research.'—*Liverpool Courier*.

'An undertaking of immense grasp and great importance; every thing relating to our Eastern Possessions, collected from a variety of sources, most of them official.'—*Asiatic Journal*.

'It is gratifying to observe that this national work has been duly appreciated by the public. A history of our immense Colonial possessions, of the great interests connected with them, of their bearing and influence upon the mother country, with a clear view of the policy which had been operating upon them, was a desideratum in our language. With an external empire ramifying itself into every part of the globe, there was a complete blank in our literature of works relating to its people, its laws, its customs, its physical aspects, industrial and economical character, its productions, and its governments, previously to Mr. Martin devoting his energies to the task of giving to the public his comprehensive and most valuable work, a noble monument of perseverance and industry, and of a sagacious and powerful mind. The volume has our very hearty commendation. The statistical information it embraces is wide, and has been collected with great pains, and is remarkable for its accuracy; and the remarks upon men and manners are distinguished by a philanthropic spirit highly honourable to Mr. Martin. No library, whether public or private, can be considered complete without this work, both as a book of reference and for agreeable and instructive reading.'—*Constitutional Magazine*.

'The fourth volume of the 'History of the British Colonies,' as regards its plan, fulness and execution, holds on its mighty and splendid career without faltering or abatement, and if possible with a more masterly freedom, knowledge and philanthropy than ever:—this last feature seems to expand as the publication advances in magnitude and age; nor do we exceed the simple but prominent truth in saying that Mr. Martin's enlightened, liberal and religious fervour of humanity sheds abroad such a lovely light as to render his purely statistical details exceedingly interesting and attractive even to the general reader, and to

excite kindred feelings in all. His acquaintance with every distinct Colony, nay, every patch of territory on which a few British subjects have settled seems more minute and complete than any that has ever been formed by individual historians or tourists of single settlements, while the ease with which he disposes of his vast and multiform materials points out a grasp of intellect of extraordinary power. That one man should *not only* visit all or almost all of the British Colonies, but write of each and all, by far the most satisfactory account of their relations, internal condition, capabilities and prospects that has ever appeared, can only be explained by declaring that the writer's mental powers and acquirements are extraordinary, and that nothing short of a passion for the task could have carried him through with it. The work is essentially statistical, calling in the aid of politics, science and the arts, as scope may be granted to a mind of great compass, vivacity and enquiry; his pages of figures, with very slight and few exceptions, are as plain and accurate as the simplest lessons in arithmetic, whilst of his style it can seldom be said that it is other than pure, or where description is called for that it falls short of eloquence of a fine order; nor must we forget to mention the sustained tone of Christian feeling which pervades every sentiment and every argument in Mr. Montgomery Martin's great and invaluable work—a work worthy of the mighty and numerous Colonial dependencies of the Empire of Britain.—*Monthly Review for June, 1835.*

Mr. Montgomery Martin has nobly redeemed his original pledge to the public, and by placing before it in a clear and comprehensive light the state of our Colonial possessions in Europe, completed a work of rare industry, and of great national importance. We cannot help in casting a glance back upon his entire labours, which exhibit the arms of our dear native land stretched abroad in every sea and quarter of the earth, east, west, north, and south,—holding the strongest points, and controlling powers every where—spread over millions of miles of territory, and ruling millions of people of every shade of human colour and every religious faith—her language spoken, her protection sought, her institutions copied, her character venerated;—we cannot, we repeat, look upon this picture, so vividly brought before us in Mr. Martin's work, without thinking of the wonderful progress and greatness of Britain: "*totò ditto orbe Britannos*,"—what a jest is it now! when she is seen in every part, encircling, embracing, and pervading the whole mighty and universal globe!!! As a library book—as a book of information—and as a book of reference—it has no superior, and we cordially recommend it to the encouragement it so eminently merits.—*Literary Gazette.*

Mr. Martin has in this great work happily exemplified what may be accomplished by honesty of purpose, persevering labour, and independent talent. He has, by the present Volume, concluded a work not more called for than it was new; and when we consider the immense variety of information requisite to its completion, and the want of guides by whom his path might have been pointed out, it is astonishing that he should have been able to approach anything like a satisfactory history of the unparalleled and unmeasured possessions of the British nation. Mr. Martin surveys, explains, and descends into every branch of information which a country and a community can offer, and every part is executed with a degree of earnest pains-taking, whether we regard his spirit of fidelity, his unwearied research, or his fearless assertion of the whole truth as it appears to him, that may well become an example to all writers of constitutional and historical works. The same high-toned sustenance of moral purity, the same reverence of sacred truths, characterize the present volume, that attracted our admiration and praise in those that preceded. Nor, now that Mr. Martin has completed his history, is it too much to declare that he has earned a noble and undying reputation as a scholar, a sound reasoner, an ardent advocate of freedom, a spotless moralist, and a consistently zealous Christian.—*Monthly Review for Dec., 1835.*

In an exceedingly modest address to his readers, prefixed to this volume, Mr. Martin alludes to some of the many formidable and most discouraging circumstances he had to contend with in the execution of his stupendous work, and we think this little narrative will not be read without exciting the most kindly feelings towards its author, nor without leaving the most lively impressions regarding his extraordinary assiduity and perseverance. In this address Mr. Martin claims the merit of industry only for his labours, but the public has discovered many higher qualities than this in the work before us. It has discovered intelligence, talent, a sound and comprehensive judgment, discrimination and taste, and last, though not least, literary attainments of no ordinary kind, and it has awarded Mr. Martin a reputation proportioned to these merits.—*Scotsman, Dec. 5, 1835.*

In this volume, Mr. Martin concludes his great undertaking, which is distinguished by the same marvellous spirit of industry—the same unwearied research, and masses of fact for which the former volumes were so remarkable. It is the very first work of its kind;—the materials of which it is composed, were scattered over a large surface and in a multitude of places; its tabular illustrations are derived from such a variety of sources, that it would be all but impossible to make them quite free from errors—and when it is remembered that one head and one hand has gathered these enormous stores of information, and in an incredibly short space of time put them together, we will be disposed to wonder that the work is so complete. If any circumstance in addition to its intrinsic merits were required to increase the claims of the "*History of the British Colonies*," upon public patronage, the fact that Mr. Martin persevered in it to the end, unaided by any assistance from Government or any other associating bodies, and resting solely from his own limited means, ought to be sufficient in itself to procure it a welcome wherever there are readers who sympathize in the extended interests of mankind. It cannot be expected that men of ability should devote their energies to the public service, unless some reward come to them in a gratifying shape, and the reward to which Mr. Martin looks, is of a kind, to confer as much benefit upon the patron as upon the author. The success of the publication has, we believe, been considerable, but it cannot meet greater success than its importance so eminently deserves.—*Atlas.*

